PUBLIC OPINION AND IRISH NEUTRALITY:
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE ‘RATIONAL PUBLIC’ HYPOTHESIS

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Submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD in Political Science
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DECLARATION

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Karen M. Devine
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<td>AfrI</td>
<td>Action from Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESDP</td>
<td>Common European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>IAA</td>
<td>Irish Aviation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISPAS</td>
<td>Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANA</td>
<td>Peace and Neutrality Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
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<td>POFP</td>
<td>Public opinion and Foreign Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Opinion polls have consistently shown that public opinion in Ireland is strongly in favour of neutrality. There is a significant discourse in the media and in academic texts which argues that Irish neutrality is a ‘myth’ and that public opinion in support of Irish neutrality cannot be ‘rational’ – it is ‘emotional’ and ‘confused’. This paradox of strong public attachment to a concept that does not exist (according to media and academic discourse), is the puzzle this thesis attempts to solve.

There is a new debate in public opinion and foreign policy (POFP) literature concerning the ‘rational public’ thesis that argues that public foreign policy preferences are based on a sensible and coherent structure of core beliefs and values. This study evaluates public opinion on Irish neutrality against the ‘rational public’ hypothesis, contributing the first theoretical and empirical study of public opinion and Irish neutrality and providing additional fuel to the ‘rational public’ debate. It adds a unique case-study to the wider body of POFP literature that is dominated by analyses of public opinion in larger states, particularly the United States.

The first half of this thesis takes a close and critical look at political discourse, in particular, a foundational thesis called “Unneutral Ireland”, that argues Irish neutrality is a ‘myth’ and that Ireland is ‘unneutral’. A poststructuralist deconstruction undermines the thesis’s conclusion that Ireland is ‘unneutral’ by demonstrating that neorealist assumptions drive the analysis, destroying the alleged ‘objectivity’ of the evaluation of Ireland’s neutrality. A comparative analysis reveals that other neutral states in World War Two Europe failed the same criteria as Ireland did in the Unneutral thesis, and so these states must also be deemed ‘unneutral’. This part of the thesis concludes that the concept of neutrality used in the Unneutral thesis is too narrow and unrealistic to be a sensible yardstick for evaluating the neutrality of states and that a social constructivist understanding of Irish neutrality is a better theoretical framework to use in the formulation of hypotheses on public attitudes to Irish neutrality. Since Ireland is found to be as neutral as any other neutral state, the claim that the public is irrationally clinging to a myth is also rejected.
A review of neutrality concepts in the literature demonstrates a range of neutrality definitions from ‘realist’/‘passive’ to ‘idealist’/‘active’ that embody different values and characteristics and produce different foreign policy agendas. A comparative analysis of Irish government and public concepts of neutrality using official government sources and public opinion data shows that the government concept of ‘military’ neutrality is a rather limited one, amounting to staying out of military alliances. The most strongly-supported public concepts closely resemble the wider, ‘active’ concept of neutrality that embodies characteristics such as peace-promotion, non-aggression, the primacy of the UN and the confinement of state military activity to UN peacekeeping, not supporting ‘big powers’, not being involved in wars, maintaining a nuclear-free zone, and maintaining Ireland’s independence, identity and independent foreign policy decision-making (in the context of ‘big power’ pressure).

This profound difference in government and public concepts of neutrality, and a metatheoretical analysis of POFP literature in the second half of the thesis showing that the negative academic evaluations of public opinion on Irish neutrality are based on a realist, ‘post-Cold War’ security policy framework of understanding, help to explain the failure of ‘realist’ elites and academics to consider public support for Irish neutrality in the ‘post-Cold War’ era as ‘rational’. This divergence of neutrality concepts and frameworks of understanding also points to the supposition, that as public preferences for Irish neutrality appear to be based on a discernable and recognised set of values, Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality may fulfil the ‘rational public’ criteria.

A review of the historical literature on Irish neutrality and the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature produces a set of hypotheses - ethnocentrism, efficacy, attitudes to Northern Ireland, independence and patriotism - that are said to underpin Irish neutrality. A structural equation model shows that public attitudes are structured along the dimensions of patriotism and independence. The presence of a structure and the understanding of the dimension of identity as part of a ‘social constructivist’ IR theoretical worldview satisfy criteria of the rational public hypothesis. A regression model controlling for socio-demographic and behavioural variables shows that the characteristics of Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality compare favourably to those of publics in other states. This collective evidence supports the conclusion that public attitudes to Irish neutrality are ‘rationally’ structured.
INTRODUCTION

No foreign policy - no matter how ingenious - has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none - Henry A. Kissinger

This thesis seeks to understand public attitudes to Irish neutrality. Specifically, it explores why people in Ireland support or reject neutrality; the values that shape attitudes to Irish neutrality; and what Irish neutrality means to people in Ireland. These issues are central to an investigation into the academic question of whether public attitudes to Irish neutrality are ‘rationally’ structured. In exploring these issues, this thesis also seeks to solve the paradox of a strong public attachment to a concept of Irish neutrality that, according to several media and academic discourses, does not exist.

Every Political Science PhD thesis should be based on a research question that is formulated with the help of the current academic literature on the subject. Surprisingly, there is very little literature on public attitudes to Irish neutrality. This thesis fills that gap in the literature, as the first theoretical and empirical evaluation of public opinion on Irish neutrality. Fortunately, there is sufficient foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature on Irish neutrality, and a wide body of international literature on public opinion on foreign policy (POFP) to use in the formulation of an approach to the question of public opinion and Irish neutrality.

The small volume of literature on public attitudes to Irish neutrality consists of a number of newspaper articles written by academics and elites; (FitzGerald, 1996; Sinnott, 1996), a paper written for a think-tank that analyses data from opinion polls conducted on behalf of newspapers, (Marsh, 1992) a chapter in an edited European book about public opinion and the international use of force (Gilland, 2001) that draws on the same public opinion data as Marsh (1992), and finally, comments in a chapter in an edited US volume on public opinion and foreign policy (Everts, 2000) and in books on Irish foreign policy and neutrality (Keatinge, 1984: 116-119; 1973: 163-185). The research question of this thesis, “are public attitudes to Irish neutrality rationally structured”, is formulated to address the view of public opinion and Irish neutrality in this literature as well as the major hypotheses from the two sets of POFP and FPA literature mentioned above, that collectively form the academic discourse relevant to public opinion and Irish neutrality.

There is a saying that “a little learning can be a dangerous thing” (Pope, 1709). As it turned out, the small number of academic articles and book chapters on public
attitudes to Irish neutrality examined as part of a literature review presented a number of challenges in formulating a research question around public attitudes to Irish neutrality and some relevant hypotheses for testing. The challenge necessitated a dual focus, in which the first half of the thesis examines the range of theoretical assumptions underpinning the literature and the impact of those assumptions on the status of Irish neutrality and public opinion. The second half of the thesis formulates and tests a theoretically pluralist set of hypotheses on public attitudes to Irish neutrality on the basis of the deconstruction and analysis carried out in the first half of the thesis.

The Rational Public Puzzle

Part of the reason for the dearth of attention paid to public attitudes to Irish neutrality in academia is the lack of public opinion data that is necessary to build a model of public attitudes to Irish neutrality. What is known from the small number of public opinion polls on Irish neutrality that have been carried out on behalf of newspapers since the 1980s, is that a majority of people in Ireland have expressed support for Irish neutrality. The 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy states, “the majority of the Irish people have always cherished Ireland’s military neutrality, and recognise the positive values that inspire it, in peace-time as well as in time of war”, (Ireland, 1996) and notes that “many people have come to regard neutrality as a touchstone for our entire approach to international relations” (Ireland, 1996: 51). The White Paper goes on to say that the values that underlie Ireland’s policy of neutrality have informed almost every aspect of foreign policy and are a principal motivation behind the state’s foreign policy activities (Ireland, 1996: 119).

Against this, there is a strand of literature on Irish neutrality that argues that Ireland is not neutral, that Irish neutrality has never existed. This ‘unneutral’ discourse is based on a thesis called Unneutral Ireland that set out to test “whether the Irish interpretation and understanding of these concepts [neutrality/nonalignment] are legitimate” (Salmon, 1989: 2). The thesis concluded that ‘Ireland certainly is, and has been “unneutral”’ (1989: 311) and that “the Irish cannot properly claim to be neutral at all” (1989: 8). The thesis has been cited throughout several decades of academic literature that supports both the analytical approach - the construction of a concept of ‘classic(al)’ neutrality to serve as the yardstick to evaluate Irish neutrality (FitzGerald, 1998: 13; Salmon, 1989: 5) - and the conclusion that Irish neutrality is a myth. This academic debate has spilled over into the public discourse, with many academics and journalists writing newspaper articles and giving national radio interviews on the subject of Irish neutrality during referendums on EU treaties in 2001 and 2002 and
during the start of the Second Gulf War in 2003, advocating the ‘myth of Irish neutrality’. Crucially, the proponents of this anti-neutrality discourse also suggest that Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality is ‘confused’ (FitzGerald, 1996).

Here lies the paradox this thesis must solve: there is ample evidence that Irish people are strongly attached to Irish neutrality and yet many academic and elites have said that Irish neutrality does not exist. In terms of formulating a research question to evaluate the ‘rationality’ of the dynamics of public opinion on Irish neutrality, the combination of the two hypotheses – (a) that Irish neutrality is a myth and (b) that a significant proportion of the voting public supports Irish neutrality – leads to the seemingly obvious hypothesis that Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality is not rational, as it is strongly committed to a concept that does not exist. The first half of this thesis examines the basis of this hypothesis, focusing in particular, on the assumptions and arguments of the ‘unneutral’ discourse.

The second half of the thesis deals with the ‘rational public’ hypothesis evaluation, which means that there should be (1) consistency in the meaning of neutrality (2) presence of a structure of underlying values and beliefs (3) a minimum number of these dimensions to achieve stability of the structure (4) the factors or dimensions should satisfy the coherence element by being from the foreign policy domain (5) they should also be coherent in relation to international relations theory and finally, (6) satisfy the element of comparative coherence which is tested for in regression analyses controlling for socio-demographic and behavioural variables. The failure of public opinion to satisfy these criteria of the rational public concept means that the hypothesis is falsified.

**Part One: theoretical and empirical concepts of neutrality**

Two key questions regarding the above paradox spring to mind. The first is whether the analysis and the ‘classical concept’ of neutrality in the Unneutral thesis are underpinned by a particular theoretical worldview of international relations and foreign policy. It is important to establish and understand the theoretical assumptions underpinning the claims that Irish neutrality does not exist because of the philosophical proposition that ‘questions can be raised about the acceptability of a norm or principle by demonstrating that on analysis the principle is only meaningful against a background of theoretical assumptions that are themselves questionable and open to debate’ (Hyland, 1995: 22). If the allegedly ‘objective’ arguments of the Unneutral thesis are shown to be based on a particular theoretical worldview, then the thesis becomes open to question, as does the basis of the claim that Irish public
support for Irish neutrality is not rational. Chapter One explains why the assumptions underpinning academic discourses on public opinion and Irish neutrality must be identified and it lays the foundation for understanding these sets of theoretical worldviews by describing the content of the assumptions of the International Relations theories of ‘realism’ and ‘social constructivism’.

The second chapter undertakes an analysis of academic concepts of neutrality to establish a range of the concepts in terms of IR theoretical assumptions, content, motivations and values. A central question is whether the public-supported concept of neutrality is the same as the ‘unneutral’ elites’ concept? This issue is tackled in Chapter Two through a detailed review of academic concepts of neutrality and an empirical analysis of the characteristics of the concept of neutrality captured in opinion polls. The two sets of characteristics are compared with each other, as well as with the characteristics of the concept held by the Irish government. The results show that the characteristics of the most strongly supported public concepts of neutrality closely approximate those of ‘active’ neutrality, whereas the government concept of neutrality is a very narrow one, consisting of staying out of military alliances and little else. This provides some early indications that narrow, realist concepts of neutrality expounded by ‘unneutral’ elites and the Irish government are not sufficient to understand public opinion on Irish neutrality.

The concept of neutrality in the Unneutral thesis is ‘deconstructed’ in Chapter Three by pairing it with a different analysis of Irish neutrality that is based on a concept of ‘active neutrality’, and peeling back the surface layers of both sets of arguments and commentary to reveal their theoretical foundations. The deconstruction shows that the Unneutral thesis is dependent on a (neo)realist understanding of international relations and neutrality, destroying any notions that the ‘unneutral’ thesis is ‘objective’. It also demonstrates that a social constructivist understanding of Irish neutrality is more conducive to understanding public attitudes to Irish neutrality because it considers public opinion to be a part of the concept of neutrality and it argues that neutrality is part of the identity of the state and the people, providing a basis for understanding a number of ‘rational’ reasons why neutrality is supported by mass publics. These theoretical conclusions feed into the empirical analysis of public opinion on Irish neutrality in the second half of the thesis.

As mentioned earlier, parts of the ‘unneutral’ discourse claim Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality is ‘confused’. It is worth understanding the links between the ‘non-rational’ discourse on public opinion on Irish neutrality and the ‘unneutral’ discourses
on Irish neutrality in a wider context of Western debate on neutrality. The main characteristic of the discourses on neutrality published shortly after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s is a distinct negativity towards neutrality - a turn that has been identified by academics such as Laurent Goetschel (1999: 116) and Pertti Joenniemi: “it has started to be seen as a contested, irrelevant or empty concept; it is depicted as a constraint rather than an asset” (1993: 291). This is because neutrality stands in the way of deeper European integration in the area of defence and security policy, and it stands in the way of potential EU military activities and impedes contributions to and participation in wars that may be waged by Western states.

Ireland’s neutrality has also been the subject of hostile (Balls, 1998; Harrison, 1994; Waters, 1995) academic and politico-military elite discourses. These discourses distinguish Irish neutrality from the neutrality of other European states (FitzGerald, 1998) and portray aspects of Irish neutrality as odd, unique and *sui generis* (Binter, 1989; Kearsley, 1998; Keatinge, 1984; MacGinty, 1995; Salmon, 1989). It is alleged that “both great power blocs, and all the more, the Continental neutrals, view Ireland as *sui generis*” (Karsh, 1988: 169). Irish neutrality is also characterised as the most questioned European neutrality policy. In a report for the US Congress, Stanley R. Sloan argues, “among the former European neutrals, Ireland probably has the least defensible argument for remaining outside the emerging cooperative defense framework in Europe…other Europeans as well as U.S. officials question the justification for Ireland’s position” (1998).

This apparent failure of Irish neutrality to equate to the neutrality of other European neutral states and its failure to fit the dominant theoretical framework of (neo)realist assumptions of the Cold War is linked in Irish academic and public discourses to the characterisation of public attitudes supporting Irish neutrality as ‘emotional’ (Keatinge, 1972: 439-440; 1973: 174; 1978: 73; Salmon, 1984: 206; Sundelius, 1987: 8) - a characteristic that is equivalent to the label of ‘non-rational’ opinion.

To tackle this issue, Chapter Four takes a closer empirical look at the analysis of Irish neutrality undertaken in the *Unneutral* thesis and undertakes a comparative analysis to establish whether Irish neutrality is really all that different to the neutrality of other European states. It identifies the criteria of neutrality that Ireland is alleged to have failed during World War II (leading to the conclusion that Irish neutrality never existed) and evaluates the neutrality of other states against the same criteria. The results show that Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland would all be deemed ‘unneutral’, because they all, in some way, failed these same criteria during World
War II. Thus, Irish neutrality is just as ‘neutral’ as these paragon neutral states; it is fair to say that Irish neutrality did exist, which helps undermine the hypothesis that public opinion in support of neutrality is not rational.

In conclusion, the first half of this thesis shows that in order to establish whether public attitudes are rational or not, one has to step back from the political science literature and evaluate its contextual and theoretical perspective, before using it as a basis to formulate hypotheses on public opinion on Irish neutrality. It highlights key assumptions and biases underpinning the conclusions of academic discourses on Irish neutrality and public opinion and demonstrates that realist and non-realist assumptions are present in formulations of concepts of Irish neutrality and underpin academic and elite conclusions on Irish neutrality and public opinion. It argues that a social constructivist IR theoretical worldview is a better framework for understanding and explaining public opinion on Irish neutrality. The results of the first half of the thesis give some theoretical indications that factors such as identity, that have until recently been omitted from analyses of public opinion and foreign policy, should be included in the modelling of public opinion on Irish neutrality. It also shows that the alternative hypothesis that Irish public opinion is rational should be considered.

Part Two: theoretical and empirical models of public opinion

The second half of this thesis addresses the hypothesis that Irish public attitudes to Irish neutrality are rationally structured. The notion of a ‘structure’ to public attitudes on foreign policy and the characterisation of public opinion on foreign policy as ‘rational’ stem from two new debates in the academic literature on public opinion and foreign policy (POFP). Gabriel Almond’s *The American People and Foreign Policy* ([1950] 1960) argues that foreign policy attitudes among most Americans lack intellectual structure and that “such superficial psychic states are bound to be unstable” (Almond, 1960: 53, 69). Later, Converse argued this lack of ideological structure and consistency meant public opinion amounted to “non attitudes” (Knopf, 1998: 546). As Knopf points out, the research strategy of the revisionists such as Page and Shapiro aims to refute these various propositions in earlier studies of public opinion: “none of the revisionists seek to prove that public opinion fits the definition of rationality employed in decision theory or other rational actor approaches…Instead of seeking a positive, the revisionists are more concerned about disproving a negative” (Knopf, 1998: 548), i.e. disproving the propositions that public opinions lack structure and change capriciously. This is the approach taken in this thesis in evaluating the rationality of public opinion on neutrality and public concepts of neutrality.
Chapter Five discusses the approach and methods of the new ‘revisionist/rationalist’ debate in POFP that are applied in this study of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

One strand of the academic debate posits that attitudes about foreign affairs are in fact structured in moderately coherent ways, even though the general public may be rather poorly informed about the factual aspects of international affairs (Holsti, 1996: 47). The contemporary approach in the public opinion literature argues cognitive orientations and values play a significant role in explaining public attitudes to foreign policy (Isernia, 2001: 263) and that individuals structure their views about specific foreign policies according to more general and abstract beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1114). For example, using empirical data and sophisticated analysis techniques, Wittkopf demonstrates that public foreign policy attitudes in the USA “exhibit both structure and ideological sophistication” (Wittkopf, 1990: 14). Thus, in order to better understand public opinion on foreign policy, the literature has shifted its focus onto the ‘higher’, more abstract level in the attitude structure of core political belief systems rather than the ‘lower’ level of attitudes to particular foreign policy events (Sniderman, 1993: 228).

In another strand of the POFP literature, Page and Shapiro coined the term ‘the rational public’ and argued that mass public opinion on foreign policy is “real, meaningful, and coherent, reflecting underlying values and beliefs” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 36). According to their definition of collective public rationality, the public chooses a policy in accordance with its values and therefore, public foreign policy preferences form coherent patterns that reflect underlying goals, values and beliefs (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 281). This criterion of rationality can be tested using Hurwitz and Peffley’s model of the structure of public opinion on foreign policy that is defined by three levels of abstraction or generality.

Taking these two strands of POFP literature together and linking the Page and Shapiro definition of rationality to the Hurwitz and Peffley model focuses attention on their hypothesised link between values (highest level of abstraction) and postures (medium level of abstraction) (Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron, 2004: 291) and in terms of whether there are relevant political values of the Irish public that are determinates of attitudes to neutrality. Thus, in order to evaluate the ‘rationality’ of public attitudes to Irish neutrality, it is essential to establish whether there are any values and core political beliefs that ‘structure’ public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

However, this task presupposes a position on a crucial, often overlooked issue, the question of what is ‘rational’? – in particular, what factors can be considered as
‘rational’ underlying dimensions of public foreign policy attitudes? There are many aspects of a rational public (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 52). Knopf observes that “the revisionists have put forward several different definitions of what they mean by rationality, but the most common claims are that public judgments are “sensible” or “reasonable” (Knopf, 1998: 544). How can we decide the most appropriate, “reasonable” and “sensible” academic yardstick or theoretical worldview to judge the ‘rationality’ of these factors? This is a problematic issue because it is not normally made explicit that “the researcher must establish the “logical” framework against which the populace’s opinions will be judged” (Jackson, 1983: 742). Furthermore, it is not generally acknowledged that most researchers work under a particular set of assumptions about the world they are investigating that constitutes a particular theoretical framework for understanding public opinion on foreign policy. Researchers also have a bias towards a particular methodological and philosophical approach to investigating public opinion on foreign policy.

This ‘coherence’ issue, or what is considered ‘sensible’, can be dealt with through the specification of the IR theoretical tradition to which the variables that form the structural dimensions belong. Many scholars have taken this approach of connecting “domain beliefs to international relations theory – realism and idealism” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1990; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Wittkopf 1990, 1994; Maggiotto 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Russett, Hartley, and Murray 1994; Holsti 1996; Murray, Cowden and Russett 1999; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Page and Barabas 2000)” (Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron, 2004: 291).

Having deduced the dimensions of Swedish public foreign policy attitudes, Bjereld and Ekengren (1999: 515) relate their dimensions to venerable IR theories of realism and liberalism. Notably, the dominant realist paradigm resists the notion of identity as a determinant of a foreign policy stance, but in the social constructivist paradigm, this is a ‘sensible’, ‘coherent’ variable of the foreign policy domain.

An element of Page and Shapiro’s concept of the ‘rational’ public is also concerned with how attitudes relate to the historical context and international events (Page and Shapiro, 1992: xii-xiii). Chapter Six shows that most interpretations of historical context and international events are underpinned by a set of ‘realist’ assumptions from International Relations theory about international relations and the Cold War. Jørgensen argues that the realism of many academics means that, “much tends to remain unexamined because implicit assumptions and deeply held beliefs among analysts tend to replace analysis. What is considered to be of minor or major importance tends to be identified ex post, rather than a priori and by means of theory-
derived hypotheses” (Jørgensen, 1999: 113). Realism is so dominant in IR and FPA that it is taken to be the objective view of the world.

Crucially, realism cannot theoretically handle public opinion in analyses of states’ foreign policy behaviour (Bloom, 1990: 3), and so, in contrast to the social constructivist perspective on Irish neutrality advanced by McSweeney (1985: 180; 1985: 12; 1988: 209), realism determines that the role of ordinary people in the form of public opinion ‘inside the state’ has little or no theoretical role in determining the foreign policy of a state (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 599). Realism considers public opinion on foreign policy as a barrier to ‘rational’ foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1973: 7) and that permitting the public a voice in policy would allow the ‘emotional’ to govern the ‘rational’ (Morgenthau, 1978: 558). These theoretical and normative characteristics of realism, in addition to its failure to consider values and identity as variables of foreign policy (Donnelly, 2000: 195; McSweeney, 1999: 124; Tooze, 1996: xvi-xx), mean that realism is an inadequate theoretical framework for understanding public opinion on foreign policy, including Irish neutrality. Non-realist theoretical frameworks of explanations are likely to provide more adequate models (Vasquez, 1998: 322-324). Finally, realism is negatively disposed towards neutrality as a foreign policy concept because neutrality challenges (Joenniemi, 1989: 52) and contradicts (Karsh, 1988: 4) realist assumptions about states’ foreign policy behaviour, so it will be virtually impossible to encounter a fair or favourable (neo)realist analysis of public opinion and Irish neutrality.

Everts speculates that the wish to be as “objective” as possible is part of the reason why public opinion on foreign policy is characterised as “unstructured” and “nonorganized” (Everts, 2000: 179). Using specific examples, Chapter Six shows that the “objectivity” Everts is referring to is the (neo)realist worldview that is pervasive in the IR and FPA academic literature (Burchill, 2001: 86; Smith, 2001: 226; Vasquez, 1998: 120). Chapter Six shows that these (neo)realist assumptions underpin Everts’ characterisations of public opinion on Irish neutrality in the post-Cold War era as ‘non-rational’ and constituting “an obstacle to desirable adaptations to changed international circumstances” (Everts, 2000: 179), and underpin his apparent difficulty in understanding and accepting the Irish public’s attachment to “a perhaps outdated policy of neutrality” (Everts, 2000: 179) - a difficulty that is evidently shared by several Irish academics and elites.

In addition, Chapter Six demonstrates that the comments made by academics on public opinion and Irish neutrality, such as Sinnott’s claim that the notion of neutrality
as it exists in public opinion is ‘aspirational’ and ‘symbolic’ (Sinnott, 1996), Gilland’s claim that public concepts of neutrality are ‘limited’ (2001: 150) and ‘inconsistent’ (2001: 154) and Marsh’s portrayal of public support of the concept of neutrality as shallow (“the rhetoric of neutrality wins much more support that the substance” (Marsh, 1992: 12)) are ontologically biased towards behaviouralism and are theoretically biased towards a realist security policy interpretation and framework of understanding. These biases are significantly less appropriate approaches and frameworks for understanding public opinion on Irish neutrality compared with the cognitive approach and social constructivist framework of understanding that are posited in the conclusions of the first half of this thesis.

**Stability of the concept of neutrality**

Isernia et al. argue that “stability of public opinion is dependent foremost on the state of the international environment. If major international upheavals affect one country, then this regularly has an impact on public opinion. Therefore it is necessary to take into account the specifics of foreign policy in the different countries” (Isernia, Juhász, and Rattinger, 2002: 205). “One could argue for a greater stability of public opinion in countries where a relative exclusion from the vagaries and tensions of the international environment results in a less active foreign policy” (Isernia, Juhász, and Rattinger, 2002: 204). Ireland does not engage in wars, nuclear posturing, and other variables identified by Isernia et al.. If this is the case, then capricious change in the meaning of the concept held by the public, such as that identified by Gilland in the analysis of the content of the concept in 2001, would, according to the literature, falsify the rational public hypothesis because Ireland was not affected by an international upheaval (Isernia, Juhász, and Rattinger, 2002: 205) and the vagaries of the international climate and new events (Isernia, Juhász, and Rattinger, 2002: 216) to account for a reasonable change in concept. Also, given the assumed stability of values, consistency of these values in the concept of neutrality is an indicator of a rational public. A theoretically pluralist analysis of this data in Chapter Six shows that the capricious change identified by Gilland is questionable. Chapter Six contends that the opposite is true, that the content of the concept of neutrality and associated values are consistent and stable over time, satisfying an element of the rational public criteria.

Turning to the models in Chapters Seven and Eight that further test the rational public hypothesis, the first question concerns what, if any, are the organising concepts that lend some coherence to mass public attitudes to Irish neutrality? The ‘positive values’ driving Irish neutrality mentioned earlier in the White Paper on Foreign Policy are central to the puzzle of the dynamics of public attitudes to Irish neutrality. There is an argument in the POFP literature that the structure of foreign policy attitudes may be
diffuse in all countries (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 503), on the basis of evidence in a comparative public opinion study on foreign policy attitudes analysing Swedish and US public attitude structures. In that study, Ulf Bjereld and Ann-Marie Ekengren found “sometimes the items used in the Swedish case have no equivalence whatsoever in the American context or the questions are not even posed in both Sweden and the US” (1999: 507). Each state has very different political, historical, cultural and material characteristics that determine a heterogeneous collection of drivers of POPP. These differences in characteristics are particularly noticeable between big and small “powers”. Acknowledging these idiosyncrasies of case studies, the Irish history literature on Irish neutrality is analysed to establish the key themes that should inform hypotheses on the drivers of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

**Foreign Policy Domain variables and dimensions**

Hurwitz and Peffley, as part of the revisionist debate, argue that it is necessary to limit the analysis of attitude structures to specific policy domains (Juhász, 2001: 62; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1100; Sulfaro, 1996: 303), in other words, the underlying dimensions that tie foreign policy attitudes together into structures are specific to the foreign policy domain (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1101, 1114), (Sulfaro, 1996: 306). The literature on Irish neutrality argues that independence, efficacy, attitudes to Northern Ireland, and anti-British sentiment (ethnocentrism) are drivers of Irish neutrality. These dimensions are relevant to the foreign policy domain. Using structural equation modelling and the Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey data, Chapter Seven identifies which, if any, of these factors structure public attitudes to Irish neutrality. The values of independence and patriotism emerge as two significant dimensions, providing evidence in favour of the ‘rational public’ thesis, by satisfying (1) the criteria that these factors are from the foreign policy domain, (2) the criteria that public opinion is ‘reflecting underlying values and beliefs’ (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 36), and (3) the ‘coherent’ and ‘meaningful’ criteria, as they are part of a IR theoretical social constructivist framework of understanding of Irish neutrality and public opinion.

**Number of dimensions**

Many studies have considered the number of dimensions as an attribute of coherence (Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, 2001: 54). In addition to the content of foreign policy dimensions, the number of dimensions also matters: Chittick and Freyberg-Inan recently concluded a multidimensional structure provides public opinion with a greater degree of underlying stability than a one-dimensional structure. They consider a three-dimensional structure even better and more stable – foreign policy-dedicated
data is needed to establish if there is a third dimension of public attitudes to Irish neutrality. The two-dimensional structure of independence and patriotism satisfy the stability aspect of the rational public hypothesis.

**Comparative coherence**

To examine the comparability puzzle from another perspective, one can ask, what kind of structure would be coherent with the differences that exist between a small state like Ireland and a superpower like the United States of America and even other smaller states like Sweden? The increased use of structural factors rather than the usual demographic variables such as age, gender and income to explain public attitudes to foreign policy in the literature lays emphasis on the importance of producing a theory-guided and empirically defensible judgement of the structure of public opinion on Irish neutrality (Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, 2001: 52).

There are numerous studies calling for comparative studies of the coherence and shape of beliefs (Eichenberg 1989; Risse-Kappen 1991; Holsti 1992; Isernia, Juhász, and Rattinger 2002) (Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron, 2004: 287). They used multiple regression analysis of core beliefs, controlling for respondent age, gender, education and annual household income (Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron, 2004: 298). Building on the results of the cognitive orientations, core beliefs and values structural equation models in Chapter Seven, Chapter Eight presents a regression model incorporating the standard socio-demographic and behavioural variables from the international POFP literature to see if these types of international norms and hypotheses hold true for Irish opinion on foreign policy.

For example, the POFP literature refers to potential explanations of cleavages in foreign policy attitudes, such as the ‘generation gap’ and ‘gender gap’ hypotheses (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 511; Holsti, 1992: 458; Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 117; Wittkopf, 1990: 42) that have been extensively examined in analyses of foreign policy attitude data. Several studies have also examined a ‘political party affiliation’ (Marsh, 1992: 16) or ‘partisan’ hypothesis, (Wittkopf, 1990: 48) a ‘rural-urban’ hypothesis (Almond, 1960: 132), and hypotheses concerning ‘knowledge’ (Sinnott, 2000) and ‘education’ (Holsti, 1992: 456; 1996: 178). The model in Chapter Eight also includes variables specific to the question of public opinion on Irish neutrality, including voting behaviour in the Nice Treaty referendum and the cognitive orientation of anti-English sentiment. This socio-demographic, values/beliefs, and behavioural regression model provides further evidence that the dynamics of public attitudes to Irish neutrality are coherent and rational as they correspond closely to the
theoretical expectations and norms of the POFP literature positing the “rational public” thesis.

The conclusion argues for a more serious role for a postpostivist approach in the analysis of public opinion on foreign policy and highlights the contribution of that approach in under-researched POFP areas such as public attitudes to neutrality. The review of findings argues that the framework of understanding, including the metatheory, methodology and theoretical assumptions of IR underpinning that framework, applied in analyses of Irish neutrality and public opinion is too narrow, realist, behaviouralist and elite security policy-oriented to understand public opinion on Irish neutrality. A social constructivist framework of understanding supports the classification of the structure of public attitudes to neutrality based on two dimensions of patriotism and independence as ‘rational’. The evaluation of public opinion against the POFP socio-demographic and behavioural norms shows that public opinion in Ireland is not singular or abnormal and therefore is no less ‘rational’ in those terms. Taken together, these theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that public attitudes to Irish neutrality are, indeed, rationally structured.
CHAPTER ONE: METHODOLOGY AND IR THEORY FRAMEWORK

Excursions into metatheory are notoriously controversial in the social sciences - (Lapid, 1989: 235).

What is at stake in debates about epistemology is very significant for political practice. Theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention - (Smith, 1996: 13).

Introduction

The main argument of the first half of the thesis is that the different, competing concepts of neutrality existing in the academic literature and public discourses in Ireland are related to different competing concepts of security that are in turn dependent on disparate - or as some characterise them - binary opposite, worldviews or approaches in International Relations theory: neorealism and critical social constructivism. These worldviews are demonstrated to have significant consequences for the characterisations of public opinion on Irish neutrality. The dominant worldview in the academic and media discourses on Irish neutrality is realism and an alternative to the realist perspective is necessary when studying public opinion on neutrality for two reasons. Firstly, the concept of neutrality available in the realist paradigm is narrow and militaristic and one that might not represent the public understanding of neutrality. Secondly, the broader concept of neutrality acknowledges that public opinion (and not just the official stance of ‘the state’) might be constitutive of neutrality. These hypotheses contribute to a more nuanced and faithful analysis of public opinion on Irish neutrality.

The process of demonstrating this assumption-dependent status of Irish neutrality literature is part of the work of ‘perspectivism’ – an element of the Third Debate in International Relations. Third Debate critical theory is a meta-theoretical project; its importance lies in the critique of prevailing assumptions about legitimate knowledge, the nature of the social world and the purpose of theory, not in the substantive analysis of international politics (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1787). This is a relatively new development in the discipline of IR and sub-discipline of FPA, and is virtually unheard of in POFP analysis. McSweeney surmises, the era of the ‘third debate’ in IR ‘has scarcely begun’, signalled by the arrival of a variety of anti-positivist theoretical positions which carry their own internal critique of the controlling ideas of the political science period that preceded and followed it: a conceptual, normative and

1 At the 2005 ECPR Workshop Foreign Policy Analysis Panel, one of the participants mentioned that he had come from a foreign policy conference of 2,000 participants in the USA and not one of the papers or presenters mentioned ‘metatheory’.
philosophical attack on positivism, or objectivism, is mounted encompassing the obvious targets of neorealism and behaviouralism (McSweeney, 1999: 24).

Neorealism and behaviouralism are two sets of assumptions this thesis has identified in the FPA and POPF literatures that pose problems for the formulation of hypotheses on public attitudes to Irish neutrality. Intimately linked to the role of assumptions of International Relations theories in those literatures are the questions of ontology and epistemology, i.e. the normative and philosophical concerns with what is knowledge and the basis of claims made to knowledge. The first task of this chapter is to explain what a poststructuralist approach is and how its premises underpin the process of deconstruction. The second task is to explain where each of the IR theoretical approaches lies on the ontological and epistemological spectrums. The final task is to explain the two main elements of the IR theory framework of understanding, Neorealism and Social constructivism, in preparation for the demonstration of their role in understanding public opinion and Irish neutrality in the deconstruction in Chapter Three.

**The status of poststructuralism in the discipline**

Most of the research produced under the discipline banner of Political Science is positivist - that is, ‘empirical research based on the actual, “objective” observation of phenomena’ (Johnson, Joslyn, and Reynolds, 2001: 1). Academics using the process and methods of scientific research - the well-defined principles for collecting, analysing and evaluating information - are referred to as ‘positivists’. Most positivist academics researching political phenomena using these ‘scientific’ methods define the discipline of Political Science as “simply the application of these principles to the study of phenomena that are political in nature” (Johnson, Joslyn, and Reynolds, 2001: 1). Such a definition of Political Science research therefore excludes research that is post-positivist, postmodern or poststructuralist. Treating “International Relations” as a sub-discipline of Political Science (this is perceived by many as a controversial categorisation), most of the research produced in this sub-discipline is positivist.

The ‘new-comer’ status of poststructuralism and discourse theory in foreign policy analysis, Political Science and IR (Cochran, 1999: 121-122) means that there is a certain level of the unknown about the approaches and this means they can be regarded with initial hostility. However, the main reason why a poststructuralist approach attracts hostility is because it stands in opposition to the continuing domination of a philosophical realism in IR, from its logical positivist to rational
choice forms, that has a natural preference for conceptual rigor and clarity (Der Derian, 1997: 59).

The relevance of a poststructuralist approach to this research question

Despite noting the disposition of mainstream IR to dismiss poststructuralism by polemic, or ignore it through arrogance, Der Derian suggests that even the “epistemologically challenged” might recognise the recent and rapid changes in ‘international, intertextual, interhuman relations’ in the world producing new discourses and ‘realities’ that demand poststructuralist readings (Der Derian, 1997: 55-56). There are indications that poststructuralism will become more acceptable in the future as the need to address ontological and epistemological issues in academic research becomes more widely understood, with a parallel move away from positivism towards recognising the need to focus on meta-theory in discourses. As Cochran argues,

all theory in International Relations (IR) is normative theory. By this I mean that even those engaged in positivist approaches, who aim to study world politics in a manner that resembles as closely as possible the methods of natural science, cannot avoid normative assumptions in the selection of what data is important, in interpreting that data, and in articulating why such research is significant. There was a time when such a statement would have been highly controversial. For some approaches within IR it is still highly controversial. However, powerful criticisms of the positivist bias towards explanation, objectivity and the fact/value separation have been unleashed in IR that take the radical edge off of this opening statement (Cochran, 1999: 1).

Cochran claims that “practices such as genealogy, deconstruction and reading the world textually are strange to mainstream IR theory, yet such practice is the (anti)method that informs the poststructuralist critique of traditional thought in IR” (Cochran, 1999: 122). Poststructuralism operates with a notion of deconstruction (Devetak, 2000: 1742). “Deconstruction is a political practice, an attempt to dismantle the logic by which a particular system of thought and, behind that, a whole system of political structures and social institutions maintains its force” (Sarup, 1988: 60). Deconstruction aims not at making meaning transparent but at making visible the presuppositions of the statements (Zehfuss, 2002: 204).

The aims and premises identified with poststructuralism and deconstruction resonate with the focus of this thesis on (1) the political struggle over the concept of Irish
neutrality and how one discourse has achieved hegemony and appears to be logical and natural (2) the argument that subjugated discourses can and should be examined, to de-stabilise the hegemony, in order to understand public attitudes to Irish neutrality better and (3) the hypothesis that specific assumptions of IR theory drive the elite claims made about the ‘reality’ of Irish neutrality and are the foundations that support the ‘truth’ of these discourses.

**Combining poststructuralist deconstruction with statistical methods**

Many might regard philosophical and methodological issues as peripheral elements of a research question, but they are vital to understanding the approach taken in this thesis, and the decision to combine deconstruction with statistical methods. Within international relations, there are modernists, positivists, empiricists and rationalists; there are also postmodernists, postpositivists, poststructuralists and critical theorists. In general, academics fall into one or the other camp, but never both. They are seen as mutually exclusive. They do not ‘talk’ to one another; they use different language and operate under different ontologies and epistemologies, making a synthesis between the two types of work difficult. Juppille puts it another way – he points out that, “different disciplines (for example, sociology, economics, political science) and subdisciplines (for example, Comparative Politics and International Relations within political science) often entail different architectures of inquiry. They provide different sets of received wisdoms (and empirical puzzles), leading questions and suggested answers. In that sense, while they are not usually recognised as such, disciplines and subfields, arguably, are metatheoretical” (emphasis added) (Jupille, 2005: 211).

This thesis is an empirical investigation into the structure of public attitudes, but one that evaluates whether the model may have been constructed in the image of the realist, rationalist dominated literature; whilst a model of public opinion is formulated, the hypotheses are metatheoretically-informed. Using statistical methods to evaluate data on concepts does not render the concepts epistemologically incontestable (Jupille, 2005: 216); the problem is that many academic pieces are written as though the concepts are epistemologically incontestable. So although statistical techniques are employed in this thesis and formal models of public opinion are provided, this does not mean the approach is one of a hardened positivist. In fact the overarching philosophy is a postmodern one; “from this standpoint of theory as practice, exploring the dominant discourse of international relations theory is not considered a prelude to substantive analysis but the very essence of such analysis” (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1788).
Metatheory and Methodology

After a unique metatheoretical and methodological survey of the literature on the subject area of European Union studies, Jupille attempted to map the combinations of metatheory and methodology used by academics publishing in this area (that is relevant to public opinion on foreign policy and public attitudes to Irish neutrality). In terms of ontological social metatheory in combination with statistical methods, there are ‘few’ (Jupille, 2005: 215). This vacuum is understandable given the growth pattern and development of research in the discipline and the system of educating students and among them, future tenured political scientists, emanating from those research growth dynamics.

Figure 1.1: Metatheoretical and Methodological Combinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epistemological</th>
<th>Methodological Dimension</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Statistical</th>
<th>Formal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positivist</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Positivist</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontological</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Theoretic</td>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdisciplinary</td>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarly Stylist</td>
<td>Generalizing</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularizing</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the academic discipline of Political Science/Politics/International Relations, poststructuralist thinking/deconstruction and statistical analysis methods are generally not used in conjunction with each other to answer a political science research question. Jupille argues that this exception is unsurprising; “it is hard to conceive of work done within a post-positivist epistemology using statistical methods, since the latter rest squarely on the contested notion that observation and testing produce knowledge” (Jupille, 2005: 215-216). Nonetheless, “some counterintuitive combinations have been employed”; specifically, Jupille cites the combination of social ontology (or constructivist social theory) with statistical methods (Jupille, 2005: 216) - a combination that appears to most closely approximate the approaches used in this thesis. So, although this thesis uses statistical models normally associated with positivism, it does not use the logic of positivist investigation; rather it sees the use of poststructuralist deconstruction as a way to inform a metatheoretically pluralist model of public opinion on Irish neutrality. This is a new and different approach thus far in POFP analysis.
The most significant reason why these lacunae have occurred in the discipline is due to the work involved in producing that type of research, rather than any incompatibilities. Jupille has identified that “resource constraints, such as our willingness to invest time in learning new methods, come into play” (Jupille, 2005: 215). There are no logical incompatibilities between methods and many metatheories. As Jupille argues, “it seems quite plausible to suggest that many metatheoretical combinations are logically permissible, with some quite misunderstood and a good number grossly underexploited” (Jupille, 2005: 213). Public opinion on foreign policy is one subject area that would benefit enormously from the acknowledgement of this research vacuum and a dedicated research programme to alleviate it. The next section describes and explains the key concepts of ontology and epistemology, their role IR theory and effects on shaping research into public opinion and Irish neutrality.

**The ontology and epistemology of IR theories**

IR paradigms and methods can be located and understood on a spectrum that operates from positivism, which is the metatheoretical approach of most political scientists, to postpositivism which is the metatheoretical approach of most poststructuralist IR theorists. Table 1.1 below illustrates the spectrum with respect to premises and approaches relevant to the study of public opinion and foreign policy that will be dealt with in detail in this Chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.1 <em>The spectrum of ontological and epistemological positions</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ONTOMETRY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essentialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PREMISES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reality of the social world is the same as the natural world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study empirical behavioural regularities, to produce explanatory laws/generalisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPROACH TO CONCEPTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rigorous concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operationalised through statistical methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PREMISES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External, empirical frame of reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material interpretation of international politics; legitimate understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public attitudes to FP classified as non rational/emotional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Positivist ontology**

Positivism assumes that the research methodology developed for the study of the natural world is equally suited to the study of the social world, because there is no difference between the social world and the natural world so fundamental that the approach used in the natural world is not appropriate to study the social world (Neufeld, 1995: 34). The positivism to postpositivism spectrum serves to delineate realists from critical social constructivist theorists in IR. Booth identifies the unreflecting positivism implicit in much of the method of traditional (realist) international relations (Booth, 1997: 106); with “traditional security studies… characterized by positivist methods” (Booth, 1997: 111). On the other hand, poststructuralist approaches in IR believe that the positivist notion of objectivity that depends on an assumption that there is a world out there - existing independently of theory - to be discovered and accessed is not plausible (Smith, 2001: 227). As will be discussed in detail later, the more critical strand of social constructivism sympathises with the poststructuralist position and as such, embodies a qualified departure from positivism.

For post-theorists, “scientific knowledge is seen as productive. As with all other discourses, scientific discourse produces knowledge production, social relations and identities. This understanding of knowledge production stands in contrast to the objectivist view of science to be found in positivism, whereby knowledge is seen as a reflection of reality” (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 116). For the positivist, it is the ability of factoring out the identities of the individual researcher that makes objective knowledge possible.

Although POFP researchers use positivist methods, some admit that “there are ways in which the patterns [in the data] uncovered can be shaped by the premises and preconceptions of the researcher” (Holsti and Rosenau, 1986: 478). This phenomenon is discussed in relation to biases in the analysis of Irish public opinion and Irish neutrality in Chapter Six.

**Objectivity**

Realists’ “most robust claim and the one which best characterises the period under review (late 80s security studies) is that of scientific objectivity” (McSweeney, 1999: 37), whereas “social constructivism promises a decisive break with the idea underlying Waltz – and shared more or less by all the approaches hitherto reviewed – that the social and the natural worlds belong to the same continuum of reality”
Poststructuralists argue that “it is objectivity that masks contingency and, in doing so, hides the alternative possibilities that otherwise could have presented themselves. Objectivity can therefore be said to be ideological” (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 37).

The notion of objectivity is under fire, and with that, researchers are becoming aware that their writing will be held to proceed from a standpoint/position: “parties in the field [of IR] know that their every instance of interpretation and conduct will be held to proceed from a standpoint, a position, a subjective perspective and that enables them to justify what they say and do, impose interpretative limitations, and then, so limited, decide the meanings of events” (Ashley, 1996: 241). (The thesis will discuss the interpretative notion later: in terms of the limitations of understandings and possibilities of Irish neutrality that are produced and re-produced on the basis of assumptions of IR theory and approaches in the literature). With the increasing profile of poststructuralist theoretical approaches in the discipline, every researcher will be asked, as Ashley asks, “What tradition, perspective or community do your labours faithfully represent?” (Ashley, 1996: 241) - this thesis sympathizes with the critical social constructivist approach in IR.

**Subjective and paradigm-dependent**

The catalyst of the fourth juncture of the development of the International Relations discipline was Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), which undermined the very idea of ‘science’ on which the behaviouralist argument was based. “The implication of Kuhn’s argument was that there was no possibility of knowledge which stands apart from or independent from the values, beliefs and preferences of the observer… Knowledge was subjective and ‘paradigm dependent’ rather than ‘objective’” (Rengger and Hoffman, 1990: 130). Subjective meaning in IR theory is broadly defined as that which is constitutive of practice: “the relationship between the ‘subjective meanings’ which make up the web of meaning and human practices is not one of correlation, where subjective meanings serve as an ‘intervening variable’ in a causal sequence. Rather subjective meanings are constitutive of those practices” (Neufeld, 1988: 45).

However, the prevalence of neorealism in IR and the teaching curriculum in universities means that discourses and statements about foreign policy and concepts such as neutrality are largely constrained by the structure of the paradigm of neorealism that, until recently, has remained largely unquestioned. This renders neorealist thinking on neutrality “inescapable” given the dominance of the paradigm
in the discipline and the foreign policy literature; as Keith L. Shimko argues, “people have no choice but to rely on what they already know to understand what they do not know and on past experiences to understand and solve new problems” (Shimko, 1995: 82), and that includes mainstream academics and researchers.

Given that “how we understand realism – or any tradition of analysis – may influence how we think and act today” (Donnelly, 2000: 199), neorealism, then, is the web of meaning, the web of language, symbol and institutions, that constitutes the rules that restrain thought and action in relation to neutrality. It is important to bear in mind that “International theory underpins and informs international practice…once established as common sense, theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known but also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest” (emphasis added) (Smith, 1996: 13). Specifically, neorealism precludes the validity of the non-realist explanations of neutrality and public support for neutrality (e.g. that neutrality represents the values and identity of people within the neutral states) and therefore excludes the very basis of the notion that neutrality can legitimately continue to be a state’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. This is the theoretical obstacle that must be overcome by a student of public opinion and neutrality, simply in order to claim legitimate grounds for choosing to study the subject, and it can only be overcome by resort to poststructuralist thinking and the employment of a more critical IR theory approach to the subject, such as critical social constructivism.

**Parsimony and conceptual rigour**

Parsimony is an essentialist objective of positivist science in relation to the formulation of concepts; it reflects the goal of conceptual rigour in terms of measurement. Sinnott argues that “political science begins by defining certain concepts, for example, authority, democracy, legitimacy, participation, public opinion and so on. In order to observe these, however, it must go a step beyond conceptual definition to operational definition, that is, to defining the concepts in terms of how they are to be measured” (Sinnott, 1997: 5). The neatest, unitary concept is prepared for use. But operationalising a concept and taking that as its meaning makes the concept inherently essentialised and uncontested (McSweeney, 1999: 84) and although operationalising a concept does not mean it is not contested, the problem is that most research is written with that assumption.

Normative and scientific problems are presented when a concept is not considered as contested – and there are even more problems when a concept is not considered at all in public opinion analysis. For example, the results of a survey on people’s
satisfaction with the way democracy works in the UK did not consider the concept of democracy in the understanding of these finding (Clarke et al., 2004: 290-307). One quarter of people agreed that ‘there is nothing more to democracy than giving people the right to vote’ and one third concurred with the idea that ‘in a true democracy, income and wealth are redistributed to ordinary working people’ (Clarke et al., 2004: 292). Therefore an evaluation of the chances of individuals of being satisfied or dissatisfied with democracy should take account of the supposition that (Clarke et al., 2004: 307) the former definition is easy to achieve and the latter is more difficult to achieve. This should have some influence over whether the individual is satisfied as to the working of UK democracy. Instead the variability of the concept of democracy was not explicitly taken into account in the evaluation of satisfaction with democracy and in effect, the analysis contained an assumption that the public have a homogenous interpretation of the concepts of democracy, rendering the findings limited or incomplete.

Parsimony stands in opposition to “an ontology that locates freedom in the privileging of multiple practices” (Cochran, 1999: 134). The latter ontology is part of the poststructuralist approach, in which meaning is never closed and the goal is to emancipate meanings that are marginalized. These premises highlight the difference in the types of research goals of each camp: poststructuralists are interested in how a dominant meaning of a concept appears to be natural (and the structures and practices that maintain that domination) in order to emancipate alternative subjugated concepts and to make space for other truths. Chapters Two and Three illustrate that the neorealist researcher attempts to test evidence in support of a ‘truth’, and attempts to objectively find the essence of the concept, e.g. the Unneutral thesis argues, “it is worthwhile to pursue the search for the essence of non-alignment, since, if a concept is to be used, it should have a clearly understood content” (emphasis added) (Salmon, 1989: 30).

Defining the concept of neutrality in a particular way, as the only genuine understanding of the concept, can create problems for a researcher incorporating that concept into a study of public attitudes to neutrality. McSweeney argues that ‘a narrow, operational definition of the concept of peace such as ‘the absence of war’ excludes so much that is relevant that it is of little use in understanding the idea or the policy required to embody it’ (McSweeney, 1999: 133). The same argument applies to the narrow concept of neutrality in government and realist academic discourses – defined as non-membership of NATO – because this potentially excludes other definitions, crucially the non-realist, “active” concept of neutrality and its values, and
the notion that a set of values may drive public support of it. Thus, an anti-essentialist ontology is important in overcoming the biases already present in the academic literature, to arrive at a more nuanced and relevant analysis of neutrality concepts. Help may be sought from alternatives in IR theories to neorealism, such as social constructivism.

**Epistemology: the foundationalist spectrum**

Epistemology is the philosophical theory of knowing or knowledge (Jupille, 2005: 211), often defined as the study of how we claim to know something (Smith, 2001: 227). The spectrum runs from academics carrying out foundationalist, substantive analysis in the discipline to those conducting research using anti-foundationalist, metatheoretical or perspectivist approaches. Key concepts of anti-foundationalist approaches to research in IR are reflexivity and contingency. A foundationalist epistemological position is one that thinks that all truth claims about some feature of the world can be judged true or false (Smith, 2001: 227), a position intimately linked with the essentialist ontology described above.

In terms of locating IR theories on the epistemological spectrum, (neo)realism operates using a foundationalist epistemology. “Neorealism, as the dominant rationalist theory, was thus considered hegemonic not only in the sense that it structured international relations theory, but also in the sense that it structured the practice of international relations”; and as a result of this hegemony, “the positivist-realist image of the world ‘out there’ has become reality, and the foundationalist approach to knowledge had become the only legitimate way of understanding global human society” (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1788).

The terms “minimal foundationalism” (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1787) and “qualified foundationalism” are used to describe the position of the IR theoretical approach of constructivism. For example, McSweeney describes qualified foundationalism as representing ‘the implicit epistemology of the emerging trend in sociological theory and research, and of much of the work in international relations theory which can be identified as ‘social constructionist’ in its approach’ (McSweeney, 1999: 106). An anti-foundationalist or ‘weak’ foundationalist concept of ethics is consciously aware of the need to deny eternal, sovereign meanings: “it suggests an ethics which is loosely fastened to local practices, and is understood to be historically contingent” (Cochran, 1999: 136).
Reflexivity and contingency

Associated with the qualified foundations of the social constructivists’ claims is the notion that their work is reflexive:

Many social constructionists, including discursive psychologists, view their own studies as discursive constructions that do not provide the only possible representation of the world but, rather, just one version which is part of the discursive struggle within the research field in question…As a result of their distinctive understanding of knowledge, social constructionists often emphasise reflexivity – that is, they attempt to apply their theories to their own research practice” (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 116).

A reflexive theory of the social order supports the moral and emancipatory impulse of a critical theory of international relations which aims to expose the contingency of all social arrangements, and the human choice and interests which gave rise to them (McSweeney, 1999: 219). The goal of reflexive theory in this thesis is to expose the contingency of the dominant neorealist thesis on neutrality and the concomitant claim that public support for neutrality is non-rational. Reflexivity enables a researcher to look beyond the ‘state-centric-ness’ of neorealism and to look at variables and levels of analysis that would otherwise have been excluded, e.g. neutrality from the point of view of the public.

Many poststructuralists point to local practices rather than abstract, historical principles as the source and ground for ethical claims. The practice of taking the human individual instead of the state-centric view of neutrality is the equivalent of the “local practice” relevant to this thesis. The notion of contingency is practiced by acknowledging one’s own theoretical standpoint as a researcher, taking account of one’s own role in research and justifying the choices made in research. “Although discourse analysis does not accept objectivism’s scientific demands of reliability and validity, this does not mean that all demands for validity are dismissed. With respect to political significance, the researcher can judge her/his own and others’ research in terms of the role that the research plays in the maintenance or, or challenge to, power relations in society, that is, in relation to the ideological implications of the research” (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 117). The validity of the claims made in this first half of the thesis about the perspectivism of the literature on neutrality, and the validity of the claims in support of the prioritisation of social constructivist variables over (neo)realist variables for testing the dimensions of public attitudes to Irish neutrality made in the second half of the thesis, can be assessed by looking at the coherence of
analytical claims and evaluating the explanatory potential of the analytical framework (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 125).

**Behaviouralism**

The realists’ *positivist, empirical* ontology and foundationalist epistemology leads them to focus on the material and the behavioural. “For some, behaviouralism – or the behaviouralist approach – seems to be synonymous with the positivist approach to political science” (Holden, 1974: xvi). And “neo-realism was in part a response to the behavioural challenge for more scientific method in International Relations” (Buzan, 1999: 58). Thus, realists are concerned with material structures and behaviours that are held, in the positivist tradition, to be phenomena external to the researcher.

This approach sets (neo)realists\(^2\) apart from social constructivists, who rose up in reaction to the dominance of this type of approach and analytical concern. The positivist, behaviourist premise is that only tangible realities are measurable and therefore what matter in the study of political science (Smith, 2001: 243). Just as Realists concentrate on the behaviour and outcomes that seem to follow from the characteristics they have attributed to men and states (Waltz, 1995: 79), as will be argued in Chapter Six, much of the public opinion research relevant to public attitudes to Irish neutrality looks to study the behaviouralist dimensions of attitudes to the neglect of other dimensions (Sinnott, 1997: 7), through the dominant prism of realist policy (Everts, 2000; Sinnott, 1996, 1997, 2000).

“Materialism is the view that material reality exists, regardless of perception or interpretation, and that what we know is a faithful representation of reality out there. Materialism informs functionalist and rational choice social theories, which are the basis, respectively, of neo-realism and neo-liberalism in IR” (Adler, 2002: 111). Social constructivists do not reject the notion of material structure but argue that the interpretation of material structures is cognitive/theoretical. They also conceive of behavioural regularities as theory-laden interpretations of action; as Neufeld argues, “meaning makes behavioural regularities what they are – human practices” (Neufeld, 1988: 44). It was “the realization that we live within structures that are theories, that the material circumstances of strategy are the manifestations of theories, that theories about security deliver our strategic facts, and that there is more than one strategic logic led to a growing disquiet with realism and its familiar positivist methods” (Booth, 1997: 96).

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\(^2\) The term (neo)realism refers to both realism and neorealism.
McSweeney articulates the nub of the social constructivist critique on the materialist ontology of the realist concept of the international system; he argues,

The international order is part of the social order, *not a peculiar object in its own right or a material entity*. We understand it only by reference to the concept of social action exemplified in the behaviour of individuals, who are its irreducible units. By analogy with speech, social action is understood as the work of agents communicating through the medium of an historically-bound structure of meaning, norms and rules, which limits their creative capacity as it facilitates it, and *which exists only by virtue of the actions of individuals* (McSweeney, 1997: 345) (emphasis added).

The differences between the philosophy of social constructivists and (neo)realists are important to understand because the latter present a number of obstacles to analysing public attitudes to Irish neutrality that the former can overcome. For example, the realist concept of neutrality denies individual action ontological status because the dominant understanding of neutrality in this paradigm is that of a state-dependent concept (Ørvik, 1971: 73). This is a significant ontological obstacle to the goal of studying public attitudes to Irish neutrality because the objective of public opinion research is typically to predict behaviour (O'Grady, 2001: 271); thus, most research is concerned with behaviouralist dimension of attitude (Sinnott, 1997: 6-7).

Behaviouralists hold that public attitudes are only meaningful if they have behavioural consequences: a behavioural action serves as a link between a ‘belief’ and the determination of ‘a full-blown attitude’ (O'Grady, 2001: 250). “There is no neutrality for the individual citizen, only neutrality for the state” (Kruzel, 1989: 308). Bonjour echoes this assessment: (Bonjour, 1946: 131) “only the state is neutral…no violation of neutrality in contravention of international law can be committed by a private person”. Legally, no behaviours exist for people to ‘be’ neutral or to produce and sustain neutrality – therefore there are no empirical, measurable units of action that can be accounted for, rendering public opinions and behaviours in relation to neutrality a non-entity in foundationalist, positivist, behaviouralist political science. Also, neutrality conceived as a political value held by publics is disregarded due to uncertainty or vagueness over empirical translation or interpretation. It is precisely because there are no behavioural aspects of attitudes asked of individuals in relation to neutrality that there is a need to move to the analysis of cognitive dimension of attitudes, such as values, and to have that level of analysis regarded as important as the behavioural.
The second issue is that behaviouralists regard attitudes stemming from emotion as less ‘rational’ than attitudes stemming from beliefs (O’Grady, 2001: 250); there is an effective binary of emotional/rational attitudes and behaviours in the behaviouralist approach, in which the former is subordinated to the latter in terms of importance and credibility. Thus, the body of literature on neutrality (cited earlier) that characterises public attitudes as ‘emotional’ (Keatinge, 1972: 439–440; 1973: 174; 1978: 73; Salmon, 1984: 206; Sundelius, 1987: 8), presumably does not conceive of public attitudes as stemming from beliefs and core values, and at the same time equates public opinion as subordinate to the ‘rational’ attitudes of elites. This assumption is evident in (the founding father of Realism) Morgenthau’s argument to erase the public from foreign policy analyses in order to construct ‘a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality’ (Morgenthau, 1973: 7), underpinning the Realist claim that permitting the public a voice in policy would allow the emotional to govern the rational (Morgenthau, 1978: 558).

The basis of these mainstream claims regarding the public’s alleged non-rationality may be due to an assumption made by these academics (or governments) that the public’s rules, interpretations and values regarding foreign policy are the same as those of the government and academics. Richard Herrmann outlines approaches that attempt to redress this assumption in IR; he explains that,

many phenomenological approaches rely on concepts and theories drawn from psychology, not because they believe actors are irrational as much as they believe that to understand action we need to appreciate the actor’s point of view not only the scholar’s. Instead of comparing the actor’s construction of reality to the scholar’s and declaring deviations irrational, scholars…forgo this comparison and use psychology and the cognitive sciences to refine the conceptual apparatus they use to represent actor values and worldviews (Herrmann, 2006: 125).

Finally, the discourse perspective premise, that the “rational” is only the expression of the temporary hegemony of a particular political discourse (Larsen, 1997: 22), is a direct invitation for a metatheoretical deconstruction of the academic literature and elite/government discourses that argue that Ireland is unneutral and that public attitudes to Irish neutrality are non-rational and emotional. The deconstruction helps to expose and circumvent the inevitable conclusion of (neo)realists (given their premise that it is only possible to arrive at ‘rational’ foreign policy theory by
excluding the public from foreign policy analysis) that the public hold non-rational attitudes in relation to foreign policy.

To conclude this first half of the chapter, this thesis brings together approaches, concepts and theories from the postpositivist IR discipline (a poststructuralist approach and method of deconstruction, and social constructivist framework of understanding) and applies their logic of investigation and interpretation to the use of the positivist public opinion research methods of the political science discipline. This thesis argues that there is a need for approaches and techniques that can recognise and capture the notion of the essentially contested nature of concepts. The structural equation model technique employed in the second half of the thesis uses a number of different but related statements to measure the values that are hypothesised to drive attitudes to neutrality; these multiple indicators of values are translated into an operationalised latent variable that is interpreted as an orientation. Theoretically, this is a less essentialised operationalisation than other techniques such as multiple regression analysis that use just the one single measurement as a variable. The meaning is a little more open to interpretation – although hardcore positivists might see this as merely introducing more error.

A meta-theoretical approach to the identification of the latent variables for the model allows alternative variables (e.g. values such as identity) as well as mainstream realist variables (efficacy, independence). It is more likely to provide for the possibility of change in the structural norms of the traditional public opinion model because the formulation of the model is not pre-determined, and nor will it become closed or cyclical as it would if operating within only one mainstream IR paradigm. In addition, if the approach is pluralist in theory, there is a possibility of investigating a positive hypothesis of rationality, rather than submitting to the negative realist hypothesis of the non-rational nature of public opinion, derived from the neorealist a priori framework that dictates what is or is not regarded as rational (Kubálková, 2001: 57). The approach of conducting a meta-theoretical interpretation of the latent variables constitutes a postpositivist, poststructuralist logic of investigation and interpretation.

“The nature of the postmodern critical project involves the recognition that we cannot properly analyse foreign policy without examining the general context of the constitutive rules in which foreign-policy formulation and implementation take place (Rengger and Hoffman, 1990: 142). The employment of poststructuralism and deconstruction in the first half of this thesis ensures that the hegemony that renders the concept and practice of Irish neutrality a “prisoner of unstated assumptions”
(Keohane, 1986: 4) is overcome (emphasis added). This fulfils the goal of making a contribution to the IR and Political Science discipline and also illuminates other views on Irish neutrality, which helps to achieve a better understanding of public opinion on Irish neutrality.

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY FRAMEWORK**

This section outlines the debates surrounding the IR theoretical worldviews and approaches of neorealism and social constructivism respectively, and offers a broad picture of their respective sets of assumptions, drawn from a number of academic sources. The IR theory framework is the most useful way to identify, organise and explain writing on Irish neutrality. The point of summarising the key paradigm features of neorealism and social constructivism is to help the reader imagine what a neorealist analysis of Irish neutrality would focus on and prioritise as key variables compared to that of a critical social constructivist. This lays the groundwork for the next two chapters, in which a number of these assumptions are identified in the academic literature, and are argued to serve as theoretical basis of discourses on and evaluations of the neutrality of Ireland and other European states, including public attitudes to the concept.

This framework is built to feed into the arguments that (1) (neo)realism is privileged above social constructivism in the discipline of IR and this is a considerable source of power that can have a detrimental impact on attempts to formulate hypotheses on public attitudes to Irish neutrality; (2) that each of the accounts of Irish neutrality in the deconstruction are underpinned by the particular assumptions, concepts and epistemologies belonging to each of the IR theoretical worldviews, and this has been sufficiently and clearly demonstrated; and (3) that the social constructivist selection and hierarchy of the variables of Irish neutrality should explain public opinion and Irish neutrality better than (neo)realism.

**The Importance of Identifying Assumptions**

Why undertake an exercise involving the identification of underlying assumptions in texts? There are several reasons over and above the fact that the exercise is part of “the business” of IR; “perspectivism in the sense of a strong post-positivist focus on thematic premises and assumptions has been internalized as a foremost characteristic of the third debate in international relations theory” (Lapid, 1989: 243). It is easier to understand the nature of the statements and the characterizations of neutrality by establishing what theoretical camp the writers belong to; this also helps us to
recognize that there are alternative views on neutrality and public opinion on neutrality to those of the mainstream. Identifying the theoretical camp of writers’ accounts of neutrality makes it easier to problematize the arguments for and against the neutrality theses made in their texts. It also allows one to draw conclusions as to what is the ‘dominant’ theoretical perspective in terms of the discipline-wide frequency of use, and gives clues as to how that dominance is maintained.

Any literature analysis demands vigilance for evidence of the IR theoretical assumptions underpinning the literature because the paradigm in operation has important implications for policy or other action because of the paradigmatic assumptions about concepts such as power and security (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 39). The stakes are high because of the links between theory and practice: “international theory underpins and informs international practice, even if there is a lengthy lag between the high-point of theories and their gradual absorption into political debate” (Smith, 1996: 13). From normative and political interests, it is important to establish what the hegemonic discourse is in order to account for exclusion and resistance in terms of the political struggle over the content of the concept of neutrality, and from that, the content of policy in terms of prescriptive state actions.

Establishing the underlying theoretical assumptions of the discourses helps to explain how the mainstream discourses have arrived at their account of the relationship of public opinion and neutrality, and why there appears to be so little else written on the subject. Finally, the apparent lack of worldview ownership in the literature is a research finding in itself; of Salmon (1989), FitzGerald (1996), Marsh (1992), Sinnott (1996; 1997), Everts (2000) and McSweeney (1985), only the latter has specified a theoretical worldview in his writing on neutrality, including public opinion on neutrality. This worldview, standpoint, position, or subjective perspective is what “enables them to justify what they say and do, impose interpretative limitations, and then, so limited, decide the meanings of events” (Ashley, 1996: 241) including statements made about the ‘rationality’ of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

**Why realism and social constructivism?**

There are many theories of IR, including Liberalism, Marxism and Feminist IR theory. The IR theories of Realism and Social Constructivism are chosen for the framework in this thesis. There are several reasons behind this selection. Firstly, Realism is the dominant theory of IR and so it would be an oversight not to consider it as an integral part of a thesis on neutrality and public opinion. Secondly, social constructivism is viewed by many academics (but not every academic, for reasons that will be explained
later) as an alternative, oppositional approach to neorealism (Cochran, 1999: 3). Defined by McSweeney, it involves a ‘rejection of key tenets of realism’ (McSweeney, 1999: 106). The selection of two opposing approaches helps to highlight the differences between them in terms of the key factors likely to underpin discourses on neutrality, and illuminates the fundamentally different, opposing statements and conclusions made about Irish neutrality and public opinion in the two sets of literature. Each of the approaches has different concepts of power and security, and each emphasises a different set of factors in foreign policy analysis, for example, structure versus agency, conflict versus cooperation, etc. Each considers differing levels of analysis (international, state, sub-state), which is important to identify because analyses of Irish neutrality that fail to include the sub-state level of public opinion and the sub-state population as a referent of security will be unsuitable for the formulation of hypotheses on public attitudes to neutrality. And, as highlighted in the previous section, each approach operates under different ontological and epistemological assumptions, and as a result, each would have different conclusions as to what constitutes ‘rational’ foreign policy and ‘rational’ public opinion on foreign policy.

There are limits in the presentation of the two theories in this chapter and in the thesis overall, as not all permutations and details are presented. The elements of the two approaches that are directly relevant to foreign policy analysis and research on public attitudes to Irish neutrality are the elements that are presented in broad terms. There is a slightly more detailed exposition for the key features of neorealism and social constructivism that serve as the indicative checklist to help identify the assumptions distinguishing the competing theses on Irish neutrality in the third chapter.

It is also worth noting that there is a significant debate over the definition and content of the distinct IR theoretical traditions (Kegley, 1995: 3; Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 137; Zehfuss, 2002: 3, 7). Certain propositions in a paradigm are more important than others; either because the adherents of the paradigm claim that these propositions have greater theoretical explanatory power or because they are what distinguish the paradigm from rival paradigms (Vasquez, 1998: 132). The fact that neorealism and social constructivism are conceived of as existing in relation to each other (Rosenthal, 1995: 324), and as some would argue, in binary opposition to each other (McSweeney, 1999: 106) are dynamics that feature in the texts under deconstruction and guide the discussion of the characteristics in each of the following summaries.
IR theory spectrum

This thesis uses a conceptual spectrum to locate the different theories for the purpose of demonstrating the ontological and epistemological differences between them (see Figure 1.2), and for the purposes of showing what assumptions underpin theses on Irish neutrality in the deconstruction. Different authors in the IR theory literature use their own typologies to explain neorealism and social constructivism and their variants.

FIGURE 1.2 Theories of IR on the ontological and epistemological spectrum

Theory or Approach?

The term ‘theory’ is used throughout the thesis, as is the term ‘approach’. Strictly speaking, neorealism is classified as a “theory” by its adherents, although sympathetic critics have argued for neorealism to be understood as a philosophical orientation or a research programme (Donnelly, 2000: 75) rather than a theory defined by an explicit set of assumptions (Donnelly, 2000: 6). For Waltz, the founding father of neorealism, “theories deal in regularities and repetitions…a theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies relations among them. Theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually” (Waltz, 1995: 71). Waltz’s employment of “theory” as the term for neorealism indicates a hierarchy of variables, the notion of rigour, and encapsulates regularities – use of the term ‘theory’ is attractive to neorealists because all of these elements relate to commitments of the positivist tradition of science. Donnelly argues realism is usually present in both academic and popular debates as a philosophical orientation or research program (Donnelly, 2000: 194).

The more critical or postmodern social constructivist adherents would argue social constructivism is classified as an “approach”, not a theory (Hopf, 2000: 1772) because
they would deny the worthiness of ‘grand theories’ and reject the suggestion that their own contribution to the study of world politics constitutes a ‘school’ or even a unified theoretical approach” (Burchill, 2001: 8). Others stick to the term “theory” but emphasise their different interpretation of the term compared with (neo)realists, for example, Emanuel Adler argues that constructivism, unlike realism and liberalism, is not a theory of politics but “rather, it is a social theory on which constructivist theories of international politics – for example, about war, cooperation and international community – are based” (Adler, 1997: 323). Thus the different strands of constructivism – conventional, critical and postmodern – (Zehfuss, 2002: 7) are associated with different adoption of the terms “approach” or “theory”. Throughout this thesis, in most instances, neorealism will be accorded its status of theory and because this thesis favours a critical, postmodern ethos, social constructivism is referred to as an approach.

(Neo)realism(s)

As Donnelly puts it, whether one loves it or hates it – or is at once fascinated and repulsed – the student of international relations cannot ignore realism (Donnelly, 2000: 31). Realism has become the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of the establishment of the academic sub-discipline of International Relations (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001: 145). There is widespread acknowledgement through the IR literature that (neo)realism dominates the discipline of IR (Neufeld, 1988: 51; Smith, 2001: 226; Vasquez, 1998: 42); as Burchill puts it, “the language of realism has largely become the language of International Relations” (Burchill, 2001: 86). Although an anti-realism movement arose in the 1970s in the form of a fundamentally non-idealist brand of liberal internationalism, realism returned to academic dominance in the 1980s.

This revival arose from the work of a new generation of scholars who sought to establish realism on the foundations of positivist social science. The key figure in this “neorealist” revival was Kenneth Waltz, whose work will be discussed in detail later (Donnelly, 2000: 30). Donnelly argues Waltz’s (1979) Theory of International Politics “was for a decade the most influential theoretical work in the academic study of international relations, the central text of contemporary neorealism. Today it remains a touchstone for both realists and their critics” (Donnelly, 2000: 16). Burchill affirms that Waltz’s “account has often been referred to as occupying a position of intellectual hegemony in the discipline” (Burchill, 2001: 88).
The hegemony of (neo)realism is in part, due to its claims to proceed on the grounds of scientific methods. As Donnelly points out, the revival of the paradigm was due to the efforts of its adherents to establish realism on the foundations of positivist social science (Donnelly, 2000: 30); specifically, its rationalism (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1788), foundationalism and epistemic realism. The realist ontology is essentialist, for example, (neo)realism takes the state as a given (Campbell, 1998: 202) entity in international relations. Its epistemology is foundational, concentrating on the materialist structures in international relations (Reus-Smit, 2001: 225). The preferred methodology is quantitative (Reus-Smit, 2001: 224) and it adheres to “the prevailing rationalist conception of human action: both neorealist and neoliberals imagined humans – and by extension states – as atomistic, self-interested, strategic actors, thus positing a standard form of instrumental rationality across all political actors” (Cochran, 1999: 3; Donnelly, 2000: 30; Reus-Smit, 2001: 225).

The scientific, rationalist approach is linked to the search for law-like generalisations on the behaviour of states: both Morgenthau and Waltz, the leading figures of the two dominant strands of twentieth century American realism, seek a general theory of international politics based on law-like behavioural regularities (Donnelly, 2000: 57). Such laws provide realism with a framework for explaining the neutrality of states and, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, these characteristics of the theory of (neo)realism impinge on the understanding of Irish neutrality in the literature.

**Variants of (neo)realism(s)**

There is no single tradition of political realism; there are ‘realisms’ (Mingst, 1999: 79). Donnelly identifies six paradigms of realism (Donnelly, 2000: 13) and two subgroupings of realists: biological (classical, fundamentalist) realists who emphasise a fixed human nature and state motivation (Donnelly, 2000: 11); for example, Morgenthau (*Politics Among Nations*, 1948), and structural realists (Donnelly, 2000: 50), or neorealists, who emphasise international anarchy and the balance of power system (but who also must make motivational assumptions about states and individual) for example, Kenneth Waltz (*Theory of International Politics*, 1979) (Donnelly, 2000: 16; Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 52).

Structural realists are called ‘neorealists’ in an effort to emphasise their ‘newness’ and their differences from earlier realists arising from their strong structuralism. Whilst neorealists are quick to point out that their structural accounts of international politics do not concern specific foreign policies; with the latter defined as ‘particular, unit-based, internal explanations or forces’ (Donnelly, 2000: 56). Based on the notion that
the interaction of states generates a structure that then constrains them from taking certain actions and disposes them towards taking others, neorealist theory explains why states similarly placed in the international system behave similarly despite their internal differences – the explanation of states’ behaviour is found at the international, not the national level (Waltz, 1996: 54).

**Neorealism and Foreign Policy**

In contrast, Waltz argues, a theory of foreign policy would explain why states similarly placed in a system behave in different ways; it has to take the performance of governments as its object of explanation (Waltz, 1996: 55). Differences in behaviour arise, Waltz argues, from differences of internal composition (Waltz, 1996: 64). And, as Waltz explains, international political theory does not include factors at the level of states (Waltz, 1996: 55). A neorealist theory of international politics explains how external forces shape states’ behaviour, but says nothing about the effects of internal forces. Waltz concludes, “under most circumstances, a theory of international politics is not sufficient, and cannot be made sufficient, for the making of unambiguous foreign-policy predictions” (Waltz, 1996: 57). The solution to the problem, according to Waltz, comes in the form of a “unified theory of internal and external politics” and, he suggests, until someone comes up with that theory, “the theoretical separation of domestic and international politics need not bother us unduly” (Waltz, 1996: 57).

However, as Colin Elman responds, Waltz himself has made a considerable number of foreign policy predictions (Elman, 1996: 60), which “is hardly surprising because to a significant degree, foreign-policy predictions are the bread and butter of international relations scholars, and a large part of the jam too. Refraining from making such predictions would diminish neorealism’s usefulness considerably (Elman, 1996: 60). And it is clear that the epistemological, ontological and substantive assumptions of neorealism inform academic analyses of foreign policy, including those on Irish neutrality, as the deconstruction in Chapter Three will demonstrate. Although there are a number of substantive differences between neorealism and realism, the two paradigms are collapsed into one ‘(neo)realism’ for the purposes of the deconstruction in this thesis. This is because both are relevant to understanding the most significant claims made in relation to Irish neutrality in the Unneutral Ireland thesis and they also share the same ontological and epistemological premises.

**Neorealism**

Waltz’s work is a critique of Morgenthau’s realism and “a substantial intellectual extension” of realism (Burchill, 2001: 90); the main point of departure is his argument
that the international political order may be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure, with three important characteristics (Burchill, 2001: 91-92): (1) the anarchic ordering of the system: the absence of any overarching authority regulating the behaviour of nation-states towards each other. The ordering principle of the system forces states to perform exactly the same primary function regardless of their capacity to do so, that is, to seek security through the accretion of military power. (2) The character of the units in the system, nation-states, are identical in terms of their security needs, existing in a self-help environment where they are required to pursue security before they can perform any other function. (3) The distribution of capabilities within the system: although states are functionally similar, they differ vastly in their capabilities, creating a constantly shifting distribution of power across the international system and the categories of great powers and small powers. This distribution of power overrides consideration of ideology or any other internal factor in terms of foreign policy goals and activities.

Morgenthau and Waltz are considered to be ‘strong’ realists who adopt realist premises in a way that allows only modest space for politically salient “non-realist” concerns (Donnelly, 2000: 12). Although each type of realism is predicated on a key group of assumptions, each attaches different importance to the various core concepts. Neorealists give precedence to the international system structure over individual states emphasised by traditional realists and over explanations that focus on the innate characteristics of human beings (Mingst, 1999: 77). What unites proponents of realist theory is their emphasis on the unitary autonomous state in an international anarchic system; this is also what distinguishes them from other IR theories such as (neo)liberals, Marxists and feminists. The next section will concentrate on the similarities of the two forms of (neo)realism, that will be discussed as follows:

**Anarchy, self-help, co-operation and competition**

According to Realists, the international system is anarchic (Donnelly, 2000: 7); there is no overarching authority. International interactions are essentially conflictual in nature because power and its pursuit by individuals and states is ubiquitous and inescapable in an anarchical, self-help system (Donnelly, 2000: 8). Tucker argues, “the primordial institution of self help…along with the ‘natural’ inequalities of state, guarantees that the international system will remain highly oligarchical” (Donnelly, 2000: 101). The insecurity of each party in the anarchic system impedes cooperation
Realism presents the Prisoners’ Dilemma as the central feature of international relations because anarchy precludes enforceable agreements to cooperate (Donnelly, 2000: 21). The Prisoner’s Dilemma formulation of realism does not require assumptions about human nature or a world of egoistic amoralists. Cooperation in the face of unscrupulous others who defect ensures all must be treated as a potential enemy or they will perish or be subordinated to the will of others (Donnelly, 2000: 22). Without an insurance scheme that allows actors to risk cooperation, the actors are locked in a system of competition.

**State-centric analysis, state as a unitary actor assumption**

The dominant discourse of international relations is state-centric (Larsen, 1997: 71). The realist state-centric assumption posits that states are the most important actors in world politics (Keohane, 1986: 164-165). The paradigm also conceives of states as unitary actors (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001: 30). Some social constructivists also employ the realist state-centric approach in their approach to analysing international politics, for example, the “conventional” social constructivist, Alex Wendt. He affirms realist principles of method and supports a structural, state-centric perspective (McSweeney, 1999: 124).

Critics of the realist paradigm contend that the state-centric assumption is created by (neo)realists in order to be able to employ scientific methods. McSweeney argues, “the purpose served by the identification of the state as key actor, its priority as security referent, and military capabilities as the primary variable relevant to its security, is to provide the theorist with the material essential to the application of the scientific method to the study of international relations” (McSweeney, 1999: 37). And it enables neorealism to apply microeconomic rational choice analysis, as mentioned earlier in the discussion of the use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma by realists. But in positing the primacy of the state in the political science tradition, a gap has been permitted to develop between the meaning of the term ‘security’ as applied to individuals and its meaning for the state. As McSweeney argues, “in effect, the means have become the end; the object has become the subject of security when the state is made its ultimate referent. If the state is the primary actor within the political science perspective, what is the focus of concern about its security?” (McSweeney, 1999: 33-34); McSweeney speculates, “if human beings were taken to be the acting units, the quantification of their behaviour for scientific analysis would be complicated by the obvious difference in their interests and preferences as stimulus to action. By assuming that the material unit of the state is an actor of undifferentiated interests as well as identity, Waltz could eliminate the problem a priori” (McSweeney, 1999: 34).
This state-centric ontology of neutrality fits with the neorealist-specified causes of neutrality: the balance of power system (discussed later) engendered by the system structures and distribution of power, (not by internal forces such as publics). But with the human individual precluded from the creation and maintenance of neutrality and extracted from the analysis of neutrality, there is a radical difference in the meaning of neutrality as applied to individuals and that applied to the state. The human forces behind neutrality and the role of identity stemming from those forces are rendered ontologically and epistemologically defunct.

Another consequence of applying the state-centric approach is that realism ignores key theoretical facets of foreign policy (and neutrality) promoted by non-realist understandings of international relations and security, including domestic politics and beliefs (Vasquez, 1998: 332-324). For a study of public opinion and foreign policy, this side-effect of the dominance of state-centrism is a major theoretical hurdle to overcome in terms of assessing the ontological status of the individual in relation to neutrality, specifically the role of public opinion in the constitution of foreign policy and the knock on effects in the formulation of a model of public attitudes based on appropriate hypotheses and substantive dynamics.

Unless the alternative approach of social constructivism emerges as a legitimate theoretical contender for the framework of analysis and a meta-theoretical deconstruction of the hegemonic literature is carried out to demonstrate and ‘prove’ the existence of these theoretical obstacles, a student of public opinion on neutrality could never hope to carry out adequate research on the meaning of neutrality and drivers of support for neutrality from the point of view of public opinion. Empirical examples of these theoretical problems are identified in Chapter Six on the role of metatheory in the public opinion and foreign policy (POFP) literature. The state-centric assumption is also linked to the levels-of-analysis issue, the separation of the domestic and international realms and the concept of ‘rational’ foreign policy.

**Levels of analysis**

McSweeney rejects the assertion that there are three levels of analysis under consideration by the corpus of realist literature and argues that there are just two, the state and the international system (McSweeney, 1999: 62). Buzan, Kissinger, Waltz, Kennan and Morgenthau are notable realist commentators whose conception of the domestic sphere appears to be no more than a dimension of the state and their concern with the sub-state level is in terms of the impact of domestic instability on the
capacities of the state to achieve security (McSweeney, 1999: 62). The sub-state level is ignored as a distinctive referent object and it is employed merely to illustrate the complexities of state-level security (McSweeney, 1999: 60). Sub-state objects are relegated to the status of ‘conditions’ for state security (McSweeney, 1999: 55).

**Structure over agency**

Waltz defines the international system’s structures, first, by the ordering principle of the system - anarchy - and second, by the distribution of capabilities - power in terms of material military capabilities - across units. International structures vary with significant changes in the number of great powers. Great powers are marked off by the combined capabilities (or power) they command (Waltz, 1995: 74). A key criticism of the neorealist focus on structure is that it ignores the role of human will and the notion of agency (one of the key considerations of social constructivism) in international politics. As Neufeld surmises, ‘in short, positivist-inspired mainstream IR theory can be seen as a major social force contributing to the maintenance of the “ideologically frozen relations of dependence”, an effect it accomplishes through the “reification” of the global order, i.e. by presenting that order as a “thing” standing apart from and independently of human will or action’ (Neufeld, 1988: 59).

Doty exposes the exclusion of the issue of representation in IR generally and takes issue with the mainstream debate on the ‘agent-structure’ problem, which solutions are underpinned by scientific realism, wedded to an essentialist notion of structure (Gould, 1998: 94). Due to the dominance of neorealism in the discipline, ‘currently IR theory provides much more insight into structure than agency’ (Hudson, 2005: 4).

‘International’ separate from ‘domestic’

The neorealist accounts of world politics emphasizing ‘structure’ over ‘agency’ tend to draw deep distinctions between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ politics. This distinction means that the interrelationship between the two is effectively ignored, the developments that take place in domestic civil society or at the individual level are perceived as having little or no meaning at the international level (Rengger and Hoffman, 1990: 131). Neorealist structuralism presents hierarchic domestic and anarchic international politics as qualitatively different realms that must be studied with logically incompatible theoretical framework (Donnelly, 2000: 12). This neorealist priority of structure over human agents/the mass public is seen in Salmon’s account of Irish neutrality that sustains the idea that post-Cold War security structures and EU leaders are the forces that shape Irish foreign policy. Public opinion is largely ignored, other than some comments that the Irish population has been duped by successive governments, and a reference to an opinion poll in the concluding
paragraphs of the “unneutral” thesis (Salmon, 1989: 310). It is important to recognise the bias created through the use of this literature by students as a basis for understanding Irish neutrality and creating hypotheses about opinion on Irish neutrality that is compounded by the theoretical problem of the ontology of the public pointed out earlier.

**A theory of foreign policy aiming at ‘rationality’**

Realists, including Morgenthau, the founding father of realism, sought to erase the concept of the public from foreign policy analyses in order to construct ‘a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality’ (Morgenthau, 1973: 7). Whilst Waltz appears to chastise Morgenthau for confusing the problem of explaining foreign policy with the problem of developing a theory of international politics, (Waltz, 1995: 71), regardless of whether the ambition is to explain ‘foreign policy’ or ‘international politics’, the failure of realists and neorealists to consider the public as a variable in either phenomenon is problematic and controversial. Arguably these realist and neorealist themes embedded in mainstream analyses of foreign policy in IR have contributed to the *Unneutral Ireland* thesis’ failure to consider public opinion in the conception and analysis of Irish neutrality.

**Concept of power and “Power potential”**

Neorealism’s concept of power is used as a defining characteristic of structure. Power in neorealist theory is simply the combined military capability of a state. As mentioned earlier, its distribution across states, and changes in that distribution help to define structures and changes in them (Waltz, 1995: 79-80). Realism is characterised by its ‘power assumption’, that states seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power (Keohane, 1986: 164). Realists argue that in an anarchical international environment with power disparities between states, measured as military capacity, states are responsible for their own security and must maintain an adequate ‘power potential’ (Mingst, 1999: 166). Alliances represent the most important institutional tool for enhancing a state’s power and meeting the perceived power potential of opponents (Mingst, 1999: 173). Realists emphasise the primacy of balance of power politics (Donnelly, 2000: 8). These primary (neo)realist assumptions - the unitary state as the most important actor, power conceived primarily as military power, and the balance of power dictum - can be identified in *Unneutral Ireland*’s analysis of Irish neutrality and, importantly, they underpin the “disavowal of external help” and “due diligence” criteria that are used to conclude that Ireland is ‘unneutral’.
Balance of power

Central to the realist framework is the balance of power concept, which is used to manage insecurity. Unlike liberalists who argue that security can be managed through international co-operation, realists posit states in a competition with each other to increase their own capabilities and to undermine the capabilities of others, thereby maintaining a balance of power. They assert this framework is compatible with the nature of man and that of the state, which is to act to protect self-interest by maintaining one’s power.

Unlike the earlier realists, neorealists believe that the balance of power is largely determined by the structure of the international system. Waltz’ view of the balance of power system is that individual decision-makers and their states have less freedom or capability to alter the course of events; “the balance of power is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen” (Waltz, 1995).

Realists such as Waltz who emphasize balance of power as a system tendency have been labelled as “structural realists” or “neorealists” because they have allegedly departed from a realist tradition that granted the statesman or policy-maker greater freedom from constraint and thus greater ability to affect international events (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 52-53). These assumptions are seen in the Unneutral Ireland (Salmon, 1989) discourse that posits neutrality as a function of balance of power.

Having accounted for the theoretical premises and priorities of (neo)realism, it is worth mentioning the factors of foreign policy and international relations that (neo)realism ignores or rejects: specifically, (1) the sub-state level of analysis: “neo-realists especially, but also neo-liberals, must pay attention to what goes on inside a state. Issues of political culture, identity and domestic political games must be considered” (Lamy, 2001: 193); (2) Co-operation: “Realism persists because it regularly offers insights into recurrent sources and patterns of conflict rooted in anarchy, competition and diffidence. It tells us very little about cooperation, which many analysts find a no less important part of international relations” (Donnelly, 2000: 197); (3) Moral objectives: Morgenthau’s brand of “political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe (1954: 10)” (Donnelly, 2000: 195). Neorealism’s “emphasis on power and interest” gives rise to “skepticism over moral concerns in international relations.

Ethical considerations and objectives, realists typically argue, must be subordinate to ‘reason of state’ (raison d’etat)” (Donnelly, 2000: 10-11); (4) Change and agency: change is not possible in the realist world due to biological realism’s assumption of the invariability of the nature of man: realists believe, ultimately, conflict and war are
rooted in human nature (Waltz, 1995: 79). “The question of agency is one of how practices of representation create meaning and identities and thereby create the very possibility for agency” (Doty, 1996: 167-168) and because realists’ practice of representation is found in a constant conception of the war-making nature and identity of man, change, (for example, co-operation, as discussed earlier) is theoretically impossible; (5) Values and identity: (Neo)realism’s lack of interest in values, norms and ideas as elements of the structure of international politics is the central factor that spawned the new approach of conventional social constructivism (McSweeney, 1999: 124). Tooze argues that “we must venture outside of the orthodox”, that is (neo)realism, to analyse identity in IR – “the questions raised by our concern about identity, nationalism and the state cannot be responded to from within the current mainstream of IR theory” (Tooze, 1996: xvi-xx)

Social Constructivism(s)
Social constructivism is posited as the alternative school that studies the important parts of international relations and foreign policy that realism has left out. Within social constructivism, there are several types of social constructivism: some variants such as ‘conventional’ or ‘Wendtian’ social constructivism are closer to (neo)realism than other social constructivists, particularly the ‘critical’ social constructivists, might like, thus casting a shadow over the claim that it is the ‘alternative’ to (neo)realism and therefore a genuinely different approach to understanding neutrality and public opinion than that of the mainstream literature. Thus, it is important to outline the debate about the variants of constructivism and to explain these differences, specifically in relation to the elements identified in the alternative writing on Irish neutrality, and the implications for using social constructivism as an approach to understanding public opinion on Irish neutrality.

Social Constructivism: History
In the introduction to The Social Construction of Reality (1966), Berger and Luckmann discuss the history of the “sociology of knowledge” (considering the theory of ideology to be a part of the latter) (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 24). They remind the reader that “an awareness of the social foundations of values and world views can be found in antiquity” and that it is possible to make a good case for several distinct ‘genealogies’ for the central problem of the sociology of knowledge3 (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 17). Berger and Luckmann identify a German philosopher, Max Scheler, as the first person to coin the term ‘sociology of knowledge’ in the 1920s

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3 They define the sociology of knowledge as a concern with the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises, with the general problem of concern being the extent to which thought reflects or is independent of the proposed [psychological, biological, social, historical] determinative factors of human thought (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 16-17).
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 15-16). Noting that is accepted that constructivism reached the shores of the International Relations discipline in the 1980s, (Dessler, 1999: 123) because constructivism in the social sciences builds on centuries of intellectual developments in philosophy, sociology and social theory, it is not easy to speculate about its origins (Adler, 2002: 96). Within the discipline of IR, Alder identifies Nicholas Onuf as the first person to coin the term ‘constructivism’ in 1989, although he argues “some of the credit for the development of IR constructivism should go to the radical constructivists who, in the late 1970s, shocked the IR community by building their arguments around Foucault (1980) and Derrida (1978)” (Adler, 2002: 99). Constructivism is said to be “one of the most influential IR traditions of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Walt, 1998)” (Weber, 2001: 60).

Constructivism is not another IR ‘ism’, paradigm or fashion that has joined the ranks of ‘realism (neorealism) and ‘liberalism’ (neoliberalism). As discussed earlier, constructivism is an approach, not a theory. Although Hopf adds, “if it is a theory, it is a theory of process, not substantive outcome” (Hopf, 2000: 1772). It is not a substantive theory of world politics (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 56).

“Constructivism has come a long way. It has become an alternative way of doing IR theory and research and has made a substantial contribution to the IR discipline”…but…. “IR constructivism is at a preliminary stage only; much work still remains before it becomes a normal and taken-for-granted way of doing IR theory and research” (Adler, 2002: 111). Much constructivist scholarship has taken on the metatheoretical challenges issued during The Third Debate (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1786). As a result, some critical constructivists are associated with Poststructuralist approaches and work within the school of Critical Theory.

**Different variants of constructivism and debate over who uses the label**

It is important to note that there are many significantly different variants of ‘social constructivism’: for example, Zehfuss identifies three constructivisms (Zehfuss, 2002) in a spectrum of work from Kratchowil to Wendt. Adler identifies four IR constructivist approaches – modernist, modernist linguistic, radical and critical (Adler, 2002: 96). The work of the different individuals is commonly located at points along a social constructivism continuum, thus, “there are many constructivists, and thus perhaps, many constructivisms” (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1811). The various approaches employed under the label of social constructivist work in IR are subject to scrutiny and vigorous debate, to the extent that a major critic of constructivism is want to declare, “we still lack clarity on what constructivism is” (Zehfuss, 2002: 6).
Continuums and binaries are useful devices that can be used to categorise and define the various types of social constructivisms. In the literature, social constructivisms are stratified by various forms of labelling, for example, Price and Reus-Smit explain that constructivism has two principal forms: “systemic constructivism” and “holistic constructivism” (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1792). Holistic constructivism is more concrete and historical, consciously shunning systemic theorizing: Kratochwil and Ruggie are proponents. They are concerned with the dynamics of international change and see the partitioning of the domestic and international realms as a unique historical construct (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 1793). Using other labels, Hopf identifies the binary opposites of “conventional versus critical” social constructivism, (Hopf, 2000: 1757), labels that this thesis uses throughout.

Reus-Smit differentiates constructivists according to their methodology: “the gap between these rival methodological standpoints within constructivism is most clearly apparent in the contrast between those studies that employ quantitative methodological techniques and those that adopt genealogical approaches” (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 224). McSweeney uses an epistemological continuum, identifying ‘social constructionist’ work in IR theory as using a ‘qualified foundationalism’ that is “as far removed from radical postmodernism as it is from objectivism of the empiricist and structural-functionalist schools” (McSweeney, 1999: 106). Others employ levels of understanding as a way to differentiate constructivisms: for Adler, “constructivism is a three-layered understanding of social reality and social science, involving metaphysics, social theory and IR theory and research strategies. It is a metaphysical stance, a social theory, and an IR theoretical and empirical perspective” (Adler, 2002: 96). Alex Wendt, the founding father of conventional constructivism, identifies “three distinct epistemological positions with constructivism”: a ‘positivist’ position, an ‘interpretivist’ position and a ‘postmodern’ position (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 57). As can be seen from this brief review, social constructivists, their work (sometimes called ‘constructionist’) and the variety of approaches can be mapped according to ontological, epistemological, methodological, as well as IR theoretical (empirical and analytical) dimensions (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 56).

Onuf et al. take issue with the casual assumption of the constructivist label by some scholars: “just as some scholars feel that they ought to make sure that they are critical in some sense of the term, many are now self-proclaimed constructivists. They often use the term to suggest what they are not: they are not realists or positivists in any narrow sense. They do not practice “deconstruction”. Taking the middle path, as they
see it (Alder 1997), they are protected on both sides by the fuzzy use of language” (Kubálková, Onuf, and Kowert, 1998: 8). According to McSweeney, the terms ‘constructivism’, ‘critical theory’, ‘constitutivism’ and ‘reflexivism’ were coined to characterize the break with positivism within the IR discipline, sometimes referred to as the ‘third debate’. He places constructivism, along with these other ‘third debate’ groups in the home or location of ‘critical security studies: “a constructionist approach which specifically addresses the problem of international security and which draws eclectically on diverse post-positivist perspectives is that of ‘critical security studies’” (McSweeney, 1999: 114).

For the purposes of this thesis, the label matters less than the content of the definition – the crucial distinction is whether a constructivist adheres to the dominant neorealist/neoliberal assumptions of IR theory about the world, or if a poststructuralist philosophy is employed with a critical/perspectivist concern with the assumptions underpinning IR and FPA literature, in order to open up space to consider alternatives to the mainstream. It is this latter ‘critical’ social constructivist approach that is fundamental to understanding the metatheoretical dimensions of the literature on Irish neutrality, concepts of Irish neutrality, and the formation of hypotheses in a study of public opinion on Irish neutrality.

The definition of social constructivism in binary opposition to realism works for this thesis because that property makes it a lot easier to demonstrate the presence of the two types of assumptions in texts on neutrality. The move can highlight how social constructivism encompasses the important aspects of foreign policy and international relations, identified earlier, that the (neo)realist paradigm does not consider: moral objectives, co-operation, values, identity, change through emphasising agency over structure, a human-centred analysis/concept of security, the human referent of security and the role of the public.

Core assumptions of constructivisms
Risse-Kappen outlines a comprehensive list of core assumptions of social constructivists that reflect these ontological propositions and highlight their differences from neorealism and neoliberalism:

first, they endogenize the interests and preferences of actors. These interests are not fixed by some presocial calculations of costs and benefits but emerge from processes of social interaction and communication. Domestic, international and transnational discourses provide the framework in which
actors define their preferences and build consensus-based coalitions. As a result, these discourses are causally consequential for the resulting practices and behaviour. Second, structures and agency are mutually constitutive. International and domestic structures constrain and enable the practices of actors, while these practices enact and change the structures. Third, material capabilities and structures are indeterminate with regard to interests or policy preferences. Ideas – worldviews, principled beliefs, and knowledge – not only define the meaning of power but also affect the reasoning process by which state actors define their interests. Fourth, anarchy understood as a self-help system is not the defining feature of international relations. World politics is heavily regulated by norms that prescribe appropriate behaviour and are embedded in formal and informal institutions. These institutions form the social structure of international relations. The logic of anarchy itself is socially constructed, as presocial actors do not need to be conceptualised as potentially hostile. The “democratic peace”, for example, constitutes a social relationship in world politics where the logic of anarchy and of the security dilemma is virtually absent (Risse-Kappen, 1997: 262-263).

Adler argues “there exists enough common ground among most types to permit dealing with meta-theoretical issues on the basis of IR theoretical and empirical questions”, (Adler, 2002: 109), but arguably it is only the most poststructuralist or critical variants that are able to drive out the subtle but crucial meta-theoretical differences in FPA. The variants called, “soft”, (Kubálková, 2001: 56) “conventional”, (Hopf, 2000: 1757) “structural”, (McSweeney, 1999: 125) “systemic” (Reus-Smit, 2001: 219) or “Wendtian” (Weber, 2001: 63; Zehfuss, 2002: 95) all share the same ontological and epistemological assumptions as the state-centric theories of neorealism and neoliberalism. These constructivisms follow the neorealist in adopting the ‘third image’ perspective, focusing solely on interactions between unitary states. Everything that exists or occurs within the domestic realm is ignored (Reus-Smit, 2001: 219) – therefore, these constructivisms are theoretically inadequate for understanding public opinion and Irish neutrality.

“Systemic theorizing holds domestic politics constant and explores variance in the international arena. This approach flattens the role of domestic politics to zero in order to see whether changes in the environment within which states operate alter their behavior. This is, of course, the central premise of realism: assuming a unitary, rational state in order to examine the variance within the international system. It is as well the central premise of any system approach, including neoliberal institutionalism
and system constructivism” (Gourevitch, 2002: 309). Without introducing non-
 systemic sources of state identity – such as domestic political culture – systemic 
constructivism offers an overly static conception of the state and the international 
system, providing no clue as to how agents or structures change (Price and Reus-Smit, 
2000: 1793).

Conventional/Wendtian/Systemic social constructivism does not consider the 
 domestic processes of identity formation because it takes identities and interests of 
states as exogenously given (Zehfuss, 2002: 13). Conventional constructivism can’t 
explain fundamental changes in state identities and social structures because it 
brackets a state’s “corporate identity” (its internal human, material, and ideological 
characteristics) and concentrates on its “social identity” (“the meaning an actor 
attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others) (Price and Reus-Smit, 2000: 
1792). Wendtian social constructivists’ (and realists’) preoccupation with the state 
prevents them from seeing a security role for the sub-state human collectivities at the 
domestic level (McSweeney, 1999: 65). Synder claims “the constructivist focus on 
identity and ideas through enlightened agency and the realist emphasis on material 
factors have left a large gap, however, that ignores politics, particularly the relation 
between foreign policy and domestic politics” (Synder, 2005: 56).

Identity and domestic politics as a determinants of foreign policy 
Scholars contend that social actors inform state identity and in turn, identity has an 
effect on foreign policy (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 478). Thus citizens are implicated 
in the formation of state identity that has an impact on foreign policy. Jepperson et al. 
point out,

Conceiving of the state in relational terms and investigating the domestic 
 sources of foreign policy focuses attention on the degree to which the 
identities of actors are constructed by state-society relations….shared 
conceptions of identity appear to have had an important indirect effect on a 
number of policies (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996: 50).

It is argued in this thesis that neutrality can represent part of the identity of the state. 
For example, in the Irish case, Keatinge and McSweeney both recognise the 
emergence of the Irish peace movement as a variable in shaping the concept of Irish 
neutrality (Keatinge, 1984: 118; McSweeney, 1988: 209). The relation of identity to 
concepts of Irish neutrality will feature in the rest of this thesis.
Conclusion

This chapter has described the different approaches and sub-disciplines within political science and how this research question fits into the matrix of IR theories, political science methodologies, and the matrix of foreign policy analysis and public opinion and foreign policy literatures that exist in the discipline. The metatheoretical aspects of positivist and poststructuralist Political Science/IR in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodology have been described and linked to the approaches taken in the literature dedicated to understanding neutrality and public opinion.

Much of the FPA and POFP literature that serves as the starting point for analysing public attitudes to Irish neutrality uses the mainstream metatheoretical traditions of positivism as part of the mainstream IR paradigm of neorealism. Recognising that realism has become the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of academic International Relations (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001: 145) is the first step to understanding the difficulties posed in understanding neutrality from the point of view of public opinion.

A new challenge to this definition of scientific research and the realist way of analysing international relations and foreign policy has been launched. It is argued that, “International relations theorists cannot ignore the advances in the social sciences, and in sociology in particular, which have brought together the explanatory and interpretative concerns of the classical tradition in an eclectic approach to understanding human behaviour and institutions. The international order, as part of the social order, is a construct of ideas, values, norms and interpretative schemes, which yields understanding only to a procedure of decoding or deconstructing it” (McSweeney, 1997: 174).

The need to take a critical approach to the literature and to deconstruct examples of Irish neutrality literature is as a result of the relatively unbroken hegemony of (neo)realism in the Irish neutrality discourse and its lack of attention to variables and research practices compatible with a holistic approach to researching public opinion and Irish neutrality. Hudson has identified that “other types of theory have not been well developed in IR, such as the theory of how cultural factors and social constructions within a culture affect state behaviour” (Hudson, 2005: 3) and neutrality is characterised by many literatures as (i) not externally imposed and therefore seemingly (ii) a function of internal desires. For example, Neal G Jesse’s article discusses this notion in detail (Jesse, 2006) and attempts to fit Irish neutrality into the
appropriate IR theoretical framework of understanding in that light. The deconstruction must be carried out because public attitudes and concepts will inevitably encompass a wide range and variety of conceptions of neutrality, many of which might embody non-realist variables such as norms and identity, concepts that are not current in the dominant academic and elite discourse, but which are nonetheless logical, rational and important to consider in the research approach. The argument of this thesis is that a researcher has to be meta-theoretically aware and IR theoretically pluralist in order to adequately and faithfully approach the under-researched topic of public opinion on Irish neutrality.
CHAPTER TWO:
A COMPARATIVE AND METATHEORETICAL REVIEW OF NEUTRALITY CONCEPTS

*Neutrality is like beauty. To some extent, it transcends an inner spirit, but it is perhaps more clearly reflected in the eyes of the beholder* - (Sundelius, 1987: 9)

*To the extent that Irish neutrality is in the eye of the beholder, Irish neutrality may be fuzzy indeed* - (Keatinge, 1984: 93)

**Introduction**

The focus of this chapter is on the underlying motivations and meanings of neutrality. The goal of this chapter is an initial critique of the various elements of the concept of neutrality, particularly in relation to the content of the concept of neutrality in the ‘Unneutral Ireland’ thesis, its realist basis and the relevance of the conceptual elements to the contemporary situation vis-à-vis Ireland’s current neutrality. This chapter investigates the “meanings” of neutrality in the academic literature, in elite discourse and among the public, together with the motivations among the public for support for neutrality and its significance.

This chapter shows that even before the detailed deconstruction of the Salmon/McSweeney debate in the next chapter and the construction of a structural model of public opinion on Irish neutrality in Chapter Seven, some of the central elements of the “Unneutral Ireland” thesis and its supposed relevance to the Irish contemporary situation can be shown to be extremely debatable. Specifically, these elements are

(i) that there is only one concept of neutrality and it must be state-centric and include a credible self-defence capacity - over and above just ‘staying out of wars’.

(ii) that the central motivation of neutrality is realist – the military security of the state.

(iii) that public opinion is not relevant – it does not constitute neutrality and is not relevant to the state’s adoption of a neutrality policy.

(iv) that in the case of Ireland (this is the elite view), neutrality is just a negotiable, “not part of a military alliance” policy.

(v) that also in the case of Ireland, public opinion is confused, non-rational, and symbolic and hence a) is not practically relevant and b) can be over-ridden.

The arguments and evidence presented in this chapter render the above points questionable.
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF DEFINING NEUTRALITY

It would be impossible, if not foolish, to write a thesis on public attitudes to neutrality without first defining what neutrality is. This task is not as straightforward as it may seem because neutrality, like many seemingly simple political concepts that are frequently talked about, such as democracy and sovereignty, is an essentially contested concept - a concept about which there is no universal agreement. It has been called an “illusive concept”, (Andrén, 1991: 67) and a “wide-ranging, elastic concept” (Joenniemi, 1993: 289). According to Keatinge, “the very term ‘neutrality’…bears more than its fair share of different connotations” (Keatinge, 1984: 3). Nils Andrén described it as “the policy conducted by countries who claim to conduct the policy” (Andrén, 1982: 111; Vukadinovic, 1989: 31). Even as a legal prescription, neutrality is manifested with great empirical variety; Goetschel argues that “neutrality according to international law is a clearly and narrowly defined status which allows the conduct of many different policies of neutrality” (Goetschel, 1999: 118).

It is important to understand the substantive question of public opinion on Irish neutrality in its political context that includes five key issues. First, is the ‘fit’ of neutrality with a European Union (EU) Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) that has the eventual goal of establishing a military defence alliance similar to that of NATO, to include all EU member-states. Second, there is the role public support for neutrality plays in terms of referendum voting behaviour on Treaties of the European Union. The Nice Treaty was rejected in June 2001 due to, in part, perceived threats to neutrality (Sinnott, 2001: v). A subsequent Declaration designed to allay public fears on neutrality attached to the Treaty helped its safe passage in a second referendum in October 2002. Third, is the fact that as a result of the Declaration, the Irish government placed public opinion as a determinant of the future of Irish neutrality due to a promise of a referendum in the event that the members of the Council of the European Union agree to form a military alliance.4 The

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4 The Irish government has officially placed the decision of whether to retain or reject Irish neutrality (or more specifically, the government concept of ‘traditional military neutrality’) with the Irish people through the twenty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution Act (that allowed the state to ratify the Nice Treaty) which refers to the so-called Seville declaration that a referendum will be held in Ireland should the European Union create a European Common Defence alliance (Ireland, Government of. 2002. Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 2002.). Before this, the same promise was made in the 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy that in the event that the European Council sought to form an EU military alliance, a referendum would be held in Ireland: “this will ensure that Ireland’s policy of military neutrality remains unchanged, unless the people themselves decide otherwise” (Ireland, 1996: 147). In a 1996 Irish Times/MRBI poll, the Irish people were asked “do you think that Ireland should maintain its policy of neutrality or should it be changed?”, and 69 per cent of respondents said “maintain”. In the 2001-2002 Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey, the Irish people were asked “where would you place yourself on the following scale of 0 to 10 regarding neutrality? A score of “0” means that you think Ireland must remain neutral in all circumstances, and a
tension underlying these political developments is the fact that a majority of people in Ireland support Irish neutrality (this support is acknowledged by political elites and there is evidence in opinion polls⁵), and the fact that many political elites in Ireland appear to be inclined to support countries at war through the provision of facilities in Ireland, and are in favour of developments at the level of the European Union CESDP that undermine Irish neutrality.

Governments and elites in other European neutral states have indicated a wish to abandon neutrality and, in many cases, militarily align themselves with other states in collective arrangements and institutions. For example, in February 2002, Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson’s government announced a new security doctrine that drops the reference to neutrality, (Möttölä, 2002: 24) prompting commentators to speculate that it opens the door to NATO membership (Monaco and Riggle, 2002) and Kari Möttölä notes that Finland’s security and defence doctrine includes a statement that NATO membership remains an option although it is not on the active policy agenda (Möttölä, 2002: 8). Publics in these states also appear to prefer to retain their neutrality (Austria: (BBC, 2001; Sloan, 1998; Staunton, 1996; Thalberg, 1989: 235-236)) (Sweden: (Åström, 2001; Dahl, 1997)) (Finland: (Stählberg, 1989: 253)) (Switzerland: (Goetschel, Bernath, and Schwarz, 2005: 16; Kappeler, 2000: 6)).

It is worth drawing attention to the political context of neutrality in other Member States such as Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland. Before continuing with this discussion, however, it is necessary to outline and address the two issues cited above, that (1) the provision of facilities in Ireland, and (2) developments at the level of the European Union CESDP violate neutrality, as there is much controversy and debate over such claims, and to establish their effect on the status of neutrality and public opinion.

The provision of facilities in Ireland
It is held that providing facilities at Shannon for the US military is a violation of Irish neutrality. Certainly, the accepted 1907 Hague Convention doctrine of neutrality does not permit overflights or the use of landing facilities by belligerents in a neutral state.

score of “10” means that you think Ireland should give up its neutrality⁵, and 57% of people in Ireland felt Ireland must remain neutral in all circumstances (with a score of 0-4).

⁵ In a 1999 speech to the Irish Council for the European Movement, the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern talked about “our declared policy of positive neutrality, to which there is a continuing strong attachment. You do not have to be a politician to know that. The polls done by political parties and others show those figures so I do not think that there is any debate about that. I have very recent figures on that to show what the figures are so I think that there is no argument about the publics view on that” (Ahern, Bertie. 1999. (Verbatim) Opening Address at a European Movement National Conference on Partnership for Peace. Paper read at European Movement National Conference on Partnership for Peace, 29 March, at Burlington Hotel.. The words in italics are the verbatim speech, which is different to the official speech, available at http://www.irlgov.ie/taoiseach/press/current/29-03-99.htm. The verbatim speech was made available after the Conference by the Irish Council for the European Movement.
The editorial of the Irish Times summed up the events of 2003, when the US and its allies invaded Iraq: “Mr Ahern went to Washington and confirmed that Shannon could be used as a staging-post by US military aircraft, in the absence of a UN mandate for war. Earlier, opinion polls had indicated that 54 per cent of the electorate were opposed to such a concession. But with the Tánaiste and leader of the Progressive Democrats, Ms Harney, in firm support, the gesture was made. The development stretched the concept of Irish neutrality to breaking point and brought about 100,000 people onto the streets of Dublin in protest” (Kennedy, 2003).

There was a doubling of military activity in Irish airspace coinciding with the start of US and British military operations in the Gulf (Clonan, 2005) 50, 914 US troops passed through Shannon Airport in the first four months of 2003: “this compares to 73,000 military personnel that passed through Shannon during 2002, which earned Aer Rianta’s Shannon operation €9 million. According to an Aer Rianta spokeswoman, transit movements through the airport increased during April with the return of World Airways, North American and Miami Air International operating through Shannon. All three commercial airlines are employed by the US military to transport troops and were involved in the build-up to the US war against Iraq” (Deegan, 2003). Tom Clonan points out that the Irish taxpayer is funding the US military overflights, as “the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA), under Government direction, is providing navigation support – free of charge – to US military aircraft passing through our airspace on their way to Iraq”, (Clonan, 2005), although a poll showed that Irish people do not support the use of Shannon by US military (Reilly and Lavery, 2003).

Minister for Transport, Mr. Martin Cullen, endorsed the transit of US troops through Shannon airport, saying it was “good for business” (Clonan, 2005). The Taoiseach Bertie Ahern refused to stop the transit of troops through Shannon, claiming it would be a ‘hostile act’ (Crowley, 2003). He also argued that Britain and the US “are our biggest trading partners. They are the biggest foreign investors in the Irish economy. They are host to the biggest Irish communities overseas. They share many of our political and civic values. They are particularly worthy of our understanding where such understanding is appropriate” (O'Regan, Legal advice is that landings are constitutional, 2003). In a television interview, (FitzGerald, 2003) Garret FitzGerald defined foreign policy as the “interests of the State”, arguing that foreign policy is not “about values or ideals”. He also claimed that US Republicans would be “influenced emotionally” about their foreign investment decisions if Ireland were neutral during the Iraq war and, consequently, refused the transit of US troops and munitions.
Labour Party TD Mr. Pat Rabbitte argued, “it is spurious to suggest that US multinational investment in Ireland would flee if our Government had the courage to assert our traditional neutrality in the face of an unsanctioned war” (O'Regan, Claim on withdrawal of investment 'spurious', 2003). Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Brian Cowen, declared the government must “define neutrality in a very complex set of circumstances; the value of international friendships and the expectations that come with those friendships” (Hennessy, Coalition has easy victory but emotion runs high, 2003). There is no doubt that the Irish Government is well aware that providing these facilities to the US violates the accepted legal concept of neutrality, the concept of active neutrality, in fact all concepts of neutrality, bar the Irish Government’s concept defined as staying out of military alliances.

Ireland is the only neutral state in Europe to permit use of its airspace to US forces engaged in the Iraq war. “Austria, Sweden and Finland have made it clear that they regard military action against Iraq without a fresh UN resolution as illegal and that they will not help Washington’s war effort in any way” (Staunton, Europe's neutral firm on no US overflights, 2003). Austria’s National Security Council agreed on January 29th 2003 that any form of assistance to a military campaign without an explicit UN mandate would breach the country’s neutrality. In the event of war, Austria would forbid the transport of military equipment through its territory and deny the US and its allies over-fly rights through its airspace (Staunton, Europe's neutral firm on no US overflights, 2003).

Seemingly then, neutrality is important enough to be adhered to in times of war, despite the peace-time developments that, if realised, will result in the end of neutrality in Europe as it is known. This tension is one of the marked idiosyncrasies of the political context of neutrality in Europe.

**Support for European Union developments**

With regard to the second issue, there is significant elite support for developments at the level of the European Union CESDP that violate neutrality. “Mr Gustaf Hagglund, chairman of the EU Military Committee, confirmed that NATO and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) would merge within a decade” – (Gormley, 2003) - this development will mean that Ireland, as part of the European Security and Defence

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This argument appears to be backed up by the response of the US businessman Mr. Jack Welch to the direct question posed by David McWilliams on TV3’s Agenda programme on 2nd March 2003, as to whether Ireland’s neutrality in the US-led war against Iraq and refusal of the use of Shannon would affect the decisions of US business people to invest in Ireland; Mr. Welch, former CEO of General Electric in the US, confirmed that Irish neutrality would make no difference whatsoever to US investment decisions. He explained that people do business in Ireland because it is profitable and US businesses will continue to invest in Ireland as long as it is profitable, regardless of Irish foreign policy or Ireland’s decision to be neutral and prohibit the transport of troops and munitions through Shannon airport.
Policy, will also become a member of NATO, unless Ireland opts out of the ESDP, as Denmark did, after the Danish people rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum.

There are many elites in Ireland who support these developments that will have serious consequences for Irish neutrality. In 2000, Fine Gael published a policy document called “Beyond Neutrality”, which both advocates the creation of a European Defence entity and Irish participation in it. In 2003, it was reported that “Fine Gael has become the first Irish political party to call for the abandonment of traditional military neutrality, saying Ireland should sign up to a European defence structure and substantially increase its defence spending….Fine Gael has endorsed a document from its foreign affairs spokesman, Mr. Gay Mitchell, saying neutrality is no longer a viable position”7 (Brennock, FG calls for State to abandon neutrality, 2003). Mr Mitchell advocated revisiting the Western European Union (WEU) Treaty’s Article Five, which requires signatory states to provide automatic military assistance to each other if attacked and suggested that Ireland could propose to adopt article five as a “protocol” on the basis that any military assistance provided to other states would be at the government’s own discretion8 (Kelly, 2003).

In 2006, during the debate on the second stage of the Defence (Amendment) Bill 2006, members of Fine Gael made clear their wishes to get rid of the “triple lock” on Irish troops participating in overseas military operations (2006) (characterised as a “political straightjacket”) (FineGael, 2003: 13) which provides that the Defence Forces can only take part in military operations that are endorsed by a UN resolution, approved by Dáil Éireann and agreed within the Government.

In contrast, the Minister for Defence, Mr. Willie O’Dea maintained that, “it is our adherence to the triple-lock mechanism that expresses our commitment to military neutrality and the United Nations” (O’Dea, 2006). Before the debate on the Bill, pro-neutrality parties, such as the Green Party, articulated the pressure from elites, both in Ireland and in the EU, to get rid of the triple lock, and argued that such a move would have a serious effect on Irish neutrality (Gormley, Enshrine triple lock in Constitution, 2006) and would dispose of the requirement for a UN mandate for Irish Defence Forces operations, (UN peacekeeping is a traditional element of Irish neutrality, and a core element of ‘active’ neutrality). The Green Party called for the triple-lock to be enshrined in the Constitution, but this was rejected by the Government (Gormley, Enshrine triple lock in Constitution, 2006). The difference in policies in relation to neutrality and the triple lock between the Fianna Fáil-led government and Fine Gael

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7 Although Fine Gael party members are on balance in favour of keeping neutrality (Marsh and Gallagher, 2002: 161).
8 Notably, the NATO Article V guarantee of military assistance is also at a government’s discretion.
opposition party have become explicit in a particularly fraught political context, so much so that if there is ever a time when Irish neutrality should be an election issue, it is at the 2007 election. Nonetheless, there is a paradox at the heart of the Fianna Fáil discourse on preserving the triple-lock and the importance of UN approval of military action in the face of assistance to the US at Shannon in a war that, in the opinion of many commentators, has not been sanctioned by the UN.

The Defence (Amendment) Bill 2006 was introduced in order to facilitate participation by Irish troops in the EU’s battlegroups (Ireland, 2006) and, according to the Green Party, effectively destroys the triple lock and dilutes Irish neutrality (Gormley, Defence Bill diluting our long-cherised neutrality, 2006). The Bill was passed with the support of Fine Gael and Labour in July 2006. PANA campaigner and former UN peacekeeper Edward Horgan argues that none of the battlegroups already in place have requirements for UN approval before being deployed and that this is a breach of the UN Charter, which dictates that military force may only be used outside state borders in self-defence or with UN approval (Horgan, 2006). The loss of the triple lock and participation in EU battlegroups without a genuine UN mandate (through a resolution) is incompatible with the fundamental concept of active Irish neutrality, but, as the Opinion piece in the Irish Times on Ireland’s participation in the EU battlegroups points out, these developments do not affect the concept of neutrality “defined minimalistically by the Government as non-participation in military alliances” (Kennedy, 2006). Thus, the role of the concept of neutrality is key to the debate and is set to become even more important in a potential struggle over neutrality in the future.

In support of explicit elite desires to abandon neutrality, (Dahl, 1997: 177), elites in other European states are also involved in a reformulation of the concept of neutrality (Dahl, 1997) that may contradict public concepts of neutrality, including the concept of active neutrality. As will be discussed in the next chapter, pro-CESDP/NATO elites in Ireland have spread a discourse from an academic thesis arguing that Irish neutrality is a myth into the public domain through writing in newspapers and through television and radio interviews. The content of the concept of neutrality is central to the arguments made in the pro-neutrality and “Unneutral Ireland” discourses. The concept of neutrality is also important because it is a signifier of a bridge between attitude and worldview and is a determinant of policy (McSweeney, 1999: 82). The alternative thesis that Irish neutrality exists is based on a very different concept of neutrality to that in the “unneutral” and anti-neutrality discourses, a thesis that does not seem to get as much press in Ireland as the “Unneutral” discourse (see Table 3.1,
the Deconstruction Summary table in the next chapter. See also the results of google.scholar.com search in Appendix B/C that shows the lack of citations of this thesis (aside from the 2006 Irish Studies in International Affairs article based on Chapter Three of this thesis).

To summarise, the definition of neutrality is malleable because it exists within, and is empirically determined by, government and non-government speech acts and governments’ foreign policy actions (that are usually derived from their ‘interests’ and fluid interpretation of international relations and events such as wars). A battle over the conceptualisation and characterisation of neutrality can be found at the level of empirical discourses of Irish and European elites. And in the longer term view, the existence of different types of neutrality at different periods (MacGinty, 1995: 129) means that neutrality is a concept flexible according to time and environment. For example, there are a number of changes in the nature of the concept that are articulated in relation to the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War world – the idea of a peacetime (less legalistic) formulation of neutrality; the concept of ‘active’ neutrality; the notion of neutrality as an element of national identity, etc.

Bias is inevitable in the formulation of concepts and in the evaluation of any state’s practice of neutrality. Karsh admits this to a degree in the preamble to his analysis of neutrality, in which he considers, “by way of developing a research tool for the examination of the political value of neutrality, one must adopt a ‘biased’ approach and somewhat arbitrarily delineate the spirit of neutrality in a way that enables one to distinguish clearly between the failure of neutrality on the legal plane, and its political failure as a foreign policy instrument” (Karsh, 1988: 21). As Sundelius (Sundelius, 1987: 9) surmises in the introductory quotation to this chapter, neutrality, like beauty, is very much in the eye of the beholder.

In the academic discourse, it will be seen that any definition of neutrality in the academic discourse is inextricably linked to a worldview, for example, a theoretical paradigm of the state and international relations. Different theoretical standpoints give rise to different interpretations of the concept of neutrality. Problems arise, particularly for a study of public opinion on Irish neutrality, in a situation whereby the dominant or hegemonic worldview makes a particular definition of neutrality appear ‘fixed’, natural and legitimate, which frustrates efforts to problematise the concept and criticise the discourses in which the concept is situated, and to formulate relevant hypotheses on the ‘rationality’ of public opinion.
Attention now turns to the literature on neutrality to see how other academics have defined neutrality and what they might have said about Irish neutrality. The chapter will take the definitions from over a dozen authors that include a mix of academics and policy advocates, and examines whether there is a pattern of variables evident in the definitions of neutrality, whether the perspectivism of the author is acknowledged, and whether attention to the role of the public is evident in the concept. Reference will be made to the ontology, epistemology and IR theoretical assumptions associated with the definitions. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the variability in concepts and to seek to understand this variability through the IR theoretical perspective of the author. The analysis shows that the lack of acknowledgement of the IR theoretical perspective, particularly by analysts of Irish neutrality, and the dominance of the realist approach in the accounts of Irish neutrality fails to capture a sufficiently pluralist, reflective academic concept with which to compare with public and government concepts. The realist analytical consensus that neutrality means the absence of military alliance membership in the Irish neutrality analyses makes it, at best, more difficult to understand the public concepts of neutrality and at worst, leads to the dismissal of the public concepts that contain a broader concept that reflects elements of the active neutrality concept advocated by a social constructivist approach.

The Irish government definitions will be sourced through the 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy and various discourses in print and radio interviews. The Irish public definitions will be sourced from a data review of opinion polls from 1985 to 2001. The comparison of Irish public concepts of Irish neutrality with those of the government and academics will inform conclusions as to the ‘rationality’ of public opinion on Irish neutrality. The summary of public concepts will also indicate the relevance of the realist “unneutral” concept of neutrality.

**APPROACHES AND DEFINITIONS IN THE COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE**

By and large, the literature under review can be characterised as empirical, comparative case-study analyses. There is little or no substantial theoretical examination or identification in terms of IR theory approaches whilst many have assumed a neorealist or realist outlook on neutrality. Several of the comparative analyses (Karsh, 1988; Salmon, 1989) contain a concept of neutrality formulated for the purposes of deciding whether states are real or successful neutrals. Notably, there are some binaries evident in some of the discussions of neutrality, for example,
idealistic and realist, or active and passive, which are useful tools to categorize and capture the contested and IR theory-embedded nature of the concept.

This section will briefly examine the work of political science academics in Ireland concerning concepts of neutrality, specifically, that of Patrick Keatinge, (Keatinge, 1973, 1978, 1984). Róisín Doherty, (Doherty, 2002) including a brief synopsis of Trevor C. Salmon and Bill McSweeney. The latter two academics are only discussed briefly because the deconstruction in the next chapter deals with each of their concepts of neutrality in more theoretical detail. (The fourth chapter will analyse Irish neutrality in greater empirical detail, based largely on the historical accounts of Irish neutrality (Carroll, 1975; Duggan, 1985; Dwyer, 1977; Fisk, 1983). The concern of this section of the chapter is also to examine what the literature outside Ireland says about the definition of neutrality. A range of perspectives are covered, in terms of IR theory realist (Doherty, including Salmon) and non-realist (including McSweeney) Goetschel, Kronsell and Svedberg) conceptions, in terms of general ‘textbook’ politics literatures (Calvocoressi, Vayrynen) and in-depth expert analysis (Jessup and Deak), and finally, in terms of what comparative analysts have said about the motivations of Irish neutrality (Andrén, Ogley, Pentillä).

**Patrick Keatinge – neoliberal Irish neutrality analysis**

Although Keatinge notes that neutrality, like other apparently simple political labels, bears more than its fair share of different connotations, he states, “the essence of neutrality is not being involved in wars between other states, a condition which has strict legal basis in the Fifth and Thirteenth Hague Conventions of 1907” (Keatinge, 1984: 3). Keatinge’s work is important to the question of public attitudes to Irish neutrality because, although neutrality ‘essentially describes the behaviour of governments’ (Keatinge, 1984: 6), he suggests that neutrality also exists in the general discourse as a political value, separate from state policy, derived from two ideological sources: (1) nationalism, whereby neutrality is a manifestation of separate cultural identity and independent statehood and (2) European liberalism in the cosmopolitan tradition – this view posits the futility and immorality of force/harmony of interests of mankind and argues that alliances increase insecurity. Both types (self-regarding and universal pacifism), function as justifications for neutrality, and converge in general public debate. He concludes, ‘given the range of meanings…an examination of the Irish case…admits no straightforward approach’ (Keatinge, 1984: 7).

Keatinge identifies three distinct stages of Irish neutrality, the first of which is the existence of neutrality as a fundamental concept and political value before Ireland’s
independence, and he notes the failed attempts to translate this into policy (Keatinge, 1984: 10). During the pre-independence era, Irish republicans were strongly associated with advocating neutrality as a political value for a future Irish state. Keatinge also argues that a national tradition of neutrality was laid down after World War II: “Although in 1939 de Valera had disclaimed ‘adherence to some kind of theoretical, abstract idea of neutrality’, by 1945 the basis for a national tradition of neutrality, both as a value and a policy, had been laid; an orthodoxy, if not a dogma, had been established” (Keatinge, 1984: 10). And in the third stage, in the context of European integration, Irish neutrality, he argues, entailed a different experience to that of other European neutrals, and later, it became a very political issue (Keatinge, 1984: 10). In this respect, he argues, “to the extent that neutrality is in the eye of the beholder Irish neutrality may be fuzzy indeed” (Keatinge, 1984: 93).

Keatinge appears to be the only significant academic (aside from McSweeney) to acknowledge levels of analysis beyond the state and he does not appear to sign up to structural realism’s determinacy of the international system as the major factor driving neutrality, certainly in the Irish case. He argues,

the continued existence of Ireland’s neutrality, as that of any other country, depends to a large degree on external factors, such as the general configuration of power and the credibility which a particular neutrality policy enjoys in the eyes of the major states. But it cannot be explained wholly in such a deterministic way, for this is both a freedom of, and necessity for skill in, diplomatic manoeuvre in the presentation of a credible neutral stance. The effectiveness of this diplomacy in turn depends largely on the internal dynamism of neutrality, that is to say on the strength of the popular demand to be neutral. The external credibility of neutrality is thus linked to internal legitimacy; the state’s foreign policy ultimately rests on domestic political values. The credibility of neutrality therefore is a function of the clarity of its articulation and the extent to which it is supported in party and electoral politics (Keatinge, 1984: 99).

Keatinge, thus, seriously considers the role of sub-state actors and public opinion in Irish neutrality, to the extent that he identifies a divergence of public and government concepts and attitudes towards neutrality and conceives of neutrality as a political value (Keatinge, 1984: 6-7) (each of which is discussed in detail later). It appears Keatinge is closest to a neoliberal IR theoretical position in his analysis of Irish neutrality.
Trevor C. Salmon – realist Irish neutrality analysis
Salmon draws on the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and their subsequent refinements through the Declaration of London in 1909 to argue, “what had emerged as the essence of neutrality was abstention, the inviolability of neutral territory, and impartiality. Each of these aspects had associated with it a number of rights and duties (Salmon, 1989: 11)...including the recognition of neutral status by belligerents, the disavowal of external help, the freedom of decision and action in the political economic and military spheres” (Salmon, 1989: 79-80). As will be argued in the next chapter, Salmon’s concept of neutrality is (neo)realist in terms of the assumptions underpinning it; he argues it is an inherently passive concept (Salmon, 1989: 26).
Although he discusses the notion of “active and independent foreign policies” of the three European neutrals (Austria, Sweden and Switzerland) (Salmon, 1989: 50), he rubbishes the notion of active neutrality (Salmon, 1989: 311). His is a strict legalistic concept that, unacknowledged in this thesis, all European neutrals had violated in some way during World War II. The purpose of the analysis is to “prove” Irish neutrality is a myth, and the concept is employed and interpreted in different ways in support of that goal.

Róisín Doherty – realist Irish neutrality analysis
From the outset, Doherty does not offer a definition of neutrality: “this study does not aim to analyse the meaning or relevance of neutrality in the post-Cold War context” (Doherty, 2002: 3). Neither does the author try to make a concerted academic effort to define neutrality: “It should be noted that the research does not define neutrality in an intellectual way...” (Doherty, 2002: 2). Instead she assumes the narrow, governmental/realist elite definition of ‘non membership of a military alliance’, as neutrality. As Doherty puts it, “the end of [neutrals’] status would be membership of a military alliance and the research proceeds from this assumption” (Doherty, 2002: 3). Notably, the opening remarks made about Irish neutrality state that Ireland is “a special case”, and that Ireland applies neutrality “in a unique way”, (Doherty, 2002: 8) echoing the standard Unneutral Ireland discourse that Ireland, with respect to neutrality, is “sui generis”.

This is a marker for the realist discourse on neutrality that follows, with the same internal inconsistencies and unsupported statements about Irish neutrality that feature in the Unneutral Ireland discourse, that are dealt with in great theoretical detail in the next chapter. They are: (1) distinguishing Irish neutrality from the neutrality of the other neutral states after World War Two on the basis that Irish neutrality is “not
required for state security” (Doherty, 2002: 18), with the failure to recognise Irish neutrality as a set of foreign policy values or foreign policy identity for the state and the people. (2) The allegations of the dubiousness of Irish neutrality during World War Two that are not made with respect to other neutral states, despite those latter states exhibiting the same behaviour. Doherty argues: “Ireland’s neutrality was extremely benevolent towards the allies to the extent that it is doubtful whether Ireland should be described as neutral or simply as non belligerent” (Doherty, 2002: 13, 17), although it is noted in an endnote that Swiss neutrality in World War Two was “maintained with some difficulty” (Doherty, 2002: 26), and the same is said about Sweden’s neutrality (Doherty, 2002: 13). Furthermore, it is also recognised that “other neutrals also co-operated with the belligerents in order to preserve the essence of their neutrality” (Doherty, 2002: 34), but the argument that “a precedence was set with regard to the flexibility of Irish neutrality” (Doherty, 2002: 13) is not applied to the cases of Swiss or Swedish neutrality. (3) “The lack of a credible defence” (Doherty, 2002: 18) and (4) allegations of a lack of impartiality in claims that Ireland voted in the UN “more often than not with the US” (Doherty, 2002: 18), although it is noted later on that “Ireland’s voting behaviour shows similarity with that of Sweden”, a “genuine” neutral state in Doherty’s thesis (Doherty, 2002: 47-48).

There are a significant number of other Unneutral/(neo)realist characteristics that are re-constituted in Doherty’s analysis, such as the characterisation of neutrality’s “enduring appeal” to “the public imagination” on the basis of “emotional resonance”; (Doherty, 2002: 30). The public opinion-Plato’s Cave analogy (Doherty, 2002: 42); the myth of de Valera’s condolences for Hitler’s death (Doherty, 2002: 40); the claim that partition was the key reason for Ireland’s refusal to join NATO (Doherty, 2002: 45) and that it had nothing to do with neutrality, (Doherty, 2002: 46), including the comment on McBride’s attempts to formulate a bilateral defence pact with the US and the comment by Lemass in a United States newspaper about yielding a technical label of neutrality (Doherty, 2002: 51) and the empirical tables of comparative “military strength” (Doherty, 2002: 38). Finally, there is an interesting pattern of citing “one commentator” anonymously in the text (Doherty, 2002: 43) that appears in the relevant endnote references as Trevor Salmon and the Unneutral Ireland thesis.

Doherty argues that “there is no checklist of measures against which to define neutrality in peacetime”, (Doherty, 2002: 10). Yet McSweeney offers one in a monograph Doherty cites in a different context later on. Doherty does acknowledge there is a “set of norms” with respect to peacetime neutrality, but argues those norms are interpreted so differently so as to give rise to different policies of neutrality.
Although the plan of the book includes a “general discussion on Irish attitudes towards neutrality from the period before 1939 until 1992”, (Doherty, 2002: 6), these attitudes concern those of Irish elites or government – not those of the Irish public or non-government organisations that support Irish neutrality.

The author explains that, “Domestic constraints such as public opinion and the impact of coalition politics or lobby groups will be examined where they are relevant in chapters 6, 8 and 9 but they are not the focus of the study” (Doherty, 2002: 2). This focus on the elite level is another feature of the book’s (neo)realist, institutionalist perspective.

Finally, a core objective of the book is that, “the neutrals will be analysed with respect to the security architecture and EU integration in order to chart changes in the concept of neutrality”, (Doherty, 2002) signalling that the subject matter is not neutrality per se, but rather, it is how neutrality has prevented Ireland from full participation in EU security structures (a classic elite perspective associated with the classification of Irish public adherence to neutrality as ‘emotional’). As a result, the monograph does not contribute towards a survey of definition of neutrality either in the context of public opinion or in terms other than that of the realist discourse on Irish neutrality; a discourse that is based on the assumption that neutrality means simply “non-membership of a military alliance”.

**Harto Hakovirta – soft-realist, comparative/internationalist neutrality analysis**

For Hakovirta, “neutrality takes its identity mainly from norms…the development of norms is a major indicator of the viability of neutrality as an institution or foreign-policy option…without a modest degree of clarity neutrality cannot maintain its viability for long. Some degree of clarity is necessary for any meaningful assessment for the neutral states’ policies” (Hakovirta, 1988: 14). Hakovirta has identified the positivist, essentialist predicament for any empirical investigation, analysis or evaluation of neutrality, as practiced by states. The approach that conceptual clarity is the ontological basis of neutrality can be used politically because the corollary of allegations of the fuzziness of a concept, ‘proven’ or otherwise, is that the neutrality does not exist. That is why distinguishing Irish neutrality from ‘the norm’ of the neutrality of the other European states is such a successful strategy, in terms of attempting to achieve the goal of extinguishing Irish neutrality. This is why the deconstruction and comparative section in the last chapter are so important, as well as feeding into the evaluation of the hypothesis of the mainstream “uneutral” discourse that the Irish public hold non-rational attitudes to neutrality.
In terms of a definition, he suggests, “originally, neutrality meant abstention in the sense of non-participation in wars waged by other states. This core idea has remained clear and indisputable…from the eighteenth century onwards the original idea of neutrality as non-participation in war was gradually complemented by the concept of impartiality, meaning equal treatment of belligerents” (Hakovirta, 1988: 14-15). The importance of the role of the ‘domestic aspects’ of neutrality is epistemologically and methodologically determined and then excluded, in that he claims, “the effort to maintain the focus on the comparative patterns of neutral foreign policy means that the domestic aspects receive less attention than their role as explanatory and consequent factors of individual neutral policies would suggest” (Hakovirta, 1988: 6). Hakovirta does discuss the basic structure of the international system as determined by power-centres or poles it contains, (Hakovirta, 1988: 37), and the analysis does largely remain at the state-level, but the fact that it does mention and import meaning to a number of elements of the sub-state level of analysis, including the divergence of public opinion and state policy in Alliance states, the non-legal aspects of neutrality, the identity of neutral states and the practice of peacetime neutrality, means that Hakovirta’s analysis of European neutrality appears to be ‘soft-realist’ or liberal internationalist.

Efraim Karsh – realist comparative/internationalist neutrality analysis

Karsh suggests that most of the literature on the subject of neutrality consists of either abstract theoretical cases evaluating the correspondence of neutrality to international co-operation and participation in organisations, or “concrete historical cases” describing the experience of specific states in a given war (Karsh, 1988: 5). To fill this vacuum, Karsh concentrates on the political aspects of neutrality in his book. Karsh aims to determine ‘the spirit of neutrality’, the ‘fundamental principles underlying the idea of neutrality, the violation of which, either by the neutral state or the belligerents, is considered a failure of, or conversely, departure from neutral policy’ (Karsh, 1988: 21). Karsh differentiates between the external violation of neutrality on the part of a belligerent, and internal violations of neutrality on the part of the neutral state (Karsh, 1988: 22). The former concerns “any and all steps taken by the belligerent camps that in some way transfer the war to the territory of the neutral state (on land, sea or in the air) against its will, constitute violations of the spirit of neutrality and will be viewed as external violations” (Karsh, 1988: 22). With regard to the latter element of neutrality, “the essence of the spirit of neutrality relates to the principle of impartiality which dictates the behaviour of the neutral state towards the belligerents….the principle of impartiality does not apply to the
ideological sphere of the policy of neutrality, but only to the operational level” (Karsh, 1988: 23).

In terms of a definition, Karsh proposes

the scholar of international relations seeking to understand the essence of neutrality should go the way of Machiavelli and assess the political value of the idea. For, ultimately, neutrality is not an abstract philosophical notion. Rather it is a legal institution that took form over many generations of social and political activity, and which is linked integrally to the most acute mode of this activity, war. More precisely, neutrality is nothing but an attempt, institutionalised in international law, to find a solution to one of the most fundamental problems of the state: maintaining its independence and sovereignty in wartime (Karsh, 1988: 5).

In this respect, Karsh follows a genealogical method, although initially he appears to take an essentialist stab at defining the “hardcore” concept, he latterly appears to entertain a multi-faceted view of the manifestations of the concept. He argues (emphasis added),

By focusing on the political aspects of neutrality, this study consciously avoids an inquiry into the full scope and significance of neutrality as a legal institution and societal phenomenon. It is, however, believed that *through such a relatively narrow focus one may be able to reach the hard core of neutrality*, and to seek to determine the degree of correlation that exists in reality between neutrality as an idea, a world view, a legal institution – and the foreign policy goals that this idea seeks to attain (Karsh, 1988: 5).

Karsh analyses the historical experience of six small neutral states – Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Norway, Spain and Ireland – during World War II, in order to evaluate the operative components of the policy of neutrality, and the way in which neutrality aided or hindered the small state in preserving its independence and sovereignty (Karsh, 1988: 6-7). He states, “four of the six states, Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland and Spain, successfully maintained their neutrality” – (Karsh, 1988: 7). Seemingly then, Karsh considers Ireland as a neutral, and a successful one at that.
Acknowledging the non-realist aspects of neutrality, Karsh posits neutrality as, ‘a policy which rejects the use of physical force for the advancement of foreign policy goals’ (Karsh, 1988: 1) and he finds that neutral “states reject the image of neutrality as immoral; rather they see the aspiration to avoid being dragged into the wars of others as a natural and logical goal” (Karsh, 1988: 2) – indicating that part of the definition concerns staying out of wars.

**Bill McSweeney – social constructivist analysis of Irish neutrality**

McSweeney has written a chapter on “the case for active Irish neutrality”, in which he identifies the characteristics of active neutrality. Chief among them are primacy of the United Nations, as “active neutrality represents an ideal of the United Nations, a foreign policy wholly in line with the aims of the Charter” (McSweeney, 1985: 185). Active neutrality involves the setting up of nuclear-free zones and tries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons (McSweeney, 1985: 186). Active neutrality adds to the fact of being non-nuclear the additional fact of not being part of the confrontation between superpowers, and, therefore, a potential recipient of their nuclear weapons” (McSweeney, 1985: 187). Active neutrality demands “working for a UN definition of neutrality which specifies indicators of active peacemaking involvement and of the nature of internal military defence which will distinguish active neutrality from the narrow isolationist policy which is not compatible with the United Nations” and calls for “ideally, the reservation of UN peacekeeping to nations which conform to a UN standard of active neutrality” (McSweeney, 1985: 187).

Active neutrality involves ways “to guarantee its non-aggressive nature for neighbouring territories” (McSweeney, 1985: 188). This means military capability is contrived so as to be sufficient to provide for territorial defence. For McSweeney, the primary objective of territorial defence is to provide a deterrence adequate to the realistic assessment of external threat and the needs of internal confidence (McSweeney, 1985: 190). McSweeney argues, “military training should be consistent with the military goals of active neutrality. Territorial defence requires a different kind of soldier, with different attitudes and expectations…the creation of new links with Swiss and Swedish training schools would afford some compensation for abandoning those informal arrangements with NATO countries which the army is understandably secretive about today” (McSweeney, 1985: 189). Finally, he surmises “it would be good to feel that Irish nationalism could serve the needs of active neutrality, supplying the energy and commitment for territorial defence. Nationalism is about fighting for one’s country; it resists foreign alliances. But active neutrality is not about fighting for one’s country except as a last resort and it is primarily about
foreign alliances and commitments which make the policy work to its benefit” (McSweeney, 1985: 195-196). As will be discussed in the next chapter, McSweeney rejects the static, objective idea of neutrality that is pervasive in the literature, and instead conceives of neutrality as a fluid concept of ‘active’ neutrality that ‘relates to a wide range of activities and skills’ such as those mentioned above (McSweeney, 1985: 182).

**Laurent Goetschel – non-realist, comparative/internationalist neutrality analysis**

For Goetschel, “being neutral means not taking part in military conflict” (Goetschel, 1999: 119). Goetschel’s approach to analysing neutrality has shades of critical social constructivism because he takes a critical view of the recent (post-Cold War) literature and the negative sentiment underlying attitudes to neutrality into account in his discussions. He is aware of the dominance of realism and focuses on the role of identity in the adherence to and practice of neutrality. He notes, it is “striking that neutrality has almost disappeared as a research object in international relations in this high time of norms, values and identity” (Goetschel, 1999: 132).

He considers the distinction between neutrality’s ‘normative political core and its legal dimension’ (Goetschel, 1999: 131). Goetschel argues for the ascendance of an idealist role conception of neutral states:

I argue that, due to the evolution of the international system, role conceptions of neutral states linked to their non-participation in a military conflict (realistic roles) have lost their significance. However, the same does not count for the role conceptions of neutral states which reflect an attempt to transcend traditional war conditions between states (idealistic roles) (Goetschel, 1999: 121).

In many respects his position is similar to that of McSweeney and others in their promotion of the concept of active neutrality. Of particular importance to the question of understanding Irish attitudes to neutrality is the centrality for Goetschel of the role of identity in the neutrality of post-Cold War Europe; he argues, “the reason the principle of neutrality continues to exist after the ending of the Cold War is because its most important function is to provide identity” (Goetschel, 1999: 155). This identity embodies a range of values that underpins a particular foreign policy agenda.
Edgar Bonjour – non-realist/theoretically pluralist Swiss neutrality analysis
Edgar Bonjour writes in the Second World War period and, interestingly, appears at many points to offer an interpretation of neutrality from the point of view of the people in Switzerland. He defines neutrality somewhat in his discussions of Swiss neutrality:

In the present grave anxiety for the life and the future of their native country, the Swiss have the right to regard neutrality in the first place as a mere means of self-preservation, of the preservation of their political independence and national character, without being obliged to justify, let alone extenuate, that axiom by works of philanthropy. In a world which has failed to put super-national law into action and knows no super-national means of keeping the law and preserving peace, the Swiss may have no qualms in refusing to wage war in the interests of a so-called “collective security”. It must, however, be said at once and most emphatically that neutrality properly understood and practiced expresses the moral convictions of the Swiss… (Bonjour, 1946: 126).

In some ways then, Bonjour’s analysis echoes some elements of Irish public opinion of neutrality and the cosmopolitan interpretation alluded to by McSweeney and Keatinge: he argues the Swiss “still cannot bring themselves to believe that the worth of a people depends on the number of its guns and soldiers; it depends on the principles that people embodies and actively practises. In the Confederation, those principles lie in the domain of universal morality; it is that which gives Swiss neutrality its nobility and its right to survive” (Bonjour, 1946: 129-130). He considers that “the idea of Swiss neutrality is actually almost coeval with the idea of a Swiss nation”, (Bonjour, 1946: 11), and comes closest to a definition in the description of Swiss neutrality, in that it “did not completely cut Switzerland off from the outside world, but protected her from military embroilments” (Bonjour, 1946: 20).

Kronsell and Svedberg – non-realist, Swedish neutrality analysis
Kronsell and Svedberg back up this proposition in their analysis of neutrality as Swedish identity projected into the world. They argue,

Neutrality and folkhemmet are the two central dimensions of nationalism. A collective identity was shaped by the neutrality doctrine and the building of the welfare state… in other words, the political discourse of what constitutes Sweden, or the representation of Sweden’s self-image, consisted of two,
separate, albeit interconnected dimensions: an external one and an internal one. Applying Ole Wæver’s words to a Swedish context, the neutrality doctrine can be seen as “the state’s external projection of itself into the world (Wæver, forthcoming) (Kronsell and Svedberg, 154).

Kronsell and Svedberg confirm Goetschel’s identification of the discourse that “today, neutrality as a political doctrine has lost much of its long-standing salience. Still the strong ties between the policy of neutrality and Swedish national identity may explain why in the debate on Sweden’s future security arrangement, the idea of Sweden as a neutral power in world affairs still occupies an important position” (Kronsell and Svedberg, 155).

Kronsell and Svedberg’s explanation of the continuing presence of neutrality in the Swedish foreign policy discourse has parallels to the situation in Ireland, in which the strong ties of the values and identity of the Irish people with neutrality are apparent. These ties will be explored further in the second half of this thesis. The identity dynamic is supported in hypotheses from the historical analysts of Irish neutrality. For example, it is argued by Patrick O’Mahony and Gerard Delanty that “neutrality perfectly served the cultural aspirations of the new state….it was also an opportunity to re-assert the code of national identity as rejection of the outsider” (O’Mahony and Delanty, 2001: 155). The historian Nicholas Mansergh surmises, “in the last analysis Irish neutrality was an expression of national feeling. Unable for so long to decide the course their country should follow, Irishmen were determined that in these momentous years their independence of action should be asserted so that all the world might understand that Ireland’s destiny lay in the hands of her own people” (Mansergh, 1946: 94). Thus, Kronsell and Svedberg’s characterisation of the function of Swedish neutrality as the external identity of the state for the Swedish people resonates in the case of Ireland. Whether the identity function of Irish neutrality identified in Irish historical analyses is also identified in the motivations of Irish neutrality presented in non-Irish comparative analyses of neutrality is a question considered in the next section.

**Bengt Sundelius – non-realist/theoretically pluralist Finnish neutrality analysis**

Sundelius’s analysis touches on norms and considers a less militaristic concept of neutrality, emphasizing the notion of agency through neutrality in the international realm and the concept of ‘active’ neutrality. He argues that the Finnish brand of neutrality/‘version of the doctrine’, compared to the ‘traditional concept’, “is more based on diplomatic sensitivities and is less concerned with military strength… the
diplomatic component has carried more weight than military strength” (Sundelius, 1987: 6-7) and as a result he considers, in a sense, the Finnish experience has served to broaden the concept of neutrality beyond a focus on expected behaviour in an open great power conflict to also encompass a norm for peace time conditions.

The notion of agency rather than the typical realist connotation of passivity in the concept of neutrality is acknowledged: “not content merely to adjust their foreign policies to the international realities, the Nordic neutrals hope to more directly promote international systemic change…advocates of so-called active neutrality regard this as a comprehensive security strategy” (Sundelius, 1987: 6). Sundelius also turns his definitional and analytical attention to Irish neutrality: “the Irish version of the concept is defined in the context of the overwhelming bilateral relationship with the great power neighbour, the United Kingdom….it is also intimately linked to the unsettled question of Northern Ireland…the doctrine has evolved from a matter of tactics to an element of a national role. The emotional appeal and public support of this doctrine seem to be at least as solid as in the other four nations surveyed” (Sundelius, 1987: 8). Do other comparativists regard Northern Ireland and relations with Britain as the main drivers of Irish neutrality? It appears a majority do.

**Nils Andrén, Roderick Ogley, Risto E. J. Penttilä – comparative neutrality analysis**

Nils Andrén states that “Anglo-Irish relations rather than various forms of great power confrontation are the moving force behind the neutrality of an island country on the ocean fringe of Europe” (Andrén, 1978: 174). Andrén argues that geostrategic considerations have shaped Irish neutrality: “the notion of Irish neutrality is both more comprehensive and more permissive than that of most other neutrals. Virtually surrounded – and protected - by the Atlantic Alliance, Irish neutrality, on the other hand, does not need the protection of a credible national defense. Her geostrategic situation enables her also to abstain from certain credibility promoting measures regarded as necessary by other neutral democracies” (Andrén, 1978: 174-175). Ogley also comes from the same standpoint: “after the occupation of Norway, Sweden was virtually surrounded by Axis powers, as was Switzerland after the fall of France. Ireland, similarly, was a neutral enclave behind Allied lines” (Ogley, 1970: 129). Penttilä surmises, “as such, Ireland differs from other neutral countries, whose neutrality was defined during the Cold War by the division of Europe” (Penttilä, 1999: 173). Similar to Sundelius, he cites the relationship with Britain as the main variable: “Ireland’s neutrality is best understood with reference to England. Neutrality has offered the best way of creating a political distance between Ireland and England. The
roots of Irish neutrality lie in the 1920s’ struggle for independence. At that time neutrality offered the best way of differentiating Ireland from England. The same motive of keeping a distance was the main rationale for Irish neutrality during the Cold War” (Penttilä, 1999: 173). The second half of this thesis will examine whether Northern Ireland and relations with Britain are the main drivers of Irish neutrality for the public of today.

**Philip C. Jessup, Francis Deak – neutrality historians**

**Raimo Väyrynen and Peter Calvocoressi – foreign policy/IR analysts**

In a four volume set on neutrality, Jessup and Deak give reasons why they found it is not possible to categorically state the year in which the conception of a status of neutrality become generally recognized. However, they state that “Nys finds the word used in the sense of non-participation in a war as early as 1378” (Jessup and Deak, 1935: 20). In terms of definitions, in the fourth and final volume of the series on neutrality, Jessup proclaims, “the primary objective of a neutrality policy should be to keep out of war” (Jessup and Deak, 1935: 156). This most singular definition of the purpose and aim of neutrality is echoed by many more academics, such as Väyrynen: “neutrality is, of course, intended to keep the country that practices it out of war” (Väyrynen, 1989: 123) and Calvocoressi: “neutrality was a general declaration of intent to remain out of any war which might occur” (Calvocoressi, 1996: 172). This common understanding of neutrality and its primary objective in the international literature stands in contrast to Salmon’s pronouncements on Irish neutrality, in which he says, “the Irish objective was simply to avoid participation in the war. That is not neutrality” (Salmon, 1989: 136). Notably, staying out of war is the most prominent definition of neutrality in the literature in this survey.

Having established that a majority of academics appear to consider the main definition of neutrality as staying out of/avoiding wars, it is appropriate to examine whether public concepts mirror this meaning because a comparative analysis contributes to an assessment of the ‘rationality’ of public opinion. The metatheory in analyses of concepts of Irish neutrality held by the public will be considered in Chapter Six, but first of all, it is worth examining the factors in the mainstream literature that hamper any approach towards understanding the public’s concepts of Irish neutrality.
THE POLITICS OF DEFINITIONS OF NEUTRALITY

The role of the public in concepts of neutrality

This thesis argues that the importance of looking at public concepts of neutrality is linked to Realism’s conception of the role or agency of public opinion in neutrality: “most theorists...subsume individuals into a nation-state or other organizational context, such as those decision-making units that play key roles in formulating foreign policies on behalf of states” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 29). Nonetheless, empirical evidence and theoretical analyses indicate that public opinion is a factor in the realisation and maintenance of neutrality. For example, in Sweden during the Second World War, FPA analyst Ogley argues “there is no doubt that public opinion exercised a great and increasing influence on the Government’s foreign policy” (Ogley, 1970: 166). From a theoretical perspective, POFP analysts Page and Shapiro argue “public opinion concerning foreign policy has to be taken seriously as an influence in democratic policy-making” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 284); indeed, it is claimed that foreign policies of democracies are more peaceful because public opinion plays a part in constraining policy makers. It has been tentatively argued using case-studies that public opinion has an impact on the formulation and operation of foreign policy (Holsti, 1992: 451-455). Robert Putnam portrayed political leaders as positioned between two tables of (1) international negotiation and (2) domestic political forces (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 298-299). During the 1990s, theorists emphasised the requirement for a more careful integration of thinking about foreign policy-decision making and domestic politics.

In the Irish case, Keatinge recognises that neutrality is constituted by publics within the state; “at the very least the credibility of neutrality policy is assessed by interested governments in terms of its domestic support” (Keatinge, 1984: 8). There is empirical evidence that public attitudes to Irish neutrality influence voting decisions in referendums on further European Union integration. As we saw earlier, polling data from the 1990s to date suggests that the threat to Irish neutrality is a motivation behind a large section of the public’s ‘no’ votes in EU referendums, (Jupp, 2003; Marsh, 1992; Sinnott, Post-Amsterdam Referendum Survey, 1998, 2001). Arguably demonstrating the salience of neutrality for the public and providing further argument for the inclusion of the public in assessments of neutrality.

Public opinion needs to be considered as a separate agent from its representative government because since the end of the Cold War, there is empirical evidence of a divergence between public and government thinking on neutrality in European states.
Many governments have indicated a wish to abandon neutrality and in many cases, militarily align themselves with other states in collective arrangements and institutions. However, public support for neutrality in European neutral states continued throughout the 1990s and continues nowadays despite opposition at the elite level, thereby creating a tension between elites and publics (Dahl, 1997: 2; Huldt et al., 2000: 3; Silva, 1995: 378). Therefore, aside from the issue of how theoretically relevant public opinion is in defining and explaining neutrality, it is worth noting the democratic normative argument (underpinned by the fact that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of government to the preferences of its citizens, considered political equals) (Dahl, 1971: 1) with respect to the demand for the inclusion of publics in analyses determining the neutrality of a state, particularly when governments are failing to reflect public opinion on the matter.

Finally, it is argued that neutrality, conceptualised as a political value, opens up the possibility of the ownership and constitution of neutrality by individual citizens of a state, and collectively as ‘publics’; Keatinge makes the argument that neutrality exists as a political value; used this way, it exists independently of actual state policy, either for its own sake or in association with other political values. However he is not particularly positive about this conceptualisation; neutrality denoted as a political value, leaves it ‘at best, a consideration of fundamental moral issues, and at worst a rhetorical smokescreen for political opportunism’ (Keatinge, 1984: 6-7). Goetschel conceives of neutrality as a normative value or belief; he argues, “neutrality’s political core is an overarching principled belief, consisting of normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong or just from unjust” (Goetschel, 1999: 117). But, any conceptualisation of neutrality as a normative value contrasts with realists contention that politics is not a function of ethical philosophy (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 71) because the anarchical international system means that states are power-seeking and must protect themselves from external threat; values are irrelevant for those purposes. Realists, theoretically, would not consider a value held by a public observable or worthy of study. Rather, neutrality measured empirically in terms of defence expenditure and memberships of international organisations is warranted knowledge.

**Neutrality as a public value**

Conceptualising neutrality as a political value also goes against the associated positivist, behaviourist premise that only tangible realities are measurable and therefore what matter in the study of political science (Smith, 2001: 243). Behaviouralists are accused of denigrating values and not recognising the extent to
which normative concerns are crucial to political acts (Monroe, 2004: 96). “International theory tells us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention”; (Smith, 1996: 13); it also tells us what is perceived as legitimate ‘action’ in the operation of neutrality. As discussed earlier, given that individuals are excluded from the conduct of neutrality under international law, (Bonjour, 1946: 131; Switzerland, 2000: 12; Thalberg, 1989: 236), conceiving of neutrality as a political value is arguably the only way publics can operationalise neutrality under the dominant realist state-centric, state-operated concept, but the question of how neutrality as a political value is translated into action is hampered precisely due to the dominance of the realist/behaviouralist-defined concept of neutrality that exists in international law.

The question of how publics can support neutrality is posed by Comerford; they include organising demonstrations in the hope of influencing elites at the local and national level, joining organisations which support neutrality by organising talks and producing literature, and becoming better informed (Comerford, 1984: 99-100). Would realists accept these as empirical manifestations of neutrality? Arguably, empirical manifestations of neutrality have to be connected to core values in order to be consistent over time during changing circumstances and in different kinds of conflict. However, the fact that neutrality is attractive as a political value without corresponding empirical constitution by publics should not mean that neutrality and public support of it should be denigrated and disregarded as a political reality.

Public attitudes to neutrality are characterised as ‘non attitudes’ and are disregarded if they take the form of a political value without concrete empirical actions attached to it. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, Marsh summarises public opinion as attached to ‘a salient political symbol’ (Marsh, 1992: 25) without knowing what it is they are attached to; ‘the rhetoric of neutrality wins much more support than the substance’ (Marsh, 1992: 12). ‘Neutrality thus appears to be a potent political value but one with a stronger symbolic than empirical content’; (Marsh, 1992: 13); the analysis indicates a position that the Irish public holds “non-attitudes” to neutrality.

The relationship between values, interests and identities
Mass publics matter to liberals because they help to formulate the state’s interest (Mingst, 1999: 162). National interest depends on national identity, which is a construct in our minds describing and prescribing what we should think, feel, value, and ultimately how we should behave in group-relevant situations (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 95). This identity has an internal (how groups imagine themselves)
and external dimension and is a function of values. As Poole argues “an identity is a form of inscription: as such, it embodies a specific evaluative point of view. All identities involve values and commitment, and the acquisition of identity means coming to accept these values and commitments” (Poole, 1999: 46).

The link between values, interests and identity converge in the concept of neutrality because “neutrality has a role as an identity provider for the population”; (Goetschel, 1999: 121). In the realist framework neutrality is chosen to serve a state’s concept of national interest, which is a manifestation of national identity in the liberal perspective, and it represents a political value (Keatinge, 1984: 6) that is held by publics and is constitutive of identity. Neutrality’s contribution to a nation’s political identity…builds on neutrality’s political core and not on its legal dimension; (Goetschel, 1999: 121); this can go some way towards explaining why neutrality is not generally conceived of as a value and identity-provider for publics, because the dominant realist analysis of neutrality tends to focus almost exclusively on the legal dimension.

Some members of the Irish public identify with neutrality as a value, as representing ideals they believe are worth pursuing (ISPAS 2001/2002). The Irish government acknowledges that “the majority of the Irish people have always cherished Ireland’s military neutrality, and recognise the positive values that inspire it, in peace-time as well as time of war” (Ireland, 1996: 15) and claims that “Ireland’s foreign policy is about much more than self-interest. For many of us it is a statement of the kind of people we are” (Ireland, 1996: 7). Thus, the Irish government appears to acknowledge the link for the Irish public between neutrality and their values and identity.

The positive values that inspire neutrality, that are recognised by the people of Ireland (Ireland, 1996: 118), are important because the Government maintains “the values that underlie Ireland’s policy of neutrality have informed almost every aspect of Ireland’s foreign policy” (Ireland, 1996: 16). For example, “neutrality has provided the basis for Ireland’s wider efforts to promote international peace and security; (Ireland, 1996: 15); “Ireland’s policy of military neutrality has served Ireland well. Our reputation for impartiality has enabled us to play a meaningful role in the preservation of peace in the world.” Neutrality is the lynchpin: “all steps taken by the Government to enhance our contribution to international security will be carried out within the scope of this undertaking” (Ireland, 1996: 16). It appears that successive Irish Governments have claimed to uphold Irish neutrality and the values associated with it due to support from a majority of Irish people: the interesting question is whether the content of the
government concept of neutrality is reflected in public concepts of neutrality. Interests are key in understanding the formulation of the content of the concept of Irish neutrality.

**Interests, neutrality concepts and policy: the EU defence alliance plan**

As will be emphasised in the next chapter, logically, policy direction derives from the meaning of a concept. “Neutrality defines the core elements of foreign policy and suggests appropriate means to pursue them” (Väyrynen, 1989: 123). Therefore, it is important to establish what Irish neutrality means to Irish people, and in particular, whether the content of public concepts coincides with the content of government concept because it is the government that formulates policy on the basis of the content of the neutrality concept. However, any analysis of neutrality cannot exist separate from the political context and time period in which it exists and in particular the interests of the elites who are charged with delivering policy in the interests of their citizens and who have the role of putting neutrality into practice. Notably, Irish neutrality (and the neutrality of other European states) exists in a political situation of EU elite plans for European integration in defence.

These ambitions have been known within Irish elite circles since the year of Ireland’s accession to the EEC. Looking at newly released documents for public inspection at the National Archives Deaglán de Bréadún reports that “neutrality and participation in European defence was an issue 30 years ago” (de Bréadún, 2004). In the report, it was stated that “Jealousy of the EEC’s progress from less successful rivals, inevitable competition for markets and the natural desire to protect its own interests, must in the long run, force the Nine to consider some form of mutual defensive measures” (de Bréadún, 2004). In the days of “the Twelve”, “Ireland – because of its policy of neutrality – together with Denmark and Greece…adopted a restrictive interpretation of the provisions of the (1980) London Report and the (1987) Single European Act by which the Political and Economic aspects of European security may be dealt with under political cooperation” (Noël, 1991: 62). The “Second Pillar” of the Treaty on European Union established European Political Union, which consists of an intensified intergovernmental co-operation in a Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as working together towards a Common European Defence policy based on the Brussels Treaty Organisation founded in 1948, commonly called the “Western European Union” (WEU) (Commission, 1995: 54).

These common defence interests have been articulated and supported by a number of elites in Ireland and in Europe. With respect to the former, Garret FitzGerald, former
Taoiseach, has stated “At the end of the 1940s I joined with one of my brothers in initiating and carrying on in the columns of the Irish Independent a correspondence in which we advocated Irish membership of the North Atlantic Alliance, then in the process of being established” (FitzGerald, 1995). The party FitzGerald was once leader of, Fine Gael, has become the first Irish political party to call for the abandonment of “traditional military neutrality”, saying Ireland should sign up to a European defence structure and substantially increase its defence spending. Its current foreign affairs spokesman, Mr. Gay Mitchell, has said neutrality is no longer a viable position (Brennock, FG calls for State to abandon neutrality, 2003).

With respect to the latter, leaders of larger European states have always pushed for neutral states to join NATO/WEU and proposed a merger of the two bodies in order to create a European Union military alliance. For example, in 1995 “Mr. Wolfgang Schaeuble, parliamentary leader of the German Chancellors’ Christian Democrats (CDU), said the EU would only have a real security policy when it became the European arm of the western alliance” (Reuter, 1995). Most member-states see the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the defence arm of the EU (Brennock, EU 'will not force State to abandon neutrality', 1996). Schaeuble added that the neutral countries should be given time to make a gradual transition into EU security structures (Reuter, 1995) In 1996, the EU’s external affairs Commissioner Mr. Hans van den Broek told reporters in Dublin that no attempt would be made by the EU to force Ireland to abandon neutrality – “this debate will not end with 40 countries surrounding Ireland saying ‘Why don’t you join the WEU?’ That’s not the way Europe works” (Brennock, EU 'will not force State to abandon neutrality', 1996). Van den Broek said, “we shouldn’t give Irish citizens the feeling that things are being imposed. They must make their own decision” (Brennock, EU 'will not force State to abandon neutrality', 1996). Twenty months later, the government pledged that a referendum on any proposal involving “a mutual defence commitment by Ireland”, perhaps in anticipation that this decision will need to be made in the near future. The then Foreign Minister, Mr David Andrews said, “I wish to place on record the Government’s position that, if the issue of an EU common defence, which would involve a mutual defence commitment by Ireland, were to arise for decision in the future it would be put to the Irish people for decision in a referendum” (Brennock, Government gives pledge on defence referendum, 1998). Notably, a referendum on the issue of Ireland’s membership of an EU military alliance will only arise after the Irish government has agreed to the creation of an EU military alliance at the European Council.
However, the proposals continue to be presented to neutral states in an effort to get them to abandon neutrality. Even the Swiss, who are not members of the EU, are continually under pressure to join a defence alliance; “another lesson obvious to the Swiss is that they have had to live through a long history of pressure from friendly nations wanting them to join in an alliance and hence abandon neutrality” (Brunner, 1989: 284). In 2003, the Finnish Foreign Minister Mr Erkki Tuomioja objected to the joint proposals by France, Britain and Germany for “structured co-operation” in EU security and defence policy, under which a core group of states would be allowed to co-operate more closely in developing military capabilities. Mr Tuomioja objected to the EU draft constitution for an enlarged 25-nation union that included a mutual defence clause, recognising NATO as the foundation of collective defence. He said that his country would not accept any formula that bound it to a military alliance (Reuters, 2003). In the end, the Italians proposed a new draft text of the proposed constitution that included the statement that the mutual defence clause will not affect “the specific character of the security and defence policy of some member-states”, (Brennock and Staunton, 2003); although there was no indication that the latter meant “neutrality”.

Evidently, then, a mutual defence is the determined ambition of many European elites who expect to see it realised in the near future, despite neutral states opposition; “Mr Gustaf Hagglund, chairman of the EU Military Committee, confirmed that NATO and ESPD (European Security and Defence Policy) would merge within a decade” (Gormley, 2003). With respect to the latest anti-neutrality discourse in Ireland9, a researcher in an EU-funded think-tank claims that, “framed within the 1999 EU European Security and Defence Policy and the 2003 European Security Strategy, Ireland has set about developing a “security community”, (Keane, 2004), whilst a proponent of Irish neutrality, a former Irish Army commandant, Edward Horgan, argues in a pro-neutrality discourse that, “we are now being told that Ireland has a role to play in EU common security strategy. Notice the weasel words “security strategy” have conveniently replaced “common defence” to get around the new Article 29.4.9” (Horgan, 2004). Horgan refers to the new article as “the bogus clause inserted in the [Irish] Constitution in the second Nice referendum to mislead Irish voters that they were enshrining neutrality in the Constitution” (Horgan, 2004). The new article was the result of An Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern’s travels around European capitals to garner support for an EU declaration on Irish neutrality, in order to support his Government’s

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9 The article can be considered an ‘anti-neutrality’ discourse because, according to the article, “Irish neutrality denotes a lack of priorities, principles and responsibility”, which reflects the realist interpretation of the concept, rather than the ‘active’ or ‘positive’ notion. Reflecting the realist ‘myth’ discourses in the Irish media identified earlier, the article claims, “neutrality only exists in Ireland’s psyche…an acceptance that neutrality is more imagined than real would be a positive step” (Keane, Rory. 2004. Neutrality: nothing but a ‘group think’ mantra. Irish Times, 30 July).
strategy of persuading the Irish voting public to support the Nice Treaty in a second referendum in October 2002, (de Bréadún, Ireland to seek neutrality assurances as plans laid for new Nice campaign, 2002) having failed to secure support in a June 2001 referendum. Given that any change in Ireland’s neutral status will have to be put to the people in referendum, the discourse on neutrality in the run-up to this vote will be of utmost importance.

**Interests/policy and academic research, funding, discourse production**

Discourse, then, is an important part of the equation in terms of understanding the context of this study of public opinion and Irish neutrality. POFP academics, Page and Shapiro have pointed out that “research money and media attention tend to flow to the visible and “effective” scholars and think tanks that generally agree with the administration, so that the tide of expert opinion generally seems to support the policies of those in power” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 381). Waters articulates this phenomenon in relation to elites and Irish neutrality, explaining that,

for several years now, a number of Irish politicians – most notably members of Fine Gael – have been chipping away at the concept of Irish neutrality. Every so often, without any apparent prompting, some politician makes a statement sniping at the policy in terms suggesting it is no more than a sentimental hankering after a dubious past. They tell us that the end of neutrality is ‘inevitable’, even asserting quite straightforwardly that it has become a bargaining chip in our relationship with the EU. Such politicians have loaded the ‘debate’ so as to ensure that ‘progress’ now means, inevitably, movement away from neutrality. All discussions are sucked along by their logic, terminology and agenda (Waters, 1995).

There are many examples of EU or NATO-funded research papers on public opinion and neutrality/foreign policy, papers that are inevitably framed for the purpose of these organisations. The only paper on Irish public opinion on neutrality to date was published by the Institute for European Affairs in 1992, an EU-funded think-tank based in Dublin; the objective of the report was to establish whether the public would reject the Maastricht Treaty in a 1992 referendum because of fears about the loss of neutrality and the report argued that the results of the poll emphasised the “ambiguous nature” of Ireland’s neutrality10 (Marsh, 1992: 10). The Institute for Security Studies produces research papers on European public opinion and is a subsidiary body of the

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10 This characterisation has normative consequences because, as Hakovirta (1988: 14) explains “without a modest degree of clarity neutrality cannot maintain its viability for long”. And allegations of the ambiguity of the concept are used as a basis for ignoring and rejecting neutrality.
Council of the WEU that is funded by the EU and NATO and it sought to highlight “the highly inaccurate nature of much public perception” in regard to defence decision-making, which it argued, “has consequences for the expression of non-attitudes and ill-informed attitudes in response to opinion poll questions” (Sinnott, 1997: 38).

To highlight the issue of WEU/EU/NATO funded research on public opinion and foreign policy/neutrality is not to suggest that there is anything malign afoot; as Hacking puts it: “there is no monolithic conspiracy in any part of the globe to determine the kinds of possibilities in terms of which we shall describe and interact with the cosmos. But our ways of worldmaking, to repeat the phrase of Nelson Goodman, have very often been funded by one overall motivation” (Hacking, 1999: 185). This quote is used here to highlight that the research has an elite, (neo)realist motivation that does not produce an account of public opinion on foreign policy/neutrality per se, but characterises it in relation to the elite security and defence policy framework. Hacking reported the effect of being funded by one overall motivation in the case of weapons research, is that, “we have created forms of knowledge which have a homing device. More weapons, for example.” (Hacking, 1999: 185). Similarly, the “homing device” of the knowledge produced by the above-mentioned EU/WEU-funded research institutes is attuned to finding more “non-attitudes” or “non-rationality” in public attitudes. The fact that the discourses of public ‘non-attitudes’ in relation to foreign policy and ambiguous concepts of neutrality exist in a vacuum of research, publications and discourses on understanding the nature of public foreign policy attitudes and concepts of Irish neutrality from the point of view of public opinion (rather than politico-military elites), means the EU/WEU-backed research is more likely to have a significant effect, e.g. it offers the only starting point for further research and thus shapes future research; it is also more likely be cited; and thus will spread further into new and emerging discourses.

**Elite interests and changes in neutrality concepts**

The creation of an EU defence alliance is an important elite interest that must be considered in any analysis of government and public concepts of Irish neutrality, because interests can have the effect of reversing the causal direction of concept and policy. As McSweeney argues: “in the concrete, policy may be driven by the interests of the actors, resulting in the reverse causal sequence. One’s interest in a particular policy can be a powerful motive for defining the concept underlying it in terms restricted to that policy” (McSweeney, 1999: 82) (emphasis added). There is evidence of elite attempts to re-formulate the definition of neutrality in parallel with evidence of
elite determination to achieve deeper military cooperation within the EU framework in Ireland (McSweeney, 1985: 182) and in the other European neutral states (Gillespie, 1998; Goetschel, 1999: 115; McSweeney, 1990: 156). The revision or re-labelling of neutrality by political elites in Sweden, Finland and Austria in the context of joining pre-existing and future military alliances and defence pacts is noted in an article by Cronin in the early 2000s:

The general consensus in the ruling Social Democrat party is that the word “neutrality” is outdated and that it should be re-named as “nonalignment”. Sources close to the party believe Prime Minister Goran Persson will shortly announce that Sweden is to pursue a policy of non-alignment, with the possibility that it can be neutral in the case of a war in a neighbouring state. Superficially, this may appear to be only a subtle shift, but observers of the defence debate felt it would pave the way for Sweden to become actively involved in European military operations, with or without a UN mandate. The likely choice of words for redefining its doctrine appears to mirror how a diplomat from neighbouring Finland once described his country’s neutrality as non-alignment with the possibility of joining NATO at a later stage. The move coincides with soul-searching debates in Finland and Austria about whether their neutrality should be maintained. Vienna’s foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner said recently that her government was ready to “take part in a European defence community, including a mutual assistance pact” (Cronin, 2001).

The same phenomenon is reported in other sources such as official government reports in the case of Switzerland and a NATO review piece referring to Sweden. In the latter it is reported that shortly after joining the EU, Sweden’s then Foreign Minister Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas was reported to have said that “rather than an exercise in semantics, the official change of vocabulary resulted from the country’s new role as a member of the EU, once and for all removing ‘ideological’ neutrality from the agenda and turning non-alignment into solely a matter of absence of military obligations” (Dahl, 1997: 2). In a 1993 Federal Council report, the Swiss claimed “neutrality today is perceived as an instrument of limited use only to respond to certain contemporary conflict situations” (Switzerland, 2000: 18) and have “inaugurated a partly new orientation in the practice of Swiss neutrality…the newly formulated concept of neutrality poses no obstacle to greater co-operation in security matters or to membership of the European Union or the United Nations” (Switzerland, 2000: 2).
Turning to the Irish case, in a 2003 public interview, on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Brian Cowen attempted to recast the history and the concept of Irish neutrality as essentially non-membership of a mutual defence pact and NATO, with the implication that Irish people are mistaken in believing that ‘Ireland’ adheres to the wider definition of neutrality identified in the academic literature earlier – staying out of wars, independence in foreign policy decision-making and impartiality – as well as the ‘fundamental’ or ‘active’ concept of Irish neutrality adhered to by some sections of the Irish public (Cowen, 2003). The same theme of elite puzzlement over the notion of public adherence to these aforementioned concepts of neutrality rather than the government definition is seen in the 1996 White Paper: under the heading “Neutrality” the Paper states,

since the Second World War neutrality, expressed in peace-time through Ireland’s decision to abstain from membership of military alliances, has taken on a significance for Irish people over and above the essentially practical considerations on which it was originally based. Many have come to regard neutrality as a touchstone of our entire approach to international relations, eventhough (sic), in reality, much of our policy is not dependent on our non-membership of a military alliance (Ireland, 1996: 51).

It is clear from the previous chapter that “the essentially practical considerations on which it was originally based” were considerations that appeared to be very important at the time, both to the then Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and the rest of the government, the political elites and the people of Ireland – those were considerations of the survival of the Irish state and its people. It is also clear that de Valera appeared determined throughout the War to adhere to the letter of the wider concept of neutrality and its rights and duties in so far as they helped to achieve those objectives or considerations. At that time, the central method of achieving those objectives had little or nothing to do with non-membership of military alliances. Although for many publics and academics, non-membership of military alliances is not the sole constituent of the concept of neutrality, non-membership of NATO has come to be considered an element of neutrality after the Second World War, because it contributes to a central objective of neutrality - to stay out of war. The question remains then, what is the government concept of neutrality? And what is the Irish public’s concept of neutrality? Is there a divergence in government and public concepts that could produce competing foreign policy agendas?
IRISH GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC CONCEPTS OF NEUTRALITY

Irish Government definitions: the 1996 White Paper

According to the 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy: “successive Irish governments have taken the view that in the event of a major international or European conflict the security of the State could best be preserved by the adoption of an attitude [note: not policy, but attitude] of neutrality [note: not ‘military’ neutrality]. Irish foreign and security policy has therefore been conducted in a way as to preserve the option of neutrality in the event of an outbreak of hostilities that might threaten the security of the State. Ireland’s decision not to participate in the two western military alliances established after the Second World War – the NATO and the WEU – reflected this approach….membership of either would not be compatible with an intention to remain neutral” (Ireland, 1996: 120). In this passage, it appears that non-membership of military alliances is characterised as a policy that contributes to the achievement of neutrality, rather than the central defining element of the concept of neutrality. However, the Paper also states that “The central elements of Ireland’s security policy over many years comprise – a policy of military neutrality, embodied by non-participation in military alliances…” (Ireland, 1996: 117).

This latter 1996 White Paper definition is reflected in the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, definition of Irish neutrality given during an interview that was described by Marion Finucane as “talking to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Brian Cowen about our neutrality and what the definition of what our neutrality might or might not be” (Cowen, 2003). Minister Cowen laid claim to the central characteristic of the neutrality of Ireland and of the other European neutral states, which Minister Cowen referred to as the five “neutral or non-aligned” European states, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Ireland. According to the then Foreign Minister, “What you can say is that the essential characteristic is, that none of these countries are part of military alliances, we are not members of mutual defence pacts, we are not members of NATO…if you are looking for an essential characteristic, that is it” (Cowen, 2003: 3 minutes).

Two weeks after the Minister’s declaration on Irish and the other European neutral states’ neutrality, during a Dáil debate over a proposed amendment to the Irish Constitution, the then Minister of State Mr. Tom Kitt argued that Ireland’s long-serving policy of military neutrality, as followed by successive governments, was fully respected, protected and upheld by the constitutional amendment (Nice II) approved by the electorate on 19th October 2002. In this speech he claims to articulate the
meaning of Irish neutrality for the Irish people – tellingly, it is the same as that of the government: he argued that the constitutional amendment “confirmed the central and defining characteristic of Irish people in this area, that is, our non-participation in military alliances” (O’Regan, Parties in neutrality debate, 2003).

**A divergence of public and government concepts?**

The question remains whether the government pronouncements are true – that the central characteristic of the public concept of neutrality is non-membership of a military alliance. Some of the academic literature (e.g. Keatinge, McSweeney) indicated that this may not be true, certainly with respect to the situation in the 1980s. It is possible to establish what the main characteristics of Irish neutrality are for the Irish people nowadays, using open-ended survey questions asking people what Irish neutrality means to them. This type of question was asked in the 1980s, the 1990s and in the early 2000s. In the 1980s, Keatinge identifies the divergence of public and government concepts of Irish neutrality that harks back several decades (Keatinge, 1996: 111) and his exposition is worth quoting at length because he provides the political context to the divergence that persists today:

> the official concept is broadly consistent with most government statements since 1961, and is normally referred to as ‘military neutrality’, to indicate it is above all a matter of not belonging to an existing military alliance. Given the long-term commitment to European integration however, it is essentially limited and ultimately negotiable. A more far-reaching concept is contained in formulations found…among the public at large. In this view neutrality is seen as a basic principle of all Irish foreign policy, and the concept may be conveniently labelled ‘fundamental neutrality’ (Keatinge, 1984: 32). The first concept has often been presented to the outside world as being primarily a consequence of a transient dispute in Anglo-Irish relations, with the implicit corollary that public support for such a neutral policy was itself restricted and not related to wider issues… this view has always been suspect (Keatinge, 1984: 118). The concept of fundamental neutrality, as articulated in the early 1980s, is based on much broader attitudes than the parochial contingencies of Irish partition. In its rejection of direct involvement in East-West conflict, in its denial of military force or threat and in its emphasis on moral change, fundamental neutrality is akin to ‘neutralism’. This term, though assiduously avoided in statements of official policy, indicates common ground between public attitudes in the more firmly established continental neutrals, such as Sweden, or in the less enthusiastic member-states of NATO, such as the
The divergence between the concept of ultimately negotiable military neutrality, as practiced by governments whatever their rhetoric, and the concept of fundamental neutrality as advanced by the pro-neutrality lobby, has been an important development of the early 1980s, which should not be ignored (Keatinge, 1984: 118).

Keatinge identified the government formulation in the context of elite interests of “long-term commitment to European integration”; certainly if the latter means considering possible membership of the future planned EU military defence pact, then indeed, a government concept of neutrality formulated according to those interests “is essentially limited and ultimately negotiable”. McSweeney echoes this summation of the Irish situation: “while there appears to be strong domestic attachment to the ideal of Irish neutrality at present, the official policy continues to be one of expediency, leaving open the possibility that Ireland may join a defence community in the future” (McSweeney, 1988: 208).

Linked to the elite revision of the concept of neutrality in the five European neutral states, (Penttilä, 1999: 174), Fanning identifies a universal divergence of government and public opinion on neutrality in European neutral states in the wake of the end of the Cold War: “in Ireland, as in the other neutral states of Europe….a credibility gap is opening between the preferred options of the foreign policy elites and their respective publics” (Fanning, 1996: 147). Therefore, one of the reasons why the divergence should not be ignored is because the existence of diverging concepts of neutrality in the government and public minds has important implications for public constraint of the Irish government’s policy options in the exercise of Irish neutrality and with respect to future European integration in the area of defence. It is worth examining the available opinion poll data on the meaning of Irish neutrality to try to establish the incidence of non-membership of a military alliance in these opinion poll responses.

What does Irish neutrality mean to the Irish public?
A classical attribute of the “rational public” is the finding that public attitudes [to foreign policy] are relatively consistent over time, allowing for change in relation to new information and changed circumstances (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 282). This raises the question as to whether the public’s concepts of Irish neutrality are consistent at the aggregate level over time. Stability in concepts of neutrality and attitudes to neutrality is expected because values and identity are stable concepts that do not change capriciously and the former are based on the latter. Whilst acknowledging that opinion poll data cannot be simply equated with ‘public opinion’, this puzzle of the
‘rational public’ thesis can be tested using the same as the approach as Page and Shapiro (1992). Members of the public responded to the question wording of “There has been a lot of discussion lately about Irish neutrality. I am interested in finding out what neutrality means. What does Irish neutrality mean to you?” in the face-to-face phase of the ISPAS 2001/2002. The analysis of this puzzle is aided by comparability of question wording across the surveys. Although this data covers three decades, one would expect to find reasonable stability in the proportions of population professing a particular concept of neutrality based on a set of values/identity, given that the impact of events and changes on the world scene would not impinge greatly on what a concept like neutrality means to people.
FIGURE 2.1: *Public definitions of Irish neutrality (1985)*

**Definition of Irish Neutrality (1985)**
(Base: people of Ireland)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>% of population offering definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We don’t get involved in wars</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No alliance with other nations/We don’t take sides</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should stay as we are</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not part of N.A.T.O.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A free/Independent state</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be involved in N.A.T.O./Should back E.E.C.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would mean nothing in a nuclear war</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have no nuclear weapons here</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the last war, we were safe and uninvolved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a safe/Peaceful country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of being Irish/What we fought for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can side with whom we choose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn’t exist/Eventually we’ll be forced to join alliances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s meaningless while Northern Ireland situation exists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MRBI survey (code name: MRBI/3370/85) carried out on 22/04/85 - 23/04/85 for Irish Times

Question: There has been a lot of discussion lately about Irish Neutrality. What does Irish Neutrality mean to you?
Figure 2.2: Public definitions of Irish neutrality (1992a)

Definition of Irish Neutrality (May 1992)
(Base: people of Ireland)

- We don't get involved in wars: 31%
- Don't know: 25%
- We should stay independent/As we are: 14%
- Means nothing/In a nuclear war: 9%
- No alliances/We don't take sides: 7%
- We should back E.C./N.A.T.O.: 6%
- Other comments: 6%
- We are a free/Independent country: 5%
- We are not part of NATO: 2%

Source: MRBI survey (code name: MRBI/4050/92) carried out on 05/05/92 - 06/05/92 for Irish Times
Question: There has been a lot of discussion lately about Irish Neutrality. What does Irish neutrality mean to you?
Figure 2.3: Public definitions of Irish neutrality (1992b)

Definition of Irish Neutrality (June 1992)
(Base: people of Ireland)

Source: MRBI survey (code name: MRBI/4060/92) carried out on 08/06/92 - 08/06/92 for Irish Times

Question: There has been a lot of talk recently about Irish Neutrality. What does this Irish Neutrality mean to you?
Figure 2.4: Public definitions of Irish neutrality (2001)

Definition of Irish Neutrality (2001)

(Base: people of Ireland)

- Not involved in wars: 22%
- Don’t know/no opinion/don’t care: 16%
- Independence/make own decisions (go to war/not): 12%
- Nothing: 6%
- Good thing: 5%
- Being neutral: 5%
- (UN) peacekeeping only/UN involvement (only): 3%
- No side taken in war/non-partisan: 2%
- No conscription/children not sent to war: 1%
- Neutrality difficult/not possible now: 1%
- Not in defense alliance/NATO: 1%
- Peaceful/promote peace: 1%
- Irish identity: 1%

Source: NSPS survey, November 2001

Question: There has been a lot of discussion lately about Irish neutrality. I am interested in finding out what neutrality means. What does Irish neutrality mean to you?
Table 2.1 shows the rank order\(^\text{11}\) of the response categories and demonstrates reasonable stability in the range of meanings of public concepts of Irish neutrality: the top four definitions of neutrality are ‘not getting involved in war’, ‘staying independent/independence’ and ‘not taking sides [in wars]/impartiality’ and ‘not possible/means nothing’ (MRBI April 1985; MRBI May 1992; MRBI June 1992, ISPAS November 2001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t get involved in wars</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t take sides</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means nothing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying out of NATO/military alliances</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most popular public meaning of neutrality, “don’t get involved in wars”, correlates strongly with most academic concepts of neutrality. As mentioned earlier, Jessup claims, “the primary objective of a neutrality policy should be to keep out of war”; (Jessup, 1936: 156). For Goetschel, “being neutral means not taking part in military conflict” (Goetschel, 1999: 119) and according to Calvocoressi, “neutrality was a general declaration of intent to remain out of any war which might occur” (Calvocoressi, 1996: 172). The second and third most popular public concepts – “independence/staying as we are” and “not taking sides” - are considered by many academics as methods to achieve the objective of staying out of wars and therefore constitute practices in support of neutrality. Given that the public concepts of Irish neutrality appear to be reasonably stable over time and compare favourably with historical and non-realist academic concepts, it is fair to say that public understandings of the concept of Irish neutrality are consistent and ‘non-realist’, rather than inconsistent, confused and ‘non-rational’. The following section provides examples of the verbatim definitions of neutrality from the ISPAS 2001/2002 open-ended question asking what neutrality means to people.

In Table 2.2 (shown after the verbatim discussion in the next section (page 115)), the first-mentioned element of an individual’s concept of neutrality is awarded a code and each code is presented in a rank-order according to the strength of that person’s

\(^{11}\) The more general principle of rank order is chosen instead of showing the percentages because of the differences in the samples and coding frames between the 1985, 1992 and 2001 surveys.
attitude towards neutrality (Appendix E shows the entire dataset). This approach gives some indication of the nature and characteristics of the strongly-supported neutrality concepts and the concepts that are rejected by Irish people. The pattern in Table 2.2 shows that concepts defined in negative terms, for example, people saying neutrality means nothing, is irrelevant, or it is the equivalent to fence-sitting, are associated with relatively negative attitudes towards neutrality, i.e. rejection, and the ‘positive’ elements of neutrality, such as peace-promotion, mediation, etc. are associated with an attitude that is most strongly supportive of neutrality.

The ISPAS survey data shows that the most strongly supported element of the concept of neutrality is in relation to **peace**, being peaceful and promoting peace (mean score of 1.75):

- To be a peace loving nation-not to take sides in wars-only provide soldiers for peacekeeping
- It means standing up for peace and refusing to be brought into other countries conflicts
- Peace keeping army
- Not having to go to war/remaining peaceful
- Living in a peaceful country that’s not involved in war with another country
- Not getting Ireland involved in any wars. Ireland remaining a peaceful nation
- We should not go to war. We are a peaceful nation
- Neutrality means having peace

The notion of being mediators in conflicts and ambassadors is also a most strongly-supported element of Irish neutrality:

- We should play a role in international relations-we are good ambassadors
- Acting as a mediator between conflicting states
- Not going to war. Don’t take sides. We can act as mediator in conflict
- Being vocal about conflicts and try influence other countries in disputes
- Not taking sides in conflicts seeking to resolve things by diplomacy
- That we don’t want to take sides in conflicts and help to bring two sides together

‘Having no enemies/being free from war’ was the next most strongly supported concept (linked to a mean score of 1.94), along with the notion that there would be no conscription; young people and children would not be sent to fight in wars (echoing elements of the referendum debate on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 in which fears
were raised about conscription to a European Union army if the Treaty, and its Common Foreign and Security Policy provisions, were passed):

- Be nobody’s enemy- avoiding war
- Free from war
- The country being on its own and free from war
- To be free of wars
- It means the right to peace, and freedom from war, a stance defending our country
- Means no conscription
- No conscription in the event of a world war
- In times of war- no conscription
- Keeping out of wars, staying neutral, means no conscription
- Not taking part in wars, no conscription
- Our children never having to go to war
- My children cannot be conscripted to war
- That our young people should not have to go and fight
- Protecting the children from being conscripted
- In the event of war our children wouldn't be conscripted

Equally strongly-supported are the themes of ‘not supporting Big Powers’ and not being in an ‘EU army’. All of the above are the most strongly supported elements of Irish neutrality, attracting a support score of 2.00 or less on a scale where 0 means strongly support retention of neutrality and 10 means strongly support rejection of neutrality:

- Remain on our own and not join superpowers
- Can’t be forced to fight with superpowers
- That we don’t have to join any major power if there should be war
- Ireland should remain neutral and not be lead by other powers
- Staying apart from the big powers
- We shouldn’t be biased towards the Western superpowers
- Non-involvement with great powers
- There would be no US base or large powers here
- Our country should keep outside the big powers - not doing what America or England are doing
- Not part of single European army
- It means we should not have to join a European army
- To remain free from joining a European army
• Not taking part in a European army

The theme of the European Union in the concept of neutrality features in a number of respects. Aside from rejecting participation in an EU army, there is also a wider context of not supporting the EU in general. Furthermore, the notion of neutrality as independence has an element of being independent from the EU:

• Not going with the European Union
• Not being involved in the Unification of Europe
• Neutral to the European Union, not to get involved in being part of a union
• Ireland doesn’t participate in the EU
• Should be positive, through the UN and definitely not a superstate of the EU
• We should be able to rule our country without interference from the EU
• The ability of the Irish Government not to go to war if the EU does
• To stay as independent as possible within the EU
• We wouldn't have to bow to the European Union.
• Not ruled by EU
• Being independent from EU

The opinion that neutrality is ‘a good thing’ is the next element on the list, but this is a normative statement rather than a definition, similar to the evaluative statement (ranked after ‘mediators’ (1.91)) that neutrality ‘is important’. As they are not concepts of neutrality per se, none of the verbatims of these responses are provided. Instead, the next element of neutrality, attracting a mean score of 2.86, is the objective of limiting the foreign military activity of the Irish state and the Irish army to peace-keeping, with this activity carried out only through in the UN.

• Peace-keeping only. No other military commitment
• Take a neutral stand- only use the army for peace-keeping purposes
• No involvement in wars with other countries but we have an army for UN peace-keeping
• Army for peace-keeping only
• Army does not go out as a fighting force. Peace-keeping
• Non-participant in war. Irish army on peace-keeping missions only
• Not providing armed forces in wars, other than U.N. peace-keeping missions
• Ireland should only be involved in peace-keeping
• To be a peace loving nation - not to take sides in wars - only provide soldiers for peace-keeping
• It means we should keep Ireland and Irish forces as a peace-keeping force
• Peace enforcing only. Defence of this country only
• Neutrality means not taking action or being involved in any warfare other than peace-keeping
• Peace-keeping only
• Ireland only participating in UN operations

There are several examples of the related element of being involved in and supportive of peace-keeping, including UN peace-keeping:
• Staying neutral during wars. Supports UN peace-keeping
• Should provide peace-keeping force
• Stay neutral in war situation. Act as peace-keeper for UN
• Remain neutral in war and participate in peace-keeping missions
• Not being involved in war. Staying out of major issues. Support UN peace-keeping
• Ireland can use Irish army to assist in UN peace-keeping/enforcing
• Don't get involved in wars. OK as peace-keeping under UN
• Should not participate in wars, Ireland should participate in peace-keeping
• During war time we do not involve ourselves, we are a peace-keeping country
• Peace-keeping forces. Not taking part in wars
• We should stay a peace-keeping nation and not involve ourselves with any alliance
• Not to engage in wars of aggression and to co-operate fully in peace-keeping operations
• Staying away from war, be more peace-keeping.
• Peace-keeping army

Another variation on that theme, and an element of neutrality that attracts virtually the same mean score (2.88) is non-aggression:
• Does not have aggressive army compared to other countries
• Not getting involved in other nations war, also not causing distress to other nations
• No army for purpose of aggression
• Non-aggressive policy and no engagement in conflict
• Not be a threat and not be threatened
• Not to be an aggressor towards other nations
• It means staying out of aggressive action
• That we do not force with arms our ideas and ways of living on other countries

Examples of the most popular response category (the first-cited element of more than 1 in 5 Irish people), staying out of war/no war (3.01)/not involved in war (3.03), are:

• Not to get involved in war - that Ireland stays outside other countries’ rows
• It means not becoming involved in other countries’ conflicts
• Ireland won’t get involved in other people’s wars
• We do not get dragged into other people’s wars
• Not supplying troops or directly involved in conflict outside the country
• It means that Ireland stays out of international wars

As discussed earlier, this definition is also considered the principle element of neutrality by several academics. A smaller but nonetheless sizeable proportion of the population offer “staying/being neutral” as a primary response to the question of the meaning of neutrality, but this does not shed much light on what the meaning of that is:

• Keeping neutral in time of war
• Ireland should stay neutral
• Ireland should stay neutral at all cost
• Ireland should remain neutral in time of war
• Remaining neutral, not taking sides in wars between other countries
• Remaining neutral in the event of war
• Being neutral in the event of a world war
• Being neutral in time of war such as world war
• It is a good idea that Ireland is neutral and should stay so
• Ireland should stay neutral except in grave circumstances to help out when necessary

And a small minority cite the notions of a Nuclear-free zone and an anti-nuclear/armaments stance:

• Having no nuclear power and being a voice rather than an arms country
• Our policies in relation to arms - independence
• Keeping war planes and nuclear weapons out of country
• Not use nuclear weapons
The second largest response category is that Neutrality means independence, in terms of independent decisions with regard to war and foreign policy. This also entails not being compelled to get involved in a war or the foreign policy agenda of another state or states, or just falling into line with the mainstream:

- Keeping our own viewpoint and not just going along with other countries
- Ireland can make its own decisions without pressure
- Not compelled to get involved in outside war
- We are free to make our own decision whether to be involved in a war or not
- Being able to make up our own minds about foreign policy matters
- To make our own decisions regarding participation in any war
- Irish neutrality means Ireland making up its own mind on particular situations
- Our independence as a state and our lack of obligation to align ourselves

Neutrality also means independence or sovereignty *per se*:

- We govern our own people for ourselves
- Government do their own thing
- Our own country should be run by our own government not by other governments
- We are our own people
- That we have the full say in the running of our own affairs
- That we can follow our own instincts and we have our own freedom
- Just holding our own, making our own decisions with regard to going to war
- We should have our own views on controversial matters
- Keeping one’s independence
- It is important for our independence
- Our own say over defence and keep our own independence and go our own way
- Maintaining our own independence
- Independence in international affairs
- It gives Ireland an independence that cannot be interfered with by the EEC
- Independence to decide future of country
- Independence to decide own decisions
- Maintaining our independence and individuality

Finally, the last element that is connected to above-average support is the notion of identity:

- That I am Irish and I’m proud of it
• Right to control our own identity in regard to nuclear and defence issues
• Holding own identity
• Hold our identity as long as we can
• Ireland retains its identity avoiding unnecessary conflict
• It’s identity of being Irish, but that’s about all.
• Country makes up its own mind and is not tied to any other state or political identity
• Means sense of identity - recognition of ideas our ancestors fought for
• Keeping our own identity, making our own decisions what to involve ourselves in

All of the above concepts are elements of the concept of Irish neutrality for people who hold above-average levels of support for retaining Irish neutrality. The next list concerns the primary element of neutrality for the cohort expressing below-average support, those with a score of up to 5. It also shows those of the cohort who wish to reject Irish neutrality (with a score of 6 or 7).

There is an element of independence that could take on a hue of isolationism or indeed a lack of interference, depending on your view, with neutrality conceived of as Ireland standing on its own and minding its own business:

• Minding our own business and not becoming involved in the business of others
• Mind our own business and not get involved in war
• We look after our affairs and don’t get involved with other countries’ problems
• Mind our own business
• Not getting involved in other countries’ problems
• Not getting involved in other states’ business
• We mind our own business when it comes to war
• Mind our own business and keep out of foreign troubles
• Ireland standing on its own two feet
• Staying out of everybody else’s business

The element “no side taken (in war)/non partisan” (3.64) is discussed further in Chapter Six, as it is interpreted by some realist academics as being similar enough to be combined with the government definition of not joining a military alliance. In
terms of the academic discourse on neutrality in general, however, this element of neutrality is closer in meaning to “impartiality”.

- We do not assist either side in wars abroad
- Not going to war or siding with anyone in particular
- Not in line with any other country. In favour of Ireland remaining neutral
- That we don’t commit ourselves or our army to any particular side in a war
- Doesn’t take sides in war/military matters
- Doesn’t side with warring groups
- Not taking sides in other countries’ conflicts
- Not to be taking sides or getting involved in wars or things like that
- That Ireland does not take sides in times of war
- Not taking sides with other nations
- Means not taking sides if a war broke out
- Not taking sides
- Not taking sides in a conflict
- That we would not take sides in other countries’ conflicts

The next element is the right to decide to go to war or not (3.73). This right is stated by some in the context of the European Union, with the implication that there might be a situation in the future whereby this right may not exist or may be difficult to support as an EU member. It is telling that the next set of definitions on the hierarchical list concern the concept of military alliance, and not being involved in a military alliance, developments that impinge on this right to decide to go to war or not.

- The right to decide between going to war or not going
- Having the right to opt out
- Means a great deal- right not to participate in war
- The right not to have to get involved
- A right to stay neutral
- A right to do our own thing in times of war
- A “right” not going to war
- Right to be neutral
- Right to decide on Military matters
- We have a right by law to remain neutral, even though we are part of the EU
- A country’s right to make decisions without external influence
- To have the right not to go to war
- We have the right to be an independent state in the EU as those in USA
- It should retain its own rights to decide
• We should have the right to stay out of conflict and remain neutral
• Right to remain neutral when there is conflict
• Having the right to be independent on certain issues
• We’re not forced into siding with other countries if we don’t believe it to be right

The next section examines the verbatims related to not being part of a military alliance (4.04) and not being part of NATO (4.56) together. It is interesting to note the mentions of peacekeeping with these definitions, presented as the acceptable alternative, or as the limit to military action on the part of Ireland. In addition, definitions specifically referring to NATO in comparison with the definition referring to a generic military alliance, attract an average of a half-point on the attitude scale further towards rejecting neutrality.

• Not part of any military alliance. Agree with EU peacekeeping and self defence
• No involvement in military alliances
• Not getting involved in military alliances
• We should stay a peacekeeping nation and not involve ourselves with any alliance
• Non-engagement in military alliances with other states
• Not joining NATO or taking part in any wars
• Not being involved in wars or NATO
• Not joining a military block
• Don’t join NATO
• Having own laws. No defensive alliances

With an average attitude score of 4.66, nearly 5% of the population mention the European Union in their response to the question of what neutrality means. Some refer to neutrality in conjunction with a statement favouring the EU and some mention the EU in the context of an “either/or” situation with neutrality, implying an incompatibility or the sense of a trade-off between the two. The number of mentions providing an association between Irish neutrality and the EU at under 5% is perhaps surprisingly low given the prevalent discourse of pro-EU elites during referendum campaigns that it is immoral to reject the EU treaties out of adherence to neutrality given that Ireland has benefited from EU Structural Funds, etc. The results also indicate resilience in the commitment of supporters of Irish neutrality to the values and meaning it holds for them in the face of these regular, and at times, strident discourses.
• If Ireland wishes to partake fully of all EU benefits, it must forego its neutrality
• I don’t think neutrality should stay. We should be part of a European army
• I believe our neutrality has gone because of our EU membership
• It means nothing - we should be part of Europe - i.e. not neutral
• I don’t agree with neutrality considering Ireland’s role in the E.U.
• Important up to a point but we should be aligned to Europe
• Is diminishing now with Europe - used to mean we could decide alone - not free now
• Doesn’t feel that any country should be neutral - we are in Europe now
• If we were part of Europe and forget neutrality we would have more power
• Think we should be involved in European army
• We should stay neutral or go European
• Can’t keep neutral if EU gets involved in a war
• Not neutral if we join Europe
• Irish neutrality is not relevant anymore, I support European integration
• It does not mean a lot. We have to play our part in the E.U.
• Not going with the European Union
• It doesn’t mean a lot, now that we are part of Europe
• We should be involved in European defence, Irish neutrality is in name only now

The concept associated with the highest level of hostility to neutrality, an average of 7 on the attitude scale where 10 means strongly reject neutrality, is not taking responsibility, or failure to take up a position, i.e. sitting on the fence.

• Neutrality is a cop out of our responsibility, letting others fight our battles
• That we abdicate our own national defence to others
• Neutrality to me is another name for being cowardly. Afraid to side with another
• Afraid to come off the fence
• It means sitting on the fence
• Sitting on the fence
• Standing on the fence
• Sitting on the fence relevant to Northern Ireland and foreign affairs
• Way out for us to commit ourselves- we can sit on the fence to avoid war
The final question arising from this analysis of verbatim responses is whether there is any evidence of the ‘Unneutral’ or ‘Myth’ discourses that make regular appearances in the broadsheet newspapers. A small number of responses appear to embody the discourse, for example, “It’s only a word, we are not neutral” and “Neutrality is a concept, in practice we are not neutral”. In addition, there are responses saying neutrality means nothing; that it doesn’t exist because the Cold War is over; that it is out-dated and no longer relevant:

- Doesn’t exist since Cold War is non-existent.
- A waste of time, it is no longer relevant
- Not a lot - I don’t know what it means anymore
- Irish neutrality is an outdated phrase. Idea good in principle. We must move with the times

There is also some evidence of resistance to the above hypotheses (that are also current in the Irish media and academic discourses), for example, one survey respondent says, “Irish neutrality is up for question and we have to fight for it”.

One of the central questions this chapter seeks to answer concerns the compatibility of public concepts of neutrality and the government concept of neutrality. In 2001, only 1.4% of Irish people adhered to the government’s concept of neutrality and offered a definition of neutrality as staying out of military alliances and/or NATO. In 1985, 5% of people in Ireland said that was what neutrality meant to them. In 1992, the figure was 2%. Interestingly, it appears that the publics in other European neutral states shared the same content of neutrality concept. It has been reported that substantial majorities of public opinion in Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland continue to support neutrality and positively associate neutrality with staying out of conflicts, independence, sovereignty and national identity (Dahl, 1997: 20; Goetschel, 1999: 121; Kilroy, 1998; Kux, 1986: 36-37; Lahodnysky, 1992: 26; Sloan, 1998: 5). The fact that such a small number of people cited non-membership of NATO or a military alliance as their meaning of Irish neutrality is evidence in support of Keatinge, McSweeney and Fanning’s identification of a divergence of public concepts from government concepts, with the former representing a wider and more fundamental concept than the latter.

It is argued that since 1980, “a growing number of Irish people take neutrality to mean both military and political independence. In their eyes political integration and neutrality are incompatible” (Staunton, 1994). In 1985, less than 6% of Irish people mentioned independence when asked ‘what does Irish neutrality mean to you’ (MRBI
April 1985) (Marsh, 1992: 4). The Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey data shows that nearly 1 in 8 Irish people define neutrality as ‘Ireland’s independence’, ‘Ireland standing on her own feet and looking after her own affairs’, or ‘Ireland’s ability to make a decision whether to go to war or not’, supporting the notion that, at least for a proportion of the Irish population, neutrality embodies some level of political independence. Thus, independence appears to be a significant narrative, which has not been accounted for in much detail in previous analyses of open-ended questions on what Irish neutrality means.

Empirical studies have shown that “abstract words in common use in the mass media often mean very different things to different people” (Smith, 1987: 75). Nonetheless the four major definitional clusters: ‘staying out of war’, ‘staying independent/independence’, ‘not taking sides/impartiality’ and ‘means nothing/not possible’ (MRBI April 1985; MRBI May 1992; MRBI June 1992, ISPAS November 2001) appear to be comparatively stable over time, certainly in terms of rank order. The level of ‘don’t know’ responses declines considerably over time, effectively halving over a twenty-year period, to just 16% of responses in 2001. This may be due to the fact that the samples are slightly different, and there may be considerable difference in the levels of detail in the coding frames used to collate the data. The 2001 sample is drawn from the electoral register, whereas the other survey samples are based on a quota-sample of the population. The data from the latter surveys were collected over a very short fieldwork period and coded in a matter of hours, due to the need to publish the survey results in the newspaper just days after the fieldwork ended. Notably, Isernia et al. pointed to a ‘house effect’ in their analysis of data over time that “has usually more to do with the proportion of ‘do not know/do not answer’ categories than with substantive categories” (Isernia, Juhász, and Rattinger, 2002: 206).

The ‘rationality’ of these definitions can be partly assessed by comparing these definitions with public opinion data from other neutral states, helping to establish whether a cross-case range of meanings exists. Mentioned previously, it has been reported that substantial majorities of public opinion in Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland continue to support neutrality and positively associate neutrality with sovereignty, national identity, independence and staying out of conflicts. Certainly, there appears to be evidence that Irish public concepts of neutrality appear to be of similar character to those of other European neutral state’s publics. But does the

12 To establish a significant attitude change, Isernia et al used “Page and Shapiro’s standard of ‘a 6 percentage point shift in responses after excluding ‘don’t know’ or ‘no opinion’ replies’ (Page and Shapiro 1988: 216)” (Isernia et al., 2002: 208). An abrupt change is defined by a change of at least 10 percentage points per year. A fluctuation of opinion was coded whenever a repeated reversal in the direction of significant changes within a specific time interval occurred. Gradual changes are a residual category in which the opinion shifts are neither abrupt nor part of a fluctuation (Page and Shapiro 1982: 28-29) (Isernia et al, 2002: 209).
concept variable matter in a deeper sense; do the findings indicate a level of sophistication in public opinion, as part of the characteristics of the rational public thesis? And does the concept variable have an important role in explaining public attitudes to foreign policy?

**Linking concept of neutrality and attitude to neutrality**

The fact that the public defines Irish neutrality in at least four distinct ways has implications for the analysis of attitudes towards neutrality. In evaluating the ‘rationality’ of public attitudes to neutrality, it makes sense to hypothesize a link between a person’s concept of Irish neutrality and their retain/reject and salience attitudes. In the ISPAS self-completion questionnaire, people were asked: “Where would you place yourself on the following scale of 0 to 10 regarding neutrality? A score of “0” means that you think Ireland must remain neutral in all circumstances, and a score of “10” means that you think Ireland should give up its neutrality. Many people would place themselves somewhere between these two views.” This was followed by a salience measure: “Where would you place yourself on the following scale of 0 to 10 regarding how important the issue of neutrality is to you? A score of “0” means that you think neutrality is not at all important, and a score of “10” means that you think neutrality is very important. Many people would place themselves somewhere between these two views”.

Tannenbaum assumes “intensity being least for neutral attitudes and increasing progressively as the attitude becomes more favourable or unfavourable” (Tannenbaum, 1956: 420). If the ‘rational public’ thesis holds true for Irish public opinion on neutrality then individuals should choose a higher level of salience (6-10) in combination with positive attitudes towards Irish neutrality in terms of being in favour of “retaining” it, (4-0 on the retain/reject scale). It is plausible to expect that those with a ‘positive’ concept of neutrality, for example, those articulating a more cosmopolitan and ‘peace-promotive’ concept of neutrality should attract a more intensely positive attitude in support of neutrality and vice versa. As mentioned earlier, Eurobarometer surveys have shown Irish people value highly independence: the ‘independence’ concept of neutrality and that of staying out of wars may attract a comparatively more moderate attitude of support, whilst the negative or non-concepts may attract the least supportive attitude. Those with a ‘negative’ concept of Irish neutrality, for example “it means nothing” or “fence-sitting”, should have a relatively negative attitude towards Irish neutrality. Those failing to offer a concept can be hypothesized as having a disinterested stance on neutrality, choosing the middle ground or ‘non-attitude’ position on the support/reject attitude scale, for example (5).
on the (0-10) attitude scale, whilst also exhibiting a low salience attitude. Table 2.2 below shows the average attitude and salience figures according to the concept of neutrality held.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=</th>
<th>Definition of Irish Neutrality</th>
<th>retain -&gt; reject</th>
<th>important -&gt; not</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Peaceful/promotes peace/mediator</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>No enemies/free from war/conscription</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>123</td>
<td>Good thing</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>143</td>
<td>Not involved in other countries’ war</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>366</td>
<td>Not involved in war/no war</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Being neutral</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>Independence/make own decisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>Ireland standing alone/minding own business</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<th>-----</th>
<th>AVERAGE SCORE</th>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<th>retain -&gt; reject</th>
<th>important -&gt; not</th>
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<td>151</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
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<td>96</td>
<td>Right to decide to go to war</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td><em>Not in defence alliance</em></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Military neutrality*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><em>No NATO involvement</em></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Disagree with it</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Fence-sitting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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</table>

*base sizes are too small to show data.

Looking at table 2.2 it appears there is an attitude and concept relationship, although it is important to note that many of the concepts have low base numbers. Nonetheless, the scores and relationships are indicative. Those who expressed a ‘pacifist’ and ‘anti-war’ ideology in their meaning of Irish neutrality were most strongly in favour of retaining Irish neutrality. Those who did not respond and offer their meaning of Irish neutrality were quite ‘neutral’ on their attitude to Irish neutrality, occupying the median and being neither strongly against nor strongly in favour of Irish neutrality. Those who said Irish neutrality meant ‘nothing’ did not regard it as important and were in favour of giving it up. Those who held a negative definition, who simply said they disagreed with it rather than offering a definition or who offered definitions such as ‘fence-sitting’, were most eager to give it up. There may be merit in stratifying models of public attitudes to neutrality by concept, to assess whether different concepts of neutrality signal different values driving attitudes to neutrality.

To investigate the link between attitude and concept of neutrality further, the summary table below shows the mean attitude and salience scores of those who offered the top four definitions of: ‘not getting involved in wars’ and ‘taking sides in a war’, those
saying it means ‘nothing’ and those saying it means ‘independence’, (including independence with respect to decisions to get involved in war). The first group are those most strongly supporting neutrality (mean score of 2.9) and also have the highest salience mean score (7.2) compared with holders of other definitions. Nearly 1 in 4 of the Irish population falls into this category of neutrality supporters. The next largest cohort of the population conceives of neutrality as independence (12% of the population), and also have a high salience score, but have a comparatively less intense support score with the mean of 3.5. This is significantly lower than the score for the first group (t-value = 2.6, p=.01).

Those that state that neutrality means ‘nothing’ exhibit the least intense ‘retain’ attitude, being closer to the neutral point in the scale, with a mean score of 4.55, (that is also different at the statistically significant level from the mean score of the independence concept group). This group also holds the least intense salience attitude, which makes sense because if they feel neutrality is meaningless, they should be more willing to say it is not important. Noting the context of the design of this analysis that uses the first-mentioned, top-of-mind characteristic of neutrality, the fact remains that the number of those offering the government definition of ‘not in NATO/an alliance’ is very small. Interestingly, 1 in 10 respondents offered an opinion or evaluation of neutrality as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing, rather than an actual definition. 5% of Irish people offered the opinion that neutrality is a ‘good thing’, and their attitude mean score (2.8) reflects the ‘positiveness’ of the verbatim.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main definition</th>
<th>% population*</th>
<th>Mean q7a** Attitude</th>
<th>Mean q7b** Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not getting in war/not taking sides/free from war</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>2.90***</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence/right to decide to go war or not</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.55***</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in NATO/an alliance (government definition)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion offered instead of a definition</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good thing</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE: NATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SURVEY 2001/2002**

*base of 2498 respondents

**base of 1855 respondents

***statistically significant at .05 level vs. mean attitude towards neutrality of those citing independence as their primary definition of neutrality.13

13 t-values of 2.6 (independence versus no war) and 3.8 (independence versus nothing)
Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that the definition of neutrality is problematic. The concept is essentially contested and exists in a genealogical history that prevents the ‘discovery’ of the ‘true’ ‘fixed’ ‘essence’ of the concept. The political analysis showed how events shape the discourses of Irish governments and elites on the definition of neutrality. The link between definitions of neutrality and foreign policy interests was made explicit, which is important to highlight in the context of the hegemony of one set of interests over another (specifically in a situation where it appears that the dominant set of interests run contrary to public interests). Thus, the politics of the definition of neutrality and any differences between the concepts held by the public and the concept held by the government is important to investigate because of the links between dominant interests, the dominant definition of neutrality and the foreign policy agenda that flows from the definition.

The review of academic discourses on neutrality endeavoured to show the different foreign policy themes that are prioritised and reflected in concepts of neutrality. The review demonstrated that there are concepts of neutrality produced by non-realist academics that are meaningful in attempts to understand public motivations for supporting neutrality in states across Europe. Specifically, the discourses on neutrality by Salmon, Doherty, Hakovirta and Karsh were identified as the product of realist levels of analysis, omitting public opinion and concentrating at the state and government levels. These discourses contributed little theoretical guidance for hypotheses designed to understand public opinion on neutrality, compared with the non-realist discourses of McSweeney, Goetschel, Bonjour, Kronsell and Svedburg and Sundelius that suggested themes such as identity and activism. The provision of wider concepts of neutrality such as McSweeney’s ‘active’ neutrality also demonstrated the need to move beyond the dominance of the realist understanding of neutrality in the literature on Irish neutrality, because the second half of the chapter analysing public concepts of neutrality showed significant evidence that the public cohort most strongly attached to neutrality define neutrality along the lines of the ‘active’ concept of neutrality.

The review of public concepts of neutrality and government concepts of neutrality emphasised the difference between the narrowly-defined government concept of ‘staying out of military alliances’ and the wider public concept that means staying out of wars, independence and impartiality. Several other elements of the public concepts of neutrality, such as peacekeeping, non-aggression and the rejection of superpowers’
foreign policy agenda find significant parallels with the ‘active’ concept of neutrality considered by non-realist academics. The failure of government to acknowledge and to represent the fundamental, active concept of Irish neutrality held by a majority of people in Ireland will eventually and inevitably be made explicit, and thereby constitute a significant political tension in future debates on the EU and in the relevant forthcoming referendums in Ireland. Keatinge may be right that Irish neutrality appears to some elites and academics to be ‘fuzzy’; this elite discourse alleging the fuzziness of public concepts of neutrality can only help a government wishing to fudge the fundamental differences between the foreign policy agendas that flow from the different concepts of neutrality. The analysis of the concepts of neutrality held by the public over time and the findings of relative stability in the meaning of neutrality also provide evidence that the meaning of neutrality is an important variable to bear in mind in the evaluation of the values that drive public attitudes to Irish neutrality that will be undertaken in the second half of the thesis.
A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest – (Foucault, 1988: 154 in (Campbell, 1998: 191))

Introduction
This chapter and the next chapter consist of a two-part critique of the ‘Unneutral Ireland’ thesis. The deconstruction part of the critique in this chapter argues that the concept of neutrality used by Salmon is contestable, that there are alternative concepts of neutrality such as that of McSweeney, and that proving that Ireland is ‘unnecessary’ using Salmon’s realist-based notion of neutrality is not equivalent to proving that Ireland is not neutral in any viable sense of the term.

The second part of the critique in the next chapter shows that even if Salmon’s limited definition of neutrality is accepted, Salmon’s argument that Ireland was not neutral during the Second World War does not stand up to critical analysis. Further, if it is accepted that countries such as Switzerland, Sweden and Finland are meaningfully described as neutral - despite engaging in practices identical to the one Salmon cites in Ireland’s case to impugn Ireland’s neutrality - this acceptance not only undermines Salmon’s substantive case against Ireland’s neutrality, it also points to another inadequacy (in addition to the inadequacies revealed by the deconstruction) in the strict legalistic, militaristic concept of neutrality Salmon’s thesis employs.

Why deconstruct?
The reason why this deconstruction has been undertaken is due to a noticeable bias in the Irish media discourse on Irish neutrality, which, upon closer examination, relied upon a particular strand of academic literature that claimed to objectively analyse Irish neutrality and concluded that Ireland’s neutrality is a myth (i.e. Salmon, 1989).

The ‘unnecessary’ discourse is a factor in the struggle over the content of the concept of neutrality identified by several scholars, specifically, elite attempts (1) to re-define the concept so that it is rendered meaningless or non-existent; (2) to ignore public concepts of neutrality; (3) to ignore public support for (non-elite concepts of) neutrality; and (4) to conflate public and government concepts despite empirical evidence of a divergence – ostensibly for the purpose of achieving further European integration in the field of security and defence. These political discourses are reconstituted in debates preceding relevant EU referendums in Ireland.
What are the consequences of the relative hegemony of the ‘unneutral’ thesis in the discourse on Irish neutrality? For one, laying claim to the ‘truth’ through a seemingly objective and empirical analysis of sets of variables that are said to constitute the ‘true’, ‘classic’ and ‘genuine’ concept of neutrality and drawing the ‘evident’ conclusion that Irish neutrality has never existed, establishes a hierarchy over the opposite viewpoint that Irish neutrality does exist and the other academic analyses that offer an alternative set of variables argued to constitute the Irish neutrality concept. Second, by corollary, it portrays those who argue that Irish neutrality exists and those who support its existence as ‘non-rational’.

As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, it is assumed that discourses have a potential effect on public opinion; Zaller hypothesizes a change in attitude as a result of receiving new information (Zaller, 1992: 267) depending on a number of other factors such as the dispositions and education of the receiver of the information. Presumably, also, these discourses are aimed at an audience, with some of that audience open to changing or reinforcing their opinions on neutrality.

Carrying out a deconstruction is part of the poststructuralist research agenda, with the aim of making space for alternatives; these alternative views have the potential to emancipate the concept of public opinion and Irish neutrality. The results of the deconstruction can help to establish public opinion as an ontological element of Irish neutrality; thereby smoothing the path of a student attempting to establish the ‘rationality’ or otherwise of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

The deconstruction also feeds into the aim of poststructuralism in IR that demands that standpoints are exposed and articulated (Ashley, 1996: 241), and demonstrates that the (neo)realist discourses on Irish neutrality are not the only truth on Irish neutrality and public opinion. Philosophically, then, the (neo)realist positions are provably contingent. The deconstruction will also help loosen the grip of (neo)realism on the discourses on Irish neutrality, contributing to this dynamic of resistance in the wider IR discipline. The conclusion that non-realist theories may be required to understand Irish neutrality and public opinion on Irish neutrality will also help inform a more relevant approach to establishing the ‘rationality’ of public opinion.

Why is it that the texts written by the academics Bill McSweeney and Trevor C. Salmon have been selected for the deconstruction, when there are other texts on Irish neutrality (with comments on public opinion) to choose from, e.g. Patrick Keatinge
The texts are considered to be the most appropriate to deconstruct because, firstly, they are competing discourses on Irish neutrality and they explicitly engage with one another in a discursive struggle over the content and meaning of the concept of Irish neutrality. Secondly, that fact that their conclusions are so radically different means that it is easier to show the different assumptions underpinning these conclusions. A liberal institutionalist and conventional social constructivist comparison would appear to be so similar as to be indistinguishable from each other, given that their respective sets of assumptions are also not radically different. Finally, one thesis is relatively hegemonic in the academic discourse, and has made its way into the public domain, and the other has received scant attention (see Appendix B); these characteristics fit the profile of a binary implicit in a deconstruction.

The deconstruction and the ‘rationality’ of public opinion.
The definition of a ‘rational’ public means that the public chooses a foreign policy suited to their needs and in accordance with their values (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 35).

As discussed in the introduction and in the previous chapter, research into public voting behaviour in Irish referendums on European Union Treaties – Maastricht and Amsterdam in the 1990s and the Nice Treaty in June 2001 and October 2002 – has shown that a significant number of Irish citizens have repeatedly voted to reject the Treaties due to perceived threats to Irish neutrality (Sinnott, 2001). Opinion polls conducted in the 1980s and 1990s have shown that nearly two-thirds of the Irish population want to retain Irish neutrality (Marsh, 1992: 6). According to the White Paper on Foreign Policy, ‘the majority of the Irish people have always cherished Ireland’s military neutrality and recognise the positive values that inspire it’ (Ireland, 1996: 118) and so it appears that a significant proportion of the Irish population support Irish neutrality, and elites and academics seem prepared to acknowledge this phenomenon, despite a seeming lack of understanding of the dynamics of public support for Irish neutrality.14

In terms of formulating a research question to evaluate the ‘rationality’ of the dynamics of public opinion on Irish neutrality, the combination of these two hypotheses – (a) that Irish neutrality is a myth and (b) that a significant proportion of the voting public supports Irish neutrality - raises the spectre of attempting to justify research into the phenomenon of strong public commitment to a concept that doesn’t exist. This has several implications, including (1) public opinion is ‘non-rational’

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14 No survey designed to understand public attitudes to Irish neutrality has ever been conducted. More specifically, in the context of voters rejecting EU treaties due to perceived threats to neutrality, ‘there have been no surveys which have systematically explored the various options for a new security and defence policy, or the ways in which neutrality might be consistent with such options’ (Marsh, 1992: 25).
according to academic standards, or (2) the academic discourse claiming Ireland’s neutrality is a myth does not reflect ‘rational’ public opinion. Certainly, most of the academic and elite comments on public support for Irish neutrality appear to favour the first implication, variously describing it as ‘emotional’, (Keating, 1972: 439; 1973: 174; 1978: 73), ‘rhetoric’ (Marsh, 1992: 26), ‘symbolic’ (Marsh, 1992: 26; Sinnott, 1996), ‘sentimental’, (McMahon, 1999), ‘contradictory’ (Sinnott, 1996) - effectively ‘non-rational’ (Everts, 2000: 178-179). However, consideration of the second implication raises the question of whether it is adherence to the ‘unneutral’ discourse that prompts a characterisation of public attitudes to Irish neutrality as ‘non-rational’. Some evidence points to this possibility, e.g. one of the elites promoting the ‘unneutral’ thesis also characterises public opinion supporting Irish neutrality as ‘confused’ (FitzGerald, 1996). Alternatively, the two implications could be reconciled through a supposition that each is based on a different IR theoretical worldview and a correspondingly different concept of neutrality. It was the desire to test this supposition that led to the task of deconstructing of the ‘unneutral’ thesis that claims Irish neutrality is a ‘myth’.

Approach
The terms ‘analysis’, ‘thesis’ and ‘discourse’ are interchangeable since the academic texts are conceived of as ‘discourses’. The full title of the ‘unneutral’ thesis on Irish neutrality is “Unneutral Ireland: A Unique and Ambivalent Security Policy”, written by Trevor C. Salmon; this book will be referred to throughout as the Unneutral Ireland thesis. The ‘unneutral’ discourse (no italics) refers to the body of literature by various authors that promotes the ‘unneutral’ thesis on Irish neutrality. The alternative analysis in support of Irish neutrality consists of several chapters (McSweeney, The Case for Active Irish Neutrality, 1985, Changing Perceptions of Irish Neutrality, 1985, Some Arguments Against Irish Neutrality, 1985). In a book edited by Bill McSweeney, entitled “Ireland and the Threat of Nuclear War: the question of Irish Neutrality” - this collection of chapters will be referred to in shorthand as the Irish neutrality thesis. This chapter focuses on these texts and incorporates two journal articles written by Salmon and McSweeney respectively. It is worth stating that the object of this investigation is the printed book or journal article, not its author, noting however, ‘this distinction is, of course, to ignore the lessons of deconstruction’ (Spivak, 1989: 176). In order to emphasise the paper’s focus on the selected texts as discourses, references to the authors of the texts are avoided and the ‘texts as discourses’ are conceived of as third person entities i.e. ‘the unneutral thesis’ and the ‘Irish neutrality thesis’. Some key signifiers and statements in the texts will be highlighted in bold.
Poststructuralism – a brief recap

In the first chapter, it was explained that poststructuralists and positivists have different conceptions of knowledge, ask different research questions, and differ over what should be studied and how it should be studied. The former believe that the positivist notion of objectivity that depends on an assumption that there is a world out there - existing independently of theory - to be discovered and accessed is not plausible. Instead, poststructuralists argue that our theories define what we see as the external world, and therefore each theory will define what counts as the facts (Smith, 2001: 227). The premise resonates with this chapter’s focus on the political struggle over the concept of Irish neutrality and the hypothesis that IR theory assumptions drive the elite claims made about the ‘reality’ of Irish neutrality. The poststructuralist aim is to investigate ‘the interrelationship of power and representational practices that elevate one truth over another, that legitimate and subject one identity against another, that make, in short, one discourse matter more than the next’ (Der Derian, 1997: 59). This aim encourages consideration of a link between the theoretical dominance of neorealism (and its positivist, essentialist ontology and foundational epistemology (Neufeld, 1988: 51; Smith, 2001: 225) in the discipline of IR and the dominance of the (neo)realist-inspired ‘unneutral’ Ireland thesis over the social constructivist thesis supporting the practice of Irish neutrality. These poststructuralist premises and aims are realised through the method of deconstruction, a brief description of which now follows.

Deconstruction

For many deconstructionists, deconstruction is not a ‘method’ because ‘deconstruction has to do with what cannot be formalized or anticipated’ (Royle, 2000: 6). Indeed, ‘the question “what is deconstruction?” is itself evidence of a serious naivety, for deconstruction is, above all perhaps, a questioning of the ‘is’, a concern with what remains to be thought, with what cannot be thought within the present’ (Royle, 2000: 7). That said, one of the key ideas associated with deconstruction is a strategy concerned with conceptual oppositions, e.g. reality/myth, male/female, same/other, rational/non-rational, and more particularly with the acknowledgement that these oppositions always entail a ‘violent hierarchy’: the first term is, in a specific context which must itself be demonstrated, privileged over its supposed opposite (Royle, 2000: 5); ‘the second term in each pair is considered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the first, a fall away from it’ (Johnson in Zehfuss, 2002: 197). The first move in deconstructing the opposition is to overthrow the hierarchy. In the next phase, this reversal must be displaced, with the winning term put ‘under erasure’:
‘Derrida’s method consists of showing how the privileged term is held in place by the force of a dominant metaphor and not, as it might seem, by any conclusive logic’ (Sarup, 1988: 56-57).

How does the deconstruction in this chapter proceed? It starts with a conceptual binary comprised of the dominant ‘Unneutral Ireland’ thesis claiming Irish neutrality is a ‘myth’ and the subjugated Irish neutrality thesis that embodies the opposing claim that Irish neutrality exists. The ‘violent hierarchy’ is made explicit in the texts under deconstruction: the Unneutral thesis constructs a ‘genuine’, ‘established’ concept of neutrality (the key to Unneutral Ireland assertions about the mythical status of Irish neutrality) that is superior to Irish neutrality’s concept of ‘active’ neutrality: ‘the notion of “active neutrality” involves a contradiction in terms and a disregard for the established meaning of the concept’ (Salmon, 1989: 311). This micro-level, qualitative hierarchy in the texts is mirrored at the macro-level of the International Relations discipline because within the discipline of IR, the neorealist paradigm is qualitatively and quantitatively privileged over non-realist approaches (McSweeney, 1999: 106). Such overwhelming bias in the discipline of IR may partly explain why the Unneutral thesis has escaped criticism and is readily cited, whilst the Irish neutrality thesis is largely ignored.

**Perspectivism**

This chapter replaces Derrida’s ‘dominant metaphor’ as the force behind the privileged term in a binary with the force of a ‘dominant IR theoretical worldview’ – (neo)realism. This perspectivist approach (Lapid, 1989: 243) resonates with premises employed in political philosophy, e.g. Hyland’s argument that, ‘questions can be raised about the acceptability of a norm or principle by demonstrating that on analysis the principle is only meaningful against a background of theoretical assumptions that are themselves questionable and open to debate’ (Hyland, 1995: 22). The corollary of this perspectivist deconstruction is that neither discourse can claim the sole, logical ‘truth’ about Irish neutrality – in the sense that each thesis on Irish neutrality is theory-dependent, each is equally ‘true’ and equally contingent. Pre-empting accusations of relativism, this chapter takes the position (discussed later) that the social constructivist account of Irish neutrality is more relevant and appropriate for the purposes of understanding the dynamics of public opinion on Irish neutrality compared to the (neo)realist ‘unneutral’ discourse.
The dominance of the *Unneutral* discourse

Having cited the qualitative hierarchy of the *Unneutral* thesis’ concept of neutrality, attention now turns to the quantitative hegemony of the ‘unneutral’ discourse in the academic literature and print media. The following titles of academic journal and newspaper articles illustrate the elite-led discourse that Ireland’s neutrality is not ‘real’, but a ‘myth’ (emphasis added):

- *Neutrality and the Irish Republic: myth or reality?* – (Salmon, 1984)
- *A myth of ‘traditional neutrality’ developed from the Irish decision to be a non-belligerent in the Second World War* – (FitzGerald, 1997)
- *Casting off the imaginary cloak of neutrality* – (Collins, Casting off the imaginary cloak of neutrality, 2003)
- *Our sham neutrality has finally been exposed* – (Collins, Bertie beware, the fence is about to give way, 2003)
- *Wartime neutrality theoretical rather than real* – (FitzGerald, 2005)

The *Unneutral Ireland* thesis set out to test “whether the Irish interpretation and understanding of these concepts [neutrality/nonalignment] are legitimate” (Salmon, 1989: 2) and concluded that ‘Ireland certainly is, and has been “unneutral”’ (Salmon, 1989: 311). The thesis has been cited throughout several decades of academic literature that supports both the analytical approach - the construction of a concept of ‘classic(al)’ neutrality to serve as the yardstick to evaluate Irish neutrality – (FitzGerald, 1998: 13; Salmon, 1989: 5) - and the conclusion that Irish neutrality is a myth. For example, in a 1995 *Irish Studies in International Affairs* journal article, referring to *Unneutral Ireland*, MacGinty claims ‘Trevor Salmon has convincingly outlined how, since independence, Ireland has failed to fulfil the criterion for a credible neutrality policy’ (MacGinty, 1995: 129). Kearsley quotes the *Unneutral* thesis arguing, “‘the Irish’...‘deviate from the traditional characteristics of neutrality so much so that ‘...even the appellations ‘messy’, ‘qualified’, and ‘limited’ neutrality are inappropriate’” (Kearsley, 1998: 172).

In an article entitled *The Origins, Development and Present Status of Irish Neutrality*, with a noteworthy use of inverted commas around the word ‘neutrality’, FitzGerald refers to the “seminal work *Unneutral Ireland*” (FitzGerald, 1998: 12) and uses key arguments underpinning the *Unneutral* thesis to contend that ‘it is at least questionable whether Ireland can properly be described as having been “neutral”, because the scale of assistance given secretly to Britain was scarcely compatible with the concept of neutrality under International Law’ (FitzGerald, 1998: 13). Having
demonstrated direct support for the methodology and analytical approach underpinning the ‘unneutral’ thesis, FitzGerald concludes,

it will be evident from what I have said that Irish neutrality does not conform to the classic definitions of neutrality. Nor is the Irish situation similar to that of other European neutral states such as Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, which, in their different ways, have had much more clear-cut concepts of neutrality than Ireland has demonstrated since the state was founded (FitzGerald, 1998: 18).

In the most recent academic work referencing *Unneutral Ireland*, Doherty opines, “during World War Two Ireland’s neutrality was extremely benevolent towards the allies to the extent that it is doubtful whether Ireland should be described as neutral or simply non-belligerent” (Doherty, 2002: 13). Thus, there is strong support for the *Unneutral* thesis in the academic literature and the print media (despite appearing to go against the grain of public opinion on neutrality) that constitutes a relative but significant hegemony over the *Irish neutrality* thesis. Interestingly, a (neo)realist bias, similarly unreflective of public opinion, is said to be present in the mainstream media discourses on neutrality in other neutral states, e.g. Ståhlberg notes that in Finland ‘the independent press plays a restrictive role [in terms of representing public opinion], because its argumentation is related to the “realist” position with regard to neutrality’ (Ståhlberg, 1989: 258).

**Neorealism and social constructivism: key differences**

To recall a number of key points from the previous two chapters, a major criticism of the (neo)realist focus on structure is that it ignores the role of human will and the notion of agency (one of the key considerations of social constructivism) in international politics. Human agency and the possibility of change in international relations is the first element of the so-called ‘agent-structure’ debate in IR. Neorealist accounts of world politics emphasizing ‘structure’ over ‘agency’ tend to draw deep distinctions between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ politics and, crucially, are also more likely to ignore the role of public opinion in foreign policy. Arguably these realist and neorealist themes embedded in mainstream analyses of foreign policy in IR have contributed to the *Unneutral Ireland* thesis’ failure to consider public opinion in the conception and analysis of Irish neutrality.

As will be discussed next, within the discipline of IR, critical theorists and social constructivists are counteracting the (neo)realist desire to extract or ignore the human
variable by calling for a more human-centered concept of security, however, there are several other political theories and normative arguments justifying consideration of human agency and public opinion in foreign policy analysis, for example, Marxist theory or participatory democratic theory (Dahl, 1998: 38; Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2001: 216; Pateman, 1970: 104). In addition, Brown points out that theorists of decision-making have undermined the idea that foreign policy is radically different from domestic politics and the neorealist emphasis on the irrelevance of domestic factors is undermined somewhat by the phenomenon of the ‘democratic peace’ (Brown, 1997: 118). The lesser emphasis of critical social constructivists on the international-domestic divide and their consideration of human agency in security and international politics may offer a better explanation of foreign policy, and in particular, the phenomenon of popular adherence to neutrality in the face of European elite hostility (Fanning, 1996: 145-147). Thus, Irish neutrality’s consideration of human agency and public opinion as key constituents of the concept of Irish neutrality may signify a fundamental theoretical advantage over the (neo)realist Unneutral thesis in attempts to understand the dynamics of public opinion on Irish neutrality.

**Concepts of security**

Concepts of security provide a way of linking together many areas of theory and analysis within International Relations (Buzan, 1991: 372) and they also serve to illustrate the differences between competing paradigms of neorealism and social constructivism and competing concepts of Irish neutrality. Deepening our understandings of security involves ‘investigating the implications and possibilities that result from seeing security as a concept that derives from different understandings of what politics is and can be all about, and specifically, politics on a global scale’ (Booth, 1997: 111). Traditionally states are the primary referent object in the security debate, not individual human beings (Booth and Vale, 1997: 334). By excluding people from the discussion of state security (and neutrality) we simplify the model, and escape the task of investigating security in all its complex, value-laden respects as a concept which has meaning only in relation to people and their needs (McSweeney, 1999: 86). McSweeney articulates the call to adopt a deeper, human-centred idea of security in place of the state focus, and a broader concept instead of a narrow, militaristic one (McSweeney, 1999: 82). Similarly, Ayoob argues for a concept of security that ‘must go beyond the traditional realist definition of security and overcome its external orientation and military bias’ (Ayoob, 1997: 134), ‘to include domestic and non-military dimensions’ (Ayoob, 1997: 139). Because ‘different worldviews and discourses about politics deliver different views and discourses about security’ (Booth, 1997: 106), and different concepts of security in turn produce
different concepts of neutrality, the critical social constructivist would construct a
more human-centred concept of neutrality to those of a Wendtian social constructivist
and would prioritise these dimensions in an analysis of Irish neutrality.

**Neorealism and social constructivism – a brief recap**
The purpose of summarising the key paradigm features of neorealism and social
constructivism in the first chapter is so that we can imagine what a neorealist analysis
of Irish neutrality would focus on and prioritise as key variables compared to that of a
critical social constructivist. In summary, a neorealist approach would conceive of
power in terms of military capabilities, empirically measure these factors and
designate the appropriate role and foreign policy options of the state, and from these
assumptions, proceed to analyse the state’s foreign policy. More specifically, a
neorealist analysis of neutrality would view the balance of power assumption as a
critical variable and ignore the role of sub-state actors and public opinion. To be seen
as scientific, a neorealist would construct an essentialist, legalistic concept of
neutrality using positivist methods, gathering empirical evidence designed to support
claims of objectivity, and would write with an explanatory tone.

Social constructivists would consider the role of identity, and its malleability as a
social form, as significant for international relations theory and substantive
international relations (McSweeney, 1999: 31). Constructivism assumes *a priori* that
identities are potentially part of the constitutive practices of the state, and so,
productive of its actions at home and abroad (Hopf, 2000: 1770). A social
constructivist approach would emphasize agency, understand structure in cognitive
rather than exclusively material terms, consider identity and interests as important
variables, and view the international order as a construction of actors. A more critical
social constructivist would offer a reflexive, qualified-foundational analysis of Irish
neutrality, incorporate the role of public and sub-state actors into the concept of Irish
neutrality and focus on normative political issues in the debate, given the
emancipatory goal of critical social constructivist writing.

Table 3.1 summaries the binary positions occupied by the *Unneutral* thesis and the
*Irish neutrality* thesis in relation to meta-issues of ontology, epistemology,
methodology and approach, as well as the specific variables related to the IR
theoretical assumptions that direct each thesis’ analysis and conclusions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1</th>
<th>Deconstruction summary: Thesis, paradigm, approach and variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text</strong></td>
<td>Unneutral Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author</strong></td>
<td>Trevor C. Salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thesis</strong></td>
<td>Irish neutrality is a ‘myth’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IR theory paradigm</strong></td>
<td>(Neo)realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>Essentialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>Foundational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology/Approach</strong></td>
<td>Positivist/objective/explanatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Actors’ emphasised</td>
<td>States and decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Variables’ emphasised</td>
<td>Material factors and military capabilities, balance of power, protective umbrella, sovereignty, international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples of supportive academic literature</td>
<td>FitzGerald, 1998; Kearsley, 1998; Raymond, 1984; MacGinty, 1995; Doherty, 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical position</td>
<td>Hegemonic/mainstream</td>
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<td>Academic school</td>
<td>Security studies</td>
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**The deconstruction**

Drawing attention to the IR theoretical assumptions where appropriate, this chapter will highlight (1) the differences in approaches employed in each of the respective *Unneutral Ireland* and *Irish Neutrality* discourses, i.e. essentialist versus anti-essentialist, foundational versus ‘qualified foundational’, positivist versus reflexivist, objective versus normative and explanatory versus emancipatory. These approaches in turn give rise to (2) the differences in the nature of the concepts of neutrality presented i.e. a ‘true’, measurable fact vs. a possible, flexible process, external vs. internal dynamics, wartime vs. peacetime concepts, passive vs. active concepts and (3) different levels of importance attached to the variables common to each analysis, i.e. identity and discourses will not be discussed. The IR paradigm also influences (4) the level of salience attached to variables common to each neutrality concept, i.e. defence capabilities, sovereignty and law and (5) the selection of variables that have a significant role in drawing conclusions on Irish neutrality’s existence and credibility that are exclusive to each analysis, i.e. the (neo)realist factors of balance of power, protective umbrella, and the primacy of military power and the (critical) social constructivist factors of identity, discourse and public support.
Essentialist versus anti-essentialist

The *Unneutral* thesis operates with an essentialist concept of neutrality using positivist methods. It states:

what had emerged as the essence of neutrality was abstention, the inviolability of neutral territory, and impartiality. Each of these aspects had associated with it a number of rights and duties (Salmon, 1989: 11) including … the recognition of neutral status by belligerents, the disavowal of external help, the freedom of decision and action in the political economic and military spheres… (Salmon, 1989: 79-80).

These fixed, ‘essential’ components of the *Unneutral* thesis’s concept of neutrality contrast with the fluid concept of ‘active’ neutrality that “relates to a wide range of activities and skills” described in the *Irish neutrality* thesis. The ontological character of the latter concept means neutrality:

is not a fact, but an accomplishment. That is to say, it is more like child-rearing than childbirth, like trade rather than a trade agreement. This may seem obvious to some, but the static, objective idea of neutrality is very pervasive (McSweeney, 1985: 182).

Foundational versus ‘qualified’ foundational

As discussed in the first chapter a foundationalist position is one that thinks that all truth claims about some feature of the world can be judged true or false, (Smith, 2001: 227), a position that is intimately linked with the essentialist ontology described above. To remind us, Der Derian refers to

the continuing domination of a philosophical realism in IR – from its logical positivist to rational choice forms – which holds that the purest, most parsimonious statement most accurately, usefully, authentically expresses a thought or reflects an event. At the level of common sense, they suggest a natural preference for conceptual rigor and clarity (Der Derian, 1997: 59).

Such premises underpin the *Unneutral* claims in relation to Irish neutrality that are expressed in a strong foundationalist tone:

‘the concept of Irish neutrality’ is not saved ‘since (as has been clearly established and demonstrated) genuine neutrality is not to be equated with
mere non-belligerency, or non-alliance membership...moreover, even if the concept of ‘military neutrality’ were compatible with neutrality as properly understood (which it is not), the equation of ‘military neutrality’ with neutrality *per se* is singularly inappropriate in the Irish case’ (Salmon, 1989: 309-311).

A ‘qualified’ foundationalism is “the implicit epistemology of the emerging trend in sociological theory and research, and of much of the work in international relations theory which can be identified as ‘social constructionist’ in its approach” (McSweeney, 1999: 106). McSweeney’s thesis on Irish neutrality is underpinned by this ‘qualified’ foundationalism that is characteristic of social constructivism in IR and a good example is seen in McSweeney’s employment of the sociological premise that “if people perceive things as real then they are real in their consequences” (McSweeney, 1985: 119).

**Positivist versus reflexivist**

Theoretical reflexivity includes “a willingness to be open about our philosophical and political starting points, and facing the challenge of clarifying ‘how our commitments and values are consistent with our (meta-)theoretical starting points’” (Devetak, 2001: 161). From the outset, the author of the *Irish neutrality* thesis explains that his academic discipline, “starts from certain moral assumptions which function to direct the progress of work and the selection of evidence” and acknowledges his position as a student of “the politics of peacemaking” (McSweeney, 1985: 3-4). Whilst the *Irish neutrality* thesis is prefaced with the proviso, “we have no truths to impart, only a case to advance respectfully” (McSweeney, 1985: 4), the tone of the *Unneutral* thesis is the traditional one of ‘several decades of security studies that involved “telling it as it is” – ‘it’ being a realist account of the purported state(s) of the world’ (Booth, 1997: 84).

With unrelenting positivism, no position is described or admitted to in the *Unneutral* thesis, and nor are any paradigmatic assumptions acknowledged.

**Formal, objective, explanatory versus critical, normative, emancipatory**

The *Unneutral Ireland* thesis follows the formal positivist ‘scientific’ method of creating a model of variables and applying it to test the case of Irish neutrality. It proceeds with

a conceptual analysis aimed at identifying the true nature of neutrality;

(Salmon, 1989: 2). The discussion in this and the preceding chapter makes it possible to identify the most significant variables associated with neutrality…
in chapter five, these variables will be applied specifically to Ireland in the years of its great test, namely the period of the Second World War (Salmon, 1989: 79-80).

From a poststructuralist perspective, the concept of neutrality - like all political concepts - is essentially contested, but this notion is normally obscured in the explanatory tone of (neo)realist writing, such as in this exemplar from the Unneutral thesis:

For neutrality per se, as demonstrated earlier, certain conditions must be met; and by utilizing them one can give content to the concept. The fact that the concept is often wrongly applied, or that the conditions may be difficult to attain in the contemporary world, is not a ground for abandoning it, especially since the term is still widely used, not least by states themselves, and does provide a useful yardstick against which to analyse the policies of such states (Salmon, 1989: 27).

In this seemingly ‘objective’ analysis, the Unneutral thesis simply takes the neutrality of other states as a ‘given’, referring to them as states that “are commonly identified as neutral or non-aligned in the literature”, that are “universally regarded as such” (Salmon, 1989: 43), in the formulation of the so-called “genuine” concept of neutrality.

The analysis of these [neutral] states’ [Austria, Sweden and Switzerland] policies and attitudes leads to an extrapolation of their essential position, which, taken together with the key characteristics of neutrality and non-alignment identified in the previous chapter, forms the basis of a model against which the Irish case is examined in subsequent chapters (Salmon, 1989: 44).

It is on the basis of these assumptions, approach and model that the Unneutral thesis argues, “the application of the variables, suggests that such orthodoxy [that Ireland is neutral] must be questioned. At best, evidence in support of it is equivocal” (Salmon, 1989: 5). The assumption of the neutrality of the European states is the basis or yardstick of Salmon’s claim that Ireland is “unneutral”, as he alleges that Irish neutrality violates the criteria he has extracted from the neutrality policies of the other European neutral states. However, had Salmon critically examined the cases of European neutrality during World War II according to the same criteria he used to
evaluate Irish neutrality, he would have had to conclude that those European states were also “unneutral”. This will be outlined in the next chapter, which demonstrates that the other European neutral states also violated the criteria of “due diligence”, “impartiality”, “concessions”, “economic dependence”, “disavowal of external help”, etc. Nonetheless, the tone employed in the conclusion imports an unquestionable ‘truth’ that Ireland is ‘unneutral’: “the Irish, then, have consistently and significantly failed to measure up to the principal prerequisites ‘of’ or ‘for’ neutrality...despite the shibboleth of neutrality, and the claims of the Irish themselves, Ireland has never been truly neutral” (Salmon, 1989: 309-311).

By contrast, the Irish neutrality thesis is more concerned with truth claims regarding neutrality in the public debate, referring to the negative “image of neutrality popularized by all the major military powers” and argues that their “tacit, multilateral agreement to downgrade neutrality has undoubtedly succeeded in lowering its status and making it difficult for an aspiring neutral to win public support at home and international recognition abroad for a policy often seen as ‘indifferent’, ‘self-centred’, ‘opportunist’, ‘short-sighted’” (McSweeney, 1985: 7). The thesis attests that “EPC…functions to create a climate which will gradually persuade the other NATO members to drop their fears of US reaction and NATO weakness and to move gradually through stages towards a defence alliance” (McSweeney, 1985: 133) and it demonstrates how certain claims made by elites or the Irish government in relation to Irish neutrality “can be a ploy to distort the term” (McSweeney, 1985: 182) and how several of these claims amount to “a crude tactic to abandon neutrality by defining it beyond the bounds of possibility” (McSweeney, 1985: 183).

Criticising the “sizeable body of feeling, innuendo and unargued comment in the writings of some politicians, journalists and historians who are clearly unhappy with Ireland’s ambiguous position”, the Irish neutrality thesis seeks to consider alternatives to those presented in the dominant discourse and asks “by what reason are we therefore invited to join a military alliance? There are other possibilities which are not presented and there is the moral dimension which is ignored” (McSweeney, 1985: 4-5). Finally, the Irish neutrality discourse refers to other neutral states in order to argue for a new normative concept of neutrality; it prompts neutrals to evaluate the policy of neutrality in terms of its ability to “serve the cause of peace” (McSweeney, 1988: 209).
External versus internal

The notion of external and internal factors relates to the agent-structure debate in IR. The Unneutral thesis deliberates on the external constraints on the Irish state that are assumed to determine a state’s ability to be neutral: “there is always the question of how ‘free’ any decision by a small, weak state really is in an interdependent world, and particularly for a state like Ireland”, (Salmon, 1989: 7), and in the best tradition of structural realism argues that “Irish non-belligerency was only really possible because of strategic factors outside the Irish government’s control” (Salmon, 1989: 125). The Irish neutrality thesis attributes agency to the state and rejects the determinacy of structure: “neutrality…depends on a multitude of factors outside the control of a neutral state – such as geography, resources, belligerent needs and strategies – and on many within its control which can be used to manipulate the external factors” (McSweeney, 1985: 12).

Passive versus active

Given the belief in the neorealist import of structure over agency as the main determinant of neutrality, it is not surprising that the Unneutral thesis, having succeeded in identifying the ‘true’ nature of neutrality, (Salmon, 1989: 2), characterises it as inherently negative and ‘passive’: “the classical view has been that the ambience, and indeed definition, of neutrality cannot be given without invoking the concept of the negative”, and that “political passivity was the main characteristic” of neutrality15 (Salmon, 1989: 26). By contrast, the Irish neutrality thesis proposes an ‘active’ concept of neutrality that “relates to a wide range of activities and skills and requires active public participation” (McSweeney, 1985: 202).

Wartime versus peacetime

The weight given to the legal aspect of neutrality indicates the degree of flexibility and the nature of the concept of neutrality in each thesis, but also underpins contestations over the wartime and peacetime connotations of the concept. The Irish neutrality thesis argues that the static, objective idea of neutrality is “indicated particularly by the weight given to the legal definition or the wartime function of neutrality” (McSweeney, 1985: 182) and rejects the legal constraints on the nature of the concept: “international law is a poor guide to the accomplishment of neutrality strategy” (McSweeney, 1985: 13). Instead, the Irish neutrality thesis conceptualises neutrality as a peacetime policy: “for it is only an involved, active, peacetime neutrality which

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15 The realist writing of Ann-Sophie Dahl also makes this explicit with respect to Sweden: the state pursued a policy that was “passive (the officially neutral security doctrine)” (Dahl, 1997: 156).
will contribute to a reduction of the tensions leading to war and to the creation of the conditions at home which may mitigate its effects” (McSweeney, 1985: 12).

The Unneutral thesis denies this active, peacetime concept on the grounds of international law strictures, claiming “there is more confusion in the use of the word ‘neutrality’, which is not an appropriate description for a peacetime policy, but is widely used as if it were. Such problems are extenuated when one is seeking to classify states whose official policy is non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming for neutrality in the event of war” (Salmon, 1989: 42). Articulating a neorealist legal positivism, the thesis relies heavily on the legal concept as a benchmark to measure and ultimately reject Irish neutrality, despite the fact that every other European neutral also in some way violated the legal concept during the Second World War16: ‘it is of major significance that, contrary to the cited literature and much Irish opinion, there is a clear distinction to be drawn between the Irish position(s)…and the requirements both of the classical theory of neutrality, as understood by international law and convention’ (Salmon, 1989: 118).

Neorealist features in the Unneutral Ireland thesis: militarist power, the state as unitary actor, and the concepts of ‘balance of power’ and ‘protective umbrella’

The Unneutral Ireland thesis prioritises distinctly (neo)realist determinates in its claim that “neutrality relates as much, if not more, to factors such as location, strength, and the balance of power as to aspiration and law” (Salmon, 1989: 23). Realists have a one dimensional view of power as military power: it “is reduced to counting the number of troops, tanks, aircraft and naval ships a country possesses in the belief that this translates in the ability to get other actors to do something they might not otherwise do” (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001: 151) and this measurement of power is seen in the devotion of a large part of the Unneutral thesis to the provision of defence expenditure figures, inventories of military equipment and Defence Forces personnel numbers (Salmon, 1989: 108 – 114, 130 – 136, 158 – 164, 193 – 201, 241 – 250). These data serve as “evidence” of Ireland’s failures with respect to its “due diligence” and “disavowal of external help” criteria of neutrality that will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. The Unneutral thesis also provides sets of military inventories ostensibly measuring the capabilities of other neutral states in order to comparatively evaluate “the Irish” exercise of neutrality.

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16 This will be dealt with in the next chapter, but for now, to summarise: Sweden allowed the transport of troops across her territory (Pentilla, 199: 179; Howard, 1956 (1970): 165); the Swiss made concessions to Germany and Italy (Howard, 1956 (1970): 143-145); the Swiss and the Norwegians experienced belligerent aircraft over-flights (Hecks, 1958 (1970): 138). Finland “pursued quite openly a policy aiming at a pact of mutual assistance with the other Scandinavian countries and especially with Sweden” (Howard, 1956 (1970): 155).
The realist state-centric assumption posits states as the most important actors in the international world and conceives of states as unitary actors. The notion of the state as a unitary actor is inherent throughout the Unneutral thesis, as the primary agent referred to is a phenomenon called “the Irish”: e.g. “the Irish, then, have consistently and significantly failed to measure up to the principal prerequisites ‘of’ or ‘for’ neutrality...despite the shibboleth of neutrality, and the claims of the Irish themselves, Ireland has never been truly neutral” (Salmon, 1989: 309). There is a complete absence of the notion of sub-state actors or levels of analysis in the thesis.

The Unneutral thesis puts forward the argument “that a basic condition of neutrality is the existence of a balance of power” (Salmon, 1989: 34) (as does Hakovirta: “the neutrals base their security on the European balance of power” (1988: 83) from which flows the concept of the ‘implicit “protective umbrella’” (Salmon, 1989: 307). Using “statistical evidence” (Salmon, 1989: 111) of Irish Defence Expenditure (Salmon, 1989: 112), the thesis claims, “the Irish relied on a protective umbrella supplied by the British” (Salmon, 1989: 114) and that “during the war there was no consistent Irish disavowal of external help...there still remained a belief in the protective umbrella” (Salmon, 1989: 145). The next chapter examines the plausibility of these claims. The point made here is that the (neo)realist concept of the protective umbrella is used in the thesis to support the argument that Irish neutrality fails to satisfy the criteria of “disavowal of external help’ (Salmon, 1989: 54), thus rendering Ireland ‘unneutral’”.

Social constructivist features in the Irish Neutrality thesis: critical and anti-realism, the identity of the State and people, and the role of sub-state actors and the public

Echoing the aims of critical international relations theory, the Irish neutrality thesis identifies the hegemony of neorealism and seeks to counteract its objectivity, although realism proper, in the discipline of international politics, is only one among competing intellectual perspectives, emphasizing the balance of power as the central factor in stability and change, in fact it is often advanced as a legitimation of existing relations, as a justification of the existing system, defining any attempt at reform or change as impossible or misguided (McSweeney, 1985: 180-181).

Irish neutrality’s reflexive approach to Irish neutrality rejects the acceptance of the ‘reality’ of (neo)realism and elite discourse on Irish neutrality and advocates
normative change, attributing to non-state actors agency in the achievement of this goal; it argues that

a convergence of interest and virtue is a necessary condition for the successful implementation of a foreign policy conceived as a moral imperative. Where such convergence does not occur, it is the duty of mass movements and public opinion to create it and to oppose realism in its unacceptable form – often masquerading as realpolitik (McSweeney, 1985: 180).

The thesis also focuses on the importance of neutrality as a facet of the identity of the Irish state: “in popular understanding it [Irish neutrality] was felt to be a general attitude to war and military alliance which was a feature of the identity of the state in international affairs and a continuing commitment of Irish governments” (McSweeney, 1985: 119) and it argues for an understanding of the importance of neutrality as “an element of a people’s identity - however inconsistent it may be with the reality of foreign policy” (McSweeney, 1985: 118).

Finally, underpinning its distinctiveness vis-à-vis the Unneutral model of neutrality, the Irish neutrality thesis considers the role and influence of public opinion, movements, interest groups and industrialists (McSweeney, 1988: 209), casting the public as a bulwark against neorealism and realpolitik (McSweeney, 1985: 180) and as active participants in the concept of neutrality (McSweeney, 1985: 202). It posits the expression of public consensus as the key to a successful declaration of neutrality (McSweeney, 1985: 12) and talks of strengthening “the domestic base of neutrality” (McSweeney, 1985: 197), something that would be unheard of in a (neo)realist analysis.

The Policy Connection

Part of the reason why US realists “still take the behavioural turn, using exacting research methodologies in the hope that they can get more reliable conclusions, more predictability”, is to gain greater policy control (Pettman, 2000: 4-5). Critical theorists argue that the influence of realism’s assumptions extended far beyond the academy to structure policy-making, particularly in the United States (Reus-Smit, 2001: 215). Quoting Vasquez, “realism has always prided itself as a theory of the world that aims to guide practice, and surely this is one of the reasons it has dominated international relations inquiry since World War II” (Vasquez, 1998: 288). The academic sub-field of strategic studies is now considered to be “primarily a policy-prescribing enterprise”, and as a result, Ayoob argues, the analysis of security cannot be de-linked from the
interests of the great power patrons and their own interest in catering to the needs and demands of policy makers in the major capitals of the world (Ayoob, 1997: 137).

Logically, policy direction derives from the meaning of a concept (McSweeney, 1999: 82). What this deconstruction has shown is that different IR theoretical worldviews deliver different meanings of the concept of Irish neutrality. Therefore, an IR theory or worldview drives the meaning of a concept, which in turn drives policy direction. Kruzel, for example, identifies two different types of neutrality adherents that he calls ‘neutrality realists’ and ‘neutral idealists’, and “the two schools of thought yield very different foreign policy agendas” (Kruzel, 1989: 299). But “for those who believe that we live in a humanly constituted world, the distinction between theory and practice dissolves: theory is a form of practice is a form of theory” (Booth, 1997: 114). A poststructuralist perspective melds (neo)realism with anti-neutrality discourses; they are constitutive. It is useful to recall Cox’s famous edict; “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (McSweeney, 1999: 110) because it suggests the idea that an IR theoretical worldview is adopted for a purpose, out of a particular set of interests, to achieve a particular policy aim.

Is neorealism deliberately chosen as a worldview by European and Irish elites in order to de-legitimate neutrality and achieve the goal of an EU military alliance? Certainly, advocates of the “unneutral” discourse have consistently argued that Ireland should join NATO and/or a European Union defence alliance (FitzGerald, 1995; McSweeney, 1985: 132-133). Or is it the case that, as Booth puts it, “nobody can be blamed for their upbringing, their teachers, their time or their place” and that students over the years have simply “been taught solely by those content to work within this framework?” (Booth, 1997: 113). Given the political stakes involved, it is most probably the former, for although “ideas – worldviews, principled beliefs and knowledge – not only define the meaning of power but also affect the reasoning process by which state actors define their interests” (Risse-Kappen, 1997: 262), it is important to consider the corollary implied thus far, that “in the concrete, policy may be driven by the interests of the actors, resulting in the reverse causal sequence. One’s interest in a particular policy can be a powerful motive for defining the concept underlying it in terms restricted to that policy” (McSweeney, 1999: 82). Thus, it is logical to identify the hegemonic elite interests as drivers behind the adoption (conscious or otherwise) of (neo)realism and the promotion of its discourse undermining Irish neutrality.
In this context, then, it is important to acknowledge that “neutrality is by its nature a
challenge to the principal theories of international relations, because it derives from
the possibility that the use of force in international relations can be restricted and
regulated” (Joenniemi, 1989: 52). Indeed, studies examining the dynamics of public
opinion and neutrality have put a survey question to the public concerning “the value
of violence in solving international conflicts” (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 508-509).
The following quotation from a rather benign explanation of neutrality from a
(neo)realist perspective illustrates the challenge posed to mainstream theory:

Neutrality is the opposite of a typical policy followed by a small state. Given
its narrow power base, one would assume a tendency on the part of the small
state, particularly while confronting a great power, to try to balance its
inherent weakness by drawing on external sources of strength. Neutrality is
the opposite situation: one in which the small state, of its own accord, chooses
to rely exclusively on internal sources of strength rather than on powerful
allies (Karsh, 1988: 4)

Seeing neutrality in non-realist, positive terms, is “to see neutrality as an indication of
evolutionary change and gradual transformation of the international system. This
change provides choices beyond the established ones and those favoured by traditional
theory – thus also further eroding the adequacy of this theory” (Joenniemi, 1989: 60).
Therefore, the deconstruction in this chapter (or a decision to support a social
constructivist concept of neutrality) not only reverses the violent hierarchy of the
Unneutral thesis over the Irish neutrality thesis at the micro-level of the selected texts,
but supports a macro-level reversal and displacement of (neo)realism by social
constructivism in IR theory.

Do neutral states’ policy-makers view neutrality in non-realist terms? The only Irish
White Paper on Foreign Policy shows few obvious signs of a radical theoretical
position on neutrality amongst Irish foreign policy elites. Joenniemi notes a similar
situation in other European neutral states, which is partly due to a failure to escape
from the theory associated with military organisations such as NATO and from the
political pressure to form a European Union military alliance. As he puts it:

The neutrals themselves do not harbour counterhegemonic tendencies. They
tend to argue their case within the framework of the dominant theory…in
some cases this may have been a conscious choice, but more often it is
because the Euro-neutrals are very much part of the same intellectual and
politico-ideological tradition as the major powers. The neutrals also subscribe
to the perceived universalism of the dominant theories and modes of
explanation. They subordinate themselves to the dictates of these theories
without too much concern about the implications for their self-understanding
(Joenniemi, 1989: 50-51).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated that different IR theory assumptions underpin the
different concepts of neutrality in two theses on Irish neutrality under examination.
The deconstruction has displaced the hegemonic position of the associated ‘unneutral’
discourse on Irish neutrality that has been dominant both in the media and the
academic literature. To view this argument as merely a way to understand ‘the
debate’ on Irish neutrality misses the entire point of employing a poststructuralist
approach - although it is understandable given that the implications of the
deconstruction may not be well received by mainstream IR and Political Science -
because the poststructuralist thrust argues that the dominant truth-claims about Irish
neutrality’s mythical, ‘unneutral’ status do not have any objective, scientific grounds,
rather they are based on a (neo)realist ideology that is potentially adopted out of elite
political interests. Neorealism is not dominant in IR because it is a good explanation
of international politics or foreign policy; it is dominant because of the political
structures, institutions and elites supporting it.  

Consequences arising from the deconstruction for (1) elite discourses in the academic
literature and print media, include placing an onus on commentators to own up to their
perspective and interests; and for (2) research approaches employed in academic
studies of Irish neutrality, there is an obligation to be aware of the meta-theoretical
biases in the literature (that may lead to inappropriate hypotheses) before launching
into research on public attitudes to foreign policy. For (3) the formulation of Irish
foreign policy, the deconstruction shows “there is a need for a theory and for
conceptualisations of neutrality that differ from the hegemonic ones, that is for a
theory that does not take the neutrals as mere objects of the international power game

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17 Elite interests that Irish neutrality stands in the way of: In the 1980s McSweeney described the “abundant evidence
of some European pressure to make the link [between foreign policy commitments and EU membership] and to define
the economic and political parts of the Community as inseparable” (McSweeney, 1985. The Case for Active Irish
Neutrality: 198). Elites in the EU have consistently argued that neutral states must join NATO (Reuter, 1995), and
there are plans for an EU defence alliance through a merger with NATO (Gormley, 2003; Staunton, 2003). George W.
Bush has made several speeches in which he favours NATO expansion and there have always been allegations of US
pressure on Irish neutrality (Brennock, 1996; Crowley, 2003). The Irish government has ignored the duties of a neutral
state and continues to facilitate US military aircraft stop-overs at Shannon, as part of belligerent war efforts, because it
is “good for business” (Clonan, 2005; Horan, 2004), and each of the government parties has claimed that US foreign
direct investment would cease if Ireland adhered to neutrality (Brennock, 2003; O'Regan, 2003). Finally, a journalist
advised that the EU and NATO fund regular trips for Irish elites and journalists to visit NATO HQ in Brussels, with a
series of anti-Irish neutrality articles and discourses written up upon the return of these elites and journalists to Ireland,
without reference to the source of the discourse or the preceding visits to Brussels.
but as independent subjects that, through their ability to inject interests and values into international politics, are capable, at least to some extent, of affecting the course of developments in the international community” (Joenniemi, 1989: 50). And finally, with regard to (4) the current status of Irish neutrality and public opinion, the deconstruction has implications for the debate on the perceived credibility of Irish neutrality and rationality of public opinion on Irish neutrality. It is now clear that any serious researcher must consider, if not argue for, non-realist theories as an aid to understanding the dynamics of public support for Irish neutrality, instead of residing in the ‘rationalist’ assumptions of (neo)realism.
CHAPTER FOUR: A COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE OF IRISH NEUTRALITY
AND THE NEUTRALITY OF OTHER EUROPEAN STATES

Introduction
Having shown that the criteria Unneutral Ireland uses to assess Irish neutrality (“the first set of variables proposed at the end of Chapter Three, namely the rights and duties of neutrality; the recognition of Ireland’s status by belligerents and others; the disavowal of external help; the freedom of decision and action”) (Salmon, 1989: 122), are based on (neo)realist concepts and assumptions, it is time to turn to the other factors the Unneutral thesis argues Irish neutrality also falls down on, such as ideology; (Salmon, 1989: 282); involvement in economic sanctions (Salmon, 1989: 281); partiality (Salmon, 1989: 127), Irish citizens joining the British army (Salmon, 1989: 130), including post-World War II factors such as EEC membership (Salmon, 1989: 71-75).

FitzGerald argues using a legal concept and a “sortal” rather than “a scalar” approach that Irish neutrality is a myth. His argument is also based on a comparison with other neutral states, who he claims have had much more clear-cut concepts of neutrality than Ireland (FitzGerald, 1998: 18). He contends that ‘it is at least questionable whether Ireland can properly be described as having been “neutral”, because the scale of assistance given secretly to Britain was scarcely compatible with the concept of neutrality under International Law’ (FitzGerald, 1998: 13).

It is necessary to establish whether Irish neutrality really is, as the (neo)realist elites argue, sui generis and whether it is valid that “both great power blocs, and all the more, the Continental neutrals, view Ireland as sui generis” (Karsh, 1988: 169). This chapter examines Irish neutrality alongside the neutrality of other states used by Salmon as the models to compare Irish neutrality with, namely Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland and will conclude on whether Irish neutrality is really all that different, as the unneutral discourse claims, to the neutrality practised by other European neutral states during and after the Second World War.

Benevolence and Concessions
Ireland did give assistance to Britain during the war in terms of shipping, emigration and aviation policy (see (Dwyer, 1977: 19) for an extensive list); for example, de Valera came up with “an ingenious plan to help Britain while at the same time preserving the appearance of strict neutrality” (Dwyer, 1977: 18). Once the Irish authorities located a submarine, the information of its whereabouts would be radioed
“to the world” (Fisk, 1983: 111) - this would not be of assistance to the Germans because they were too far from Ireland to use the information, but Britain could take action (Dwyer, 1977: 18). However, most of the actions were mutually beneficial. It was out of a determination to remain neutral that De Valera denied the British the cooperation from Ireland they wanted most (Dwyer, 1977: 19-20) the return of the Ports to British hands and Irish neutrality was never legally compromised. McSweeney reasoned that Ireland’s “defence was backed up by some ostentatious displays of military impartiality and other, less public, concessions to the Allied cause which were deemed necessary to pacify an outraged Westminster government” (McSweeney, 1985: 120).

Salmon and FitzGerald’s argument in a sense applied to all neutral states, not just Ireland. As Pentillä argues, the World Wars shattered the idea of strict, impartial neutrality because those who were able to stay out of the war (many neutral states were invaded) had to compromise their neutrality in economic and military terms in favour of the stronger belligerent side. Citing the case of Sweden that allowed the transport of German troops through its territory, he argues such states were legally non-belligerent rather than neutral, concluding, however, that, “because of these concessions, Sweden managed to stay out of the war even if it broke legal rules concerning neutrality” (Penttilä, 1999: 170). Ogley cites another example in the case of the Swiss, who also made concessions to the Axis side: “while the Swiss were determined to maintain their political independence and to defend their neutrality, the Government were obliged to make a number of concessions to Germany and Italy” (Howard, 1956 (1970): 143-145; Ogley, 1970: 143-145). Thus, “Sweden and Switzerland, like other successful neutrals, had to make concessions, in their case, largely to the Axis powers” (Ogley, 1970: 130). He says, “the fact that Sweden and Switzerland survived at all as neutrals in the Second World War says much for their diplomatic skill. Their problem, essentially, was to concede what had to be conceded to Axis powers, and no more, while making clear that they would fight against any wholesale assault on their independence” (Ogley, 1970: 18). Ogley points out that “only Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland of the European States, preserved their neutrality throughout the war” (Ogley, 1970: 129) – thus, Ireland is included in the bracket of successful European neutral states in his analysis. It also appears that Ireland did not have to make as severe concessions as other European neutrals; for example, facilitating the transportation of British or German troops as other neutrals did, casting doubt over the argument made by Salmon and FitzGerald that Ireland’s neutrality is a myth because it was of a ‘less clear-cut’ type than that of Sweden or Switzerland.
Impartiality and disavowal of external help

Impartiality is a property of neutrality that Salmon finds lacking in the exercise of Irish neutrality: he argues “partiality to one side or the other is not simply to be added up and judged acceptable if the score comes out evenly at the bottom. There can be little doubt that the Irish engaged in unneutral acts and in partial behaviour” (Salmon, 1989: 126-127). Dwyer recounts that de Valera was cautious in providing measures that might appear to prove beneficial to one side, i.e. the British, more than the other side and he had made changes to an exclusion order to include aircrafts and ships because, “if the policy were directed against U-boats alone, critics would charge that it was entirely anti-German” (Dwyer, 1977: 17). Salmon argues that an estimated forty thousand Irishmen from the Republic fighting in the British army “did infringe neutrality by its partiality” (Salmon, 1989: 130). Notably, his argument runs contrary to the legal concept of neutrality, for example, the Swiss Doctrine of neutrality provides that neutrality is not conducted by private individuals. Therefore in a neutral country there is freedom of press, freedom to join an army if so wished (Keatinge, 1984: 148). Salmon also raised the question of whether involvement in the EEC and EPC was incompatible with impartiality, especially as Ireland had participated in sanctions along with other Community members. Yet, the 1993 Swiss Federal Council report concluded “the law of neutrality does not render neutrality and participation in economic sanctions fundamentally incompatible” (Switzerland, 2000: 2). Salmon makes a number of arguments and suggests a number of incidents, actions, decisions and attitudes concerning talks, supplies, aid, trade, due diligence, disavowal of help and ideology that, he argues, meant that Ireland was ‘unneutral’. Each of these points will be examined in detail and a comparison made with the other European neutral states to establish whether Ireland failed to live up to the same standards of these ‘clear-cut’, ‘genuine’ ‘established’ neutral states.

Salmon argues that Ireland was unneutral on the basis of participating in talks about a defence alliance, claiming, “a number of talks with the British showed a clear partiality as regards disavowal of external help” (Salmon, 1989: 145), although there are no references substantiating this claim. What of the behaviour of the other neutrals, such as Sweden and Norway? Those neutral states also engaged in similar discussions, for example, Sweden had “made secret preparations for co-operating with the West in the event of Soviet aggression and neutrality failing” (Huldt et al., 2000: 2; Karlsson, 1995: 30) and neutral Norway (at least until the British invaded thereby ending their neutrality) discussed a potential defence alliance, as Ogley recounts: “the only occasion on which a slight relaxation of Koht’s strict conception of neutrality
was noticeable was when he took part in deliberations on the possibility of a defensive alliance between the Scandinavian states and Finland after the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish Peace treaty of 12 March 1940” (Ogley, 1970: 141). What Salmon’s analysis fails to consider is that the accusations he levels at Irish neutrality are not unique to Ireland; in an effort to avoid participating in the war, all of the other European neutral states engaged in unneutral acts and were biased in favour of hostile or friendly neighbours. Even the British government understood that De Valera’s goal had been to maintain neutrality and to help us *within the limits of that neutrality* to the full extent possible” (Fisk, 1983: 124) (emphasis added), and that de Valera regarded his policy as consistent.

Salmon continues, “the real question is whether the Irish reservation was sufficient to save their policy of neutrality. Preparations for and expectations of help certainly ran counter to the principles underpinning a policy ‘for neutrality’, as followed by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland” (Salmon, 1989: 144-145). From the analysis so far, Irish neutrality is no different, no less ‘neutral’ than that of Austria, Sweden and Finland, Salmon’s paragon neutral states; thus either Ireland is neutral because she compares well, or none of the other states are neutral and Salmon has defined the concept out of existence. De Valera had said in the Dáil he was willing to accept assistance from the British “provided it was clear that the whole object of it was to maintain the inviolability of our territory” (Fisk, 1983: 111); in other words, so that the state and its independence could be protected. The then Minister for Health in the wartime Cabinet, Malcolm MacDonald, was sent to Dublin to try to persuade de Valera to allow British troops into Ireland to take over the ports - his advice given “principally in the interests of Eire in itself” (Fisk, 1983: 191). Fisk surmises, “MacDonald must have realized that this was less than the truth; in her greatest moment of peril since Napoleon planned an invasion across the Channel, Britain was not offering her troops to Eire for de Valera’s benefit”; in his response to each of the British proposals, de Valera emphatically rejected any possibility of Eire abandoning her neutrality (Fisk, 1983: 191). The key point is that de Valera rejected the proposals of external help provided by the British out of a concern to preserve neutrality and the state.

**Due diligence and defence resources**

Salmon argues, “it is difficult to say categorically what constitutes sufficient resources, but at sea and air the Irish clearly did not have ‘enough’, **since they were incapable of preventing invasions into territorial waters and airspace, or violations of their neutrality.** Their relative defencelessness meant that on that occasion they did bend…with respect to ‘due diligence’ the Irish clearly defaulted,
particularly in the air and at sea. The Irish objective was simply to avoid participation in the war. That is not neutrality” (Salmon, 1989: 136). Before going into the detail of the “due diligence” accusation, it is worth pointing out, in reference to the last argument, that it is clear from this analysis that the other neutral states also had only one goal in mind: to avoid participating in the war, and this goal was pursued at the expense of many legal rules of neutrality. If Ireland is ‘unneutral’ on this basis, then all of the other states in this survey must also be ‘unneutral’.

Fisk reasons that “accidental encroachments into Irish territorial waters and a flood of refugees from Britain were the natural burdens of neutrality and de Valera could not have been surprised by these events. Eire was the only British dominion to choose neutrality – the rest of the Commonwealth followed Chamberlain’s lead by declaring war on Germany” (Fisk, 1983: 105). Salmon argues that airspace violations rendered Ireland unneutral, however, it is also the case that other European neutrals also suffered airspace violations, many of them committed by the British. Howard recounts the Swiss experience of airspace violations: “since the summer of 1940, however, British bombers had repeatedly crossed Swiss territory on their way to attack north Italian towns and, in spite of repeated protests from the Swiss Government, this violation of Swiss air by British aviators continued. The Italians complained that Swiss illumination gave an unfair advantage to British bomber crews as it helped them to find their targets in northern Italy” (Howard, 1956 (1970): 145). Norway also experienced airspace violations: Hicks describes how “there were minor violations of Norwegian neutrality during this period, in the shape of flights by belligerent aircraft over Norwegian territory. Such incidents were always followed by prompt Norwegian protests to the offending Power when it was possible to identify the trespassing aircraft” (Hicks, 1958 (1970): 138).

Salmon assesses, “on land the situation was somewhat different, since throughout the duration the land area of the twenty-six counties remained inviolate. There was perhaps an element of deterrence…Certainly the Irish could have made wholesale occupation unprofitable (Salmon, 1989: 136). (De Valera’s determination to remain inviolate will be dealt with later in relation to defence resources and threats of invasion from Britain). The Swiss were in much the same situation as Ireland, with an aggressive, hostile belligerent as a near neighbour in Germany, but they managed to stay out of the war despite similar threats of invasion. “In 1943 the Government had real grounds for fear that German threats might indeed be translated into action. Hitherto, also, although Hitler had been greatly irked by Switzerland’s continued independence and neutrality, the advantages which would have accrued from the
invasion and conquest of Switzerland had been clearly outweighed by the drawbacks. The Germans were aware that any attack would be strongly resisted by the Swiss” (Ogley, 1970: 151). The Irish government themselves acknowledged that neutrality meant limited warfare with all belligerents. As Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister for the Coordination of Defensive Measures said on 23 January 1940, “in the modern total warfare it [neutrality] is not a condition of peace with both belligerents, but rather a condition of limited warfare with both…” (Fisk, 1983: 156). De Valera added, “neutrality if you are sincere about it means you will have to fight for your life against one side or the other – which ever attacks you first. Neutrality is not a cowardly policy if you really mean to defend yourself if attacked. Other nations have not gone crusading until they were attacked” (Duggan, 1985: 123).

**Defence expenditure and “costs of attack”**

Although, as mentioned earlier, Salmon admits, “it is difficult to say categorically what constitutes sufficient resources”, (Salmon, 1989: 136), he does confirm, “neutrals do, however, need the ability to deter by making the costs of attack too high, relatively, for the belligerent” (Salmon, 1989: 24). Salmon claims that the Irish position was undermined by de Valera’s recognition that Ireland was a small state and in modern wars, the equipment and arms required were beyond a small state (Salmon, 1989: 131). These issues were also acknowledged by the small neutral states in Europe. The notion that a certain level of arms means that a defence is 100% is a (neo)realist myth; no defence can be 100% and the Swedes and other neutrals knew their defence limits too. The important fact is that de Valera pledged that Ireland would fight any incursion from any side, and the costs of attack were made high. This was acknowledged by both the Germans and the British. “In January 1938 one of the questions put to the British chief of staff’s sub-committees included a question as to whether the importance of the Irish ports was so great as to warrant military operations to regain possession of them. The reply indicated that this would require a campaign of Gallipoli proportions if it were carried out in the face of opposition” (Duggan, 1985: 57). Duggan recalls de Valera’s contingency plans in 1938 that if Britain were to be an aggressor, “Ireland would make such aggression as costly as possible for Britain” (Duggan, 1985: 40). On 14 December 1941 Hempel confirmed de Valera’s reiterated determination to defend Irish neutrality…’not an inch’ of Irish territory was for sale (Duggan, 1985: 213).

What Salmon’s analysis (and ‘unneutral’ defence charge due to a lack of arms) fails to acknowledge is the British and American refusals of de Valera’s requests for arms. Duggan recalls, “it was difficult if not impossible in the circumstances to procure
weapons. Britain was obstructive; the US was unco-operative. ...Still the realisation that the Irish would resist with whatever weapons they had was a bottom line deterrent: there was a long tradition of taking the pikes down from the thatch” (Duggan, 1985: 182). Dwyer also documents the almost vicious responses to de Valera’s pleas for arms from the Allied sides, coupled with threats to invade Ireland given the poor defence capabilities of the army: “with the British, the American President stymied every suggestion to supply additional arms to the Irish army” (Dwyer, 1977: 177). David Gray, the United States representative in Dublin during the war years and a confidant of the American President, (Dwyer, 1977), made the threat from the Third Reich seem remote by comparison: “Allied troops were already poised on Irish soil and Gray had an insensitive amateur’s appetite for action” (Duggan, 1985: 177). Fisk also explains,

de Valera’s persistent, occasionally frantic quest for weapons was to be a consistent theme of Irish foreign policy over the coming years, a search that was principally directed towards the belligerent powers and which was thus always rewarded by demands which would – if met – totally compromise Eire’s neutrality. In return for guns, the British wanted the use of the Treaty ports, the Americans wanted Irish participation in the war, and the Germans – less ambitious because there was little else to be gained – wanted a closer relationship between Dublin and Berlin. Denuded of weapons, Eire’s refusal to participate in the war was no longer just an assertion of sovereignty; from now on, the policy had to prove successful in keeping Eire out of the war (Fisk, 1983: 160).

Supplies, trade and economic dependence
Because there were exchanges of food for military supplies across the Northern Ireland border, a lack of a ‘strategic reserve’ and a dependence on other countries’ shipping for imports of wheat, maize, petroleum and bulk cargoes, Salmon claims “third parties” saw room for influence and manoeuvre, and doubted the credibility of Irish neutrality (Salmon, 1989: 146). On the other hand, Fisk regards de Valera’s prioritizing of food supplies and external trade, followed by censorship, counter-espionage and coast-watching, over military measures and air-raid precautions as “an authentic policy of neutrality, the desire to maintain the country’s commercial life and safeguard its political integrity from external pressures, while taking only minimum defence precautions on the grounds that neutrality – if strictly adhered to – would obviate the need for enormous military expenditure” (Fisk, 1983: 99). In fact, de Valera turned down trade agreements with Britain in order to safeguard Irish
neutrality: “in November the war cabinet was told that Eire had rejected the storage and trans-shipment proposals as being incompatible with neutrality and from fears that they would provoke German attacks on the ports if not on the country as a whole. Ireland’s refusal of the trade agreement may have left her vulnerable to the British economic pressure, but the refusal also sealed off a potential serious breach in Ireland’s neutrality and nothing was more important for de Valera” (Carroll, 1975: 84).

Although Salmon is right to point out that Ireland was vulnerable, if this makes her ‘unneutral’, then Salmon must retract his understanding of Switzerland, Sweden, and others as neutral, as those states experienced the same difficulties. Howard points out that although the Swiss, with the exception of a minority of fanatics and defeatists, were resolved to maintain their political independence, economically they were obliged to align themselves much more closely with Hitler’s Europe. After the fall of France Switzerland was economically at the mercy of the Axis, which controlled practically all ways in and out of Switzerland. In a trade agreement reached on 9 August 1940 Germany undertook to supply her with certain quantities of raw materials, of which the most vital were coal and iron. In return Swiss industry was to supply Germany with goods required for her war effort (Howard, 1956 (1970): 147-148).

The Swiss neutrality doctrine states the neutral country is entitled to trade with belligerents; the neutral country has merely to submit to certain encroachments by the belligerents, e.g. a blockade. According to the 1954 Swiss Ministry doctrine “the rules adopted by Switzerland during the last war of maintaining the normal level and an adequate consideration in trade were voluntarily elected economic principles of its own” (Keatinge, 1984: 151). Norway exhibited the same behaviour: “Norway continued to maintain commercial relations with both belligerents – though this to a decreasing extent, and at the price of incurring both Germany and Franco-British displeasure” (Ogley, 1970: 137). The point is that although there is some support for Salmon’s claims that Ireland was non-belligerent in the Second World War because of concessions made or assistance given, the analysis shows that Salmon has to withdraw his definition of Switzerland, Finland and Sweden as being neutral, and to re-brand those countries as non-belligerent, because those states failed the same criteria in an even more spectacular fashion than Ireland is alleged to have failed them.
“Non-belligerency” and official belligerent acknowledgement of Irish neutrality

Salmon claims that because the British didn’t guarantee not to invade Ireland and refused to officially recognise Ireland as a neutral state, Irish neutrality was not possible. He argues, “neutrality does not come into existence until recognized by both belligerents” (Salmon, 1989: 21), and therefore Ireland was ‘uneutral’, despite conceding “on occasion there was a certain apparent de facto recognition of the Irish position” (Salmon, 1989: 138). It is notable that Hitler did not guarantee not to invade Switzerland, and yet Salmon regards Switzerland as neutral.

The British always refused to acknowledge Ireland’s neutrality and preferred to use the term ‘non-belligerency’ because Ireland was still a member of the Commonwealth. As Fisk’s passage recounts, “a formal recognition of Eire’s neutrality presented a serious difficulty, said Eden, because ‘we do not want formally to recognize Eire as neutral while Eire remains a member of the British Commonwealth’. This would surrender the ‘constitutional theory of the indivisibility of the Crown’” (Fisk, 1983: 110). Another account of this period states, “the [German] Envoy had reported Allied pressure to change the Irish neutrality posture to a stance of technical non-belligerency, which would be designed, he said, to permit the Allies to use the ports” (Duggan, 1985: 220); therefore, regardless of the language the British government used due to political considerations, it was recognised by both the British and German sides that Ireland was indeed ‘neutral’ and this legal, official stance could only turn into “non-belligerency” if troops were allowed in (as in the example of Sweden cited by Pentillä above).

Britain’s official view of Ireland’s status emerged during times when the British government tried to persuade the Irish government to allow British soldiers into Ireland. MacDonald offered, “we would be content for Eire to remain non-belligerent if she invited our ships into her ports and our troops and aeroplanes into her territory to increase her security against the fate which had befallen neutral Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg” (Fisk, 1983: 205). Although throughout these meetings MacDonald avoided the word ‘neutrality’ (Fisk, 1983: 206), in fact there was ‘official British’ recognition of Ireland’s neutral status in various forums, although many were off-record.

There are several examples of this “certain apparent de facto recognition of ” (Salmon, 1989: 138) Ireland’s neutrality by Britain. For example, Duff Cooper, the Minister for Information, made a speech in May 1941 in which he “had been rash enough to state that however deeply and disastrously Britain suffered from Irish neutrality, ‘we
respect the independence of Eire and allow them to remain neutral while we are fighting for our lives. That shows Great Britain abides by her word’” (Fisk, 1983: 304). “Hugh Dalton, the president of the British Board of Trade, told the House of Commons that ‘in view of her neutrality, Eire cannot expect the same considerations as those who are at war with the common enemy’, the Irish Department of Supplies not unnaturally concluded that this ‘quite clearly indicates that because of our neutrality we are being subjected to a “squeeze”’” (Fisk, 1983: 315). In a War Cabinet memorandum, Cranbourne describes life in “Southern Ireland” as very uncomfortable, and that - “it is a direct result of her neutrality” (Fisk, 1983: 306). When Cranbourne informed Churchill of a request for arms from de Valera in a cover note attached to a dispatch from Maffey, Churchill replied, “no attempt should be made to conceal from Mr de Valera the depth and intensity of feeling against the policy of Irish neutrality. We have tolerated and acquiesced in it, but juridically we have never recognized that Southern Ireland is an independent Sovereign State, and she herself has repudiated Dominion Status. Her international status is undefined and anomalous” (Fisk, 1983: 299).

The issue behind British refusal to officially acknowledge Ireland’s neutrality was largely inspired by Churchill’s imperialist attitude towards Ireland. Fisk reports, “there is, throughout Churchill’s writing and speeches at this period, an ill-concealed impatience with the Irish that sometimes turns into contempt. Above all, there was his notion that by rejecting the Oath of Allegiance, de Valera’s Ireland might somehow legally cease to exist. It was a very disturbing idea to have been gestating in the mind of a future British Prime Minister” (Fisk, 1983: 64). At the time described by Fisk, Churchill, “still smarting over the Anglo-Irish rapprochement of 1938 [Chamberlain’s decision to hand the Treaty Ports back to de Valera]…also brought with him to the Admiralty his profound distrust of de Valera’s young state….Here, clearly, would be no friend of a neutral Eire. So it was to turn out, for as Britain went to war against Germany, Churchill’s contempt for Eire’s political status surfaced almost at once.

Only two days after the British declaration of war, he ordered the Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, to compile a special report ‘upon the questions arising from the so-called neutrality of the so-called Eire’” (Fisk, 1983: 114).

On foot of this request, Sir William Malkin, the Foreign Office Legal Advisor wrote a ten-page report (top secret – never seen by de Valera) on the legal aspects of Irish neutrality and the Treaty ports, which amounted to ‘as blunt an acknowledgement of Eire’s juridical right to remain neutral as had yet come from a British Government official’. “Malkin went on to define the complexities of Irish neutrality in a way that
morally precluded any British action against Eire” (Fisk, 1983: 119). Eden added to the report by hand ‘I fear that it becomes every day clearer that it is scarcely possible for “Dev” to square neutrality with the grant of the facilities for which the Admiralty ask. And at least 80% of the Irish people favour neutrality. Altogether a pretty problem”’ (Fisk, 1983: 120). Churchill responded to the paper in a way that “revealed the extent of Churchill’s disturbing obsession about Ireland: he did not just throw doubt on the international validity of Irish neutrality. He was questioning Eire’s very right to exist as a separate and independent state (Fisk, 1983: 120-121). Seventeen months later, Churchill had become possessed of the idea that Eire had no international rights at all” (Fisk, 1983: 122). Thus, the refusal by ‘Britain’ to recognise the neutrality of Ireland was in effect, Churchill’s refusal to recognise Ireland as a sovereign state, and this was the real dynamic behind Salmon’s argument that “the British never simply accepted the 1939 Irish aide-memoire and throughout the war refused to recognize the Irish position formally. Moreover, there was lacking not only a guarantee of respect for Irish neutrality but also a guarantee not to invade Irish territory: this latter omission was quite deliberate” (Salmon, 1989: 137-138). Germany did officially recognise Ireland’s neutrality; hours before Germany’s invasion of Poland, “on the instructions of Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, Hempel told de Valera that Germany would respect Eire’s neutrality (Fisk, 1983: 99).

**Protective umbrella and “relying on Britain”**

Salmon’s thesis claims, “the Irish relied on a protective umbrella supplied by the British” (Salmon, 1989: 114) and that “during the war there was no consistent Irish disavowal of external help…there still remained a belief in the protective umbrella” (Salmon, 1989: 145). Salmon is employing a classic (neo)realist myth in his use of the concept of a protective umbrella to argue that Ireland is ‘unneutral’. His argument is feasible in a different sense, in terms of seeking help to prevent an attack, as a speech by de Valera on 5 October 1943 illustrates. Then, the Taoiseach reasserted in tones reminiscent of a similar 1940 speech, that if Ireland were attacked by one side, Ireland would seek aid from the other. In this sense, the notion of a protective umbrella applies equally to Germany as it does to Britain and as Duggan points out, “this did not indicate any overt change in maintaining the policy of neutrality” (Duggan, 1985: 223). Salmon’s argument may also be resting on the notion that the Germans would have to overcome Britain before launching an invasion of Ireland, but that argument does not hold either, given the inability of the British to defend Belfast, and the indications of Germans plans to occupy Ireland directly. MacDonald, on occasion, put it to de Valera that a German invasion of Ireland might precede an
invasion of Britain (Fisk, 1983: 191). Fisk posits, “if the British could not even defend Belfast and protect these people, how could they possibly have guaranteed Dublin’s safety under air attack if Eire had allied herself to Britain in 1940?” (Fisk, 1983: 498). The notion that Ireland was relying on Britain to protect her from a German invasion does not stand up to scrutiny, because Britain was simply incapable of defending any part of Ireland from the Axis aggressors and furthermore, it was the British that were most hostile to Ireland and her policy of neutrality throughout the Second World War.

Salmon was cited earlier, drawing attention to the fact that Churchill was very careful not to acknowledge or guarantee Irish neutrality; in fact, Churchill threatened to invade Ireland several times, and made reference to these intentions in his victory speech after the War ended. Throughout the War, de Valera did not know which side was going to be the first to launch an invasion of Ireland and he had to make plans to tackle both the Germans and the British, including the Americans. Fisk reports that in June 1944 “Eire thought she might be invaded by American troops” (Fisk, 1983: 258). Duggan recounts that, “Hempel passed on the following British secret service report: in their judgement the Irish army was very good, in spite of a shortage of armament; that factor meant that a large force of, say, 100,000 men would be required for a quick occupation of Ireland” (Duggan, 1985: 167) and that Hempel felt a British attack had to be reckoned with (Duggan, 1985: 185) - “de Valera did not exaggerate when he stressed the threat from both sides” (Duggan, 1985: 168). Fisk confirms that, “the Irish Government anticipated not only an invasion but an occupation of large parts of Eire by British or German troops” (Fisk, 1983: 257).

By 1940, Fisk recalls, “Eire now believed that a British invasion was more likely than a German attack” (Fisk, 1983: 285). British Cabinet records show that, in the event of an enemy invasion of Ireland, Churchill proposed plans to gas the Irish population, as he was prepared to gas other populations during World War II. As Chomsky points out, “as Secretary of State of the War Office in 1919, Winston Churchill was enthusiastic about the prospects of ‘using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes’ – Kurds and Afghans – and authorized the RAF Middle East command to use chemical weapons ‘against recalclitrant Arabs as [an] experiment.’ Dismissing objections by the India office as ‘unreasonable’ and deploring the ‘squeamishness about the use of gas…’” (Chomsky, 2000: 26-27). The validity of “the Irish” relying on Salmon’s (neo)realist concept of a British protective umbrella is undermined by the fact that “de Valera was never able to rule out the possibility of British attack” (Duggan, 1985: 188).
Ideological impartiality

Salmon quotes FitzGerald who said “there really isn’t such a thing as neutrality today (1980): we are part of Western Europe and our interests coincide with theirs” (Salmon, 1989: 281) and he argues the fact that Ireland’s profession of itself as not neutral between ideologies (i.e. between Western values and Communism) violates neutrality. However, the other neutral states also declared they were part of Western Europe and shared the associated values. Hakovirta states “the neutrals identify themselves ideologically with the West” (Hakovirta, 1988: 83). Keatinge notes Finland has a consideration for the Soviet Union, mirroring Ireland’s consideration for the United States, and argues that Sweden and Switzerland are “essentially oriented to the west” (Keatinge, 1984: 97). Andrén clarifies this in more detail; “Sweden has never sought to assume a neatly balanced position in all major respects between the superpowers or between the power blocs. The Swedish policy of neutrality is related only to security, not to ideology, economic relations, or other aspects of international affairs. Sweden has repeatedly and emphatically rejected the idea of ideological neutrality” (Andrén, 1989: 176). McSweeney argues “the law, for what it is worth, places no barrier to neutrality for a nation which is ideologically close to one of the belligerents. Nor does it demand ideological impartiality even during a war” (McSweeney, 1985: 11). He argues that impartiality is not with respect to ideology or culture but some of the likely consequences of ideology, such as trade, communication links and the possibility of recruitment and propaganda.

Finally, there were other issues alleged by Salmon to violate Irish neutrality that continue to crop up in the national public discourse that are worth examining, specifically, the allegations over a deal on Northern Ireland and the condolences issue. After the bombing of Pearl Harbour, Churchill sent a telegram to de Valera, which he understood to be

a coded offer of a united Ireland in return for the abandonment of neutrality. It was apparently one of a large number of euphoric telegrams which Churchill had fired off to all corners of the globe in the wake of America’s entry to the war. De Valera’s habitual reserve stood him in good stead at that moment: neither then nor later did he seriously entertain Churchill’s offer…in truth, he had his mind made up on his preference for neutrality (Duggan, 1985: 173-174).
Fisk also shows that even if a united Ireland came about through the negotiations proposed by the British government, that de Valera would not have allowed Ireland to join the war, he describes how Mulcahy asked de Valera five days after the meeting with MacDonald, “if he would be prepared in...an All-Ireland Parliament to advocate and support going into the war against Germany. And de Valera ‘stated that he would not’” (Fisk, 1983: 214). De Valera surmised, “we are, of course, aware that the policy of neutrality has its dangers, but, on the other hand, departure from it would involve us in dangers greater still” (Fisk, 1983: 212). It was Craigavon (the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland) who implied in public that the initiative for Irish unity had come not from the British but from de Valera (Fisk, 1983: 121).

Mansergh recounts, “the rigid formalistic adherence to the letter of neutrality, which found significant expression on many occasions, caused much misunderstanding of Eire’s position even among the members of the united nations most friendly to her” (Mansergh, 1946: 95). One such occasion concerns de Valera’s “formal call of condolence on the German Minister on 3 May 1945” after the end of the war (Duggan, 1985: 241). De Valera felt “that it was important that it should never be inferred that these formal acts imply the passing of judgements, good or bad, on the Third Reich. He was quite sure that he had acted correctly and wisely” (Duggan, 1985: 242). The location of their meeting and the purpose of it is the subject of much controversy due to conflicting accounts of events and attitudes. According to Duggan who personally interviewed Hempel’s wife in Ireland, “it took Frau Hempel to put the record straight as to the location of the visit. The Taoiseach had visited Hempel’s home rather than the legation” (Duggan, 1985: 243). De Valera paid a visit out of consideration for Hempel (Duggan, 1985: 241) – “the German minister, who deduced his mission as being the preservation of Irish neutrality” (Duggan, 1985: 202), who was “a great favourite of Dev’s because he had fought against any German infringement of Irish neutrality” – and because it was the right thing to do (Duggan, 1985: 241). His attitude to “the displaced German diplomat” was “charitable and understanding. He granted asylum to him and his family” (Duggan, 1985: 244). The Hempels “had expected that Mr. de Valera would visit them and were also aware that he would be letting himself in for trouble by doing so” (Duggan, 1985: 243). Notably, anti-neutrality academics and journalists (Salmon, FitzGerald, Roberts, Girvin, and Collins) continue to promote the myth that de Valera was sympathising at the German Embassy over the death of Hitler. This is despite the facts uncovered by Duggan that

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18 The visit is normally used by those promoting the unneutral discourse to denigrate Irish neutrality. Eoin Neeson referred to the debate over issue in an Irish Times article: “a debate does exist concerning de Valera’s German embassy visit in May 1945. As is usually incorrectly stated, this was not to pay his respects to Adolf Hitler, but to acknowledge the death of the German chancellor and head of state following international protocol, as he repeated within days on the death of President Roosevelt. He did not do so on the death of Mussolini, who was not head of state when killed (Neeson, 2004).
de Valera went to the home of Hempels to provide them with asylum and out of courtesy to the diplomat who supported Irish neutrality when others would not.19

Post-Second World War issues: EEC membership

Salmon argues that the act of joining the EEC in 1973 cast doubt on the principle of Irish neutrality because Ireland “accepted… the political objectives of the Community, including political unification and a European identity…and the need ultimately to partake in Community defence” (Salmon, 1989: 224). Twelve years after the initial application, the EEC agreed to accept Ireland as a member and the Irish government put the proposal to the people through a referendum. The 1972 public debate on EEC membership concentrated on the economic implications of membership (Salmon, 1989: 214). And although the question of the possible political consequences was raised, they were not explored in any depth (Keatinge, 1973: 36). The government took the line that defence co-operation was a consequence and not a pre-condition of political union, and the latter would only arise when economic integration was complete. In the campaign in the run-up to the 1972 referendum Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael iterated the line that there was no threat to Irish neutrality, and that, in any case, neutrality was accidental, ad hoc, temporary and conditional (Keatinge, 1984: 27). The then Taoiseach and leader of Fianna Fáil Jack Lynch said Ireland would defend others in the Community and that Ireland has no traditional policy of neutrality like Sweden and Switzerland and nor did Ireland’s neutrality compare with Austria’s declaration of permanent neutrality (Keatinge, 1984: 28). The Labour Party, traditionally a defender of Irish neutrality, was the only major political party to campaign against membership. “Successive government declarations did not help to clarify the issue: they emphasised the legal position when referring to neutrality, but Irish moral and political obligations when referring to Community commitment. A distinction was drawn between current and future commitments, and between the Community and an alliance” (Salmon, 1989: 220).

Salmon goes on to argue that this acceptance was not just at the elite level; “underneath these statements lay a public recognition and acceptance that at some time in the future, and conditional upon certain developments, Ireland would join in the defence of the Community. The problem arose from a reluctance to accept the corollary, namely that such a position involved the abandonment of neutrality” (Salmon, 1989: 220). This is a remarkably confident statement regarding the state of public opinion given Salmon does not consider public opinion as a substantive

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19 The most recent promulgation of the myth appears in Girvin’s (2006) book on Irish neutrality which has the first chapter dedicated to it.
concern in his analysis of Irish neutrality. The assertion is not referenced or sourced. Is Salmon’s thesis that the Irish people accepted that Ireland would take up membership of a European military alliance true? With regard to public opinion at that time, other perspectives imply there is no case to answer, because in the public debate over Irish membership any incompatibility of these goals [of EU membership and neutrality] did not appear to have been pressed home to the Irish public (Hederman, 1983: 38 47 71 144). Keatinge argues “the decisive vote of the electorate in favour of membership of the European Community is explained by the quantifiable expectations of economic gain rather than by views, one way or another, on neutrality” (Keatinge, 1984: 28). According to Hederman, the Irish population had not decided their preferences on the limits of integration, yet Irish people were no different to any of the other European nations in this respect (Hederman, 1983: 152). EEC Eurobarometer opinion poll data supports this view.

Keatinge’s and Hederman’s analysis of the debate is corroborated by members of the public exposed to the campaigns of the political parties at the time. In 1995, one such member of the public, Mr. Desmond Curley, wrote a letter to the Editor of the Irish Times newspaper to point out that the former Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, together with the Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael political parties, deliberately minimised the debate on security implications in their campaigns for people to vote ‘yes’ in the referendum on Ireland’s membership of the EEC in 1973 (Curley, 1995). The comparative international literature on neutrality also confirms this version of events: Karsh notes, “the dismissive attitude of the Irish proponents of EEC membership to the possibility of Ireland’s entanglement within the political and military designs of the European Communities” (Karsh, 1988: 168-169). Hakovirta also opines, “the question of neutrality was never very important in the arguments presented by the Irish government for EC membership, or even in the Irish EC debate in general. It was basically seen as a limited question of non-membership in military alliances. The government argued that membership of the EC was something quite different from that” (Hakovirta, 1988: 131).

Conclusion
Salmon’s conclusion that Ireland’s neutrality does not exist (Salmon, 1989: 8) has, as we have seen, spread into and seemingly taken root in the mainstream academic discourse on Irish neutrality (Doherty, 2002: 13; FitzGerald, 1998: 13; Kearsley, 1998: 172; MacGinty, 1995: 172), is echoed in the media discourse (e.g. Collins, FitzGerald, Roberts, Keane) as well as by some members of the public (see Chapter Two’s ISPAS analysis). This chapter and the previous chapter set out to evaluate the Unneutral
thesis’s approach and conclusions, including its claims of “objective” analysis. The results of the deconstruction in the previous chapter and the comparative analysis undertaken in this chapter show that (1) the thesis is not objective but ideological, because of the (neo)realist assumptions underpinning the variables that Irish neutrality is evaluated on and (2) the approach of holding Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland up as the true practitioners of neutrality - against which, the Irish practice is deemed ‘uneutral’ - is flawed because if the behaviours of those neutral states were fairly evaluated, each of them would also be deemed ‘uneutral’. The approach Salmon has taken in evaluating a state’s neutrality according to a legalistic, prescriptive, sortal definition, has effectively defined neutrality out of existence because any empirical evaluation of a state’s neutrality shows discrepancies between theoretical and legal prescriptions, and state practices. Tonra summarises Salmon’s ‘uneutral’ thesis as one in which “neutrality has been dismissed as an almost adolescent effort to distinguish the state from its ancient enemy (Salmon, 1989)” (Tonra, 2000: 2). This chapter concludes that the Unneutral thesis bears few analytical or fruitful explanations or understandings of Irish neutrality.

What the first half of the thesis helps to illustrate, is that neutrality is a messy and complex policy, in theory and in practice, and tends to be universally hated by all sides, which can have an impact on allegedly objective analyses and evaluations of it. The Americans waged an unscrupulous campaign in the press against Irish neutrality (Duggan, 1985: 176), as did the British. As Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister for the Coordination of Defensive Measures, put it in January 1940: “neutrality is not like a simple mathematical formula which has only to be announced and demonstrated in order to be believed and respected…instead of earning the respect and goodwill of both belligerents it is regarded by both with hatred and contempt, ‘He who is not with me is against me’. In the modern total warfare it is not a condition of peace with both belligerents, but rather a condition of limited warfare with both…” (Fisk, 1983: 156). In these perennial circumstances, it will always be difficult to achieve an ‘unbiased’ analysis of Ireland’s neutrality.

Neutrality is a concept needing evaluation in relation to the particular time it exists and the situation thereof. This thesis has demonstrated the need to include an additional proviso in relation to the meta-theoretical assumptions underpinning the analyses. Jessup and Deak illustrate the former point well:

it may be well to suggest a distinction between the factors contributing to the creation of these rules of the international law of neutrality rights and the
factors conditioning their application. It is apparent that economic necessities and opportunities and political alignments moved the states of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to embrace and advocate particular rules. But the rules having once come into vogue often developed into a servant stronger than the master. The rules became part of the factual situation which statesmen had to take into account in shaping their policies from time to time. This was true because the rules were themselves the reflection of economic and political realities (Jessup and Deak, 1935: 18).

Thus, many empirical differences in the conduct of neutrality are argued to legitimately exist, and are rationally explicable in the context of state interests, the external environment and perceived associated demands. Evaluations and conclusions as to a state’s neutrality based on a particular definition will always be questionable because, as it is clear from how it is presented in the literature, the concept is fundamentally essentially contested.

The assertion by many academics that Ireland’s neutrality is questionable because of the link between the clarity of the concept and a meaningful assessment of a state’s policy is an essentialist and unsatisfactory strategy that fails in the case of Salmon’s analysis of Ireland’s neutrality and the subsequent “unneutral” discourses. The chapters in this half of the thesis show that using a narrow conception of neutrality, in particular a sortal rather than a scalar type in analyses does not lead to a realistic, meaningful assessment of a state’s neutrality. This chapter’s demonstration of the failure of all neutral states of the “Unneutral Ireland” criteria of neutrality means that a sortal approach that allows no violations of neutrality and disregards a scalar notion of the violation of criteria effectively defines neutrality out of existence. Finally, the “unneutral” discourse’s corollary that Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality is ‘confused’ and ‘non-rational’ is undermined and proven to be ideological rather than objective, and is proven to be (neo)realist and therefore, as far as an approach to understanding public attitudes to neutrality is concerned, theoretically flawed.
CHAPTER FIVE: A REVIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY LITERATURE

Even though the general public may be rather poorly informed about the factual aspects of international affairs, attitudes about foreign affairs are in fact structured in moderately coherent ways - (Holsti, 1996: 47)

The latest approach in the public opinion literature argues cognitive orientations and values play a significant role in explaining public attitudes to foreign policy - (Isernia, 2001: 263)

The first half of the thesis demonstrated how the IR and metatheoretical assumptions that are embedded – although largely unacknowledged – in the literature affected the understanding of Irish neutrality, which had consequences for characterisations of public support for Irish neutrality. This second half of the thesis turns attention to the question of whether public attitudes to Irish neutrality are rationally structured. This chapter outlines key debates in the POFP literature and reviews the literature on the structure and rationality of public attitudes to foreign policy. This chapter identifies and discusses a range of research questions common to the POFP literature and applies them to the analyses of Irish public attitudes to Irish neutrality in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. The first half of the thesis evaluated the metatheoretical assumptions and the impact of realist assumptions in the foreign policy literature on Irish neutrality; in this half of the thesis, Chapter Six discusses the impact of metatheory and realist IR assumptions on the public opinion and foreign policy literature, and more specifically, in terms of the impact on recent analyses of public attitudes to Irish neutrality. The discussion of the results of the structural equation model in Chapter Seven will also examine whether realist or social constructivist assumptions underpin the dimensions that structure public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

Set against the background of the theoretical and substantive debates over the nature of public opinion, Chapters Seven and Eight will ascertain the ‘rationality’ of Irish public opinion. Elements of the concept of the ‘rational public’ put forward by Page and Shapiro are used as the framework to assess Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality. It is not possible to replicate Page and Shapiro’s approach that looked at aggregate change in public opinion towards foreign policy issues over time (although in the previous chapter it was possible to look at the stability of the definition of neutrality over time at the aggregate level using the handful of relevant opinion polls conducted from 1985 to 2002). Instead, the concept of the rational public is examined by modelling individual level data, replicating elements of the data analysis approach.
used by academics such as Ulf Bjereld and Ann-Marie Ekengren, and William O. Chittick and Annette Freyberg-Inan to examine the structure of Swedish and US public attitudes to foreign policy.

**The history of the academic debate on public opinion and foreign policy**

The question of public opinion on foreign policy matters has preoccupied scholars for generations, from Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides, 1954) to recent studies on the nature and structure of public opinion, and specifically, the factors influencing public attitudes to foreign policy (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999; Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, 2001; Wittkopf, 1990). Although democracy appears to be growing in popularity as the mainstream arrangement for the exercise of political power, providing the opportunity for members of the public to vote for political representatives (with more maximalist democratic theorists incorporating an assumption of continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals) (Dahl, 1971: 1), the question of whether public opinion on foreign policy should be heeded is a long-standing and evolving academic debate.

The earliest generation of ‘modern’ public opinion and foreign policy (POFP) scholars writing in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (and particularly those belonging to the realist tradition), argued against the normative prescription that public opinion should play a role in the foreign policy process and had a correspondingly poor image of the quality and rationality of mass public opinion, (Lippmann, 1955: 20; Morgenthau, 1978: 558) etc. The core argument over the quality of public attitudes and the character of public opinion is part of several academic discourses; aside from the realist versus liberal/critical social constructivist debate in international relations theory, the issue is part of the elite versus participationist debate in democratic theory. The term ‘rationality’ has a long history of discussion and attempts at definition, both with respect to foreign policy and public opinion and to individual citizens’ voting decisions. Bernard Berelson et al. argue that with respect to an individual citizen’s voting decision, “most do not ratiocinate on the matter, e.g. to the extent that they do on the purchase of a car or a home. Nor do voters act rationally whose “principles” are held so tenaciously as to blind them to information and persuasion. Nor do they attach efficient means to explicit ends” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1966: 310). Schumpeter outlined the character of the “typical citizen” of the mass public and his or her ‘non-rational’ opinion thus:

> Even if there were no political groups trying to influence him, the typical citizen would in political matters yield to extra-rational or irrational prejudice
and impulse. The weakness of the rational process he applies to politics and the absence of effective logical control over the results he arrives at would in themselves suffice to account for that. Moreover, simply because he is not “all there”, he will relax his usual moral standards as well and occasionally give in to dark urges which the conditions of private life help him to repress (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1966: 310).

Berelson et al. surmise that political preferences are more like general cultural tastes: they “seem to be matters of sentiment and disposition rather than ‘reasoned preferences’” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1966: 311).

The realist versus liberal debate in the International Relations theory tradition can be traced back as far as Kant and Bentham’s liberal-democratic argument that foreign policies of democracies are more peaceful because public opinion plays a part in constraining policy makers (Holsti, 1992). The realist school is intensely skeptical of the public’s contribution to effective foreign policy. The realist school characterises people as having little inclination to become informed about foreign affairs because unlike public policy issues, foreign affairs have little impact on people’s daily lives, and the public cannot be fully informed to influence policy because, the Realists maintain, the effective conduct of foreign policy requires secrecy. They argue that the public are uninterested and ill-informed about foreign policy and as a consequence, the public’s responses are emotional and lack intellect (Rosenau, 1961: 35; Sobel, 2001: 12). Realists argue public attitudes to foreign policy are “unstable since they are not anchored in a set of explicit value and means calculations or traditional compulsions” (Almond, 1960: 69). Using panel studies, Converse claimed to have found instability in individuals’ responses about public policy and argued that significant numbers of people ‘offer meaningless opinions that vary randomly in direction’ (Converse, 1964: 243), concluding that well-organised belief systems were rare in the mass public (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 6). According to Almond, the public react to foreign policy “with formless and plastic moods” that frequently change (Almond, 1960: 53). Finally, the IR Realists claim that permitting the public a voice in policy would allow the emotional to govern the rational (Morgenthau, 1978: 558). These and other studies that emerged from ‘the Michigan School’ (Althaus, 2003: 31) paint a bleak picture of public opinion on foreign policy.

The Almond-Lipmann consensus

The outbreak of World War II and the analysis of the first sets of polling data in the post-war period gave rise to what is called the Almond-Lipmann consensus, which to
an extent “proved” the realist characterisation of public opinion on foreign policy. Gabriel Almond’s findings of “weak public interest in international issues and citizens’ inconsistent and unstructured attitudes on foreign policy questions became very influential and dominated the view on public opinion and foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s” (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 504). Thereafter, at the height of the Cold War, Lippmann depicted public opinion as so out of synch with reality that it posed a threat to effective government and foreign policy, which coincided with Almond’s depiction of public opinion as a volatile and mood-driven constraint upon foreign policy (Holsti, 1992: 442). This consensus view centred on three main propositions: (1) public opinion is highly volatile and thus it provides very dubious foundations for a sound foreign policy; (2) public attitudes on foreign affairs are so lacking in structure and coherence that they might best be described as ‘non-attitudes’; and (3) public opinion has very limited impact on the conduct of foreign policy (Holsti, 1992: 442).

The end of the Cold War saw the emergence, in the 1990s, of the “revisionist” response to the realist consensus on public opinion and foreign policy. Part of the revisionist response involves the investigation and reporting, in substantive detail, of the factors underpinning dimensions of public attitudes to foreign policy. This thesis is rooted in the “revisionist” literature, better known as the “rationalist” school of thought. The term “rationalist” refers to the hypothesis that public attitudes to foreign policy are anchored in a set of beliefs and values, and has no relation to the ‘rational choice theory’ school of political science.

**The ‘Rational Public’ school**

Page and Shapiro have mounted the most comprehensive challenge to the Almond-Lippmann thesis, and their analyses are based on aggregate change in opinion over time in the context of information available to the public and events. Notably, this thesis examines the value and belief structure of public attitudes to Irish neutrality at the level of the individual – not at the aggregate level over time – using a different approach to that of Page and Shapiro, but using their definition of rationality: “the extent to which public opinion is real, meaningful and coherent, reflecting underlying values and beliefs” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 36). This definition is tested using the approach that looks for ‘structure’ in public attitudes to foreign policy. This ‘revisionist/rationalist’ strand of the literature posits that, “even though the general public may be rather poorly informed about the factual aspects of international affairs, attitudes about foreign affairs are in fact structured in moderately coherent ways” (Holsti, 1996: 47). Hurwitz and Peffley contend that individuals try to “cope with an
extraordinarily confusing world (with limited resources to pay information costs) by
structuring their views about specific foreign policies according to their more general
and abstract beliefs” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1114). Holsti posits that members of
the public employ “a few superordinate beliefs to guide their thinking” (Holsti, 1992:
450) and Sniderman argues, “people may be fuzzy about narrow, transient options, yet
clear-sighted about their basic values” (Sniderman, 1993: 228).

Using empirical data and sophisticated analysis techniques, Wittkopf demonstrates
that Americans’ foreign policy attitudes “exhibit both structure and ideological
sophistication” (Wittkopf, 1990: 14). Using exploratory factor analysis of several
relevant political attitudinal variables, Chittick et al (1995; 2001) found a structure of
public opinion towards foreign policy along three dimensions that is empirically
verified in the American case. Several academics analysing data from states other
than the USA (e.g. Bjereld and Ekengren) (1999) have suggested modifications in
terms of the number and type of dimensions, who used the same approach to examine
the Swedish case of public opinion. The “rationalists” (i.e. those in favour of the
‘rational public’ thesis) conclude “as a result of substantial empirical research, there is
now a good deal of credible evidence suggesting that members of the mass public use
various heuristics – although not necessarily the traditional liberal-to-conservative or
internationalist-to-isolationist blueprints – for organizing their political thinking
(Holsti, 1996: 51) and that the aforementioned realist scholars misinterpreted survey
research results and gave up too quickly on the public (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 387).

The following is a summary table of what constitutes a rational public, what falsifies
this hypothesis, and what the literature on Irish public opinion has had to say in
relation to the hypothesis:
## TABLE 5.1 Rational Public Hypothesis Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confirming the Rational Public hypothesis</th>
<th>Falsifying the Rational Public hypothesis</th>
<th>Hypothesis-related discourse on Irish public opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis concerns “the extent to which public opinion is reflecting underlying values and beliefs” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 36)</td>
<td>No structure underlying attitudes can be detected</td>
<td>Public thinking is extraordinarily ill-defined (DFA, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“When one can successfully predict an individual’s specific attitudes from a knowledge of the individual’s superordinate or abstract attitudes (or vice versa)” (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985: 872)</td>
<td>There is no “correspondence between concrete issue positions and more abstract or fundamental beliefs” (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985: 872)</td>
<td>Public attitudes to neutrality are confused (FitzGerald, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilland discusses expectations of public opinion if it were rational, specifically changes in values underlying public opinion that would reflect changes in attitudes (2001:149)</td>
<td>That the public holds non-attitudes: there are no superordinate values acting as a sort of glue to bind together specific attitudes (Converse, 1964: 211)</td>
<td>Public opinion is non-rational (Everts, 2000: 178-179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When one can “uncover the structure underlying these [foreign policy] attitudes” (Bardes &amp; Oldendick, 1978: 497)</td>
<td>This is evidence that public opinion on foreign policy is “ill-defined and unstructured” (Bardes and Oldendick, 1978: 496)</td>
<td>Public attachment is emotional (Keatinge, 1972: 439; 1973: 174; 1978: 73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the extent to which public opinion is real, meaningful and coherent…” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 36)</td>
<td>No coherent concept of neutrality (also predicts stability of attitude which is part of rationality according to Gilland (2001: 151))</td>
<td>Marsh summarises public opinion as attached to ‘a salient political symbol’ (Marsh, 1992: 25). Without knowing what it is it is attached to; ‘the rhetoric of neutrality wins much more support than the substance’ (Marsh, 1992: 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of a coherent concept of neutrality</td>
<td>Meaningful: no concepts relating to IR theory; no dimensions relating to IR theory or foreign policy domain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherence and meaningful also includes links to IR theory, foreign policy domain dimensions and comparative socio-demographic characteristics</td>
<td>Inexplicable/contrary effects of socio-demographic attributes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Irish public opinion and Irish neutrality in the context of the debate on POFP**

The majority of studies into public attitudes to foreign policy are based on US public opinion data. Leading academics in the field have called for a good deal of effort to be directed towards comparative analysis (Holsti, 1992: 459), with the dearth of cases of public attitudes to foreign policy outside of the USA, the accepted ‘norms’ in the subdiscipline concerning the nature of dimensions of public opinion are unchallenged and uncontested. Having conducted a comparative analysis of Swedish and US public attitude structure, Bjereld and Ekengren believe the structure of foreign policy attitudes may be diffuse in all countries (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 503). This thesis contributes an Irish case study in an effort to fill the multi-country gap in the
literature and responds to recent calls for *multi-dimensional* models of public opinion on foreign policy (Sulfaro, 1996: 303) focusing on *core political belief systems* rather than attitudes to particular foreign policy events (Sniderman, 1993: 228).

As we will see, an examination of realist metatheory in the POFP literature in the next chapter will find that the characterisations of the public view of Irish neutrality as inconsistent, (Gilland, 2001: 150), limited (Gilland, 2001: 154) and confused (FitzGerald, 1996, 1999) are reflective of the realist consensus in wider POFP literature - Wittkopf found that the same “descriptions [inconsistent/incoherent] have dominated discussion on the nature of mass foreign policy attitudes and have in turn been used to deprecate the role of public opinion in the foreign policymaking process” (Wittkopf, 1990: 13). The unchallenged realist characterisation of public opinion on neutrality coupled with the lack of adequate empirical investigation into Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality provide the background to the main puzzle this dissertation seeks to unravel: does the opposite hypothesis – that of the ‘rational public’ – better describe Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality?

**Elements of realism/Almond-Lipmann in analyses of Irish public opinion**

The realist basis for writing off public opinion (i.e. the public’s lack of motivation to become informed which is derived from the realist’s argument that foreign affairs have little impact on people’s lives) is wearing thin in the modern day context and in the light of more nuanced POFP research. There are an increasing number of empirical studies that have demonstrated that the public have views on foreign affairs and take account of foreign policy when making political decisions. For example, John Aldrich et al. have argued that US voters take account of foreign affairs in deciding who to vote for during presidential elections; in some cases, even more so than domestic affairs (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, 1989). Others have demonstrated that public opinion has changed over time in relation to new information on foreign affairs, showing that the public does respond to foreign affairs issues, and in a rational manner (Page and Shapiro, 1992).

Secondly, as regards the public *perception* of the effect of foreign affairs on their lives and material well-being, there are plenty of messages in the media to demonstrate the impact of foreign affairs on a daily basis; for example a recent a newspaper headline, “markets tumble on US data and Iraq war fears”, introduced an article reporting the loss of more than one billion euro off the value of Irish shares (O'Sullivan, 2002). The extent to which people receive these cues has become the focus of revisionist research; in more recent studies of public opinion the crucial variables identified are people’s
education and political knowledge and interest. These variables are argued to determine the extent to which messages are received and how political discourse cues shape public attitudes to foreign affairs (Zaller, 1992).

As we have seen, mirroring the meta-level debate between the realists and liberals, several elites in the Irish discourse have characterised Irish attitudes to neutrality as ‘emotional’ or ‘sentimental’. In 1973, Keatinge explained that there is no evidence Irish people as a whole have shown a consistent or profound interest in foreign policy, and he argued that given Ireland’s lack of independence in foreign affairs for centuries, this lack of interest in such matters is unsurprising. He surmises that after independence, the preoccupation with relations with Britain rendered international politics more generally rather unreal, if not completely irrelevant to Irish people. Thus, Keatinge concluded, “public opinion may be seen as of a somewhat crude and emotional character” (Keatinge, 1973: 174). Other academics have echoed this emotional association of public opinion with neutrality; Lee writes in the context of World War II, “what was striking was not neutrality, but the emotions clustering around it” (Lee, 1989: 263). This characterisation is open to question because it was written in an era that lacked empirical data to prove the point; nonetheless, this characterisation persists in the discourse today. A former Chief-of-Staff of the Irish Defence Forces includes on the “minus side” of underlying factors that have dictated Ireland’s attitude to full participation in European security, the Irish population’s remaining “sentimental attachment” to Irish neutrality (McMahon, 1999). This ‘emotional’ characterisation is the basis used by realists as a justification to ignore public opinion - in the interests of ‘good’ or ‘rational’ foreign policy.

For all of the substantive importance of Irish neutrality in Irish and in European politics, the discourse on public attitudes has been minimal and has operated in a relative vacuum of academic analysis. Apart from Marsh’s 1992 study based on somewhat limited opinion poll data, there has been no large-scale study of Irish public opinion on foreign policy to find out the substantive nature of Irish attitudes and whether they are structured and rational; with the aid of the new data provided through the Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey (ISPAS), this thesis seeks to fill this gap. The lack of a comprehensive study of public attitudes to neutrality, including a lack of investigation into the number and nature of concepts of neutrality and the salience of the policy, presents a prima facie case for this thesis. Additionally, there is further justification for the study of public opinion on foreign policy as a contribution to the debates on the quality and nature of public opinion, and on the role of public opinion in democracies.
By borrowing the approach of Chittick et al. (2001), Bjereld and Ekengren (1999) and Holsti (1996) in the examination of the structure of Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality, this thesis contributes to and broadens the debate on the detail of these approaches by suggesting modifications and improvements after applying their hypotheses and approach to the Irish case. In substantive terms, this thesis will add another much-needed case study to the literature on public opinion on foreign policy (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 516; Keatinge, 1996: 121; Page and Shapiro, 1992) and will also place the Irish case in a comparative context. Contributing to the democratic theory discourse, these findings on Irish public opinion can inform the debate on the normative issue of whether and how Irish governments should take public opinion into account in the formulation and conduct of Irish foreign policy.

Research questions for Irish public opinion arising from the literature review

The main research question, “are public attitudes to Irish neutrality ‘rationally structured’?”, can be broken down into a series of questions that are embedded in the literature on Irish neutrality and the wider academic literature on public opinion and foreign policy. The first question concerns what, if any, are the organising concepts that lend some coherence to mass public attitudes to Irish neutrality? However, this task presupposes a position on a second, related issue derived from the principal research question “are public attitudes to Irish neutrality ‘rationally structured’; the question of what is ‘rational’ - what factors can be considered ‘rational’, mindful of the fact that “the researcher must establish the “logical” framework against which the populace’s opinions will be judged”? (Jackson, 1983: 742). The first half of this thesis argued why the mainstream realist literature is not the most appropriate framework for judging the rationality of attitudes to neutrality. What then is the academic yardstick or theoretical worldview by which to judge the ‘rationality’ of these factors?

Given that the structure of foreign policy attitudes may be different in each country, it makes sense to take into account the characteristics, history and culture of Ireland and her peoples in order to establish the dynamics of foreign policy attitudes rather than depend on dimension-specific hypotheses extracted from the US public opinion literature or even the POFP literature on other European states. This nation-state/case-specific approach to establishing what are considered ‘rational’ factors is particularly appropriate in light of the evidence of a comparative Swedish-US public opinion study on foreign policy attitudes, where Ekengren and Bjereld found “sometimes the items used in the Swedish case have no equivalence whatsoever in the American context or the questions are not even posed in both Sweden and the US” (Bjereld and Ekengren,
For example, looking at the US case, questions related to a ‘militant internationalism’ (MI) dimension that was found to organise US public opinion on foreign policy referred to the right to send US troops to other parts of the world to guard US interests. Sweden does not have the option to send troops abroad (similar to Ireland), but instead has the choice of defending national interests alone or with the help of other states in an alliance. Moreover, the MI dimensions structuring Swedish public foreign policy attitudes and US foreign policy attitudes represented expressions of different sets of attitudes; in the case of the US, the MI dimension expressed attitudes toward violence as a political means; in the Swedish case the MI dimension expressed attitudes toward autonomy or the ceding of sovereignty. Given Ireland’s postcolonial background, it is likely that Irish foreign policy dimensions expressing attitudes toward independence and national identity will be salient and particular to the case of Irish public opinion and foreign policy.

The first step on the road to assessing the rationality of public opinion involves examining the Irish foreign policy literature in order to identify a plausible range of theoretical factors underpinning the dynamics of Ireland’s neutrality. From this analysis, it is possible to formulate a series of working hypotheses to examine whether the same factors underpin the dynamics of public attitudes to Irish neutrality. A review of the history and politics literature on Irish neutrality provided a list of common factors that are said to impinge on Irish neutrality; these factors will be provided listed in the following paragraph. Several academics have argued that public attitude dimensions are related to IR theories; in order to take these dynamics into account, the factors identified from the politics and history literature must be linked with the appropriate theory of IR. It is hypothesised that non-realist approaches to Irish neutrality may provide better theoretical hypotheses for the dynamics structuring Irish public attitudes to neutrality because of two factors: (1) the approach argues that public opinion has a role in the constitution of Irish neutrality and (2) the approach argues neutrality represents the identity of the state and the Irish people. Support for the non-realist concepts and factors identified in the politics and history literatures is procured through the application of the critical social constructivist approach to understanding Irish neutrality.

According to the literature, what factors influence public attitudes to neutrality?
Having identified a range of common factors and relevant hypotheses from the history and politics literature, the next step is to test whether these factors influence public attitudes to Irish neutrality. The Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey (ISPAS) has a range of attitude statements and questions that correspond to the pivotal concepts emerging from the literature that are hypothesised to organise public attitudes to neutrality. In Chapter Seven, a range of scaled statement variables are subsumed into pivotal latent variables and modelled in a Structural Equation Model to determine the structure of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

Are these factors plausible ‘dimensions’ with respect to comparative models?

Should one or more of the identified factors of independence, patriotism, efficacy, anti-British sentiment, and attitudes to Northern Ireland be found to be driving public opinion on Irish neutrality, the next question raised in the context of this literature review is whether these factors can be related to the ‘dimensions’ talked about in other studies of public opinion and foreign policy? The late 1980s saw the emergence of a new type of literature on public opinion and foreign policy which undertook original and secondary analyses that supported the case for dimensions rather than types for the adequate description of the foreign policy beliefs of both leaders and the mass public (Holsti, 1996: 48; Kegley Jr., 1986: 456; Wittkopf, 1986: 426). Wittkopf undertook secondary analyses of foreign policy surveys of both leaders and the general public and his results revealed that two dimensions are necessary to describe

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20 Types refer to attitude clusters, foreign policy attitude categories or classifications. The types are derived from dimensions, and are usually interactions of dimensions. There is a debate over whether dimensions or types should be identified and discussed, although many academics play it safe and encompass both in their studies. Holsti argues for identifying dimensions rather than types on the basis that, “when we think in terms of dimensions rather than types, we are more likely to search for other dimensions that may enhance the analytical power of the scheme” (Holsti, 1996: 49). Wittkopf found that two dimensions described and structured US foreign policy attitudes: “support-against militant internationalism” and “support-oppose cooperative internationalism”. Dichotomizing and crossing these dimensions yields four types of foreign policy belief systems, with quadrants labelled as ‘hard-liners’, ‘internationalists’, ‘isolationists’ and ‘accommodationists’. In discussing the relative merits of discrete types as against categories defined by dimensions, Holsti argues that thinking in terms of dimensions yields greater conceptual freedom. For example, analysing a two-by-two matrix of types means that finer distinctions along both dimensions are obscured e.g. strongly oppose, neutral, strongly support. A three-by-three matrix is possible and additional descriptive labels would be developed, e.g. indifferents (Holsti, 1996: 48). Holsti and Rosenau pose the question, “should we think in terms of types or dimensions?” and argue that the latter should take precedence over the former for several reasons (1990: 120).

Previously, Wittkopf had criticised these academics for failing to this: “Holsti and Rosenau posit the existence of three dimensions, and are usually interactions of dimensions. There is a debate over whether dimensions or types should be identified from the pattern of items (questions) loading on and correlating with a factor using factor analysis methods. The items that load on the factor are part of the scale of the dimension. Types are introduced to represent the interaction of the dimensions, as these POPF academics believe that interactions of dimensions might provide better predictions of foreign policy attitudes or behaviours: “multidimensional scaling by itself will not identify these possible interaction effects” (Chittick and Billingsley, 1989: 202).
foreign policy attitudes: “support-oppose militant internationalism” and “support-oppose cooperative internationalism” (Wittkopf, 1986; 1990; Wittkopf and Hinckley, 2000). In the 1990s Chittick argued for the literature to accept a third dimension that captures to what degree people identify with the wider global community or more narrowly with their country. He argued for three dimensions, namely ‘security’ ranging from militarism to non-militarism, ‘prosperity’ ranging from isolationism to internationalism, and ‘identity’ ranging from unilateralism to multilateralism (Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis, 1995; Hart, 1995). At the start of the 2000s, benefiting from new data and further factor analyses, Chittick and Freyberg-Inan concluded that a multidimensional structure reveals public opinions as having a greater degree of underlying stability than a one- or even two-dimensional structure (Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, 2001: 54). These foreign policy dimensions, which are used interchangeably in the POFP literature with other terms such as ‘motivations’ and ‘dispositions’, can be encompassed in ‘latent variables’ that are measured indirectly from a range of related opinions and statements in the form of multiple ‘indicators’.

Contrary to their expectations, Bjereld and Ekengren found that Wittkopf’s ‘co-operative internationalism’ dimension (opinions about the value of co-operation between the U.S. and other states as well as the promotion of détente) was weaker than the ‘militant internationalism’ dimension (opinions on the U.S. right to send troops to other parts of the world; the importance of fighting communism; and the opinion that the US has vital interests to guard in many parts of the world) in their investigation into the structure of Swedish public opinion (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 514). They argued for a re-interpretation of the meaning of the dimensions given the differences in Swedish and US foreign policy, and decided that Chittick, Billingsley and Travis’s multilateralism-unilateralism dimension (considered in the Swedish analysis to be an expression of identity) was a more appropriate structure to account for the Swedish expression of foreign policy attitudes. However, they then further argued for a completely new interpretation of the second (militant internationalism) dimension, in terms of “idealism” and “ethnocentrism”, which are “grounded in international questions concerning the distribution of values, degree of openness toward the world, and the desire of the individual states to play an active role in international politics” (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 515). Interestingly, Bjereld and Ekengren even claim it is possible to interpret US attitude dimensions in these new terms. If we can assume that it is possible to deduce foreign policy dimensions that account for the various factors driving public opinion on neutrality, then the fourth question of this chapter concerns two related issues, firstly, what would these dimensions be called, and secondly, in order for these dimensions to be considered
‘rational’, would the dimensions have to correspond in some way with the dimensions found in other states’ public opinions?

**Irish dimensions with respect to dimensions in the comparative literature**

It is clear from the most recent debates in the public opinion and foreign policy literature that the nature and characteristics of structural foreign policy attitude dimensions are continually evolving and arguably state-specific. Chittick and Freyberg-Inan argue that it is important to make a case for clear analytical categories and to ensure confusion or muddled concepts, such as unilateralism and nationalism, or multilateralism and internationalism, are avoided (Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, 2001: 55). In an effort to overcome this problem, the analysis of Irish dimensions must be grounded in the dynamics of the Irish state’s foreign relations and the historical and cultural factors shaping these dynamics, which may have commonalities and differences with other neutral and non-neutral states.

There are some characteristics of Irish public opinion that stand out in a comparative context that may help to produce a better theoretical grounding for the meaning of Irish public attitude dimensions. It is clear that a long struggle for independence and a postcolonial background are potential dynamics in Irish public opinion that might set the Irish case apart from other states. For example, as early as the 1980s, Keatinge highlighted the fact that opinion polls indicated that the Irish citizen is “the staunchest defender of sovereignty” with respect to security and defence policy decision-making in the European Community (EC) (Keatinge, 1984: 117), with only 18% of Irish people supporting supranational integration and 68% believing the Irish government should have the final say in policy.\(^{21}\) Irish people are also the least supportive national cohort of the notion of the EU forming a common position in foreign affairs. Up until the 1990s, Ireland continued to record some of the highest levels of preference for national decision-making (second only to the Greek figure) (Commission, 1995: B41) and the lowest level of support for decision-making by the EU (Commission, 1990: A23), although after the neutral enlargement Finland superceded the earlier Irish figures (Commission, 2004: B85; 2005: 121). In the late 1980s, Irish people were also the most likely of all nationalities not express an opinion on what degree of European integration they wanted (Commission, 1988: A5, A15; Feld, 1991: 48). Certainly Irish people are consistently the least supportive of a Common Defence Policy of all European Union member-state populations (Commission, 1995: 63). This evidence, coupled with the associated link of sovereignty and independence with Irish neutrality evident in the Irish foreign policy literature, theoretically suggests hypotheses

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\(^{21}\) Figures are from Eurobarometer 9 (1978), cited by (Taylor, 1983: 184). Eurobarometer 9 was unavailable on the europa.eu website
supporting the existence of an ‘independence - integration’ dimension in the structure of Irish public attitudes to neutrality.

Irish people are significantly more likely than the average EU citizen to express fear of a loss of their national identity as a consequence of the European Single Market (Commission, 1999). Irish people also top the polls with the largest proportion of people who are very proud (78% in 1999) of their national identity and consistently occupy the first or second (to Greece) position with respect to the total number who are ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ proud of their national identity (Commission, 1982: 27; 1995: 67; 2000: B15; 2000: 11). Given that populations exhibiting weaker national pride tend to identify more with a European identity in addition or exclusively in relation to their own national identity (Commission, 1995: 67), it is not surprising that comparatively few Irish people consider themselves “only European” or “European and Irish” (MacCarthaigh, 1999). From the outset then, given the particularly strong levels of Irish national pride, or patriotism, and this factor’s associated link with Irish neutrality evident in the Irish foreign policy and history literature, there is strong evidence supporting a hypothesis for a ‘patriotism’ or ‘national identity’ factor or dimension in the dynamics of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

In response to Converse’s (1964) criticism of public foreign policy attitudes on the basis of their lack of consistency with domestic attitudes, Hurwitz and Peffley argue that the underlying dimensions that tie foreign policy attitudes together into structures are specific to the foreign policy domain (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1101-1114) (also hypothesised by Sulfaro) (Sulfaro, 1996: 306). Therefore, in assessing the rationality of the case of Irish public opinion on neutrality, attitudes to concepts such as patriotism and independence that represent more general and abstract beliefs and values may well provide the organising structures for attitudes to Irish neutrality but legitimately fail to provide structure in domestic policy preferences.

The other question arising from this particular set of literature is whether the emergent dimensions correlate with the dimensions structuring public attitudes to foreign policy in other states? Do Irish public attitudes to Irish neutrality have to be organised along the most familiar bipolar dimensions (Holsti, 1992: 448) of ‘liberal to conservative’ and ‘internationalist to isolationist’ to be considered ‘rationally’ structured from an international comparative perspective? Or furthermore, must they relate to Wittkopf’s bifurcated internationalist dimension of ‘cooperative internationalism’ and ‘militant internationalism’ (Wittkopf, 1990: 50) types? Or Chittick et al.’s three “community/identity”: ‘unilateralism - multilateralism’; “security”: ‘nonmilitarism-
militarism’; and “prosperity”: ‘protectionism - free trade’ (also called ‘internationalism-isolationism’ and ‘anti-involvement - pro-involvement’) factors? (Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis, 1995: 314; Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, 2001: 45).

The first important note in relation to this question is that all of the above dimensions, derived from American public opinion data, are determinants of a broad concept of ‘public opinion on foreign policy’ or public opinion on the use of force, or public opinion on particular events such as NATO airstrikes in Bosnia. This study is qualitatively different as it is concerned with explaining public attitudes to Irish neutrality, a specific foreign policy concept. As neutrality is seen by many people as the filter of Ireland’s foreign, security and defence policy (Irish political parties in the past have “presented neutrality as a fundamental and immutable element in Irish foreign policy” (Keatinge, 1989: 77); neutrality is a foreign and security policy concept (Goetschel, 1999: 119); neutrality is a principle of foreign policy [Petitpierre, 1963 [1970]: 175]), similar factors may also be at play in the Irish public opinion case, although some correlated dimensions may be more important and relevant than others.

**Diverse interpretations of dimensions**

The second issue to note is that the disparate dimension labelling among nation-state cases, and even across same-state data sets and studies, may have served to obscure similarities in the meanings of the various dimensions. Isolationism has been talked about in militar, (Dwyer, 1977: 25-26), security (McSweeney, 1990: 150), geographical (MacGinty, 1995: 136), economic (Karsh, 1988: 206), diplomatic (Keatinge, 1973: 29) and political (Keatinge, 1978: 57) senses in the literature on Irish neutrality. Distinctions therefore have to be made between the forms of the ‘isolationism’ concept argued to be associated with ‘neutrality’ and ‘Irish neutrality’, and ‘isolationism’ as part of the structure of American foreign policy attitudes that may translate to the Irish case. Thus, there are difficulties involved in attempts to come up with labels encapsulating the meaning of dimensions and in engaging in a comparative analysis of dimensions.

It is important to sort through the various analyses and interpretations of ‘isolationist’ and ‘internationalist’ dimensions because ‘isolationist’ appears to mean different things to different peoples at different times. However, it is important to note that after an examination of the range of different dimensions argued by disparate academics to characterise American foreign policy attitudes, Holsti and Rosenau claimed “labelling differences have often obscured the extent to which quite disparate analyses of American thinking about foreign affairs have in fact focused on militant
internationalism and cooperative internationalism” (Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 120). It is also important to be aware of the politics of the use of certain concepts – for example, the hostile discourse on neutrality and isolationism in the realist foreign policy literature is often cited as an example of attempts to degrade the concept of neutrality (Goetschel, 1999: 132; Keatinge, 1984: 48; McSweeney, 1985: 11; Salmon, 1989: 26).

Taking the ‘isolationism-internationalism’ dimension as an example, it is clear that the majority of the US literatures’ concepts of isolationism are based on the state’s ability to get involved in military campaigns abroad. Ireland does not have such capabilities, and therefore the Ireland-based concept of isolationism will be qualitatively different to those of the mainstream US-centred literature. Holsti and Rosenau describe the age-old characteristics of isolationists as “more parochial, less educated, less informed, and less interested in foreign affairs” and ask the concomitant question of whether isolationists are less likely to have a clearly defined set of attitudes – coherent belief systems - about foreign affairs? (Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 119). They explain that it is now questioned whether this ‘conventional wisdom’ interpretation of isolationism is applicable to the mass public (Page and Shapiro 1988; Wittkopf, 1998a) and conclude that ‘skepticism’ may be the explanatory attribute of isolationists – they do not share the militant/cooperative internationalists’ firm beliefs about the means and ends of foreign policy, resulting in a less clear pattern of responses (Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 120).

It is clear that in discussions of the internationalist-isolationist dimension a distinction also has to be drawn between levels of analysis - the state, the government and the people. In 1973, Keatinge argued that the government could sustain an isolationist attitude (“based on several factors, including an over-simplified (though not entirely inaccurate) view of diplomatic practice and the feeling that the great problems of world politics are of no concern of Ireland’s”) (Keatinge, 1973: 220), on the basis of an indifferent majority of TDs in the Dáil. However, with the effect of more than thirty years of membership of the European Economic Community/European Union on public worldviews, coupled with decades of public-supported Irish peacekeeping missions undertaken for the United Nations, the Irish Government’s 1996 assessment that “for the Irish people neutrality has never been a statement of isolationism” (Ireland, 1996: 51) is plausible.

To examine the comparability puzzle from another perspective, one can ask, what kind of structure would be coherent with the differences that exist between a small state
like Ireland and a superpower like the United States of America and even other smaller states like Sweden? There are other concepts of isolationism in the literature, outside of those based on states’ military capabilities, which conceptualise individuals’ philosophical attitudes to government policy or attributes and characteristics of the members of the public. These types of isolationism concepts may prove to have theoretical parallels with the Irish case of public opinion. The increased use of structural factors rather than the usual socio-demographic variables such as age, gender and income to explain public attitudes to foreign policy in the literature lays emphasis on the importance of producing a theory-guided and empirically defensible judgement of the structure of public opinion on Irish neutrality (Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, 2001: 52).

Are Irish foreign policy dimensions related to IR theoretical approaches?

Given the difficulties over the meaning and labelling of the dimensions and their applicability across cases of public opinion, perhaps the answer may lie at a higher conceptual or theoretical level. The latest hypotheses in this body of foreign policy literature attempt to formulate a relationship between public attitude dimensions and International Relations theories and approaches. This higher-level analysis of IR theory orientations and dimensions linkages may provide the key to understanding public foreign policy attitude dimensions in a comparative context. Both Holsti and Rosenau (Holsti, 1996: 49; Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 96-97) (in deductions of dimensions of US public foreign policy attitudes) and Bjereld and Ekengren (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 515) (in deductions of dimensions of Swedish public foreign policy attitudes) relate their dimensions to venerable IR theories of realism and liberalism. Thus, this latest approach in the literature invites the fifth question, whether Irish foreign policy attitude dimensions can be related to the higher-level IR theoretical approaches of (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism or (critical) social constructivism?

Interest, Information, Gender, Generation and Party Affiliation variables

Several academics have attempted to divide the public into groups using interest and information as the stratifying variables. Sobel outlines the work of several academics (Sobel, 2001: 12-13), for example Kegley and Wittkopf (1979), Almond (1950), Rosenau (1961) and LeoGrande (1993), who claim there are three types of publics based on different concepts of information and attentiveness. The mass public which ‘is neither interested nor informed’; the attentive public which is informed but has few means of exerting influence (comprising 10% of population on the basis of the size of the circulation of prestige newspapers; others argue it is around 15 – 20% of
population on the basis of active participation in the foreign policy process) and finally, the elite (1 – 2% of the population) which is both informed and influential. Are these stratified groups also found in Irish public opinion in relation to Irish neutrality, and what are the implications of the evidence for the ‘rational public’ thesis? Whereas “Rosenau found that individuals without the requisite information and interest in international affairs possessed opinions that were lacking in structure” (Sulfaro, 1996: 312), there is a counter-argument that poor attentiveness on the part of some members of the public does not imply a lack of rationality and that knowledge is not necessarily an indicator of ‘good quality’, ‘rational’ attitudes. For example, Wittkopf argues that interest and knowledge are largely irrelevant to whether the American people are able, in the aggregate, to hold politically relevant foreign policy beliefs: “foreign policy beliefs may be both coherent and politically relevant even if they are not grounded in political sophistication” (Wittkopf, 1990: 15).

Other attempts to explain cleavages include the ‘generation gap’ and ‘gender gap’ hypotheses (Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 117) that appear to have little support in analyses of American foreign policy attitude data. Several studies have also suggested a political party affiliation hypothesis. Can cleavages in public attitudes to Irish neutrality be explained in relation to party affiliations? For example, Fine Gael is dismissive of Irish neutrality and wants to get rid of the policy; (Brennock, FG calls for State to abandon neutrality, 2003); if a person supports Fine Gael, he or she may hold relatively dismissive or negative concepts of neutrality and negative attitudes towards the concept because of this party political affiliation.

The consideration of these prominent variables, hypotheses and themes in the POFP literature helps to establish the general theoretical comparability of the case of Irish foreign policy attitudes with international research and other nation-state cases. The conclusions of this study on the rationality and structure of Irish public attitudes to Irish neutrality will have implications for the conventional wisdom about the viability of some central assertions of democratic theory and characterisations of the nature of public opinion in general. This thesis also contributes to the evaluation of different approaches to studying public attitudes and different theoretical models of public opinion.

**Review of the academic literature on public opinion and Irish neutrality**

There are three academics who have published literature on public opinion on Irish neutrality; Patrick Keatinge, Michael Marsh and Richard Sinnott. The following review considers the data cited by these authors as well as their interpretations of it.
Patrick Keatinge

Patrick Keatinge offers a blunt assessment that “following Ireland’s accession to the EC in 1972, popular attitudes towards neutrality could only be a matter of conjecture” (Keatinge, 1984: 116). However, in that context, he also draws attention to the “remarkable consensus” among politicians that neutrality is what people want (Keatinge, 1984: 117). Keatinge identified a divergence of public and government concepts and attitudes towards neutrality and explicitly acknowledged the issue of levels of analysis, examining a range of non-state and sub-state agents in an epistemologically pluralist approach to understanding public opinion on Irish neutrality.

Until recently most opinion poll data was collected in Ireland mainly for the purpose of estimating voting in elections. Rarely is it collected on political and social opinion on issues per se. Neutrality was never an important divisive issue in elections due to the consensus on the decision during World War II and the lack of division on foreign policy between the two main political parties (Fine Gael and Fianna Fail) thereafter. In the elections of the 40s, 50s and 60s, economic or domestic issues were most prevalent, and when Fine Gael, in particular, tried to make foreign policy an issue, the party failed to make any electoral gain. Despite the potential implications for neutrality, in the 1972 referendum to join the EEC the close association between foreign policy and policy on Northern Ireland blurred the foreign policy debate and economic issues were predominant (Keatinge, 1973: 254-258). Both Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil fought the referendum on the basis that neutrality was not a real issue (Keatinge, 1984: 101). There is no evidence in the June 1981, February 1982 or November 1982 elections (in which neutrality was part of Fianna Fáil’s populist appeal and Labour called for a constitutional affirmation) that neutrality was a determining influence in voters’ choice. In no opinion poll did it emerge as a significant issue for the electorate (Keatinge, 1984: 117).

As a result of the Crotty case, brought about through a dispute over the effect of EPC in Title III of the Single European Act on the powers in the Irish Constitution, since 1987 a referendum has been held in Ireland on every new EC/EU Treaty or set of amendments to previous Treaties. The issue of Irish neutrality arose in these referendum debates mainly due to the activities of campaigning groups (e.g. PANA) and small parties (e.g. Sinn Féin, The Green Party), who have consistently claimed that the further steps of integration embodied in each of the Treaty amendments threatens Irish neutrality, despite the larger political parties’ denial of their arguments.
Polling data from the 1990s suggests that the threat to Irish neutrality is a motivation behind a large section of the public’s ‘no’ votes in EU referendums.

Aside from EU referendums, the proposal to join the PfP in 1999 was the only occasion Irish neutrality was the focus of recent political and public debate. A May 1999 poll signalled that an overwhelming majority (71%) supported holding a referendum on the Government’s proposal to join Partnership for Peace (Sinnott, 1999). Public interest in holding the referendum was strong, despite the fact that a smaller majority of Irish people (62%) was in favour joining PfP, indicating a desire to engage in the democratic process of a referendum over the issue. However, the high level of media attention and seemingly strong public opinion on the issue may have been partly driven by Fianna Fáil’s decision to renege on a promise of a referendum on the decision, rather than the issue of Irish neutrality itself.

In an analysis of Irish public opinion in the period up to the 1980s, Keatinge found that on the key test of political parties’ commitment to the concept of fundamental neutrality - constitutional affirmation - their silence or lack of action was conclusive (Keatinge, 1984: 104). Interestingly, in the 1990s, the small parties of Sinn Féin and the Green Party have promoted themselves as defenders of Irish neutrality and as providing an alternative to the larger political parties for the Irish voter on that basis. They have called for the principle of neutrality to be enshrined in the Constitution (Green Party, 1997). To recall, in September 2002 the Irish government attached the promise of a referendum on joining a military alliance to the Nice Treaty constitutional amendment to help win the second Referendum on the Nice Treaty in Ireland. Whilst this action does not necessarily show government commitment to the ‘fundamental’ concept of neutrality that is held by smaller parties and significant sections of public opinion, it has the effect of recognising, for the first time, the existence of Irish military neutrality in an international treaty. This future referendum would certainly test Keatinge’s point that “though Irish neutrality is in theory ultimately negotiable, it is by no means certain an Irish government would find it easy to negotiate it away, even in what it might regard as favourable diplomatic circumstances” (Keatinge, 1984: 119).

Keatinge makes the argument that, “the failure of neutrality to be a significant issue in electoral terms does not necessarily detract from its popular legitimacy” (Keatinge, 1984: 117); it merely reflects the failure of parties and lobbies to convince the

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22 The leader of Sinn Féin, Mr. Gerry Adams, claims, ‘the question of neutrality underscores the importance of providing voters with Sinn Féin as an option in elections and in grass roots political activity’. Gerry Adams speaking at the Sinn Féin ArdFheis, 1999.
electorate that neutrality was seriously threatened, reflecting the political and diplomatic realities of the time. He maintains, “it remains a quite plausible proposition, though, that if neutrality were seen to be seriously threatened, and if that single issue were put to the appropriate electoral test - a referendum - support for the maintenance of neutrality would be high” (Keatinge, 1984: 117). The establishment of whether attitudes to Irish neutrality are ‘non attitudes’ or ‘rationally structured’ will help to explain why support for Irish neutrality continues to appear in pre-referendum polls and it can also inform opinion as to whether the government could proceed to officially abandon Irish neutrality through a future referendum.

Michael Marsh
Irish neutrality is an important issue in the context of European integration in the areas of foreign and defence policy because concerns about neutrality weaken support for the EU (Marsh, 1992: 25). Marsh’s analysis of Irish public opinion on neutrality echoes elements of the Almond-Lipmann consensus on public opinion on foreign policy in that the analysis indicates that the Irish public holds ‘non-attitudes’ to neutrality. Marsh characterises public opinion as attached to “a salient political symbol” (Marsh, 1992: 25) without knowing what it is they are attached to; “the rhetoric of neutrality wins much more support than the substance” (Marsh, 1992: 12). Marsh finds “neutrality thus appears to be a potent political value but one with a stronger symbolic than empirical content” (Marsh, 1992: 13). Keatinge finds this characterisation of public attachment to neutrality appropriate for other neutral states’ populations, for whom neutrality “represents a sort of traditional symbol and national myth” – “it has become part of the political culture, the popular endorsement of neutrality” (Keatinge, 1984: 99-100).

Marsh finds evidence of ambiguity in his analysis of public opinion on Irish neutrality because people claim to support actions that are not neutral. This analysis is partly based on the response to questions about the Gulf War, where 67% of people agreed/supported the US use of force to remove Iraq from Kuwait. However, being part of a ‘neutral’ state does not require people to avoid having or stating an opinion on international military matters. The notion of being ‘neutral’ with respect to a debate is not to be conflated with the behaviour and attitudes of public opinion in relation to ‘neutrality’. Irish people in a neutral state can express their views on warring sides, and express ideological predispositions. The important point is, expression of opinion is not a basis for a deduction that people wish for Ireland to get involved in the war and to drop neutrality.
Another element of Marsh’s analysis that leads to the ‘non-attitudes’ characterisation of public opinion on Irish neutrality appears to be the 34% to 54% of people who are prepared for Ireland to give aid of one kind or another to victims of the first Gulf War. With respect to whether this violates neutrality it is worth noting the Swiss practice of neutrality provides for neutral states to come to the aid of victims of war (Keatinge, 1984: 148; Switzerland, 2000: 9). In the context of the importance of this phenomenon in assessing the ‘non-attitudes’ characterisation, the proportion of people offering aid for the US and its allies never amounted to more than 36% across three surveys. This proportion is similar to the 29% to 34% of people who did not want Ireland to be neutral in the war or wanted Irish troops to fight and there may be significant overlap between these groups. The 54% who were prepared to allow US planes to refuel at Shannon is arguably the only finding that can be said to point to ‘the somewhat ambiguous nature of Ireland’s neutrality’ (Marsh, 1992: 10) with respect to the public understanding of its practice. Therefore, in the most rational scenario, 25% of people who did not agree with Ireland’s involvement in the Gulf War may have been the same people who were prepared to let US planes refuel at Shannon. No other points can be supported because the question wording was inappropriate to allow conclusions on the issue.

The critical response of Page and Shapiro to the Almond-Lipmann consensus needs to be considered in this case because it is too easy to dismiss public opinion as ‘non-attitudes’ on the basis of inconsistency between an action of allowing a belligerent’s plane to refuel in Ireland and support for neutrality. It is possible, particularly given the government discourse on Shannon and neutrality, that a proportion of people do not realise a plane refuelling violated broader ‘non-government’ neutrality,23 it would be more viable to level the accusation of ‘non-attitudes’ if respondents realise the inconsistency and still claim to support Irish neutrality. The cross-tabulation of support for neutrality and support of refuelling may be illuminating in this respect. It is also possible that some of those people that claim to support neutrality and refuelling at Shannon may not adhere to a fundamental concept of neutrality that precludes this activity. For example, if people adhered to the Irish government concept of neutrality that amounts to staying out of military alliances, refuelling activity would be not be precluded under that concept. Perhaps this also needs to be understood in the context of developments pointed out by Gilland, who explains there have been changes in the range of activities policy-makers have believed to be compatible with neutrality (Gilland, 2001: 142).

23 In one opinion poll, 54% said US military aircraft refuelling at Shannon, but it is not clear how many of these people were professed supporters of neutrality.
Sniderman and others have decided to move away from trying to evaluate the rationality of public opinion on foreign policy based on responses in relation to ‘micro-level’ foreign policy events and actions in favour of ‘higher level’ variables of values and core political beliefs. This thesis assesses the basis of the rationality of public attitudes on the latter basis, and is not replicating the former approach applied in Marsh’s analysis. There is evidence of a ‘rational public’ in Marsh’s finding that “however poorly defined the concept of neutrality might be in the public mind, there is some consistency in who places value on it” (Marsh, 1992: 13).

Richard Sinnott

Richard Sinnott has analysed a number of MRBI opinion polls that referred to neutrality for the Irish Times newspaper as well as every post-EU referendum survey, including the two Nice Treaty opinion polls in 2001 and 2003 that contained interesting evidence in relation to public attitudes to Irish neutrality. Sinnott’s analysis of opinion polls takes the same approach as that of Michael Marsh; he assesses the compatibility of neutrality with a range of responses on courses of action in foreign affairs.

In every post-referendum survey, support for Irish neutrality has appeared as a dynamic of the ‘no’ vote. Just over half of those who voted ‘no’ in the Amsterdam Treaty referendum in 1998 did so because of a professed perception that Irish neutrality was under threat (Sinnott, Post-Amsterdam Referendum Survey, 1998). According to research carried out by the European Commission, the second most important attitudinal influence on the ‘no’ vote in the first Nice Treaty referendum in Ireland was “support for strengthening Irish neutrality even if this means being less involved in EU co-operation on foreign and defence policy” (Sinnott, 2001: v). As a result, public support for Irish neutrality is feared by politicians - to the point that they do not debate issues of EU treaties and the issue of neutrality itself. For example, Sinnott posits that politicians don’t debate the issues arising from EU Treaty referendums because of Irish neutrality – “it is usually assumed that neutrality is the great obstacle that, as far as Ireland is concerned, EU treaty changes must surmount or circumvent. This assumption results in much tiptoeing around, both by diplomats in the negotiation process and by politicians in the ratification debates” (Sinnott, EU treaty still widely viewed as irrelevant, 1998). Coakley makes a similar comment in relation to neutrality; that politicians in Ireland have been markedly reluctant to participate in debates on neutrality, which he links to a possible “perception that the people’s commitment to the principle is deeply rooted” (Coakley, 1999: 63).
Similar to the analysis by Marsh in 1992, Sinnott also finds discrepancies in public attitudes in relation to EU foreign and security policy options. In a 1996 newspaper article that examined opinion poll data gathered for the Irish Times by MRBI, the headline of the article stated “poll shows a symbolic support for neutrality” with a header “many Irish people see no conflict between a policy of neutrality and involvement with NATO’s partnership for peace” (Sinnott, 1996). The table below constitutes the core data of the article and shows the proportion of respondents who favoured one from a range of statement options covering ‘neutrality’ and courses in foreign policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.2 Attitudes to neutrality, foreign policy and defence co-operation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain neutrality and decide own policy without reference to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain neutrality but agree a common foreign and defence policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change neutrality and join NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change neutrality but not join NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided/no opinion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sinnott argues that the 18% of the population who say they “want to maintain neutrality but are willing to agree a common foreign and defence policy are confused and contradictory”, but crucially, refers to the concept of neutrality in providing an alternative hypothesis - “or the prevailing concept of neutrality is ambiguous” (Sinnott, 1996). In order to justify that statement it is necessary to examine the primary definition of neutrality for this cohort of nearly 1 in 5. It is possible that those who define neutrality – as the government does – as staying out of the NATO military alliance, may find their concept of neutrality fits with this course of action.

Looking at the 43% of the population who wish to maintain neutrality and decide own policy without reference to others, (Sinnott refers to them as those “who seem to adhere most closely to traditional conceptions of neutrality”), he claims that 73% of these “traditional neutralists” are in favour of joining Partnership for Peace. However, he does place the results in context and say they are surprising only in the context of the “bogeyman/thin-edge-of-the-wedge theory of NATO” and that a willingness to be involved in PFP and in a NATO-led force in Bosnia is compatible with traditional neutrality. Given that analysis, the ‘symbolic support’ label is not yet justified. (The metatheory underpinning these characterisations and labels is discussed in the next chapter).

Where the symbolic label does appear more appropriate, is when Sinnott argues, “the real test of the meaning of the public’s commitment to neutrality comes when we return to the proposal to “come to the defence of another member-state of the EU in
the event of an attack” – “this is not neutrality”. He says half of the traditional neutralists are in favour of a commitment to come to the defence of a member-state under attack – “this is the most definitive indication that neutrality as seen by public opinion as a vague “good” that does not impose narrow limits on political decisions”.

“What public opinion in this area amounts to then is a desire, perhaps at times, an inchoate desire, of the people of a small independent state for the foreign policy of that state to be based on independent judgment, while allowing that such judgement may lead to forms of international co-operation and even of military involvement that would be anathema to neutrality purists”. He explains that “part of the alleged contradictions in public opinion derive from incomplete information and understanding of the issues”. This may well be true given that the notion of coming to the defence of a member state under attack may not be seen as “a common defence policy” (all quotes from) (Sinnott, 1996). The pattern of attitudes toward the latter will be discussed shortly.

As Marsh points out in his attempts to make sense of attitudes to Irish neutrality and attitudes to EU foreign policy, part of the difficulties in drawing solid conclusions is the lack of relevant data; “there have been no surveys which have systematically explored the various options for a new security and defence policy, or the ways in which neutrality might be consistent with such options” (Marsh, 1992: 25).

Nonetheless, the absence of comprehensive analysis does not qualify Sinnott’s claim that public support for peacekeeping under PfP is “further evidence of the aspirational and symbolic quality of the notion of neutrality as it exists in Irish public opinion and of its compatibility with quite diverse courses of action in foreign affairs” (Sinnott, 1996). In fact, as noted in Chapter Two, the most ardent supporters of Irish neutrality define their concept as ‘peace-promotive’ and in terms of peacekeeping (mainly confined to peacekeeping under the UN). Sundelius finds that in many neutral states that it has been claimed that the pursuit of neutrality represents a contribution to world peace (Sundelius, 1989: 107). In this context, peacekeeping is a solid, empirical, achievable and ‘rational’ notion of neutrality and not ‘symbolic’ or ‘aspirational’.

The problem remains that a critical discussion of the concept of neutrality is not part of the analysis of public attitudes and it does not underpin the interpretation and understanding of public opinion. To an extent, Sinnott defines elements of Irish neutrality himself as his article continues, “in Irish public opinion, neutrality is a good thing. One can guess at why this is so: it is tradition; it is independence; it is anti

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The interpretation of ‘coming to the defence of’ presumably equates to getting involved in war and not the softer notion of ‘coming to the aid of’, which is frequently asked in questionnaires. It would be work getting precise details of what the former phrase means to people. Question wording and interpretation is so important, particularly if meanings are interpreted politically.
militarism; it is anti big power politics; it is pro-Third World; it was anti the new Cold War in the early 1980s and was and is against the spread of nuclear weapons. It is symbolic of a lot of aspirations that ordinary people have” (Sinnott, 1996). Notably, he argues, neutrality “is not, at least not as it exists in public opinion, a policy or even a principle that prescribes a definite policy” (Sinnott, 1996). This is questionable given the comprehensive outline of the policy prescription of the concept of active neutrality that will be outlined in the next chapter. These analyses show how important it is to try to get a comprehensive picture of what an individual’s concept of neutrality is, before trying to understand their attitudes to EU foreign policy options. It is also important to know what their understandings of EU foreign policy options are, such as what agreeing a common policy means in practice.

Attitudes to EU defence policy
Marsh found that concerns about Irish neutrality seem to be linked to opposition to further European integration (Marsh, 1992: 25); more specifically, he found “there is opposition to further integration on the grounds of threats to sovereignty, and in particular our sovereignty over defence policy” (Marsh, 1992: 18). Looking at a 1995 Eurobarometer poll, of the EU ‘Twelve’ the Irish population had by far the lowest support for a common defence policy, at 37% in favour, with the Danes expressing the next highest level of support at 53% - the average for the Twelve was 79% (Commission, 1995: 63). After the EU’s ‘neutral enlargement’ Ireland shared “with fellow neutrals, Finland and Austria, the lowest levels of support for a common security and defence policy” (Smyth, 1999) with 50% of the Irish population expressing support (Commission, 1999: 58) (The EU ‘15’ average was 71%).

Contrary to realist expectations, high levels of knowledge of the European Union do not necessarily imply support for an EU defence policy. Sinnott noted that the level of knowledge of the EU and its operations found in those opposed and those in favour of a common EU defence policy is slightly curvilinear. Higher levels of opposition are found among the least and the best informed on the European Union (25% and 29% respectively) (Sinnott, 1995: 17). Whilst the Government may believe that increasing knowledge of the EU amongst the general public can encourage positive attitudes to European integration, there is evidence that this theory does not hold true when Irish neutrality is at stake.

Given the persistence of public opinion trends in spite of elite claims that neutrality is not affected by developments in the EU - for example, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr David Andrews has surmised that, “Ever since Ireland joined the EEC over
25 years ago we have been hearing claims that Irish military neutrality was under threat. These claims were not valid 25 years ago, and they are no more relevant today” (Brennock, Amsterdam no threat to neutrality, Andrews says, 1998) - Brennock’s supposition that “the public still remains wary of greater EU co-operation on foreign and security issues, regardless of the Seville Declaration and the constitutional bar on Ireland’s involvement in a mutual defence pact” appears to be an accurate assessment of public opinion nowadays (Brennock, Grounds for hope but none for complacency in survey, 2003).

Conclusion
Page and Shapiro’s definition of collective public rationality means the public chooses a policy suited to their needs and in accordance with their values. The literature on public opinion on Irish neutrality written by Marsh and Sinnott focuses on attitudes with respect to foreign policy events, such as airstrikes by NATO, etc. This focus is very different to the ‘rational public’ question of what values drive public support for Irish neutrality. Chapter Seven shows the three tiers of Hurwitz and Peffley’s model of the hierarchical structure of public opinion on foreign policy: the upper tier of core values (e.g. efficacy, independence, patriotism, etc), the middle tier of general foreign policy posture (i.e. attitudes to neutrality) and the bottom tier of attitudes towards specific issues (e.g. attitudes towards NATO airstrikes) – the ‘rational public’ research question of this thesis focuses on the cognitive values (upper) and foreign policy orientations (middle) tiers on the hierarchical model and specifically excludes (the bottom tier of) attitudes to foreign policy events. Thus, the focus of the literature reviewed in this chapter on this bottom tier is not a sufficient framework or approach to contribute to the focus or understanding of the ‘rational public’ research question.

Secondly, the ‘rational public’ research question is influenced by the fact that “the researcher must establish the “logical” framework against which the populace’s opinions will be judged” (Jackson, 1983: 742). The approach taken by this literature on Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality of identifying attitudes through policy-related questions is inadequate because these policy questions are framed with respect to what a realist thinks is a relevant response. In addition, the specific responses vis-à-vis policy do not provide indications as to what the public thinks are important aspects of Irish neutrality. Therefore, the focus and approach of this literature to date on Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality does not contribute to an exploration of the ‘rational public’ hypothesis.
[Page and Shapiro’s] conclusion that ‘the quality of public opinion tends to reflect the quality of information and choices with which the public is presented’ is an argument in favour of investigating the quality of public opinion at the individual level and, in particular, the cognitive dimensions of attitudes – (Sinnott, 1997: 12)

Introduction

The first half of this thesis considered the role of meta-theory in analyses of Irish neutrality: this part of the thesis considers the role of meta-theory in public opinion and foreign policy (POFP) analysis. To do this, in part, the chapter considers the second element of Page and Shapiro’s concept of the ‘rational public’; how attitudes relate to the historical context and international events (Page and Shapiro, 1992: xii-xiii). The question of what is a ‘rational’ attitude in relation to the historical context of neutrality and the international events said to impinge on neutrality invites a metatheoretical analysis of the literature making claims about the rationality of Irish public opinion on neutrality based on the issues that ‘ought’ to be affecting Irish neutrality. Many accounts of public opinion on foreign policy are written from the point of view of a ‘realist’ elite, and the subjects of Irish neutrality and public attitudes to Irish neutrality are no exception. This chapter argues that the ‘mainstream’, ‘realist’ elite arguments as to what constitutes ‘sensible’ and ‘coherent’ attitudes to neutrality do not exclusively constitute the ‘rational’. The central argument of this chapter is that the basis of claims as to what is ‘rational’ in the foreign policy and neutrality domain is dependent on the metatheoretical considerations of the literature.

To recall the elite hypothesis regarding the Irish public’s reluctance to reject Irish neutrality and to become involved in EU defence integration and military alliances as ‘non-rational’ stability, as Everts puts it, “where stability has become the rule, one can be concerned in normative terms with the extent to which it presents an obstacle to desirable adaptations to changed international circumstances (as illustrated, e.g. by…Ireland, accustomed to a perhaps outdated policy of neutrality)” (Everts, 2000: 25).

The notion of ‘realist’ is employed in two academic schools of thought. An argument can be made that they are interrelated. “Realist” represents perspective of the elite writing about the problematic (or unrealistic according to the elite view of the world and foreign policy) nature of public opinion. A number of examples include Page and Shapiro’s point that Almond’s “mood theory” “underlies the foreign policy “realist” view that public opinion is “a barrier to coherent efforts to promote the national interests that transcend the moods and passions of the moment” (Holsti 1987, p.23; see also the literature reviews in Wittkopf 1990, and in Russett 1990)” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 38). Sinnott presents the realist view thus: “Given the nature of the security policy agenda and the nature of both contemporary public opinion and contemporary communications, political decision-makers must take account of public opinion, however discouraging or frustrating it may be; indeed, the imperative is not just a recent one – such a realist view was articulated as long ago as 1780 by Edmund Burke when he referred to ‘The coquetry of public opinion, which has her caprices, and must have her way’” (Sinnott, 1997: 3-4). The other meaning of “realist” concerns the International Relations theory of Realism and its later companion version Neorealism. Both the elite-public and IR theory concepts of realism are simultaneously applicable, although throughout this paper the term is used with the emphasis on the International Relations theoretical notion.
The changed international circumstances Everts is referring to is the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decision by politico-military elites to reinvigorate plans for a European Union defence alliance. These decisions and plans are linked to the elite discourse that the end of the Cold War precipitates the end of neutrality, (Sloan, 1998; Smyth, 1995) and there are numerous sources of this discourse, for example, in journal articles written by NATO research fellows (e.g.: “the concept of “neutrality” is somewhat outmoded because neutrality implies a status between two antagonists”) (Latypov, 1996: 3) and research institute academics, (Binter, 1989: 415) in newspaper articles written by Irish elites (FitzGerald, 1996) and in international comparative literature on neutrality, (e.g. Thalberg also seems puzzled by the Swiss peoples’ attachment to neutrality: “Swiss neutrality developed in the confrontation between large European powers, a confrontation that today no longer exists. Yet neutrality has become a tradition for the Swiss people”) (Thalberg, 1989: 238). The characterisations of public opinion on Irish neutrality as non-rational in the context of the end of the Cold War and the development of EU security and defence structures will be evaluated in terms of the approach, levels of analysis and metatheoretical assumptions in each of the analyses.

More specifically, the literature will be examined from two angles: (1) in terms of the level at which public opinion is studied, in the context of the latest focus of the ‘revisionist’ public opinion literature on “core values” as a level of understanding that operates above the ‘policy-level’ basis that appears to be used in academic assessments of public opinion on neutrality, and (2) in terms of a metatheoretical focus on the assumptions underpinning the ‘changed international circumstances’/end of Cold War thesis that appears to be used by elites and academics as the ‘rational’ yardstick by which to evaluate public foreign policy attitudes.27

The EU security policy prism and the ontology of behaviouralism

Fanning notes that Irish perspectives on European security are firmly rooted in the tradition of neutrality (Fanning, 1996: 137). Most analyses of public opinion and Irish neutrality are based on a reversal of these perspectives: European security and defence policy is the prism they have adopted to view and understand Irish neutrality and public opinion. This is their prism because, as Ståhlberg points out, from the elite perspective, public support of foreign policy is seen as general in character, and most foreign policy demands (experienced by elites), conversely, are directed to specific issues or policy areas (Ståhlberg, 1989: 251). In this view, then, policy linkage is the

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26 Core values do not refer directly to governmental actions or policies, (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1099-1120) but are more personal statements regarding the individual’s priorities and concerns. Ibid.

27 It is argued that, being “cognitive misers”, the public rely on elites to interpret international events Ibid, but that does not imply that the public simply embrace “official” government policy. Ibid.
basis for elite attempts to identify what they would regard as ‘real’ public attitudes to foreign policy.

The level of analysis of mainstream analyses of public opinion and Irish neutrality - linked to the policy prism - is based on a behaviouralist understanding of attitudes. As discussed in Chapter One, behaviouralists interpret the significance of public attitudes on the basis of whether attitudes are likely to have any behavioural consequences. This type of approach may lead to a failure to examine opinion at the level above policy/in relation to events i.e. at the level of foreign policy orientations (see Hurwitz and Peffley in next chapter) and the level above that, core values. In contrast, rather than using a policy prism, the focus of many of the revisionists/rationalists in the POFP literature is at these latter ‘higher’, more abstract levels of foreign policy opinion. The literature on the structure of public attitudes starts from the premise that core political beliefs and values are significant drivers of public foreign policy attitudes (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 16; Sniderman, 1993: 228). This approach, being more abstract, may be a more fruitful way of evaluating the rationality of public opinion than the approaches based on survey data of questions regarding policy options (proffered by European politico-military elites) that may be incongruent with public foreign policy desires - particularly in a context of publics potentially being in favour of a range policy options embodied in ‘active’ neutrality that differ significantly from the content of government or European politico-military elites’ foreign policy formulations, such as ‘military’ neutrality.

**LINKING REALIST POLICY/BEHAVIOURALISM WITH ‘SYMBOLIC’/‘ASPIRATIONAL’ PUBLIC ATTITUDES**

The review of Sinnott’s examination of a 1996 MRBI/Irish Times opinion poll in the previous chapter showed that the central claim of Sinnott’s article, that the “poll shows a symbolic support for neutrality” [emphasis added] was linked to Sinnott’s argument that neutrality “is not, at least not as it exists in public opinion, a policy or even a principle that prescribes a definite policy” (Sinnott, 1996). The question is whether this conclusion merely reflects the proposition that the concept of neutrality held by the public does not translate readily into the framework of EU security and defence policy? And whether an alternative hypothesis (apparently not considered in the article), whether public concepts of neutrality prescribe elements of a non-realist policy (similar to that of ‘active’ neutrality) is viable? Leaving those questions aside for now, the point is that in this analysis, the lack of policy prescription is correlated
with a concept of “the aspirational and symbolic quality of the notion of neutrality as it exists in Irish public opinion”.

The same pattern is evident in the quantitative assessment of Irish public opinion on neutrality (discussed in the previous chapter) that is aimed at understanding the importance of attitudes in determining support for the European Union, specifically in the context of the ratification of the Treaty on European Union. In this analysis, Marsh also links the public concept of neutrality to a symbolic notion through a concern over a lack of policy prescription - “though the term ‘neutrality’ has a high, positive value, people are much less decided about the expression of that value in policy terms” (Marsh, 1992: 10), surmising that “‘neutrality’ thus appears to be a potent political value but with a stronger symbolic than empirical content” [emphasis added] (Marsh, 1992: 13). Again, the question must be asked, is the empirical content simply in relation to European security policy? Are there other types of empirical content, such as policy prescribed by the active concept of neutrality, that is no less realistic and empirical than an EU security-centric policy? The lack of ‘empirical content’ in terms of policy prescriptions seems to be linked to the portrayal of public support for their concept of neutrality as shallow: “the rhetoric of Irish neutrality wins much more support than the substance” [emphasis added] (Marsh, 1992: 12) with the characterisation of neutrality as “a political value to which a majority of the population at least pay lip service” [emphasis added] (Marsh, 1992: 14). There are two interrelated points to be made in relation to the construction and use of the symbolic/empirical, rhetoric/substance binaries in each of the analyses: one concerns the ontological premises of behaviouralism, and the other, the metatheoretical assumptions of the policy expectations.

In these evaluations of public opinion on neutrality, ‘policy’ is connected to the notion of ‘action’ and ‘substance’, both of which assume a privileged position within the binaries with the ‘symbolic’ perception that is associated with ‘rhetoric’ and being the subject of ‘lip service’. Sinnott identifies four elements of a multi-dimensional concept of a public attitude: “(1) cognition, (2) salience, (3) affect or evaluation and (4) behaviour intention. In short, an individual can have an awareness of knowledge of an object, can rate its importance, can view the object positively or negatively, and can be predisposed to act towards the object in a particular way” (Sinnott, 1997: 6). He points out that much discussion of public opinion tends to focus on the third of these components dubbed the ‘affective or evaluative’ dimension of an attitude, i.e. on whether the public responds positively or negatively to a policy, and attitudes to
events, or an institution. In terms of analysing public opinion on foreign policy, the behaviouralist approach holds that “in order to interpret the significance of attitudes in this narrow sense [the affective or evaluative dimension of a multi-dimensional concept of attitude] however, we need to know whether they are likely to have any behavioural consequences” (Sinnott, 1997: 6-7). Those who are interested in people’s attitudes wish to understand them in order to predict people’s behaviours, (O’Grady, 2001: 235) and in particular, elites and academics are concerned with predicting and understanding voting behaviour in European Union Treaty referendums in Ireland. Indeed, the goal of the only paper written on public opinion and Irish neutrality was to determine whether public opinion on neutrality would stand in the way of public support for the Treaty in the 1992 referendum. Sinnott continues,

politically relevant behaviour extends well beyond voting. Voting is the mass political phenomenon par excellence but, particularly in the age of new social movements, individuals may join demonstrations, sign petitions, write to their public representative or express their views through a wide variety of more or less informal groups…Unlike behavioural intentions, the cognitive and salience dimensions of attitudes have tended to be neglected. A lot of research makes a ritual nod in their direction but they are rarely taken into account in a systematic way. Yet their significance in the interpretation of public opinion, especially public opinion on foreign and security policy, can hardly be overstated (Sinnott, 1997: 7).

In the context of the preference for policy-driven characterisations of public attitudes evident in the literature, it is important to note that according to the behaviouralist definition, “opinions abstractly held are purely intellectual data that either call for no concrete action or offer no possibility of concrete action” (Lane and Sears, 1964: 14).

According to behaviouralism, a behavioural action in relation to policy serves as a link between a ‘belief’ and the determination of ‘a full-blown attitude’ (O’Grady, 2001: 250). What is usually done is to follow a theoretical rule of thumb of the effect that the “stronger” the attitude, the more likely it will be that the subject will take consistent action toward the attitude object (Rosenberg, 1960: 336). This link between attitude and policy/action/behaviour is a variable used to evaluate public attitudes: “since some people act out their beliefs, and others merely verbalise them, this dimension can be an important one in sorting out types of opinion holders” (Lane and Sears, 1964: 14). It also functions as the method for behaviouralist and realist

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academics to distinguish between ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’ opinion-holders in relation to public opinion on neutrality.

The ontological difficulties imposed by the dominant realist understanding of security as state security and the concept of neutrality as only a state-actioned concept discussed in Chapter One need to be recalled here, particularly in the light of the important observation that ‘some kinds of opinion are “actionable” while others are not’ (Lane and Sears, 1964: 14). The almost exclusive focus of traditional security studies on governments and their instruments of policy (Booth and Vale, 1997: 342) is undoubtedly a variable in the dominance of the policy-based, behavioural framework of analysis of the majority of literature on public opinion and foreign policy. This state/government behavioural dominance is bound up with the problem, articulated by McSweeney (which will be discussed later) of lack of a human needs referent of the dominant concept of security (McSweeney, 1999: 85). Critical IR theory is attempting to bring the human individual back into the concept of security and foreign policy in IR; this goal can be achieved for public opinion and Irish neutrality through the social constructivist concept of neutrality that is based on values such as national identity. Recalling that (neo)realist theory (that has a goal of prescribing policy) is based on the practice of states (Krause and Williams, 1997: 42), in the same way, the (neo)realist concept of neutrality is also based on the practice of states. As a result, neutrality applies only to states and neutrality is not an ontological property of individuals in states. Statesmen of neutral states have emphasized that neutrality is binding on the state only and not on the individual citizen (Thalberg, 1989: 236). The aphorism that “there is no neutrality for the individual citizen, only neutrality for the state” is quoted by citizens alike (Kruzel, 1989: 308). The upshot of this ontology is that legally (and conceptually), no behaviours exist for people to ‘be’ neutral or to produce and sustain neutrality. This means that there are no empirical, measurable units of action that can be sought or accounted for in behavioural public opinion analyses, thus, public opinions and behaviours in relation to neutrality are effectively a non-entity in behavioural political science.

Generally it is held that attitudes will lead to behaviour consistent to them (O'Grady, 2001: 271): if people do what Sinnott defines as behaviour - “individuals may join demonstrations, sign petitions, write to their public representative or express their views through a wide variety of more or less informal groups” - in the name of neutrality (as Comerford (1984: 99-100) urges) could this then be considered as policy-oriented, behavioural data that would enable a classification of public concepts and attitudes in relation to neutrality as something more than ‘lip service’
and ‘rhetoric’? As ‘substance’ rather than ‘symbolic’ support for neutrality?
Ultimately qualifying as a ‘rational public’?

Ståhlberg articulates the difficulties in systematically relating public opinion to foreign policy making (Ståhlberg, 1989: 250) and identifies that people themselves do not see direct action as policy-making. He argues that, “direct participation is not a channel for foreign policy-making. When people were polled about what channels they were prepared to use for different purposes, more than four respondents out of ten favored the electoral channel for making foreign policy. Support for channels like the press, local party activity, demonstrations, addresses, or direct action varied between 3 and 5 percent” (Ståhlberg, 1989: 261). The lack of acknowledged behavioural aspects of attitudes (other than voting) to ask of individuals in relation to neutrality is another argument in favour of the move to analyse the cognitive dimension of attitudes, such as values.

In short, it appears that the only responses that would be considered ‘rational’ are those that make sense in terms of realist, behavioural, institutional, politico-military policy options, because this is the framework used to approach the subject of public attitudes to Irish neutrality in the small amount of literature that exists on the subject. For example, the stated purposes of Sinnott’s paper on European public opinion on foreign policy are “(1) to clarify certain aspects of the nature of public opinion as it relates to security policy in the new security environment, (2) to establish a framework for and approach to the realistic interpretation of public opinion poll evidence in this area and (3) against this background, to consider some aspects of contemporary European attitudes to security policy” [emphasis added] (Sinnott, 1997: 4). The ‘new security environment’ referred to is the end of the Cold War; the ‘framework’ is European security and defence policy plans and developments; and the ‘approach’ is IR theoretical realism respectively, given that ‘realistic’ means with respect to the EU defence policies. This realist worldview and policy prescriptions constitute the ‘background’ (or ‘lens’) with which public opinion will be viewed (and evaluated).

If this approach continues to be employed in analyses of public opinion on neutrality - with the aim of establishing whether Irish neutrality is one of a number of factors that could stand in the way of EU security plans and EU Treaty ratification through referendums - rather than the perspective of a social constructivist concept of neutrality that encompasses the public in its constitution, then the difficulties this approach presents in conceiving of and understanding rational public opinions (that do not easily or readily translate into realist policy prescriptions) will be simply be
bypassed through a decision to label opinion ‘symbolic’ or non-rational. This approach will continue to lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of concepts of Irish neutrality and the drawing of normative conclusions on the concept of Irish neutrality; such as the claims that public opinion data on NATO “emphasise the somewhat ambiguous nature of Ireland’s neutrality”\textsuperscript{29} (Marsh, 1992).

Is Irish neutrality really ‘ambiguous’ or is it simply that the concept does not fit with the realist concept held by a number of FPA and POFP academics identified in the first half of the thesis? It is worth exploring the notion that analysing public opinion data with the assumptions (1) that there is only one (realist) concept of neutrality (i.e. the Irish government concept of non-membership of NATO) and (2) that the public (should) adhere to it\textsuperscript{30} is what leads academics to perceive a lack of expression of support for neutrality in specific policy terms (i.e. in terms of elite policy ambitions) by the public (which is then used as a corroborating factor in the ‘non-rational’ discourses on Irish neutrality and public opinion on Irish neutrality respectively). Such a proposition prompts an approach based on the corollary: the task, then, is to understand public attitudes to NATO in terms of the concept of neutrality held by an individual.

The point that needs to be emphasised here is that if public opinion is analysed and judged from a realist perspective, that is, holding a realist concept of neutrality and considering the concept solely in the context of the end of the Cold War or European Security and Defence Policy developments, some responses in public opinion would appear to be unrealistic given the narrow framework of understanding employed and the aims of the research. Thus, the lesser qualities of the ‘symbolic’ or the ‘abstract’ are attributed to public attitudes in lieu of a link to policy prescription: such characterisations can be directly linked to the realist classification of ‘active’ or ‘positive’ neutrality as ‘idealistic’, that equates to being ‘unrealistic’ in the light of the expected realist policy prescriptions. This is an important aspect of the ‘rationality’ problematic that will be now examined.

\textsuperscript{29} the corollary is that public opinion is a factor in the constitution of Irish neutrality.

\textsuperscript{30} assumptions that are correlated with viewing policy options solely in the context of elite defence integration ambitions.
Assumptions about security and the content of neutrality concepts

Kruzel identifies two groups of neutrality theorists with fundamental differences in worldview (Kruzel, 1989: 301) and fundamentally different concepts of neutrality: “those who see neutrality as a hard-headed and realistic solution for a few small countries in a world dominated by two superpowers, and others who see neutrality as an instrument for transcending traditional power politics and moving to a more enlightened basis for international relations” - the latter are termed ‘neutrality idealists’ and the former, ‘neutrality realists’ (Kruzel, 1989: 298-299). “Many neutrality idealists, particularly those in the peace research community, see neutrality as a basis for a restored and depoliticised Mitteleuropa, an idea that profoundly agitates neutrality realists… Equally inspiring for neutrality idealists, and equally disquieting for neutrality realists, is the notion that existing neutral states offer an interesting example to the nations of Eastern Europe”31 (Kruzel, 1989: 300).

These concepts of neutrality correlate with realist and non-realist concepts and assumptions about security: for example, Eichenberg articulates the debate between ‘conservatives’ who see the balance of power as the key to security in an imperfect world and the liberal idealists who see force, if not the cause of war, then certainly as an imperfect instrument that exacerbates the underlying conflicts that give rise to war (Eichenberg, 1989: 18). Sundelius makes explicit the link between realist concepts of security and prescribed concepts of neutrality: ‘according to one observer, “The tendency of American political leaders to define security problems and their solutions in military terms is deeply ingrained.” Current U.S. policy statements addressed to the European neutrals, which emphasize armed neutrality or so-called responsible neutrality, reflect this preference for the classic approach to national security’ (Sundelius, 1989: 120).

Thus, “aspirational” and “idealist” are not only used in the context of being the opposite of “real”, concrete, elite-led policy; the same labels are also used in the foreign policy analysis academic discourse on neutrality, linked to the so-called “realist” and “idealist” notions of neutrality. These concepts of neutrality are derived from the binary opposite realist and social constructivist (McSweeney, 1999: 106).

31 Some realist discourses contain a concerted attempt to discredit neutrality as an option for the Eastern European states. One such example appears in a NATO review article, in which Latypov cites Brzezinski: “the concept of neutrality is somewhat outmoded because neutrality implies a status between two antagonists” (NATO Fellowships 1994-1996) and explains ‘supporters of this view deny the importance of neutrality at present entirely, considering it as a useless heritage of “Cold War” with no future. Hence the conclusion is obvious: Belarus should not try to obtain the [neutrality] status [that is] becoming extinct in international relations’ (Latypov, 1996).
Worldviews and are articulated in the public discourse in the form of the government’s ‘military’ concept and smaller political parties’ and lobby groups’ concepts of ‘active’ neutrality. Whilst both analyses arrive at a similar interpretation; “the question is whether the individuals are confused or the prevailing concept of neutrality is ambiguous”, (Sinnott, 1996), there is no evidence that the concepts of ‘positive’, ‘active’, ‘idealist’ or ‘fundamental’ neutrality articulated by academics such as McSweeney, Joenniemi and Keatinge in the Irish and European neutrality literature were seriously considered in the literature on Irish public opinion on neutrality previously discussed. To understand public opinion on neutrality, leaving aside judgements as to rationality for the moment, it is necessary (as has been continually argued) to note the possibility that there is more than one concept of neutrality in public opinion, indeed, there may be several identifiable concepts that may be linked to worldviews that differ from the realist view underpinning the aforementioned literature’s so-called “prevailing concept”.

Arguably the term ‘symbolic’ is applied to make sense of the fact that ‘active’ neutrality values have not been translated into policy prescriptions due to the constraints on thinking imposed by the elite adherence to realist thinking. This is unsurprising given that few of neutral states elites have made any attempt to escape the hegemonic realist worldview (Joenniemi, 1989: 30) that inspire the NATO/EU/WEU-centric policy options. It is held that Irish governments have not succeeded in translating public values and concepts of ‘active’ neutrality into policy prescriptions (Donnelly, 1995). Policy prescriptions for ‘active’ neutrality do exist - a range has been put forward by Nordic elites (Smyth, 1996) and academics (McSweeney, The Case for Active Irish Neutrality, 1985). Under the rubric of peace researchers, activists and the like – but are largely ignored by elites who view policy options only in terms of their ambitions e.g. alliance membership.

**Active Neutrality**

The notion of active neutrality is frequently discussed in the literature in the context of this “prevailing” assumption that neutrality is a “passive” foreign policy, so non-realist academic discussions of neutrality are prefaced a set of preliminary remarks to clarify that neutrality is neither “passive” nor “isolationist”. For example, Freymond argues that, “the willingness of the Swiss to maintain the status of neutrality does not mean the rejection of an active foreign policy and the presence of Switzerland on the world scene” (Freymond, 1990: 183). In another example, discussed later, Micheline Calmy-Rey argues, “the choice of neutrality does not mean indifference. It means the assumption of a useful role in the service of peace” (Calmy-Rey, 2006). The 1996
Irish White Paper on Foreign Policy contains the proviso, “for the Irish people neutrality has never been a statement of isolationism” (Ireland, 1996: 51). Sundelius introduces the notion with respect to all of the Nordic nations: “not content merely to adjust their foreign policies to the international realities, the Nordic neutrals hope to more directly promote international systemic change….advocates of so-called active neutrality regard this as a comprehensive security strategy” (Sundelius, 1987: 6). Academics, diplomats, lobby groups and government elites in the Nordic neutral states and Switzerland continue to discuss the components of ‘active’ neutrality in the 2000s, despite the continuing evolution of European security and defence plans that appear to be in contradiction to the concept.

**Academic and diplomatic discourse**

Brunner posits the evolution of three principles in parallel with changes in the international realm as the basis of a new policy of ‘active’ Swiss neutrality:

> Neutrality remains the foundation of Swiss foreign policy, but as international relations evolved, so did Switzerland’s position among the nations of the world. There came a time when a more passive foreign policy no longer sufficed to assure the pursuit of the goals Switzerland felt had to be its own. Accordingly, new principles were raised to the level of the state maxims, offering guidelines for Swiss actions. Neutrality was enlarged and completed by three notions, namely, readiness to serve the international community, solidarity in the search for solutions to global problems, and universality in devising solutions. It is through these principles that Swiss neutrality has become operational as the basis of active participation in the international sphere (Brunner, 1989: 285).

McSweeney also articulates three commitments of active neutrality. He posits,

> There is a sense in which active neutrality represents an ideal of the United Nations, a foreign policy wholly in line with the aims of the Charter. The collective security, which was originally envisaged as an essential instrument of peace-making and peacekeeping so that the UN could fulfil its Charter resolution ‘to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security’, is not incompatible with neutrality, as it was earlier argued. Certainly a narrow isolationist neutrality excludes, by definition, the collective securing of peace by military force. But an active neutrality is incompatible only with the division into military blocs of the nations aspiring to international peace
and security – blocs which today constitute the principle obstacle to the realization of the Charter aims. Active neutrality lacks the element of international organization which the UN provides. In other respects, it provides the commitment which the UN has failed to organize. This commitment to work for international peacemaking, for the genuine repudiation of nuclear weapons and for the construction of a credible domestic base in the interests of a nation’s own and its neighbours’ security – this, in theory, is what should make neutrality an attractive ideal for the United Nations and therefore, the basis of a diplomatic effort to raise its status (McSweeney, 1985: 185-186).

Clearly, then, from this understanding of active neutrality, military alliances and blocs are incompatible with the concept and its goals, as well as those of the UN. The current Finnish concept of active neutrality also contains several of the elements of active neutrality suggested by McSweeney. In a May 2006 speech, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, explained that Finnish neutrality fitted well in the evolving peacekeeping concept of the United Nations; “participation in the UN peacekeeping operations, the exercise of a policy of active neutrality, became something very natural in our otherwise not so global foreign and security policy” (Tuomioja, 2006). Reflecting the views of critical theorists in IR, Mr Tuomioja highlighted the need for a “human security” approach: “the focus of our action and policy should be on achieving security and development for human beings, not just for states” (Tuomioja, 2006). With respect to the attributes of Finnish active neutrality, Freymond finds “there is apparently a degree of convergence between government and public opinion on a foreign policy characterised by openness, solidarity, availability, universality and good offices” (Freymond, 1990: 183). The concept of a nuclear free zone was first promoted as part of Finland’s active neutrality by Prime Minster Urho Kekkonen in May 1963, and it was re-introduced in 1978 in the light of new developments in weapons technology (Studies, 2006). Another core element of Finland’s policy of active neutrality was the country’s participation in arms control and disarmament initiatives (Studies, 2006). Helsinki was the site for some of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1973 and was the driving force behind the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and was the host of its first and third meetings in 1975.

In January 2006, Dr. Francois Barras, the Consul-General of Switzerland in Hong Kong gave a lecture on Switzerland’s active neutrality policy, and outlined how the concept of active neutrality was created in the 15th century (HKBU, 2006). In June
2006, in a speech on Swiss active neutrality, the Head of Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Micheline Calmy-Rey discussed the elements of the policy of active neutrality that Switzerland has pursued in recent years, including mediation and the provision of good offices or facilities on Swiss territory to help prevent or to solve conflicts. She outlined how, “for many decades, Switzerland and Geneva have played a leading role in the promotion of peace, human rights and respect for international law” (Calmy-Rey, 2006). Switzerland’s lack of a colonial past and active involvement with the UN, including non-membership of NATO and the EU were also cited.

**Irish Political Party discourse**

In 2004, Sinn Féin launched a comprehensive document called “Positive Neutrality in Action” that corresponds closely to these ‘active’ neutrality elements. The document argues “there is no legitimate role for the European Union in military and defence matters” and that “International peacekeeping and conflict resolution should happen under the auspices of the United Nations” (Sinn Féin, 2004: 9). The document ‘proposes “neutrality” in keeping with the minimum international definition common to other neutral states, that is, upholding the rights and duties defined in the Hague Convention’ (e.g. Article 2 forbids the movement of troops, munitions or supplies across neutral territory) (Sinn Féin, 2004: 9). Sinn Féin argue the policy does not mean pacifism, ambivalence or isolationism and it does mean, among several attributes, an acceptance of a “Human Security” doctrine to guide policy, (Sinn Féin, 2004: 10) nuclear disarmament, a refusal to get drawn into military conflicts as a result of standing military alliances or mutual defence pacts, active promotion of the primacy of the UN and its reform, and a pursuit of (non-military) alliances with other progressive neutral states (Sinn Féin, 2004: 11). The Workers Party in Ireland promote many elements of active neutrality cited above in its manifesto on Irish neutrality: it argues “we are convinced that it is in the interests of the European Union to support Irish neutrality as an important European contribution to world peace and better relations with the exploited countries of the Third World” (Party, 2006). It recommends the OSCE (formerly the CSCE) as the appropriate forum for conflict resolution and the building of peace in Europe and argues Ireland should continue to play a peace-keeping role within the United Nations as part of neutrality. Irish neutrality also embodies a call for “the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the phasing out of all military power blocks” (Party, 2006)

Sinnott identified many of these attributes of active neutrality in his description of the values that prompt the support of Irish people for neutrality: “in Irish public opinion,
neutrality is a good thing. One can guess at why this is so: it is tradition; it is independence; it is anti militarism; it is anti big power politics; it is pro-Third World; it was anti the new Cold War in the early 1980s and was and is against the spread of nuclear weapons. It is symbolic of a lot of aspirations that ordinary people have” (Sinnott, 1996). Thus, the concept of active neutrality in Ireland, that compares well to international norms, is valued by public opinion, lobby groups (AfrI, PANA, National Platform) and small, left-leaning political parties such as The Workers Party, Sinn Féin and the Green Party, and involves a significant number of values that do not appear to be embodied in the Irish Government’s concept of ‘military’ neutrality, that is, non-membership of a military alliance.

The political struggle over active/neutrality in relation to the CESDP/NATO
Is active neutrality still in the diplomatic parlance of all of the neutral states today? Certainly, it is part of Swiss and Finnish diplomatic discourses, considering the recent examples cited above, but it is less prominent in Austrian discourses and virtually absent from Swedish discourses. In 1991, Sweden applied for membership of the EC and in May 1993, the Riksdag altered Sweden’s policy of neutrality. Similarly, in the run-up to membership of the EC, on 12 November 1992 the two parties of the then ruling government coalition of Austria, the Social Democrats and the People’s Party “adopted a parliamentary resolution stating that Austria should prepare itself to participate fully in an eventual collective security system within the future European Union” and the word “neutrality” was not mentioned in the text, although the parties argued in the debate that neutrality still had a role to play, “for the time being” (Lahodynsky, 1992). In 1997, two of the six political parties represented in Dáil Éireann omitted customary pledges to neutrality in their election manifestos: “Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats say European security structures are changing rapidly, and Ireland must therefore re-examine its non-involvement in military alliances” (Brennock, 1997).

On 11th February 2002, “a majority of Swedish Parliamentary parties gave their approval to a new security policy doctrine, in which Sweden gave up the notion of neutrality for all practical purposes – even though it remains in the text” (Pugin, 2002), with the Left Party and Green Party, who opposed the new doctrine, arguing this revision is paving the road to NATO membership. The re-definition of neutrality by ruling elites is evident in Austria too. Chancellor Wolfgang Schussel argued, “we are neutral by constitution but neutrality today is a completely different thing than in the 1950s” at a Dublin news conference, where he announced that participation in the EU’s rapid reaction force would not pose problems for Austria’s traditional neutrality
(de Bréadún, 2000). Thus, the concept of neutrality is variable depending on the political and military objectives of each side on the neutrality versus CESDP debate. The arguments of those in favour of neutrality, (smaller opposition parties, lobby groups, and seemingly the majority of public opinion), and the discourses of those wishing to get rid of the policy (government leaders, EU politico-military elites, and think-tank researchers) and to participate in EU military operations and/or join NATO are strikingly similar across the European neutral states.

There are plans to have an EU defence alliance, and neutrality is seen as a problematic issue with respect to securing this goal. There is pressure from many quarters on neutral states to give up neutrality. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs researcher, Dr. Tuomas Forsberg, points out that any pressure to join NATO does not come from the alliance itself but from the EU (Forsberg, 2002). During a visit to Dublin, the then President of the European Commission, Mr Jacques Santer indicated that neutrality could only be transitional, and said it should be possible to find an “accommodation and modalities” for the neutral states “for a transition period” (Smyth, 1995). The next step was articulated during the visit to Dublin of a WEU representative, who declared that the neutral states would eventually have to join NATO (Reuter, 1995). In 1996, the then opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman, Mr. Ray Burke, who became Foreign Minister after the 1997 general election, suggested there was a concerted US campaign to encourage Ireland to abandon neutrality (Brennock, Fianna Fáil asks if the US is pressing Ireland to alter long-standing policy on neutrality, 1996).

Nonetheless, despite this type of sustained and significant pressure on active neutrality from many quarters, in 2003 Finland objected to a draft of the proposed EU constitution that contained a mutual defence clause. The original draft of the proposed European constitution was eventually amended during the Italian presidency of the EU as “a concession on defence” for Ireland and the other EU neutrals through the addition of the statement that the measure will not affect “the specific character of the security and defence policy of some member-states” (Brennock and Staunton, 2003). This is the same proviso that was allegedly crafted by Irish diplomats during the 1990 negotiations over the wording of the Treaty on European Union in order to protect Irish neutrality (Diplomat, 2000).

Why is ‘active’ neutrality so strongly adhered to by citizens in neutral states (and still part of state and diplomatic discourses), and why does it pose a barrier to EU elites’ plans for a common European defence? A common finding that emerged from
research on public opinion and security policy in the 1970s and 1980s helps to explain
the tension: “citizen support for alliance structures and international institutions
contains a substantial “diffuse”, or affective, element that capture their sense of
common values and identification in addition to assessments of security policy choices
thesis argues, “thus, to inquire of citizen assessments of NATO’s “essentiality” is in
part to inquire of a sense of identification with the values and interests of the North
Atlantic community. Similarly, to ask Europeans of their support for the process of
European integration as well as their identification with the values and norms of the
European Union” (Eichenberg, 2000: 171). In Chapter Two it was argued that public
concepts of neutrality are not the same as the government’s ‘military neutrality’
concept, and a divergence of policy prescriptions arising from an ‘active’ concept held
by some sectors of the public has been noted by several commentators (de Bréadún,
Irish neutrality is in tatters, Greens warn, 2002; Hennessy, Shannon question reduces
all the parties to flying in the face of reason, 2003). Active neutrality, and public
support for the active concept of neutrality will continue to clash with elite priorities
for a European Union military alliance because active neutrality embodies values such
as nuclear-free zones, arms control and disarmament, a human security doctrine,
peacekeeping, peace-promotion, development aid and support for the Third World,
independence, mediation and the provision of good offices that are in many respects
are not possible to achieve within an EU military bloc, or stand in opposition to the
values and interests of a European military alliance. Although Kruzel argues that
“activism on the part of the states involved was more a function of the leader’s
personality than evidence of a sustained national commitment to a major role in world
affairs” (Kruzel, 1989: 301), it would be dangerous to assume that the oscillation in
elite promotion of the active concept means that it is not of importance to publics in
neutral states.

It is important to understand and emphasise the point that the discourses on public
opinion and neutrality are based on the state-centric concept of security. The
employment of a wider concept of security, of one based on a human-centred concept
of security, might yield different sets of policy prescriptions (and hence a different
framework to approach understanding public opinion on Irish neutrality) as well as
conclusions about neutrality. A human-centric security concept also widens the terms
of consideration to issues such as the role of gender in foreign policy and in terms of
the ways of understanding public opinion on Irish neutrality. McSweeney argues “we
need to rid ourselves of the notion that a widening of the concept of security to locate
its meaning at the level of the human would make the study and practice of
international security policy impossible. Against a common charge to the contrary, it can indeed have policy implications for Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, but these are situations of security breakdown, and cannot be considered the litmus-test of a concept of security” (McSweeney, 1997: 137). Locating the meaning of neutrality at the level of the human can widen the study of the concept of neutrality to consider elements that are normally precluded from the mainstream literature, such as the peace-promotive element identified in analyses of Irish public concepts in Chapter Two, that is advocated by people who have the most supportive attitude towards Irish neutrality. This element of neutrality is advocated in other neutral states too, for example, Ståhlberg notes in Finland, “it was common to talk about the peace-promoting policy of neutrality” (Ståhlberg, 1989: 255). It may be due to the dominance of realist policy prescription that “critics have attacked changes in the Finnish view of neutrality, especially the emphasis on peace-oriented activities” (Kruzel, 1989: 146). Reflecting similar criticism, Collins claims in an article that is part of the unneutral ‘realist’ discourse on Irish neutrality (identified in Chapter Three), that “others have a moral definition of neutrality which is so far removed from political reality as to be inoperable” (Collins, Casting off the imaginary cloak of neutrality, 2003). Although the peace-promotive value of neutrality is theoretically at odds with the realist view of international relations, this attribute of ‘active’ neutrality is adhered to by a significant section of the Irish public, a section that expresses the highest salience attitudes with respect to Irish neutrality and the most intense attitudes in favour of retaining Irish neutrality. The logic of behaviouralism means that these supporters of peace-oriented neutrality are those most likely to mobilise a ‘no’ vote in referendums on EU integration treaties.

The role of gender bias in concepts of neutrality
Consideration of the concept of ‘active’ neutrality, and the ‘positive’ dimension of the concept of security associated with it leads to the next argument, articulated by McSweeney, about the exclusion of women from the concept of security and international relations theory (McSweeney, 1999: 96-98), that is an important part of this chapter’s discussion of the metatheoretical issues that arise in the study of the concept of neutrality and public opinion on neutrality. A similar point is advanced by Booth who argues ‘to maintain the traditionalist (“intellectually coherent”) concept of security simply perpetuates statist, militarised, and masculinized definitions of what should have priority in security terms, and to do that leaves the agenda in the hands of the traditional strategic/security specialists’ (Booth, 1997: 111). McSweeney points out that women are excluded from the subject of security in several interlinked aspects: in terms of writing about it through academia, in terms of theorising and in
terms of having an input into the formulation of the concept, which in turn excludes input into the formulation of the policy in regard to it:

Consideration of the positive dimension of security raises the question of gender bias and the invisibility of women in international relations theory…the emphasis on negative security in mainstream security studies owes something to the exclusion of women from the policy-making and theory-building community, which sets the conceptual terms on which security is pursued and the topic is studied. There is scarcely an area of academic research in which women have been so comprehensively inhibited from participation, as security studies…. Women and men conspire to reproduce gender difference, as a consequence of which women are systematically denied access to those areas of power and decision-making which may determine how we conceptualise international security and how we formulate policy in regard to it…it is clear, however from the conceptual analysis of security and the dominance of the negative dimension discussed, that those elements associated with female attitudes and values are missing, while the masculine are projected as the defining reality, with little awareness of the distorting effect of gender (McSweeney, 1999: 96-97).

There is a robust feminist International Relations literature that demonstrates how women and women’s “way of knowing” are excluded from the analysis of foreign policy and IR. The arguments can be summarised thus: women are ignored in the theory of International Relations, (Booth and Vale, 1997: 344) are absent from the construction of knowledge in IR (Tickner, 1996) and from the construction of the identity of the state (Campbell, 1998: 11); women’s activities are treated as irrelevant to the discipline of IR on the basis that they are in the private, domestic sphere, a sphere that is ignored by IR because the discipline is definitively about relations between, not within, states (Peterson, 1995: 172), and this separation also produces the assumption, pervasive in politics and international relations, that male experience and perspective represent human experience and perspective (Peterson, 1995: 173). “Although their effects on foreign policy analysis are indirect, they are by no means irrelevant” (Peterson, 1995: 173) and they may have a significant impact on the analysis and conceptualisation of neutrality and Irish neutrality.

Hooper argues there is a need for an epistemological and ontological revolution in IR theory, as gender cannot just be grafted onto existing explanatory approaches which are profoundly ‘masculinist’ (Hooper, 1999: 475). J. Ann Tickner argues “feminist
claims that women have been absent from the construction of knowledge has been particularly true in the realm of international politics”. Feminists have questioned realism’s claim to universality and objectivity; they suggest that its epistemology is gendered masculine and is constructed out of experiences more typical of men than women (Grant and Newland, 1991; Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992, Sylvester, 1994)” (Tickner, 1996: 151). Offering an epistemological example, Lene Hansen has demonstrated by use of a case-study, the gender-blindness of the Copenhagen School’s concept of security, as it excludes the security issues of significant numbers of Pakistani women (Hansen, 2000). Hooper points out the ontological limitations of IR theory’s attempts to consider identities by ‘mechanising them in the ubiquitous rational actor model’ or doing away with them by resorting to purely systemic explanations (Hooper, 1999: 486), and Locher and Prügl argue that “constructivists tend to ignore the implications of a postpositivist epistemology, whereas for feminists the question of “Who knows?” is crucial” (Locher and Prügl, 2001: 111).

Tickner continues: “favorable attributes of states, such as independence, strength, autonomy, and self-help, resemble the characteristics of sovereign man. Where identities, inscribed as feminine, have impinged on the traditional discipline, they have done so through the association of feminine characteristics with idealism that has often been branded as naïve, unrealistic, and even irrational by its realist critics” (Tickner, 1996: 151).

Feminists argue that malestream visions of international relations distort our knowledge of both ‘relations’ and the ongoing transformations of the ‘international’ (True, 2001: 264); this conceptual blindness frequently leads to empirical blindness (True, 2001: 265). V. Spike Peterson also points out that women’s position in the private, as opposed to the public, sphere is linked to the disciplinary definition of international relations as the study of relations between states. “Insofar as the state is equated with the public sphere, which is masculine, then the abstraction employed so pervasively in international relations – the state – carries a masculine identity, in fact mimics the identity of rational actor/political man” (Peterson, 1995: 172). Realism is criticised as only “a partial description of international politics”, owing to its deeply embedded masculinist bias (Jones, 1996: 416; Tickner, 1988: 431).

Given the characteristics that (neo)realists attribute to states are quite similar to those attributed to the radical individualism of sovereign man, it is not difficult to appreciate that the characteristics that (neo)realists attribute to neutrality are also those of sovereign man. And it is of no surprise that the concept of fundamental or ‘active
neutrality’, that is similar to the ‘idealistic’ neutrality position referred to by Kruzel (1989: 298-300) (that explicitly rejects the tradition of “power politics”, seeks a high profile in international affairs, wants neutral states to challenge the status quo and to use their position to expand the global agenda, wishes for more and more countries to liberate themselves from the shackles of bloc politics, and for military alliances to gradually fade), is dismissed by the mainstream as unrealistic, irrational and naïve. Marysia Zalewski states the dynamic link inherent in mainstream IR between “idealistic” IR and the feminine that has important parallels for understanding how female values and their role in non-realist concepts of neutrality are ignored by the main/malestream discourses on Irish neutrality or dismissed as non-rational; as she explains, ‘for realists, to be “idealistic” is to be irrational (and therefore feminine)’ (Zalewski, 1998: 9). Thus, the theoretical link between realists’ denigration of active or idealist neutrality and the association with the latter as feminine is made explicit.

Because the public/state is masculine and categorically separate from the private sphere and femininity/women’s activities, international relations treats the latter as irrelevant: “what goes on within the state – domestic politics from an international relations perspective – is deemed to be of a different order than and therefore not analogous to international politics” (Peterson, 1995: 172). As Hooper puts its “IR theory found it easy to ‘black box’ the state, deeming all that goes on in it as irrelevant except where it is expressed as ‘national interests’” (Hooper, 1999: 487). The public/private, male/female division also “lends authority and legitimacy to divisions of labor that position women outside of political leadership, military activities, macro-economic management, and foreign policy analysis. The corollary is that women are not only denied access to valued and more powerful masculine activities but are assigned to specific roles and images required to enable, support and legitimate men’s activities: men lead because women are apolitical, men work because women are dependents, men go to war because women need protection” (Peterson, 1995: 173).

Campbell refers to the feminist work on how the regime of masculine/feminine disciplines the sexed body and further argues,

given the culturally pervasive nature of the gender norms it is concerned with, it is not implausible to suggest that a similar regime – or at least the gender norms that it effects – operates in other domains and disciplines other identities, such as the state. Indeed, if we consider how our understanding of politics is heavily indebted to a discursive economy in which reason, rationality, and masculinity are licensed as superior to unreason, irrationality,
and femininity, it is not difficult to appreciate that gender norms have also helped constitute the norms of statecraft. The identity of the state that is contained and reproduced through foreign policy is likely to be inscribed with prior codes of gender that will in turn operate as norms by which future conduct is judged and threats are calculated (Campbell, 1998: 11) (emphasis added).

Tickner argues that the discourse of international politics ties citizens’ national identities to “heroic deeds of warrior-patriots” and “participation in international wars”, which is a “militarized version of national identity” (Tickner, 1992: 137). Neutrality is a policy against participation in war, and in that binary, is a subjugated form of national identity in the IR and FPA discourses, (although it is slightly more supported in the POFP discourses), and stands in opposition to the (albeit complex and contradictory) ‘masculinity-militarism couplet’ (Pettman, 1996: 92) that is the dominant foundation of national identity.

There is a noted gender gap in the analysis of foreign policy attitudes and Feldman argues, “the gender gap” has at least some of its source in differences between men and women in core beliefs and values” (Feldman, 1988: 427). It is worth mentioning in the context of this theoretical discussion that women are slightly more supportive of neutrality than men: 43% of women expressed strong support of Irish neutrality compared with 37% of men, and 14% of men strongly rejected Irish neutrality compared with just 4% of women. The t-tests of the differences between men and women in terms of the “strongly in favour” and “strongly against” percentage scores are statistically significant. Thus, there does appear to be sufficient evidence to posit an interesting gender gap with respect to public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

| Table 6.1 Attitude to neutrality: distribution by gender |
|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Attitude to neutrality | 0 retain | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | Total |
| Male (%) | 156 | 69 | 86 | 73 | 57 | 167 | 58 | 46 | 60 | 18 | 38 | 828 |
| Female (%) | 238 | 94 | 114 | 96 | 81 | 277 | 63 | 39 | 20 | 4 | 18 | 1,044 |
| Total (%) | 394 | 163 | 200 | 169 | 138 | 444 | 121 | 85 | 80 | 22 | 56 | 1,872 |

Women are significantly more likely to define neutrality as staying out of wars (53.2%) compared with men (46.4%) as neutrality is seen as a less militaristic type of foreign policy and likely retains more support from women than men because this conception. These differences are linked to a “consistent gender gap in voting on
defense-related issues in many countries [that] suggests that women are less supportive of politics that rest on the use of direct violence” (Tickner, 1992: 61), in contrast to the foreign policy attitudes of elites that were found in a comparative elite-mass opinion analyses by Robert Oldendick and Barbara Bardes, to be toward a strong military posture (Oldendick and Bardes, 1981: 139).

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<th>TABLE 6.2: Gender profile of selected concepts of neutrality</th>
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<td>DEFINITION</td>
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<td>The right to decision to go to war or not/independence/make own decisions/Ireland’s voice/stance on conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not involved in war/no war/not involved in other countries’ wars/free from war/no enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important/means a lot/good thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not involved in a defence alliance/no NATO involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree with it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful/promoting peace/UN peacekeeping only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thrust of McSweeney’s argument is that there are biases and consequences arising from the exclusion of the perspective, values and experiences of half the population from the ontological and epistemological formulation of the controlling concept. This exclusion may play a part in some academic and government/EU elites’ rejection of non-realist, non-behaviouralist elements of public neutrality opinions and concepts and the consideration of these elements as ‘non-rational’. The same goal applies to the conceptualisations of neutrality as it does to conceptualisations of security; substituting the former for the latter, it is as true to say that “the concern to widen the scope and instruments of [neutrality] and to make it more responsive to the needs of people is as much a human value as the traditional ‘male’ emphasis on military preparedness and defence of the state” (McSweeney, 1999: 97-98).

“It is the values differentially allocated to men and women which constitute the stock from which theorists and policy-makers need to draw in their understanding of international security. It is easier for [men] to see security in the terms traditionally allocated to him – as a competition, a game of Chicken, with relative gains, winners and losers” (McSweeney, 1999: 139); just as it is easier for men to see neutrality as part of the zero-sum game of balance of power politics. This gender dynamic is part of the explanation as to why US policy statements addressed to neutrals reflect this preference for the so-called “classic” approach to national security – i.e. defining security problems and their solutions in military terms (Sundelius, 1989: 120).
Deepening our understandings of security (and neutrality) involves “investigating the implications and possibilities that result from seeing security as a concept that derives from different understandings of what politics is and can be all about, and specifically, politics on a global scale” (Booth, 1997: 111). Active, positive neutrality is a manifest form of differences from the dominant realist concepts of security and neutrality. The positive dimension of neutrality “creates political space of states wishing to differentiate themselves as neutrals in a power political arena, while maintaining their connection with states willing to engage in war. Although these states do not share the same perspective, they do understand the logic of the other’s position” (Joenniemi, 1993: 289). As McSweeney attributes stress on the positive dimension of security to the growing prominence in contemporary security discourse to the influence of social movements in general, including peace and environmental activism, (McSweeney, 1999: 98). The same dynamic is behind the stress on the positive dimension of neutrality in Ireland and in other neutral states (Ståhlberg, 1989: 255-256).

In conclusion, this section of the chapter has drawn attention to a number of metatheoretical and ontological problems with this policy-oriented and behaviouralist approach with respect to evaluating the rationality of public opinion on neutrality. (1) The framework of the approach to ‘rational’ responses in relation to neutrality is limited to a narrow set of realist, EU/NATO policy options. (2) Due to the realist, state-centric concept of neutrality assumed in the literature, people cannot ‘action’ neutrality, so there are no behavioural responses to consider. And even if such attitudes could exist, as Sinnott identifies, (3) “in order to make sense of the affective, evaluative and behavioural responses, it is absolutely vital to examine the cognitive dimension of the attitude and the matter of salience” (Sinnott, 1997: 7). This chapter adds another premise to the traditional approach to studying public attitudes by arguing that the evaluation of all aspects of the multi-dimensional concept of an attitude identified by Sinnott (particularly in relation to analyses of public attitudes to foreign policy) must involve a metatheoretical analysis of the different worldviews, assumptions and approaches that are used to make sense of and interpret the significance of such attitudes. Thus, if the research aim is to understand public opinion on neutrality per se, and not necessarily in relation to EU/NATO policy prescriptions, then a wider theoretical perspective beyond realism will have to be employed, along with a willingness to consider more abstract levels of attitude (as identified by Hurwitz and Peffley) that relate to the cognitive rather than the behaviouralist dimension of attitudes.
Sinnott identifies the need for this approach arising from the results of Shapiro and Page’s research on the rational public; as he puts it: “their conclusion that ‘the quality of public opinion tends to reflect the quality of information and choices with which the public is presented’ is an argument in favour of investigating the quality of public opinion at the individual level and, in particular, the cognitive dimensions of attitudes” (Sinnott, 1997: 12). This approach is employed in Chapter Seven of the thesis, by modelling public attitudes in relation to values and political orientations based on hypotheses derived from the historical literature on neutrality using individual level data. Having critiqued the realist policy-oriented, behaviouralist metatheory of the ‘non-rational’ hypotheses in the literature, the next section of this chapter carries out a metatheoretical critique of the ‘changed international circumstances’/end of Cold War framework of elite and academic characterisations of the rationality of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

THE META-THEORY OF THE ‘CHANGED INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES’/END OF THE COLD WAR

The most significant point to be made in relation to the persistent characterisation of public opinion on Irish neutrality in the post-Cold War era as ‘nonrational’ and constituting “an obstacle to desirable adaptations to changed international circumstances” (Everts, 2000: 179) concerns the set of underlying IR theoretical assumptions of these discourses on ‘changed international circumstances’ and the end of the Cold War. Evert’s difficulty in understanding and accepting the Irish public’s attachment to “a perhaps outdated policy of neutrality” (Everts, 2000: 179), is echoed by several Irish academics and elites. For example, Fanning claims, “the questions for Ireland, as for Europe’s other neutrals, are the questions put by the secretary-general of the WEU. Does the end of the Cold War not mean that neutrality, like the old system of alliances, is out of date: ‘neutrality against whom, neutrality against what?’” (Fanning, 1996: 145). However, Pentillä points out that “the redefinition of neutrality that took place in the 1990s is often explained by the end of the East-West conflict. According to this view one cannot be neutral if Europe is no longer divided into competing blocs. Without denying the merits of this common sense explanation, it should be noted that neutrality does not presuppose a bipolar structure of international relations” (Penttilä, 1999: 174). This section carries out a metatheoretical examination of these elite claims that the end of the Cold War precipitates the end of adherence to neutrality, the elites’ association of neutrality exclusively with the East-West confrontation, and their presumption that neutrality is a phenomenon of a balance of power (Salmon, 1989: 34, 23, 47) and a function of the Cold War (Latypov, 1996).
Rejecting these factors, the chapter proposes that the issue of public support for Irish neutrality is best understood in relation to the historical and political dynamics of Irish neutrality.

So firstly, in relation to the historical and political dynamics of Ireland’s neutrality, there are academics that acknowledge that Irish neutrality was not a function of the Cold War and the East-West conflict but rather the Anglo-Irish relationship, domestic politics and internal security (Doherty, 2002: 13, 14; Roberts, 1985: 22, 24). (Indeed, many realist critics of Irish neutrality used this distinction as a stick to beat Irish neutrality, characterising the neutrality of other European states as born of the East-West conflict and therefore more ‘genuine’, compared with Ireland’s peculiar and idiosyncratic elements” (Roberts, 1985: 25). That being the case, then, the changed circumstances precipitated by the end of the East-West conflict and the Cold War should not theoretically affect the basis of Irish neutrality or Irish publics’ adherence to neutrality. The primacy or otherwise of East-West dynamics in attitudes towards international politics and foreign policy is not confined to theoretical discussions on neutrality, but is a feature of public opinion analysis. As early as 1989, Eichenberg reported that the British Defence Minister was concerned that “the educated and sophisticated young people of today are less likely to accept without question a description of world affairs that attributes to the East-West balance a primary and fundamental importance” (Eichenberg, 1989: 61). Instead, the central question should concern whether the aforementioned ‘internal’ factors of domestic politics and the Anglo-Irish relationship are motivating support for Irish neutrality for the public nowadays, a point which has only recently been raised in an article (2006) by Neal G. Jesse (that will be discussed later).

Secondly, there is a vigorous debate in the academic literature that questions the premise of the Cold War - the Soviet threat32 - and some go as far as characterising it as an elite-led discursively constructed political ideology that served to deflect attention from domestic problems. Are the elites painting the public as non-rational due to an unshakeable belief in their own ideological worldview? As Keatinge and others have pointed out, the public concept of fundamental neutrality encapsulated a desire to remain aloof from the East-West conflict (Keatinge, 1984: 119), and it is plausible that for a proportion of the Irish people neutrality represented a refusal to buy into the basis and concept of the Cold War on liberal or cosmopolitan grounds. This standpoint is identified in “the writings of a largely European group of activist intellectuals who see the cold war as a “joint venture” in which the superpowers,

32 Also mirrored in the political parties of Right and Left (Eichenberg, 1989).
through a historical process of mutual formation, each engaged in reciprocal incitement that effectively legitimized the other’ (Campbell, 1998: 20). The frustration at some of the public’s refusal to acquiesce in the elite Cold War discourse is exemplified in FitzGerald’s exposition on the immorality of Irish neutrality and Ireland’s non-membership of NATO. in which he complained that many people “have now succeeded in convincing themselves [the Soviet threat] never existed” (FitzGerald, 1995).

This type of approach evident in the articles written by FitzGerald and others in Irish broadsheet newspapers is not in any sense open to the debate on the Cold War that is a feature of critical IR. Even realists like Barry Buzan can see “it hardly needs to be pointed out, for example, that many interests in the United States and the Soviet Union benefited from exaggerating the level of threat which each posed to the other. Cultivation of hostile images abroad can justify intensified political surveillance, shifts of resources to the military, economic protectionism, and other such policies with deep implications for the conduct of domestic political life” (Buzan, 1991: 11). The ‘fallen realist’ Booth, who does engage in critical analysis argues, “The Soviet Union’s power was exaggerated by Soviet and Western propaganda and it was often more threatened than threatening. Trying to understand the Soviet Union, and the variety of Western thinking about it, revealed the ethnocentric character of Anglo-American strategic studies in particular and International Relations in general” (Booth, 1997: 95-96). As a counterbalance to the realism of FitzGerald and others who write on Irish neutrality, McSweeney who promotes an ‘active’ concept of Irish neutrality (McSweeney, The Case for Active Irish Neutrality, 1985), voices concern at the Irish elite support for a defence alliance and “the absence of any attempt to investigate NATO strategy and its claims about Soviet intentions, above all the absence of any sign of genuine moral concern about NATO’s share in the arms race – what Thomas Merton described as ‘the greatest moral evil since the crucifixion’” (McSweeney, 1985: 5). He goes on to argue, “obviously, no one can prove that there is no Soviet threat. Those who like to believe there is, will find enough evidence to satisfy them in the writing of Marx and Lenin compiled in the standard texts which are required reading for ideologues in the West. Those who are willing to question it will find a growing volume of literature from the United States and the UK which analyses Soviet foreign policy with the same fairness and rigour applied to American” (McSweeney, 1985: 10).

33 This is a method of undermining the credibility of neutrality. “Whenever the opposing superpowers stress their distinct value systems, the neutrals’ moral position becomes somewhat compromised….Skepticism about the neutrals’ stand may seem particularly justified when leading citizens in the neutral nations themselves raise such moral concerns. In this way, the attitudinal dilemma threatens the credibility of the chosen security policy and has important ramifications for the strategic dilemma of the state” (Sundelius, 1989: 106).
David Campbell’s writing fits into the latter category of academic work identified by McSweeney, and his approach to the analysis of the Cold War construct concerns “an aspect of the problematic of subjectivity in international politics rather than with the international relations of pregiven subjects” (Campbell, 1998: x) in which he acknowledges “the non-essentialistic character of danger” (Campbell, 1998: 11). Campbell’s thesis helps to underpin the argument that end of the Cold War does not mean there has been a change in the underlying metatheoretical assumptions of elites’ concept of security and the formulation of foreign policy:

if we understand the cold war to be a struggle related to the production and reproduction of identity, the popularly heralded belief that we are witnessing the end of the cold war embodies a misunderstanding: while the objects of established post-1945 strategies of otherness may no longer be plausible candidates for enmity, their transformation has not by itself altered the entailments of identity that they satisfied. In the West, the cold war was an ensemble of practices in which an interpretation of danger crystallized around objectifications of communism and the Soviet Union….this figuration of difference as otherness in the cold war rendered a contingent identity (“the West”, “America”) secure…containment is a strategy associated with the logic of identity whereby the ethical powers of segregation that make up foreign policy constitute the identity of the agent in whose name they operate, and give rise to a geography of evil (Campbell, 1998: 169).

Thus, “current security policies dependent on objectifying danger must be understood as an effect, for Campbell, not a cause, of political practices” (McSweeney, 1999: 119).

Campbell (1998: 20) identifies “International Relations’ realist orthodoxy” which is indebted to epistemic realism, which dominates the understanding of the Cold War. Booth points out that a majority of students and academics in IR and Political Science have been brought up on a diet of realism, and that realism and the Cold War are inextricably linked - “Realism helped to make and was made by the Cold War” (Booth, 1997: 92). In this context then, the major debate in academia about end of Cold War and the related, more minor one on neutrality and the rationality of public support for it in the post-Cold War era are firmly embedded in and related to the wider clash of realism and social constructivism as competing theories, approaches or worldviews in International Relations. This point was proven in Chapter Three through the deconstruction of two competing theses on Irish neutrality, as it showed
that interpretations of Irish neutrality are buttressed by the metatheoretical assumptions of academics. Thus, the end of the Cold War only signals the end of neutrality according to realists. Outside of that paradigm, a non-realist logic holds that the concept of neutrality continues to be a reality in the post-Cold War scenario – thus, in the non-realist paradigm, it is rational that public support of neutrality continues despite the end of the Cold War.

In the opening preface to the latest monograph on public opinion and the international use of force, Jan W. van Deth draws attention to the phenomenon that “the relationships and recursive impacts of political opinion, on the one hand, and foreign policy making on the other, seem to remain an area where myths and common sense are as important as the results of careful and subtle analyses of the available empirical evidence” (van Deth, 2001: xiii). There is bound to be conflict in a situation of elite adherence to the “classic” realist concept of neutrality and public adherence to a very different, fundamental, “active” concept of neutrality: “to some, neutrality becomes a symbol of irresponsibility; to others, it is a position of courage” (Sundelius, 1989: 107). More specifically, it has been noted, “that Switzerland’s concept of security has not been influenced by the changing international political and strategic situation” (Vogel, 1987: 107). In a similar expression of autonomy, Finland’s concept of “an active and extrovert version of neutrality” means “neutrality becomes something more than a mere status or role which can be denied or changed by the superpowers” (Joenniemi, 1989: 58). As regards the Irish case, Chapter Three illustrated the battles in relation to claims made about Irish neutrality by academics such as FitzGerald and Salmon, and the counter-claims by members of the public and academics such as McSweeney in relation to myths surrounding neutrality. Sundelius surmises that, “during the new cold war, advocates of the moral inadequacy of a neutral position and proponents of the virtues of such a policy line have found ample support for their particular views. It is a matter of interpreting a complex international situation through different perspectives” (Sundelius, 1989: 107).

**Linking with IR theoretical (the neo-neo) frameworks of understanding**

The role of different IR theoretical perspectives in understanding and explaining Irish neutrality is a new and emerging debate. In a 2006 article, Neal G. Jesse suggests liberalism as the paradigm of choice instead of realism for understanding the dynamics of Irish neutrality on the basis that issues of sovereignty drive Irish neutrality, and he feels it makes more sense to identify the “internal forces” that support this position – “public opinion, party politics and interest groups” – than it does to look for “external” sources (Jesse, 2006: 20). Certainly, realism would look to the international structure,
specifically, the balance of power, to explain Irish neutrality, and as Jesse rightly points out, these [internal, public opinion] forces do not consider the balance of power in the international environment to be a key to neutrality policy (Jesse, 2006: 23), which prompts the decision to look for alternative paradigms of understanding. However, Jesse’s view that liberalism is the framework of understanding because of the need to consider domestic sources of Irish neutrality (Jesse, 2006: 8) implies that neoliberalism is the only existing alternative to neorealism. This is expected, given the dominance of the two theories in the discipline of IR: as Smith puts it, “of the three theories involved in the interparadigm debate one, realism, has tended to be dominant, with its contest with liberalism being the central theme of what debate has existed in international theory” (Smith, 2001: 225). However, as the arguments in the first half of the thesis made clear, the spectrum of IR theoretical approaches available for understanding Irish neutrality and the role of supportive public opinion stretches beyond liberalism to variants (conventional and critical) of social constructivism (and perhaps beyond those to poststructuralist feminist or cosmopolitan IR theories).

There are several reasons why the neorealism-neoliberalism IR theory framework is insufficient for understanding and explaining Irish neutrality. The main problem is due to the fact that there is little difference between the two theories: both “neos” share the same ontology and epistemology, and both are rationalist, state-centric theories that fail to recognise the agency of public opinion as a foreign policy dynamic. Both neorealism and neoliberalism are “system maintainer” theories, meaning that their adherents are generally satisfied with the current international system and its actors, values, and power arrangements - neither theory advances prescriptions for major reform or radical transformation of the international system (Lamy, 2001: 184). As a result, neither “neo” theory can effectively identify, let alone explain, the existence of a critical social constructivist or “active” concept of neutrality that is adhered to by sections of the Irish public, and that aims to question current values and power arrangements (McSweeney, 1985: 10).

Mindful of the arguments made in the first half of the thesis, it is plausible that the realism underpinning the European security policy prism and the behaviouralist approach to understanding public opinion and foreign policy effectively precludes the consideration of alternative worldviews as the foundation of opinion dynamics, and the consideration of alternative variables that may explain public support for Irish neutrality. A researcher has to be sufficiently critically aware to take this into account when examining public opinion on foreign policy and particularly an elite-denigrated concept such as neutrality. The researcher has to realise that the elite discourse is not
necessarily the only rational yardstick available to judge public opinion. The arguments in this chapter thus far, all contribute to the premise that metatheory is a crucial factor to take into account, particularly in the area of foreign policy and neutrality where the analysis and presentation is dominated by realist assumptions, and particularly if the object of study is public opinion on foreign policy, in terms of both foreign policy attitude and foreign policy concept.

Returning to Evert’s non-rational hypothesis, there are a number of possible scenarios that might explain this elite allegation: either the elites are ignorant of the nature and stability of the core values driving public attitudes, and public values driving attachment to neutrality have not been translated into a range of policy options that are attractive to the public in the context of the ‘changed international circumstances’ or, for some reason, the elites expect the end of the Cold War to lead to a diminution of the desire of people in Ireland for independence or other core political values that serve as a dynamic of public opinion on Irish neutrality. The question of rationality then focuses on whether these ‘changed circumstances’ should prompt a change in core beliefs, involving some consideration of the nature of the core belief and link to the external circumstances and the assumptions guiding such links.34 In this case, if independence is a core factor driving attitudes to Irish neutrality, then public adherence to neutrality is arguably rational despite the ‘changed circumstances’ of the post-Cold War era because neutrality is perceived by most commentators and a large proportion of publics as the method of preserving independence and sovereignty35 - a task states are presumed to adhere to (even by realists) in all circumstances.

As mentioned before, neutrality is also perceived of by both publics and academics as a way to stay outside major power confrontations, and this goal can be interpreted as being pursued, not so much as a strategy for security in a balance of power system (as the Cold War is envisaged by Realist elites) (Väyrynen, 1989: 124-125), but as a strategy for sovereignty, autonomy and identity (Joenniemi, 1989: 51). If a core value such as identity is driving public adherence to neutrality - as the White Paper puts it “Ireland’s foreign policy is about much more than self-interest. For many of us it is a statement of the kind of people we are”36 (Ireland, 1996: 7) - then the question for

34 Depending on these factors, arguably, changed external circumstances do not theoretically precipitate change in a person’s core values and beliefs; for example, a change in belief in the institution of marriage does not necessarily follow from the introduction of divorce laws in a state or an increase in the divorce rate.
35 e.g., “Neutrality is nothing but an attempt, institutionalized in international law, to find a solution to one of the most fundamental problems of the state: maintaining its independence and sovereignty in wartime” (Karsh, 1988:5).
36 Notably, “studies have found only very weak relationships between self-interest and foreign-policy attitudes” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1103: “the standard heuristics that have been found to structure domestic policy choices – such as liberalism-conservatism, partisanship, social class, or self-interest – are not closely related to foreign policy preferences” (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992: 443). Related to the realist link between self-interest and foreign policy is the
academics and elites is whether a stable phenomenon such as identity should change as a result of altered international circumstances and the end of the Cold War, and thus, whether it is a mistake to dismiss public attitudes to Irish neutrality driven by this dynamic as non-rationally stable.  

It was noted in the previous chapter, in the discussion of the possible dimensions of Irish foreign policy attitudes, that Eurobarometer data shows that Irish people are on record as being the most guarded about their sovereignty and most proud of their national identity of all European national cohorts (Keatinge, 1984: 117; Staunton, 1994) and for the Irish people, neutrality is intimately related to each: as Keatinge explains, “in Irish political culture neutrality more often than not appears as a manifestation of sovereignty and independence, that is, as a corollary of the very existence of a separate nation-state” (Keatinge, 1984: 108). According to Fanning, “by the end of the Second World War neutrality had become what it largely remains in the popular mind until today: the hallmark of independence, a badge of patriotic honour inextricably linked with the popular perception of Irish national identity” (Fanning, 1996: 140). If the persistence and stability of public attachment to Irish neutrality is based on the dynamics of independence and identity (Ireland, 1996: 7; McSweeney, 1985: 119; Tonra, 2000: 25), rather than providing the basis of an argument that public attachment is non-rational, the indications are that the efforts of elites to construct and imbue a European identity have not had much of an impact on Irish publics, and therefore public opinion on neutrality driven by identity and independence dynamics will continue to present implications for the development of a European foreign, security and defence policy.

At the very least, if there is empirical evidence that core values of independence and identity are factors driving adherence to neutrality, this would lead one to expect changes in EU politico-military elite discourses in relation to these factors in attempts to downplay or ignore the significance of them in an effort to achieve EU foreign, security and defence policy ambitions. There is some indication of this shift in the EU politico-military elite discourse to consider the identity variable. When asked if he understood the reasons for the rejection of the Nice Treaty by the Irish people, the then President of the EU Commission, Mr. Romano Prodi, was reported to have ‘reiterated his view that fears of the effect of the treaty were based on sentiment…disregarding

realist hypothesis of the role of threat perception and foreign policy. The latter is also not an issue: “support for particular security arrangements or institutions is only weakly related or may even be de-coupled from threat perceptions” (Sinnott, 1997: 20). This will be discussed further in the last chapter. Additionally, Eichenberg has found “some opinions are largely unrelated to security considerations. For example, opinions of defence spending react to economic and budget conditions rather than to wider debates about security, strategy and arms control. A second example concerns the confidence of Europeans in their security, which changed surprisingly little as a result of changing perceptions of the military balance” (Eichenberg, 1989: 5).

Social constructivists consider identity as a factor of foreign policy; most realists do not.
the word “independence”, he had come to see that the reasons for the No vote were rooted in what he termed identity. “The great desire for identity…. the sense that the people and the country must not lose their roots” (Mulqueen and Lucey, 2001). However, there are some strategic considerations in this shift: (1) the association of public opposition with ‘identity’ characterised as “sentiment” and (2) the identity discourse allows the elite discourse to side-step the notion that EU Treaty voting behaviour is motivated by significant and fundamental values such as independence. These issues demonstrate the ontological and epistemological difficulties in exploring the dynamics of public opinion on foreign policy in the context of elite policy ambitions and discourses.38

Leaving these difficulties aside, the hegemonic nature of the characterisation of public attitudes as ‘non-rational’ makes it all the more important to understand the nature and content of the core beliefs driving public opinion on neutrality before drawing conclusions on the rationality or otherwise of attitudes. Risse-Kappen argues, “if we want to understand the causal impact of norms, we need to concentrate on processes of persuasion and to analyze the discourses of actors. The validity claims of normative ideas are contested in communicative processes during which specific ideas win out against others and then influence the behaviour of actors” (Risse-Kappen, 1997: 263). This chapter has illustrated this point using examples of elite discourse in Ireland and other European neutral states.

To conclude, this section of the chapter has illustrated the metatheoretical assumptions underpinning the ‘non-rational’ characterisations of public support for Irish neutrality. More specifically, it has identified the realist theoretical biases in the construction of neutrality as a function of the Cold War, as a policy prescribed by a realist concept of security, and other side effects, such as gender biases and myth-making battles in the discourse. Thus, what is seen as rational in relation to public opinion and neutrality is dependent on a particular metatheoretical stance. One of the core social constructivist assumptions about International Relations is that “ideas, - worldviews, principled beliefs, and knowledge - not only define the meaning of power but also affect the reasoning process by which state actors define their interests” (Risse-Kappen, 1997: 262). In a situation where “politicians, diplomats and military establishments have their own identities and interests that are not always shared by those for whom they supposedly speak” (Booth, 1997: 115), there is a fundamental problem connecting

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38 What is considered ‘rational’ in relation to neutrality, in a large part, is derived from neorealist concept of security, which is constructed in terms of the Cold War. This metatheoretical problem will be argued later on. Walker touches on this point: “it may be that the conditions under which we are now able or unable to speak about security are in considerable part understandable in relation to the experiences of the Cold War, the institutionalized foibles of national security elites... and so on... demands for broader accounts of security risk inducing epistemological overload. Nevertheless, claims about security are a serious matter (Walker, 1997: 66).
non-realist public opinion to realist foreign policy in political science, and specifically, several metatheoretical barriers to assessing the rationality of public opinion on neutrality. The final section of this chapter looks at an example of the effects of metatheory in an analysis and assessment of the rationality of public concepts of Irish neutrality.

**META-THEORY IN ANALYSES OF IRISH NEUTRALITY AND PUBLIC CONCEPTS OF IRISH NEUTRALITY**

The IR theoretical approaches underpinning analyses of neutrality and public opinion cannot be ignored because the associated sets of metatheoretical assumptions play such an important part in the selection of the hypotheses, variables and data in these analyses, which in turn, directs the conclusions on the nature and status of Irish neutrality and public attitudes to Irish neutrality. Jörgensen argues that the realism of many academics means that, “much tends to remain unexamined because implicit assumptions and deeply held beliefs among analysts tend to replace analysis. What is considered to be of minor or major importance tends to be identified *ex post,* rather than *a priori* and by means of theory-derived hypotheses” (Jörgensen, 1999: 113).

With respect to reporting on survey data, POFP academics Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau admit “there are ways in which the patterns uncovered can be shaped by the premises and preconceptions of the researcher” (Holsti and Rosenau, 1986: 478). Recalling that a metatheoretical perspectivist analysis shows that anti-neutrality discourses are dependent on the neorealist assumptions that neutrality is a phenomenon of a balance of power (Salmon, 1989: 47, 34, 23) and a function of the Cold War, (Latypov, 1996). A similarly (neo)realist, Cold War worldview underpins the characterisation of public support for Irish neutrality as non-rationally stable (Everts, 2000) and the characterisation of the public view of Irish neutrality as inconsistent (Gilland, 2001: 150) and limited (Gilland, 2001: 154)

**“Inconsistent” and “limited”?**

Gilland’s allegation of “inconsistency” (2001: 150) in public concepts of Irish neutrality (that is cited - and therefore strengthened as the accepted, mainstream interpretation of public opinion - in an analysis by Jesse) (2006: 20), is argued here to be a product of a (neo)realist bias in the interpretation and presentation of the public opinion data. Gilland states “the response category ‘no military alliance, not in NATO’ lost 12 percentage points and went from 23 percent in 1985 to 11 per cent in 1992” (2001: 150-151) and claims the people “who associated it [neutrality] with military alliances” were outnumbered by those “who did not know what neutrality meant to them” (2001: 151). Looking at the original response category data contained
in Table 6.5 (see http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/IOPA/ for this breakdown), there appears to be meta-/IR theoretical biases behind these interpretations and claims.

**TABLE 6.3 Original response category data for the question ‘what does Irish neutrality mean to you?’**

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<td>We don’t get involved in wars</td>
<td>We don’t get involved in wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should stay as we are</td>
<td>We should stay independent/as we are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No alliance with other nations/we don’t take sides</td>
<td>No alliances, we don’t take sides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not part of NATO</td>
<td>We are not part of NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>A free/independent state</td>
<td>We are a free/independent country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
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Gilland’s figure of 23 per cent is derived from collapsing together two very distinct categories of meaning: 5 per cent of respondents who said Irish neutrality means “not part of NATO” and 18 per cent of respondents who said Irish neutrality meant “no alliance with other nations/we don’t take sides”. The corresponding response category in the 1992 data that allegedly amounts to 11 percent is derived from 9 per cent of respondents that said “we don’t take sides, no alliances” (meaning impartiality: not being seen to be allied with or supporting a nation at war) with 2 per cent of respondents mentioning the response category “we are not part of NATO”.

There are several points to consider in the search for potential explanations and biases behind the collapse and misrepresentation of these categories of neutrality definition. Firstly, with the luxury of time and armed with the awareness of non-elite, broader, fundamental and active concepts of neutrality, it was possible to have a long and detailed lists of codes in the 2001/2002 codeframe (see Appendix D), and to pick up on categories of responses that are significant enough and distinct enough in terms of meaning to be accounted for by themselves. Secondly, an awareness of the active concept of neutrality also meant that the responses that corresponded with this concept were not re-interpreted, and then coded under or collapsed into meanings based on the elite-supported, realist framework of understanding or interpretation of neutrality.

Comparing the 2001/2002 nuanced codeframe with the results of the 1980s and 1990s data, assuming a relatively stable rank order of the main categories of responses over time, (1) it is possible to hypothesise a link between the types of ‘active’ neutrality verbatims occurring in the 2001/2002 data that may have also occurred in the 1980s and 1990s data and (2) which of the resulting 1980s/1990s super-codes contain the aforementioned ‘active neutrality’ codes. As the verbatim responses and codeframes of the 1980s and 1990s data are unavailable, this is the only type of critical re-examination possible. It is worth re-iterating that this thesis’s ‘critical’ perspective is
not necessarily going to yield a non-theoretically mediated truth with respect to the
meaning of Irish neutrality for the Irish public as collected in opinion polls, but it does
put forward some interesting and plausible alternative explanations and meanings that
are heretofore overlooked or dismissed.

The comparison shows that themes occurring in 2001/2002 data relating to anti-
colonialism, independence and non-partisanship/impartiality were likely to have been
coded into the 1980s and 1990s categories labelled “no alliances, we don’t take sides”
and “no alliance with other nations/we don’t take sides” that were re-interpreted and
presented as part of the super-category of ‘membership of a military alliance’. For
example, looking at the codeframe for the 2001/2002 data held in Appendix E, code 6
“not supporting British action/not fighting alongside British troops”, code 24 “not
supporting the US” and code 9 “not supporting/non involved with/staying apart from
Superpowers/Big Powers”, although attracting a small number of mentions (just 1% -
see Appendix J), are perhaps (given the discourses of activists such as AfRI and
PANA) anti-colonial/anti-Big Power elements of the public concept of neutrality.

Anti-colonialism/anti-Big Power ethos is also associated with the ‘active’ concept of
neutrality. Because these codes mention an avoidance of association and involvement
with other nations, it is possible that these elements of ‘active’ neutrality have been
coded under the “no alliance with other nations” category, which is conflated with “no
military alliance, not in NATO” i.e. the government/realist elite concept of neutrality.
This would mean that elements of public concepts of neutrality, that are also elements
of ‘active’ neutrality are, at best, ignored, and at worst, have been changed and
subsumed into the limited, militarized, realist, elite concept of neutrality that embodies
an opposing ethos to that of the active concept.

Other codes, such as code 43, “not being part of an EU army” and code 14, “UN
involvement (only)” and code 15, “UN peacekeeping only” (3% in total – see
Appendix E) that are also elements of ‘active’ neutrality could also have been coded
under the type of 1980/1990 codes of “No alliance with other nations/we don’t take
sides” and “no alliances, we don’t take sides”. It is also plausible that code 26,
“Ireland standing on its own/minding own business” (4% - see Appendix E) could be
interpreted as being ‘not in an alliance’. When all of the ‘active’ neutrality codes are
added up, they represent a significant number of mentions (7%). These elements of
“active” neutrality would be lost in attempts to aggregate the 2001/2002 data to make
it comparable with previous sets of results, and the hegemony of the elite
interpretation of neutrality would be continued at the expense of the public meanings
of neutrality.
Firstly, then, from a critical perspective, it is evidently imprudent to collapse the separate codes of “not taking sides” with “no alliances” in the first place, given the different interpretations they may be subject to and the different leaps of associations that have the potential to be made. In the 2001/2002 codeframe, code 40 “no side taken in a war/non-partisan” is kept separate from the military alliance codes, code 18 “no involvement in a defence alliance” and code 11 “no NATO involvement”.

Secondly, the decision by the research firm who collected the data to present these codes added together means it is not possible to ascertain the size of the “No alliances” part of the code and the size of the “not taking sides” part of the code. Given there are twenty-five 2001/2002 “no military alliances” responses and there are sixty-one responses in the “no side taken in war/non-partisan” category (together with an assumption of a relatively stable rank order of the definitional categories), it is likely that the bulk of the responses in the 1980/1990 data are related to the non-partisan category.

Adding code 18, “not involved in a defence alliance” and code 11, “no NATO involvement” of the 2001/2002 data together as a combined category of ‘not in a military alliance’, gives a total 2001/2002 figure of 1.4%. This is roughly equivalent to the “not part of NATO” figures in the 1985 and 1992 surveys, which represented 5 per cent and 2 percent of the population, respectively. Gilland’s decision to create an “alliance” super-category from the two “no alliance with other nations/we don’t take sides” and “not part of NATO” codes effectively quadruples the number people alleged to associate Irish neutrality with military alliances. The two response categories are arguably too distinct in meaning to be collapsed together, and it is also questionable whether the membership of military alliance meaning, that has significantly less mentions, should take precedence in the nominal presentation of these collapsed response categories. This could be due to a concern to understand public concepts of neutrality with respect to the mainstream, governmental/realist elite definition of Irish “military” neutrality. Aside from this wish to equate public concepts to the government concept of neutrality, or to promote the realist worldview of neutrality, there appears to be no other explanation for Gilland’s decision to subsume a “no side taken in a war/non-partisan” definition of neutrality under a “not in NATO/defense alliance” definition.

On the basis of these arguments, Gilland’s claim that the meaning of Irish neutrality that is “associated with military alliances” has dropped from 25 per cent to 11 per cent between the 1985 survey and the 1992 survey cannot be sustained, as the directly
recorded per cent figure of those who perceive neutrality in relation to membership of a military alliance/NATO in 1985 is 5 per cent and the corresponding figure in 1992 is just 2 percent, leaving a difference over that time period of just 3 per cent. The claim that the people “who associated it [neutrality] with military alliances” were outnumbered by those “who did not know what neutrality meant to them” (2001: 151) is also debatable. Finally, her conclusion that there is “inconsistency” (2001: 150) in public concepts of Irish neutrality, that appears to be based on a realist/elite bias in the interpretations and analysis of the data, is questionable. Based on the evidence in the previous chapter that showed that the public concepts of Irish neutrality appear to be reasonably stable over time and compare favourably with the elements of the broader ‘non-realist’ academic concepts, it is fair to say that public understandings of the concept of Irish neutrality are consistent, coherent and meaningful and thus, the public satisfies an element of the ‘rational public’ criteria.

Conclusion
This chapter has problematised the assumptions underlying the characterisations of public opinion and Irish neutrality as non-rational, specifically the related issues of (1) the ontology of public attitudes to neutrality and the links between realist policy, behaviouralism and the symbolic and (2) the metatheoretical assumptions in realist concepts of neutrality and links with the Cold War. The chapter argues that what is expected in mainstream research on Irish neutrality and public opinion in terms of affective attitude responses is derived from a realist worldview or conception of neutrality and an EU/NATO/WEU-security policy dominated framework of understanding.

In Chapter Three it was argued that assumptions of IR theory underpin the analyses and concepts of Irish neutrality and conclusions regarding its validity and credibility. This chapter has emphasised the importance of IR theory and meta-theory in the concepts of security, neutrality and the Cold War underpinning the assessments of the rationality of public opinion. Meta-theory helps to show that the elite framework of understanding and expectations regarding public opinion ‘rationality’ may be radically different from the public framework of understanding as regards concepts of neutrality and what responses to questions are ‘rational’. For example, the Realist metatheoretical framework excludes humans as a definitive referent of security (McSweeney, 1999: 60), and it also excludes female values in concepts of security and neutrality, factors which could inform a significant number of the responses given by members of public to foreign policy attitude surveys.
This chapter has raised questions in relation to the suitability of the frameworks currently employed in analyses of public attitudes to Irish neutrality. The establishment and consideration of the public’s neutrality concepts and opinions against a metatheoretically-informed ‘rationality’ yardstick is an essential and heretofore unconsidered step in attempts to explain public opinion on neutrality as well as European foreign policy. There is a need to focus on the cognitive rather than the behavioural dimensions of attitudes and to consider non-realist frameworks of understanding, including social constructivist factors such as values and identity in models of public attitudes to Irish neutrality. The next two chapters of this thesis consider these issues.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CORE BELIEFS AND VALUES IN THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO IRISH NEUTRALITY

Following Ireland’s accession to the EC in 1972, popular attitudes towards neutrality could only be a matter of conjecture – (Keatinge, 1984: 116)

Introduction
This chapter considers theoretical models of the structure of foreign policy attitudes and identifies the elements of Hurwitz and Peffley’s model that are suitable for modelling public attitudes to Irish neutrality. Having argued that it is better to look at public opinion above the level of attitudes to events or policy-actions due to metatheoretical considerations and realist biases, the main focus of this chapter is the hypothesis that values and core beliefs structure public attitudes to foreign policy ((Holsti, 1992: 450; 1996: 47; Isernia, 2001: 263; Sinnott, 1997: 6; Sniderman, 1993: 228)). A set of “core values” of Irish neutrality are derived from a review of the historical literature on Irish neutrality and are tested for their presence in public attitudes to Irish neutrality in a structural equation model. Chapter Six also identified that many academics in the POFP field (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 505; Holsti, 1996: 49; Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 122) have found that public foreign policy attitude “dimensions correspond closely to the most venerable theoretical approaches to international relations”. Having established what values and core beliefs structure public opinion on Irish neutrality, the fit of the resulting dimensions with theories of International Relations will be assessed. These results will feed into the conclusion as to whether public attitudes to Irish neutrality are ‘rationally’ structured.

What is public opinion?
The concept of public opinion is central to political discussion, to political action, and to virtually all ideas about the meaning of political oppression and tyranny, and yet, as Murray Edelman (2001: 52) points out, ‘public opinion’ is an exceptionally ambiguous term. There is no one public, but many different ones that change constantly. Although the common conceptualisation of public opinion implies the sentiment of the population revealed in polls, in reality differing sectors of the public express their views through various mediums and forums, including direct communications with representatives, interest group activity and letters to newspapers, etc (Sobel, 2001: 3). Secondly, as Sherry Devereaux Ferguson points out, “although governments argue that they conduct polls to determine the needs of their citizenry, most public opinion polls fail to differentiate between “top-of-mind, offhand views” and “thoughtful, considered judgements”; a variety of tools including focus groups, surveys and media analysis are employed to tap the latter. The distinction between the two “explains the seeming volatility of public opinion on many major societal issues”
Edelman also maintains that there is no objective way to ascertain what public opinion is for any group of people or to define it accurately. He notes that conclusions of surveys and polls, the methods used by social scientists and journalists to establish public opinion, depend crucially on what questions are asked and what news events respondents have in mind when they answer (Edelman, 2001: 52). Much of the debate on the quality of public opinion attempts to account for these factors (Althaus, 2003; Zaller, 1992); indeed, Zaller defines an opinion based on those variables, “as a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it” (Zaller, 1992: 6). The revisionist research by Page and Shapiro contends that although public opinion can be manipulated and deceived, the public as a collective body is capable of holding sensible opinions and processing the information made available to it.

**What is an opinion?**

Lane and Sears define an opinion as “an implicit verbal response or ‘answer’ that an individual gives in response to a particular stimulus situation in which some general ‘question’ is raised” (Lane and Sears, 1964: 6). Public opinion analysts most commonly describe an opinion as consisting of two dimensions: direction and intensity. Direction means it includes some affective or emotional quality of approving or disapproving of something – the ‘pro-con’ quality. And because people can feel very strongly about certain of their opinions and much less strongly about others, public opinion analysts ask people to specify the intensity of their feeling (Lane and Sears, 1964: 9), using a scale of, for example, strongly agree to strongly disagree. The dependent variables in the models in this thesis have an eleven-point scale that run from ‘retain’ to ‘reject’ Irish neutrality and ‘high’ and ‘low’ salience of neutrality.

An important aspect of an opinion is held to be the “policy stand” implied (Lane and Sears, 1964: 14), because a personal preference can reveal a person’s estimate of what the government or the subject his or herself, should do about a situation. There is an implied activity, or as Rosenberg considers, a “theoretical rule of thumb to the effect that the ‘stronger’ an attitude, the more likely it will be that the subject will take consistent action toward the attitude object” (Rosenberg, 1960: 336). However, as Sears and Lane point out, “some kinds of opinion seem “actionable” while others are not” (Lane and Sears, 1964: 14). Rosenau notes that an “evident distinction between the role structures of the domestic and foreign areas is the much greater number of roles from which activity is likely to emanate in the former. The presence of foreign
roles in the latter area does not nearly offset the numerous citizens and officials who can be expected to participate only in domestic controversies” (Rosenau, 1967: 39). Rosenau suggests that only a small number of “occupants of much more specialized kinds of roles are likely to perceive a potential linkage between themselves and events abroad…only exporters and professors of international relations” and “at the leadership level too, domestic issues are likely to evoke behavior on the part of a greater number of individuals than are foreign ones” (Rosenau, 1967: 39). This thesis has already identified the government-centric domain of action in relation to neutrality and the difficulties in matching the direction and intensity of an attitude to neutrality to overt behaviour in support of it.

Sears and Lane argue that there are differences between an abstract opinion and an opinion guiding behaviour that can explain the failure of the assumption that expressed opinions are a predictor of overt behaviour: “it is likely that an individual has several opinions which may be more or less conflicting, in a logical sense; each is held sincerely but limited to a specified stimulus situation” (Lane and Sears, 1964: 14). This theory can explain the discrepancies described by Marsh (1992) and Sinnott (1996) in Irish public opinion, as some people expressed opinions in support of neutrality and also expressed support for foreign policy actions that might violate an aspect of a neutrality policy. In a survey of empirical research on political behaviour, Sears points out, “the distinction between self-interest and symbolic politics resembles several other views that have driven empirical research….the ‘instrumental functions of attitudes (based on the direct costs and benefits of the attitude object to the individual) from the symbolic (or “value-expressive”) function (when the attitude becomes a means for expressing values and social identity; see Herek, 1986; Prentice, 1987)” (Sears, 1993: 119). Notably, Sinnott’s evaluation of public opinion as ‘symbolic’ may well be best understood in respect of the value-expressive function of an attitude, outlined by Sears. However, in the article Sinnott appears to be employing the term symbolic pejoratively in relation to the lack of a relationship of public attitude with elite policy-prescription, rather than the “rational choice”-type of costs and benefits analysis identified by Sears.

**Why study public opinion on Irish neutrality?**

Chapter Two laid out the political context and reasons why Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality should be studied, but there is an academic, theoretical impetus too. In one of the earliest books on US public opinion and foreign policy, Markel argues that public opinion at home requires detailed study because it is – or it should be – one of the major keys to foreign policy and because it determines, to a considerable degree,
actions with regard to public opinion abroad (Markel, 1949: 18). “According to a central strand of democratic theory, the policy preferences of ordinary citizens are supposed to form the foundation for government decision-making” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 1) in the context of the demands of a democratic system whereby “policy makers may represent trustees more than delegates in decision-making in foreign affairs” (Sobel, 2001: 3), the accurate presentation and understanding of public opinion is a normative as well as an academic concern. Almond makes clear that the public is not likely to play an active role in specific policy-making, particularly in foreign policy (Almond, 1960: 6). He spells out the function of the public in a democratic policy-making process; it is to “set certain policy criteria in the form of widely held values and expectations. It evaluates the results of policies from the point of view of their conformity to these basic values and expectations. The policies themselves, however, are the products of leadership groups (“elites”) which carry on the specific work of policy formulation and policy advocacy” (Almond, 1960: 5-6). The difficulty in systematically relating public opinion to foreign policy making (Ståhlberg, 1989: 250) was previously noted and this is complicated by the fact that people themselves do not see direct action as contributing to or affecting policy-making (Ståhlberg, 1989: 261). This means that a public opinion survey on foreign policy attitudes that asks people about direct action cannot hope to adequately capture the ‘behavioural’ aspects of foreign policy attitudes if the subjects themselves do not see direct action as a way of influencing foreign policy. Firstly, action would be under-reported, and secondly, if individuals do not undertake action, then other perceived forms of influence for these individuals would need to be investigated and identified by POFP analysts.

In Almond’s view of POFP, “the layman inevitably turns to his leaders for guidance…he can draw sound inferences and arrive at sober conclusions if he can trust his specialists to formulate the issues and alternatives in such a manner that a reasoned choice becomes possible” (Almond, 1960: 7-8). The difficulties in fulfilling the latter criteria noted in previous chapters and the findings of Page and Shapiro in relation to the key role of (mis)information in determining public opinion means that, as Sinnott argues, there is a theoretical demand emerging from the POFP literature to look at the cognitive dimensions of attitudes at the level of the individual (Sinnott, 1997: 12).

In another academic review of recent developments in the POFP literature it is noted that others have made similar calls for this approach in the discipline; specifically for
multi-dimensional models of public opinion on foreign policy (Sulfaro, 1996: 303) focusing on core values of political belief systems rather than attitudes to particular foreign policy events (Sniderman, 1993: 228). Ole R. Holsti describes a belief system as “a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying for him its salient characteristics”; it also “has the function of the establishment of goals and the ordering of preferences” (Holsti, 1962: 245). Core values do not refer directly to governmental actions or policies, (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1105) but are more personal statements regarding the individual’s priorities and concerns (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1106). The next section concerns the theoretical models in the literature to date that provide the basis for an investigation of public attitudes to Irish neutrality at these levels: aspects of the work of Wittkopf (1990), Chittick, Billingsley and Travis (1995), Bjereld and Ekengren (1999), and that of Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) are presented.

Theory of the structure of public opinions

Bjereld and Ekengren summarise Almond’s 1960 thesis on POFP (Almond, 1960: 69) as arguing that citizen’s opinions are not rooted in fixed values or strategic calculations (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 504). Since the 1970s, research has concentrated more upon how citizens’ attitudes are structured rather than if they are structured (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 503). Nowadays, fixed values and strategic calculations are the two functions of attitudes that have become the main subjects of empirical research in POFP, the “value-expressive” function, when the attitude becomes “a means for expressing values and social identity” and the “instrumental” function of attitudes that is based on the direct costs and benefits of the attitude object to the individual (Sears, 1993: 119).

Eugene Wittkopf

Wittkopf’s study was based on four mass foreign policy surveys conducted in 1974, 1978, 1982 and 1986 (Wittkopf, 1990: 9). When the items that elicited responses to common underlying dimensions were identified, these were treated as scales (Wittkopf, 1990: 16). In sum, eight different foreign policy scales were found. These were given labels such as Active Co-operation, Economic Aid/Military Aid, Troops, US goals, Vital Interests, US relations, (Wittkopf, 1990: 17) etc. When the scales were used in a principal components analysis (using Pearsons’ correlations with pairwise deletion of missing data (Wittkopf, 1990: 18) – the same correlation basis as

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39 Also called ‘symbolic’ by Sears, but the term is not to be confused with the realist use of the term in the context of a lack of policy prescription. Labelling a public attitude ‘symbolic’ is unhelpful in that it can lead to associations with the notion of ‘unrealistic’: once this association is in the discourse, attitudes can then be dismissed on that basis.
the structural equation model used in the next chapter), three different dimensions were found to capture the elements of Americans’ foreign policy attitudes (Wittkopf, 1990: 21). Wittkopf eventually threw out the third dimension – as a combination of economic and military aid scales, it was too difficult to interpret – and settled on two dimensions of cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism (Wittkopf, 1990: 50) as capturing Americans’ foreign policy attitudes. In an article that discussed the controversy over the number of dimensions in foreign policy attitudes, Chittick, Billingsley and Travis (1995) claimed that Wittkopf’s two-dimensional model was too crude to be able to identify attitude patterns in public opinion because it omitted the goal of identity and instead argued for a three-dimensional model. In this Irish foreign policy attitudes study, there are no real ‘foreign policy scales’ available to mimic the studies of Wittkopf and Chittick et al. as the Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey data does not ask about foreign policy above and beyond attitudes to European integration, and the indicators regarding attitudes to neutrality.

**Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley**

Hurwitz and Peffley (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985) offer an alternative view, that opinions on single issues can be derived from specific ‘postures’ from which policy preferences are derived, offering examples of “isolationism” and “militarism”. The concept of ‘posture’ corresponds precisely to the level of the dependent variable of the SEM model provided in this chapter, that is, the neutrality posture indicating whether individuals wish to retain or reject neutrality and whether individuals believe it is an important or unimportant issue. Hurwitz and Peffley’s ‘postures’ are constrained by ‘higher level’ core values. According to Hurwitz and Peffley’s definitions, core values are easily distinguishable from postures in that they do not refer directly to governmental actions or policies (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1105). Values are more personal statements regarding the individual’s priorities and concerns (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1106) that are central to an individual’s worldview. The examples of the core values in their model are “ethnocentrism” or “morality of war”. These core values correspond to the level of the independent latent variables in the Irish neutrality structural equation model, such as “ethnocentrism”, “patriotism” and “independence” etc., that represent the core values hypothesised to predict attitudes to Irish neutrality. Thus, these elements of Hurwitz and Peffley’s conceptualisation of the theoretical structure of foreign policy attitudes (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1105; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985: 876), including the type of variables and methodology they use, correspond closely to the structure, approach, type of variables and methodology used in this chapter on public opinion and Irish neutrality. Hurwitz and Peffley have a lower tier in the hierarchy consisting of attitudes towards
specific issues; these attitudes are theoretically specified to be constrained by the middle tier of postures (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1105; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985: 876). That tier is not used in the model of Irish attitudes. Below is a representation of Hurwitz and Peffley’s hierarchical model of structural relationships as applied to the theoretical model of public attitudes to Irish neutrality used in this thesis.

FIGURE 7.1 Two Tiers of Hurwitz and Peffley’s hierarchical model.

Upper tier:

Middle tier:

COGNITIVE ORIENTATIONS AND VALUES AS STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Chapter Five outlined the latest approach in the public opinion and foreign policy (POFP) literature that argues that cognitive orientations and values play a significant role in explaining public attitudes to foreign policy (Isernia, 2001: 263) and Chapter Six argued for the need to look at a level above attitude to foreign policy events and to understand attitudes beyond the framework of elite policy.

The latest approach makes a distinction between general foreign policy orientations and abstract beliefs, on the one hand, and specific foreign policy attitudes and opinion on immediate issues, on the other, and argues that, while constraint might be lacking in relation to views on particular matters, it does obtain at the level of general orientations and beliefs (Sinnott, 1997: 6). People may be fuzzy about narrow, transient options, yet clear-sighted about their basic values (Sniderman, 1993: 228). And members of the public employ “a few superordinate beliefs to guide their thinking” (Holsti, 1992: 450). The “rationalists” claim, “at any given moment an individual has real policy preferences, based on underlying needs and values and on
the beliefs held at that moment” (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 16) and that “as a result of substantial empirical research, there is now a good deal of credible evidence suggesting that members of the mass public use various heuristics – although not necessarily the traditional liberal-to-conservative or internationalist-to-isolationist blueprints – for organizing their political thinking” (Holsti, 1996: 51). The “rationalists” conclude that the realist scholars misinterpreted survey research results and gave up too quickly on the public (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 387).

As described, Hurwitz and Peffley define a middle level of ‘general postures’ in their hierarchical model (between the upper level of a person’s core values or ‘world view’ and the lower level of a person’s attitude to a specific foreign policy issue). These postures “convey the general stance or orientation the individual would like to see the government adopt in conducting foreign policy, without indicating what specific policies should be employed to attain the desired goal” (e.g. an individual’s attitude to Irish neutrality). They argue, “it is more powerful and parsimonious… to examine these general orientations than to focus on the opinions to specific issues” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1114).

In terms of interpreting the data at this level of opinion and offering conclusions as to whether public attitudes to neutrality are ‘rationally’ structured, briefly, the effect of the negative discourse on neutrality and supportive public attitudes need to be addressed. Specifically, it is important to identify and question (1) the effect of the dominant Realist perception of the nature and content of the dimensions that can be considered as ‘rational’ predictors of attitudes to Irish neutrality and (2) the ontological basis of the realist behavioural, policy-oriented approach to foreign policy attitude research that would disregard an examination of public attitudes to foreign policy - involving “postures”, “general orientations” “core political beliefs”, “values”, “worldviews” or “heuristics” - at a level ‘above’ factual aspects of IR, transient events, or policy. For example, the revisionist premise that attitudes about foreign affairs are structured in moderately coherent ways despite the lack of factual information about international affairs (Holsti, 1996: 47) means that the variables capturing levels of information (or education) that are commonly employed by realists as means to examine the structure of foreign policy opinions and to separate ‘real’ from ‘random’ foreign policy opinions (Sinnott, 2000: 1) will not be the focus of the models of POFP in this chapter. This is because the basis of the attitude structure is values, and the quality and level of knowledge and information about international affairs held by an individual does not affect an individual’s ability to hold the kind of basic beliefs and values (Wittkopf, 1990: 15) that might ‘rationally’ determine an
individual’s attitude to Irish neutrality. Finally, given the lack of survey evidence to show what foreign policy options the public believe are incompatible with Irish neutrality (Keatinge, 1996: 121; Marsh, 1992: 25), the only option left is to establish whether the public have postures or core political beliefs that orientate their attitude to neutrality.

Notably, the majority of POFP research has been based on US data, but it is also important to highlight the fact that it has also been based on realist approaches and frameworks of understanding. Bjereld and Ekengren point out that studies that find the relevant dimensions in the form of values or postures that influence opinions on foreign policy issues, have, until now, mostly relied on US data. Therefore, it is difficult to know to what extent these findings are generalizable to states other than the USA. It is especially difficult to generalise the results to a small state like Sweden, which neither takes an active part in power politics nor, for example, has the possibility of using military interventions as a foreign policy means (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 506).

The foreign policy of Ireland, like that of Sweden, does not correspond to the ‘power politics’, ‘military means’ type of realist factors in US foreign policy. Bjereld and Ekengren hypothesise that the structure of foreign policy attitudes may be diffuse in all countries (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 503), therefore it makes sense to base hypotheses on the characteristics, history and culture of the Irish people in order to establish the dynamics of their neutrality attitudes rather than on formulations extracted from the US or European public opinion literature. The revisionists would concur with this approach, for example, Hurwitz and Peffley “argue that it is more productive to examine attitude structure using an intensive, domain-specific approach than an extensive inter-domain approach” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1100).

Public Opinion on Irish Neutrality: Values and Structure

The premise of the rational public thesis is that the public chooses a foreign policy suited to their needs and in accordance with their values (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 35-36) and Keatinge holds that the values held by the Irish public help define and maintain Irish neutrality. He explains, “particularly where international pressures are relatively diffuse, ‘neutrality’ may be defined as much by perceptions and values in domestic politics as by the more general behaviour of states” (Keatinge, 1996: 110); thus, “the [Irish] state’s foreign policy ultimately rests on domestic political values”
The question is, are the values and beliefs underpinning public attitudes to Irish neutrality simply the “anti-British” and “Northern Ireland” dynamics that are articulated in nearly every piece of literature on Irish neutrality (Fanning, 1980: 34; 1996: 140-141; Jesse, 2006: 8; Keatinge, 1978: 75; Raymond, 1984; Salmon, 1989: 183)? Or are the values driving public attitudes to Irish neutrality, “independence” (Keatinge, 1984: 32) and “identity” (Ireland, 1996: 7; McSweeney, 1985: 119; Tórra, 2000: 25) in the form of “patriotism”, factors that are considered in the critical social constructivist literature on Irish neutrality and foreign policy analysis? The next section of this chapter discusses the hypotheses related to “Patriotism”, “Independence”, “Efficacy”, “Anti-British sentiment” (broadened to ethnocentrism) and “Northern Ireland” taken from a wide range of literature and provides the relevant questionnaire indicators at the end of the discussion of each of these variables. These hypotheses are then tested in a Structural Equation Model using the Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey (ISPAS) data.

**THEORY AND HYPOTHESES: EXAMINING THE IRISH AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LITERATURE**

**Independence/sovereignty**

Both the history/politics and international comparative literatures on Irish neutrality posit independence and sovereignty as key factors underpinning Ireland’s neutrality and the former body of literature also makes explicit reference to public attitudes in this respect. The definitive statement by Keatinge encapsulates this link: “in Irish political culture neutrality more often than not appears as a manifestation of sovereignty and independence, that is, as a corollary of the very existence of a separate nation-state” (Keatinge, 1984: 108). Fanning echoes this sentiment: “in the popular mind Irish neutrality is the hallmark of independence” (Fanning, 1996: 14). Fisk dubbed Ireland’s neutrality in the Second World War, “a publicly non-aligned independence that finally demonstrated the sovereignty of de Valera’s state and her break with the Empire” (Fisk, 1983: 39). Fanning characterises the Second World War as “the supreme test of Irish independence, which is why Irish neutrality during the Second World War has been described as ‘the outward and visible sign of absolute sovereignty…the mark of independence’” (Fanning, 1996: 139). Keatinge notes a “psychological need” in Irish people “for a dramatic manifestation of independence”, a factor, he argues, that underpinned people’s reluctance to question the doctrine of neutrality (Keatinge, 1978: 73). In the international comparative literature, Vukandinovic notes that neutrality is a deliberate activity aimed at the preservation of independence (Vukadinovic, 1989: 41-42) and Karsh argues neutrality was for Ireland,
“an expedient foreign policy tool which preserved Ireland’s independence during the war years and has enabled it to pursue its political, strategic and economic goals in the post-war era” (Karsh, 1988: 192).

To put this independence hypothesis in context, it is pertinent to investigate whether the Irish population’s concern with the maintenance of Ireland’s sovereignty and independence, that finds sustenance through the Irish neutrality concept, is considerably more intense compared with other populations’ concerns with sovereignty. Looking at EU survey evidence, it does seem that Irish people are comparatively obsessed with independence, and specifically, independence in foreign policy. Through Eurobarometer surveys over the years, Irish people are on record as being the most guarded about their sovereignty of all Europeans (Keatinge, 1984: 117) and Irish people are particularly in favour of maintaining the independence of Irish foreign policy. For example, “Ireland” was significantly different from the average European view on an EU foreign policy issue that had consequences for Ireland’s independence in foreign policy decision-making; the Spring 2003 Eurobarometer results show “Irish public opinion is significantly less supportive of the proposition that when an international crisis occurs, European Union member states should agree a common position (Ireland, 74 per cent in agreement; EU 15, 83 per cent in agreement)” (Commission, 2003: 14). Certainly, up until 1995, Irish people have been consistently the least supportive of a European Common Defence Policy of all the European Community member-state populations (Commission, 1995: 63).

Evidence from the verbatim analysis of concepts of neutrality in Chapter Two indicates that the measures below are not reflecting an anti-EU dynamic given the frequency of Irish independence (12.3%) as a meaning of neutrality compared with meanings (less than 2.5%) articulating an anti-EU stance and the fact that Irish public opinion sees EU membership in overall terms as a good thing. The Eurobarometer evidence, coupled with the association of sovereignty and independence with Irish neutrality evident in the Irish foreign policy literature, points to the hypothesis that independence should be a significant factor structuring attitudes to Irish neutrality - the more an individual is in favour of Irish independence, the more that person should favour the maintenance of Irish neutrality.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q</th>
<th>Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a5_8</td>
<td>European Unification has gone too far - not far enough</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a5_4</td>
<td>Ireland should do all it can to unite fully with the EU - protect</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a5_1</td>
<td>Ireland’s membership of the European Union is a bad thing - Ireland’s</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>membership of the European Union is a good thing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a16</td>
<td>I would like you to imagine you are voting on the next referendum on</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Nice Treaty (Nice II). Where would you place yourself on a scale of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 to 7? [1 -&gt; definitely in favour; 7 -&gt; definitely against]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### National identity/Patriotism

Chittick has tried for over ten years to get the academic community to accept an identity dimension in models of public opinion on foreign policy (Hart, 1995). Chapter Two has already discussed the theoretical relationship between values, identity and foreign policy/neutrality; suffice to say that, “identity is a social act as well as a structure of meaning. As an act, it refers to the capacity of individuals to sustain a story about the self or the collective self. As structure, it relates the story or narrative sustained, from which individuals draw to enact identity” (McSweeney, 1999: 165).

Social practice is the term used to capture this dual sense of identity. “In social practices we ‘do’ concepts: that is to say we draw upon typified behavioural patterns to reproduce meaning in a particular setting or situation and, in the same act, reaffirm or modify its sense” (McSweeney, 1999: 165).

How does an individual ‘do’ neutrality? It is worth recalling that in the (neo)realist paradigm individuals can’t ontologically action neutrality, but in the social constructivist paradigm, neutrality constitutes part of the identity of the state and the people of Ireland, and therefore being supportive of ‘being Irish’ is being supportive of, or ‘doing’, Irish neutrality. Neutrality is thus part of the national character of the people, and reflects part of the character of the nation.

The relationship between neutrality and identity is cited by academics with reference to every other European neutral state: Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland. In the Swedish case, Kronsell and Svedberg argue that neutrality is one of two central dimensions of nationalism: “A collective identity was shaped by the neutrality doctrine…the neutrality doctrine can be seen as ‘the state’s external projection of itself into the world’ (Wæver, forthcoming)” (Kronsell and Svedberg, 154). Dahl claims “it is important to understand the position which neutrality has occupied generally in Swedish society. Neutrality evolved over the years from merely the security doctrine of the country to become a central tenet of Swedish national identity (Dahl, 1997: 19-22).
The former President of the Swiss Confederation, Dr. Max Pettipierre argued in 1963 that “neutrality’s justification does not lie in foreign opinion, even though this is important to us and we must seek to inform it and influence it. Justification lies above all in our own conviction that in breaking away from neutrality we would lose our national character” (Pettipierre, 1963 [1970]: 180). Freymond explains that “neutrality became and remains the guiding principle of Swiss foreign policy, not only in the eyes of the authorities, but even more for public opinion, to the extent that it has become one of the components of Swiss identity” (Freymond, 1990: 181). After an analysis of Austrian neutrality, Thalberg surmised that, “permanent neutrality has to reflect the general character and temperament of a nation” (Thalberg, 1989: 236). And finally, in a discussion of the Finnish concept of neutrality, Joenniemi argues that “neutrality is not only a role or status; it also connotes a more general foreign-policy profile or identity” (Joenniemi, 1989: 58). This identity phenomenon reflects Booth’s theory that “humans are meanings-making species, and the creation and recreation of identity are fundamental to the meanings we make of international politics. And how we conceive of international politics is at the root of the meanings we make of security” (Booth, 1997: 91). Thus, identity through neutrality in part reflects the neutral state/people’s understanding of security and their conception of international politics, as well as people’s foreign policy identity and character projected out into the world.

In an article (2006) written by Neal G. Jesse on the IR theoretical basis of Irish neutrality, he calls for ways to understand both sovereignty and identity as two central dynamics of Irish neutrality. Although Jesse presents the dynamics as independent factors, there is a dynamic of interdependence between the two factors. Fanning theorises interaction at the level of the state, arguing, “for Ireland…an independent identity meant the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy….the tradition of neutrality has always been the distinguishing feature of the foreign policy of independent Ireland” (Fanning, 1996: 137) and he also sees the interplay at work at the level of the public: “by the end of the Second World War neutrality had become what it largely remains in the popular mind until today: the hallmark of independence, a badge of patriotic honour inextricably linked with the popular perception of Irish national identity” (Fanning, 1996: 140). Thus, independence is a distinguishing feature of Ireland in the international context and national independence manifested through neutrality is a badge of patriotic honour for Irish people. The relationship is symbiotic. Keatinge too, discerns that Irish neutrality is “a manifestation both of separate cultural identity and independent statehood” (Keatinge, 1984: 6-7). The strength of the connection between the identity of Irish people and neutrality is also
noted by political elites: it is argued that, “no Irish government would be so foolhardy as to underestimate the fierce hold on the popular imagination of the historic bond between Irish neutrality and Irish identity” (Fanning, 1996: 146).

This ‘identity’ hypothesis translates well into the realm of public opinion analysis. Bjereld and Ekengren, in their investigation into the structure of Swedish public opinion, argued for a re-interpretation of the meaning of the “international” foreign policy dimensions given the differences in Swedish and US foreign policy. They decided that Chittick, Billingsley and Travis’s “multilateralism-unilateralism” dimension (characterised as an expression of identity) was a particularly appropriate structure accounting for the Swedish expression of foreign policy attitudes (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 514). Finally, Irish people have also consistently topped the Eurobarometer polls with respect to national pride, with comparatively the largest proportion of a European national population claiming to be extremely proud of their national identity (Commission, 1995: 67). The particularly strong levels of Irish national pride, the evidence in the Irish foreign policy literature of the link between patriotism/national identity and Irish neutrality, and the theoretical support for this dimension through a social constructivist framework of understanding, constitute sufficient grounds for a hypothesis that support for Irish national identity is linked to support for Irish neutrality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q. Label</th>
<th>Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a11_7</td>
<td>I would rather be a citizen of Ireland than of any other country in the world</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d2</td>
<td>Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be Irish?</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f28</td>
<td>Overall, how important is it to you that you are ‘Irish’ or other nationality</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Northern Ireland**

Stephan Kux discusses Irish neutrality in a comparative analysis of European neutral states and makes the point that, “the Republic’s conscious cultivation of a neutrality identity in its political culture is one of the tendencies which have contributed to the separateness of North and South” (Kux, 1986: 36). The international comparative literature cites Northern Ireland as an important dynamic of Irish neutrality; for example, Karsh argues “neutrality has been both a product of the painful question of Partition and a means for its solution” (Karsh, 1988: 192) and Sundelius declares Irish neutrality “is intimately linked to the unsettled question of Northern Ireland” (Sundelius, 1987: 8). Jesse argues “Irish neutrality wraps itself in its hostile relations
with Britain, the continuing separation of Northern Ireland, notions of independence and sovereignty, party politics and the continuance of myths in Irish public opinion” (Jesse, 2006: 8). Keatinge also makes the link: Irish neutrality is “a symbol of two of the most emotionally charged Irish national aspirations”, independence and unification of the island (Keatinge, 1972: 439).

Several history/politics analysts cover the details of the British government’s attempts to involve Ireland in the Second World War by floating re-unification suggestions in relation to Northern Ireland: “the possibility of a bargain over unity and neutrality was again declined, notwithstanding a curious incident after Pearl Harbour. Churchill sent de Valera a cryptic, midnight telegram which the latter at first thought indicated Churchill’s intention to link the issues” (Keatinge, 1978: 110-111). Although it is clear that from the outset, the Irish government did not link the issues of neutrality and Northern Ireland, nonetheless Salmon (1982: 205) argues that “partition… has long been associated with Irish neutrality”, and seizes upon this link to claim that Irish neutrality was never more than a chip to be bargained away. In a reversal of this thesis, Keatinge articulates a belief that de Valera’s determination to continue to link neutrality with Northern Ireland is explicable in relation to his adherence to, not disregard for, neutrality:

De Valera had so successfully made neutrality synonymous with an anti-partition stance since 1938 that when the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was formed in 1949 the Irish government declared that ‘as long as Partition lasts, any military alliance or commitment involving joint military action with the State responsible for Partition must be quite out of the question so far as Ireland is concerned.’ It has been suggested that de Valera’s obsession with partition can be partly explained by his desire to keep Ireland out of military alliances (Keatinge, 1978: 92) (emphasis added).

If Keatinge’s suggestion is true - that a desire to keep Ireland out of military alliances (a significant element of Ireland’s neutrality policy) was behind de Valera’s use of Partition as a reason to reject NATO membership - then FitzGerald, Salmon and others are wrong to claim that were it not for Partition, (a boundary dividing the island of Ireland that, under a particular interpretation of the NATO treaty, would have to be defended), Ireland would have abandoned neutrality and joined NATO in 1949 (FitzGerald, 1995, 1996; 1998: 25; Salmon, 1984: 210; 1989: 167).
If FitzGerald and Salmon are correct, their claims translated to the level of public opinion suggest a hypothesis that public attitudes in favour of the re-unification of Ireland are linked to a rejection of Irish neutrality. Chapter Three demonstrated that FitzGerald’s and Salmon’s discourses on Irish neutrality are realist, but it is important to highlight that this also means that they are elitist, in that they focus exclusively on activities and discourses at the level of government and ignore the sub-state level of the public and their opinions. Although Doherty does claim “partition was not the primary motivation for neutrality, sovereignty was more important to de Valera”, she argues that “the impression among the general public was different” (Doherty, 2002: 41). This thesis disagrees with Doherty, FitzGerald and Salmon and posits that the factors driving public opinion on neutrality are closer to de Valera’s, i.e. based on a desire to keep Ireland out of military alliances and the desire for sovereignty. Finally, as there is little evidence that FitzGerald’s and Salmon’s claims about the links between Northern Ireland, Partition and the issue NATO membership are found in public opinion (seen in the analysis of neutrality concepts in chapter two), it is hypothesised that an individual’s attitude to the Northern Ireland question should have little bearing on his or her attitude to Irish neutrality.

**TABLE 7.3 Northern Ireland Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q</th>
<th>Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a5_6</td>
<td>It is essential that all of Ireland becomes united in one state -&gt; the different parts of Ireland are best left as separate states</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q6_1</td>
<td>The long term policy for Northern Ireland should be to reunify with the rest of Ireland [disagree -&gt; agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q6_2</td>
<td>The British government should continue to have a lot of say in the way Northern Ireland is run [disagree -&gt; agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q6_5</td>
<td>The British government should declare its intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the future [disagree -&gt; agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Anti-British**

Keatinge argues, “the survival of neutrality in Ireland was also enhanced by characteristics derived from its national origins. Above all was the Irish association of neutrality with an anti-British stance,” (Keatinge, 1989: 68). One of the major themes of the “international” (largely realist) comparative analyses of Irish neutrality is the predominance of the Anglo-Irish context as a crucial variable for understanding the genesis and nature of the Irish neutrality concept. Widmer encapsulates the internationalist view of Irish neutrality that reflects that of the anti-neutrality discourse in Ireland identified in Chapter Three: “when it comes to traditional neutrality, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland come immediately to mind, although strictly speaking, Ireland should be included in the neutral group as well. The Republic of Ireland, a free state since 1921, took a neutral position in World War II.
The predominant feature of Irish neutrality, however, lies in its special relationship to Britain” (Widmer, 1989: 19). Kux summarises an internationalist assessment of Irish neutrality from the point of view of public opinion; he argues “neutrality has come to be regarded by the general public as an essentially nationalistic symbol fraught with nostalgia towards a hard-won independence and with a persistently anti-British flavour arising from its irredentist claim to a united Ireland” (Kux, 1986: 36). Sundelius says “the Irish version of the concept is defined in the context of the overwhelming bilateral relationship with the great power neighbor, the United Kingdom …the doctrine has evolved from a matter of tactics to an element of a national role” (Sundelius, 1987: 8). Andrén declares, “Anglo-Irish relations rather than various forms of great power confrontation are the moving force behind the neutrality of an island country on the ocean fringe of Europe” (Andrén, 1978: 174). And finally, Jesse states, “the initial impulse toward neutrality came from the anti-British sentiment following the Anglo-Irish Treaty” (Jesse, 2006: 21).

It is clear that a distinction has to be drawn between levels of analysis - the state, the government and the people - in making attempts to translate the ‘realist’ literature hypotheses into public opinion hypotheses; for example, it is possible that an anti-British dynamic may be directed towards the British government rather than the British people. Demonstrating a concern for levels of analysis, Keatinge explains, “for the general public a sense of national identity may be manifested in attitudes towards foreign countries, and politicians take into account what they know, or assume, to be the feelings of the public in this regard. In particular, attitudes towards Britain (seen either as a government or a people) continued to provide an incentive to display the symbols of independence, although the constitutional issue had been resolved” (Keatinge, 1978: 74). Similar to Kux, Fanning specifically attributes an anti-British sentiment to the public, and as a time-bound phenomenon: “the Irish electorate historically perceived neutrality as ‘mainly a matter of standing up to John Bull’” (Fanning, 1996: 145). There is some debate as to whether this dynamic of neutrality applied to the public in the past, and if it did, whether it still applies today. In relation to the earlier time period, Mansergh argues that “despite the difficulties and setbacks inevitable under wartime conditions, the feeling of the Irish people towards Britain on the whole continued to improve” (Mansergh, 1946: 95), and in relation to the later time period, Keatinge surmises, “neutrality is no longer presented simply as a function of Anglo-Irish relations, though it certainly retains that characteristic” (Keatinge, 1989: 76).
Arguably, the notion of anti-British dynamic that is raised in retrospective comments should be considered as a time-bound, government-level phenomenon; for example, Fisk argues “for sound historical reasons, neutrality had also come to be seen in Ireland as something intimately bound up with freedom from British rule. It was therefore inevitable that in wartime it would frequently be identified – on both sides of the Irish Sea – as essentially anti-British” (Fisk, 1983: 76). In a 2003 report called “Through Irish Eyes”, commissioned by the British Council and British Embassy in Ireland, there appeared to be a small but significant cohort (8%) of Irish people that expressed unfavourable opinions or impressions of Britain, (although it is not clear in the report whether the data (shown in Appendix A) is from a representative sample of 1200 adults in Ireland, or whether the figures are drawn from a smaller sample of younger people, aged 18-30, called the “successor generation”). If the data shown is based on a sample of younger people, then it is important to consider that there may be a larger cohort in the general Irish population expressing anti-British sentiment, because older people with more experience of historically fraught Anglo-Irish relations may have a higher tendency to convey anti-British sentiment. Although the report shows that respondents were more inclined to have negative feelings towards both the UK and the USA than to less well-known countries, and respondents were less likely to feel ‘very favourably’ towards the UK than to either the USA or France, (Associates, 2003: 16), the report argues, “it is clear that the majority of the successor generation sample is broadly favourable in its attitude towards the UK. Key reasons given for being well disposed included similar culture and interests (16%) and having direct contact with the UK through friends, relatives and having lived there personally (28%)” (Associates, 2003: 17; Lally, 2004). The ISPAS survey asked a question about level of closeness to English people and the results (see appendix B) show that 65% of respondents chose the closest option available, agreeing to marry English people and/or welcome them as members of their family. A further 15% would have English people as close friends. A total of 8% chose one of the three least close options, having English people as citizens (3%), as visitors only (4%) or, finally, debarring English people from Ireland (1%), a figure similar to the percentage of people expressing anti-British sentiment in the “Through Irish Eyes” report.

In the light of Fanning’s assessment that “nationalist, anti-partitionist imperatives insured that Ireland’s neutrality was expressed in essentially anti-British terms” (Fanning, 1996: 142), it is hypothesised that anti-British sentiment is a dynamic of Irish neutrality for the hyper-nationalist segment of the population.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q. Label</th>
<th>Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d8_1</td>
<td>How close would you allow [English]? [tick one]</td>
<td>1–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Marry or welcome as members of your family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Have as close friends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Have as a next-door neighbour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Work in the same work-place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Welcome as Irish citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Have as visitors only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Debar or deport from Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Ethnocentrism_

The hypothesised weakness of the anti-British dimension of public attitudes to Irish neutrality (and the empirical inconvenience of having only one indicator to estimate the latent construct in the model that will be discussed later) signals the need to take a wider theoretical perspective in relation to this issue. Rather than focus on one specific “outgroup”, such as “the British” or the “English”, the thesis investigates a more international and widely used “ethnocentrism” latent orientation. Hurwitz and Peffley define ethnocentrism as “the belief that one’s country is superior to all others” and make a link between ethnocentrism’s fostering of a self-centred and parochial view of the world and a tendency towards isolationism (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1108). The ethnocentric/isolationist hypothesis is alluded to by several realist academics, as many regard neutrality as an isolationist foreign policy; for example, Salmon recounts that “Frei has argued that ‘it is legitimate in the Swiss case to interpret neutrality in terms of isolationism’, while Andrén has noted the ‘traditional idea of Sweden’s attitude to international events – long prevailing, not least in Sweden itself – as one of not having any foreign policy at all’” (Salmon, 1989: 26). Keatinge notes that “at times isolationism has been an important element in Irish foreign policy: it was explicit in the policy of military neutrality during World War II and was partly implicit in the post-war policy of concentrating on the anti-partition campaign rather than developments in Europe”. He argues, “as long as Ireland has remained comparatively untouched by external events and as long as there is a ‘back garden’ demanding attention, an isolationist attitude may be sustained by the indifference of the majority” (Keatinge, 1973: 220).

Schmidt and Heyder also see this functional link with isolationism in a review of ethnocentrism definitions, and identify two dimensions of ethnocentrism: a phenomenon of cultural narrowness and the over-evaluation or idealization of the ingroup (Schmidt and Heyder, 2000). The cultural effect of Ireland’s postcolonial legacy and the notable persistence of a self-critical discourse in the media indicate the
small likelihood of “national superiority” and “blind nationalist” tendencies among the Irish population; that said, several academics (nearly all are members of the Unneutral discourse club) have alleged a pietistic inclinations among some neutrality supporters, emboldened by an image of neutrality as a morally superior foreign policy option (Doherty, 2002: 30; Fanning, 1996: 142-143; FitzGerald, 1995; Salmon, 1989; Sundelius, 1989: 106). Nonetheless, due to the mainly realist literature-based origin of the allegation, and the fact that the Government has asserted in the White Paper, “for the Irish people neutrality has never been a statement of isolationism” (Ireland, 1996: 51), it is hypothesised that ethnocentrism is not a significant dynamic of Irish public opinion on neutrality.

### TABLE 7.5 Ethnocentrism Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q. Label</th>
<th>Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a3_1</td>
<td>Ireland should always follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a11_4</td>
<td>Irish people should support their country even when it is wrong</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a11_3</td>
<td>Generally speaking, Ireland is a better country than most countries</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a3_5</td>
<td>The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Irish</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Efficacy**

Another dynamic of neutrality that frequently appears in the foreign policy literature is the notion of efficacy, linked to perceived levels of power of an individual or a state. Neutrality violates the realist power assumption because “neutrality is the opposite of a typical policy followed by a small state” (Karsh, 1988: 4). “Small” states are associated with low levels of efficacy. According to the realist dictate of foreign policy, small states are expected to align themselves with other states in a military alliance. The Irish government believes that “Ireland is a small country with a limited capacity to influence its external environment” (Ireland, 2000: 3.2.1) and it is likely that individuals might share that perception in answer to a question concerning the ability of the Irish government to have power in a globalised world. Campbell defines the personal notion of efficacy as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process” (Acock, Clarke, and Stewart, 1985: 1063): it is possible to include this personal concept as an efficacy indicator in the model, along with the efficacy measure concerning the government’s ability to influence factors affecting Ireland given the pressure of external factors and dynamics and the perception of the influence of political parties as elements of the structure of the latent variable. Given the theoretical link between neutrality and efficacy is a state-level or government-level “costs and benefits” and realist hypothesis that may not apply the level of the public opinion, it is hypothesised that the public’s
perceptions of governmental and personal efficacy is not a significant determinant of attitude to neutrality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q. Label</th>
<th>Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a9_4</td>
<td>In today’s world, an Irish government can’t really influence what happens in this country [Disagree-Agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a9_2</td>
<td>The ordinary person has no influence on politics. [Disagree-Agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a9_5</td>
<td>It doesn’t really matter which political party is in power, in the end things go on much the same [Disagree-Agree]</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Neutrality**

The relationship between the importance of neutrality and a willingness to retain or reject neutrality is shown in the density graph below (Figure 7.2). The dark clusters in the top left quadrant of the graph show evidence of a relationship after the mid-point of each of the scales, with a correlation between high salience and the wish to retain neutrality attitude. Those who score the strongest on supporting neutrality (i.e. 0, 1 or 2 at Q7a) also score the strongest on the importance of neutrality (i.e. score 8, 9 or 10 at Q7b). The correlation matrix figures in Appendix K shows a reasonably strong statistically significant correlation of 0.5.

FIGURE 7.2  *The relationship of attitude to neutrality and salience of neutrality*
**TABLE 7.7 Neutrality indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q. Label</th>
<th>Wording</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>q7a</td>
<td>And now a question about Irish neutrality. Where would you place yourself on the following scale of 0 to 10 regarding neutrality? A score of “0” means that you think <em>Ireland must remain neutral in all circumstances</em>, and a score of “10” means that you think <em>Ireland should give up its neutrality</em>. Many people would place themselves somewhere between these two views. [Remain - Give Up]</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q7b</td>
<td>Where would you place yourself on the following scale of 0 to 10 regarding how important the issue of neutrality is to you? A score of “0” means that you think neutrality is <em>not at all important</em>, and a score of “10” means that you think neutrality is <em>very important</em>. Many people would place themselves somewhere between these two views [Not - Very Important]</td>
<td>0 – 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model Evaluation and Modifications**

The next section discusses the ‘fit’ of the indicators and their psychometric properties and describes the components of the structural equation model (SEM). The requirement of a formal specification of a model to be estimated and tested, and the relatively few limits on what types of relations can be specified, means that researchers using SEM are forced to think carefully about their data and to venture hypotheses regarding each variable. The most compelling characteristic of SEM is the capacity to estimate and test relations between latent variables (Hoyle, 1995: 14). The isolation of concepts from the uniqueness and unreliability of their indicators increases the probability of detecting association and obtaining estimates of free parameters close to their population values (Hoyle, 1995: 14). The decision-making associated with model specification in SEM is considerably more involved than specification of ANOVA and multiple regression models. One of the reasons why SEM was chosen for the evaluation of public attitudes to Irish neutrality in this thesis is because it allows more conceptual flexibility (as seen in the nature of ‘unobserved’ latent variables and the incorporation of error) compared with other more restrictive and ‘parsimonious’ statistical models. It is also the most ‘realistic’ statistical modelling procedure in terms of reflecting population dynamics within the scientific realm of hypotheses development and evaluation.

A path diagram is a pictorial representation of a structural equation model and is the primary form of communicating the results of SEM hypotheses and results (Hoyle, 1995: 11). The three primary components of a path diagram are rectangles, ellipses and arrows. Rectangles are used to indicate observed variables, which may be either indicators of latent variables in the measurement model, or independent or dependent
variables in the structural model. Ellipses are used to indicate latent variables, independent and dependent variables as well as errors of prediction in the structural model and errors of measurement in the measurement model. Arrows are used to indicate association and are of two sorts. Straight arrows point in one direction and indicate direction of prediction, from predictor to outcome. Curved arrows point in two directions and indicate association (i.e. correlation).

The various indices of model adequacy, particularly the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, tells the degree to which the pattern of fixed and free parameters specified in a model is consistent with the pattern of variances and covariances from a set of observed data (Hoyle, 1995: 3). The pattern of fixed and free parameters in a structural equation model defines two components of the general SEM: the measurement model and the structural model. The measurement model is that part of the overall model in which the latent variables are prescribed. Latent variables or factors are unobserved variables implied by the covariances of two or more indicators. They are free of the random error and uniqueness associated with their indicators. The structural model is the part that prescribes relations between latent variables and observed variables that are not indicators of latent variables. (The typical multiple regression model is a structural model without latent variables and limited to a single outcome).

The most common fit index is the chi-square goodness-of-fit test. The chi-square is in reality a ‘badness of fit’ index: smaller values indicate a better fit (Hoyle, 1995: 7). A chi-square of zero (the residual matrix would contain all zeros) would indicate a perfect fit. The chi-square statistic is evaluated relative to the number of degrees of freedom available for the test. Because the value of $\chi^2$ for SEM models estimated for large samples typically increases to the point where virtually all models are rejected at conventional probability levels, Wheaton et al. suggest a relative chi-square $\chi^2/df$ with a ratio of about 5 or less as “beginning to be reasonable” (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985: 880).

Figure 7.3 shows the pre-testing ‘first’ model. Twelve models were tested altogether, and the eighth model shown in Figure 7.4 proved to be the best for a number of reasons that will be outlined later. First models rarely fit the data after the first iteration, and normally require some adjustments. As there was only one single indicator for the ‘English’ variable (SEM ideally requires at least two indicators for each latent variable), it was eliminated, which vastly improved the model-fit statistics. Instead the wider ‘ethnocentrism’ variable was proposed in its place. The ‘English’
variable will be tested as part of a combined values and socio-demographics/behavioural model in a regression analysis in the next chapter. The changes implemented and shown in the final model in Figure 7.4 were theoretically, substantively and statistically justified.

**FIGURE 7.3 The Initial Model**
Before discussing the results of the structural equation model, it is necessary to briefly address the psychometric properties of the variables used and the levels of measurement reliability. The indicators used in the model are standard and widely accepted constructs in the POFP literature, although it is worth drawing attention to some of the noteworthy features of the indicators. The Irish independence indicators are constructed in a binary with deeper EU integration (rather than Jesse’s suggestion of a “British” other). The decision to use this EU context to ask Irish people about independence can be partly explained by the importance of European integration for the government, the frequent use of EU referendum voting indicators by academics, and the fact that elusive concepts such as independence are constructed and sustained in relation to binary opposite phenomena. The patriotism/national identity indicators are separated from the more “negative” embodiments of blind nationalism or national superiority – the latter constructs are captured in the “ethnocentrism” latent variable. This separation mirrors Blank, Schmidt and Westle’s theoretical approach to modelling similar measures in their study of public opinion, in their decision to distinguish the former ‘constructive’ or ‘positive’ patriotism from the latter “negative” constructs (Blank, Schmidt, and Westle, 2001).

In another example, a US study examined the role of patriotism in foreign policy attitudes, conceived of as “an unswerving love of country or a chauvinistic view of the superiority of one’s nation” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990: 8). The study hypothesised that “stronger attachments towards one’s nation result in a more aggressive approach in dealing with perceived enemies of the patriot’s country” and found that “a general preference for a militant posture in international affairs is bolstered by intense patriotic feelings” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990: 16). However, these hypotheses must be understood in the context of the anti-Soviet images that underpinned the investigation and the notion of threat to US values implied in the dominant Cold War discourse. The opposite is hypothesised in the case of Irish foreign policy attitudes, in that neutrality, as a non-aggressive posture in international affairs, is linked to strong Irish patriotism and national identity. The efficacy orientation is measured at personal, party and governmental levels, giving it a rather broader flavour than the governmental concept envisaged by realists.

It is also important to note the reasons why the model may not fit the data particularly well. Firstly, the assumptions of the data may be violated, i.e. some variables may not be normally distributed, or linearly related. In this model, the correlation matrix of all of the variables in the model (shown in Appendix K) shows robust correlations between the latent variable indicators. Secondly, the measurement model must be
adequate in order to properly evaluate the structural model: in particular, the indicators of the latent variable must be psychometrically appropriate. This model uses indicators that work well, both theoretically and empirically, in other public opinion models.

In evaluating the measurement model the main issue concerns the extent to which the observed variables are actually measuring the hypothesized latent variables. The relationship between the observed variables and the latent variables are indicated by the factor loadings. Factor loadings are interpreted as unstandardised regression coefficients that estimate the direct effects of the factors on the indicators (Kline, 1998: 207); they indicate expected change in the indicator given a 1-point increase in the factor (Kline, 1998: 215). In this model (n=1855), all of the unstandardised loadings that are not fixed to 1.0 to scale factors are significant at the .01 level and all of the error variances are different from zero and significant at the .01 level. Overall, the measurement model appears to perform well, helped by the fact that each latent variable is represented by at least three indicators that are psychometrically sound.

The evaluation of the structural model concerns the relationship between the neutrality, independence, patriotism, efficacy, ethnocentrism and Northern Ireland latent variables. The statistical significance of parameter estimates (magnitude) and the direction (positive or negative coefficients) are required to provide a meaningful interpretation of the results. Theoretically, the concern of this thesis is with the comparison of the strength of the relationships of the independent latent variables with the dependent latent variable. If the theoretical model is a poor fit to the data, the interpretation of the parameter estimates is more difficult, however, even if the overall model is not statistically significant, the latent variable path analysis can still show significant effects. And although in large non-normal samples, significance tests of individual parameters tend to be significant more often than they should, (Kline, 1998: 209). The use of a correlation matrix results in more conservative estimates of parameter statistical significance (Kelloway, 1998: 19).

Another important measure is the assessment of the ‘fit’ of the data to the model, specifically, the comparative fit of the default model to the data vis-à-vis the null model (Kelloway, 1998: 29). The goodness-of-fit statistics that evaluate the overall fit of the model are included. The rmsea figure should be above .04 and the pclose should approximate 1.00: neither of these goodness-of-fit criteria are met in the initial model, although the elimination of the single-indicator “English” latent variable improved the model-fit statistics.
Other modifications to the initial model include the representation of the autocorrelation of the independence and efficacy latent variables, and the ethnocentrism and patriotism latent variables. These moves are theoretically justified given the close relationship between patriotism and ethnocentrism (the latter is considered the “darker” side of the former) and the interrelationship of efficacy with independence - to a large degree, perceptions of the former depend on the latter. The error term for the “Ireland should always follow its own interests” ethnocentrism indicator was correlated with the independence latent variable, illustrating a common problem in SEM of the potential of many indicators to measure more than one latent variable. This problem helps to explain the correlation of error terms, for example, the error term of the patriotism indicator, “I would rather be a citizen of Ireland than any other country in the world” correlated with the ethnocentrism indicator “generally speaking, Ireland is a better country than most countries” because they are measuring a similar orientation. Measurement error correlations reflect the assumption that the two indicators measure something in common that is not presented in the model (Kline, 1998: 201). Each of the modifications proved statistically significant at the .01 level. Having accounted for these modifications the final results showed the overall model fit the data better, with the pclose at 1.0, the rmsea of .042 coming in below the .05 threshold, and a reasonable relative chi-square ratio ($\chi^2/df$) of 4 (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985: 880).
Unstandardized estimates
chi-square=681.508 df=160 p-value=.000
rmsea=.042 pclose=1.00
Looking at the regression weights of the five latent variables shown in Table 7.8 below, only the two hypothesized determinants of public support for Irish neutrality, independence and patriotism, showed statistically significant parameter estimates and positive relationships (.6 and .8 respectively) with the neutrality latent variable. By comparison, the efficacy (.04), Northern Ireland (-.01) and ethnocentrism (-.15) parameters are weak and are not statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7.8 Full Model Latent Variable Regression Weights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutrality &lt;---- Ethnocentrism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutrality &lt;---- Patriotism</td>
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<td>Neutrality &lt;---- Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>Neutrality &lt;---- Independence</td>
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<td>Neutrality &lt;---- Efficacy</td>
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Values as structural dimensions of neutrality attitudes

This analysis has shown that there are two important cognitive orientations and values that structure public attitudes to Irish neutrality: patriotism and independence. The results in terms of the hypotheses set out earlier are as follows:

- Independence: null hypothesis can be rejected as it is a relatively strong positive factor
- Patriotism: null hypothesis can be rejected as it is a relatively strong positive factor
- Ethnocentrism: null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no effect.
- Northern Ireland: null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no effect.
- Efficacy: null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no effect.

Erasing the relationship between the non-significant latent variables yields slightly different estimates for patriotism (.91) and independence (.59) shown in Table 7.9 below, with larger critical ratios, particularly for patriotism, whilst the model-fit statistics stay virtually unchanged. The ($\chi^2/df$) ratio improves only very marginally, reducing by .08, and the rmsea shows a slight improvement also, with a .001 reduction. The magnitude of the standardised estimates improves for Patriotism, from .19 to .22, whilst independence loses .01. However, the focus of this thesis is on the relative strength of each of the five latent variables in the model, and it is clear that independence and patriotism are the two most significant dimensions underpinning
public attitudes to Irish neutrality, whilst the realist, elite-level factors of efficacy, ethnocentrism and Northern Ireland have no effect.⁴⁰

| TABLE 7.9 Two-Dimensional Model Latent Variable Regression Weights |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Neutrality | Patriotism | Estimate | S.E. | C.R. | P |
| Neutrality | Independence | .905 | .127 | 7.131 *** |
| Neutrality | Independence | .589 | .065 | 9.053 *** |

To conclude, the literature that posits efficacy as a driver of neutrality does not appear to reflect the values and orientations that drive public attitudes to Irish neutrality. The SEM results also confirm that neither ethnocentrism nor attitudes to Northern Ireland are dynamics of public attitudes to Irish neutrality. The relative strength of the independence and patriotism factors confirms the importance of these two themes and the theoretical relevance of the social constructivist framework that considers the identity factor in foreign policy analysis. One of the political consequences of this identity-based neutrality dynamic is the expectation of stability in the Irish population’s support for Irish neutrality over the short- to medium-term, given the small likelihood of significant change in the identity (and values) of the population. This finding has implications for the Irish government, specifically, the plan for a future referendum on Irish neutrality in the context of the government’s agreement to create a European Union military alliance.

The IR theoretical basis of dimensions

In an analysis of US public opinion and foreign policy discussed in Chapter Five, Wittkopf found public attitudes were structured along two dimensions, and of them, he argued “Internationalism now has two faces: a cooperative face and a militant face. Attitudes toward communism, the use of military force abroad, and relations with the Soviet Union are the principal factors that distinguish proponents and opponents of the two faces of internationalism” (Wittkopf, 1990: 25). These same types of dimensions have been used in analyses of other cases of public opinion and foreign policy. It was Bjereld and Ekengren who first made the link between foreign policy attitude dimensions and theories of International Relations. They argued ‘both the categories “militant international” and co-operative internationalism” are easy to relate to the two basic theoretical perspectives “neorealism” and “neoliberalism”’ (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 505). In a study of mass and elite foreign policy opinions, Oldendick and Bardes found that “for both the mass and elite groups, most of the dimensions were strongly related to the political philosophy of the respondents” (Oldendick and

⁴⁰ A model with a single indicator dependent variable of attitude to neutrality contained in Appendix I shows that the relationships also remain the same, with attitudes loading on the two dimensions of independence and patriotism.
Bardes, 1982: 371). The link between attitude dimensions and theories of IR is important to consider because of the link between the frameworks of understanding employed in analyses of Irish neutrality and the evaluation of the rationality of public opinion in those contexts. In other words, if public opinion on Irish neutrality is loaded on non-realist dimensions and the majority of the literature understands Irish neutrality through realism, it is likely that public opinion would be characterised as “non-rational”.

In the conclusion of his article that examined Irish neutrality in a theoretical and comparative perspective, Neal G. Jesse makes two separate calls, one for an examination of our long-held theories of international relations and the other for ways to understand a security identity tied to nationalism and independence. The calls are made because, on the basis of his conclusion that Irish neutrality wraps itself in its hostile relations with Britain, the continuing separation of Northern Ireland, notions of independence and sovereignty, party politics and the continuance of myths in Irish public opinion, “it is obvious that realist theory grossly underestimates the contributions of domestic factors to the establishment and maintenance of Irish neutrality” (Jesse, 2006: 8) (emphasis added). On the basis of this thesis, particularly the deconstruction undertaken in Chapter Three that demonstrated that IR theory constrains analyses of Irish neutrality, it is argued that Jesse’s two calls are interdependent, in that the second demand can only be achieved by meeting the first demand.

Whilst this chapter supports Jesse’s argument that the development of a security identity that is tied to nationalism and independence contributes to the continuation of neutrality (Jesse, 2006: 23, 25), his claims that liberal theories give us a better understanding of and a persuasive argument for continued Irish neutrality (Jesse, 2006: 23) are not supported with respect to the dimensions of supportive attitudes of the Irish public. This is because (1) neoliberalism accords public opinion agency with respect to foreign policy only through governments, and it is clear from Chapter Two that the Irish government concept of neutrality does not reflect or capture public concepts of neutrality41 and (2) neoliberalism (compared with critical social constructivism) does not seriously consider identity as a variable in state foreign policy or in public support for foreign policy.

41 The post-Nice I defeat meant the government (1) cobbled together a declaration by the heads of government of the EU member-states with regard to Irish “military neutrality”, and (2) offered a referendum to the Irish people on Irish neutrality, should the Irish government, along with the other EU heads of government, decide to create an EU military alliance. The declaration did nothing to secure the concepts of Irish neutrality held by the majority of the public (only 1% of the population define Irish neutrality in the same terms as the government’s concept of “military neutrality”), which included elements of active neutrality i.e. support for the primacy of the UN and UN peacekeeping, anti-colonialism, anti-militarism, independence and staying out of war.
The theoretical framework of understanding used by academics has a key role in the characterisations of Irish neutrality as “singular” and “unique among the European neutrals” (Jesse, 2006: 23) because a social constructivist perspective would find that Ireland’s neutrality is not distinct from that of the other European neutrals, because, as pointed out earlier in this chapter and Chapter Three, two major elements driving the maintenance of those European states’ neutrality are public opinion (Dahl, 1997: 20; Goetschel, 1999: 121; Kux, 1986: 36-37; Lahodynsky, 1992: 26; Sloan, 1998: 5) and identity (Dahl, 1997: 19-22; Joenniemi, 1989: 58; Kronsell and Svedberg, 154; Ogley, 1970: 180; Thalberg, 1989: 236). In addition, neutrality is characterised as a positive foreign policy option in the social constructivist framework, in stark contrast to the majority of FPA scholars (aka realist scholars) who “maintain that neutrality by its very nature constitutes a defective policy whose inherent drawbacks and limitations far exceed its potential benefits” (Karsh, 1988: 195).

**Conclusion**

Whether the dimensions of ‘patriotism’ and ‘independence’ are considered ‘rational’ or not is to a large extent dependent on the IR theoretical (and metatheoretical) framework used by the academic researcher. A social constructivist-informed analysis of the empirical model of public opinion on Irish neutrality presented in this chapter would conclude that public attitudes to Irish neutrality are ‘rationally’ structured along two complementary dimensions of independence and patriotism. Although (neo)realists would concur with the independence dimension as ‘rational’, they would argue that public attitudes to neutrality are not ‘rational’ because the central (neo)realist theoretical concept of efficacy does not feature as a driver. In addition, the insignificance of links made by (neo)realist analysts of Irish neutrality between NATO membership and Partition evident in this model of public opinion would also lead them to question the rationality of the dimensions.

In the context of the dominance of the (neo)realist approach to neutrality in the FPA and POFP literature, the results of this analysis have demonstrated the need to undertake a poststructuralist, metatheoretical review of the relevant foreign policy literature before formulating theoretical hypotheses, writing a questionnaire, gathering data and conducting empirical analyses of cases of public attitudes to foreign policy. The metatheoretical analysis of the assumptions underpinning the academic and elite discourses on Irish neutrality undertaken in Chapters Two and Three did give some initial indications as to the inadequacy of the hypotheses that are derived from the neorealist, state-centric FPA literature for understanding and explaining the case of
public opinion and Irish neutrality. The significance of the identity factor in the core beliefs and values models in this chapter signals the need to stretch the IR theoretical spectrum used to understand and explain Irish neutrality beyond (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism to incorporate a critical social constructivist approach.
INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter showed that values underpin public attitudes to Irish neutrality, which is evidence in favour of the ‘rational public’ hypothesis. Chapter Five discussed a number of hypotheses drawn from literature on POFP that are applicable to public attitudes to Irish neutrality. Testing Irish public attitudes to neutrality on a set of comparative, international socio-demographic and behavioural public opinion norms contributes to the assessment as to whether Irish public opinion on neutrality is arguably peculiar or singular, and a case apart. This chapter will address the prevalent ‘gender gap’ (Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 117; Wittkopf, 1990: 40), ‘generation gap’ (Holsti and Rosenau, 1990: 117; Wittkopf, 1990: 42-43), political party affiliation (Bardees and Oldendick, 1978: 505; Feldman, 1988: 429; Holsti, 1996: 131; Marsh, 1992: 16), education (Almond, 1960: 127; Holsti, 1996: 178; Nie, 1974: 566-571; Sinnott, 1995) and rural-urban (Almond, 1960: 132; Marsh, 1992: 14) hypotheses in the international, comparative POFP literature, simultaneously with hypotheses derived from the previous 1992 empirical study on public opinion and neutrality carried out by Marsh. The results will indicate whether the dynamics of Irish public opinion can be considered as typical and ‘rational’ as the characteristics of public opinion on foreign policy in other countries.

These hypotheses will be tested in a multiple regression model that also incorporates the core beliefs and values tested in the structural equation model (with ethnocentrism substituted for anti-English sentiment). This multi-variate approach reflects that of Bjereid and Ekengren who used both socio-economic explanations and values in their regression model of Swedish attitudes to foreign policy (Bjereid and Ekengren, 1999: 512). These findings will build upon the findings of the only quantitative socio-demographic analysis of public opinion on Irish neutrality carried out by Michael Marsh (1992). In this study, Marsh found that neutrality is an option most favoured by rural dwellers, (Marsh, 1992: 14) and to a lesser extent, the working class C2DE grouping (related to the education/information hypothesis). The pattern with respect to age or gender is “somewhat inconsistent - the differences are normally quite small” (Marsh, 1992: 14).

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2 This is used as a proxy for the information/attentiveness hypotheses (Almond, 1960: 241-242; Kegley Jr., 1986; McCloskey, 1967: 76-77; Wittkopf, 1986: 433, 1990: 45; and sophistication hypotheses (Sulfaro, 1996; Wittkopf, 1990: 15).
Although the previous chapter examined the overall relationship between the salience of neutrality and attitude to neutrality, it is worth exploring the relationship in more detail in this chapter. The table in Appendix G shows the distribution of responses across the categories by percentage figures. The same proportion of the population (4 in 10 people) regards neutrality as very important (8-10 on the question scale). Few (8.7%) are prepared to say that neutrality is ‘not at all important’. Even those who offered their disagreement with neutrality (code 29) instead of a definition at Qa6 (see Appendix E) have an average score of 5 for the importance of neutrality in a 0 to 10 scale (Q7b), and barely reject neutrality with a score 6.6 (Q7a) when the strongest possible rejection score of 10 is available. On the other hand this phenomenon could be related to the persistent ‘presence’ of neutrality; it is still held to be the cornerstone of Irish foreign policy and appears intermittently as part of the national discourse, e.g. during EU referendums and wars. On utilitarian grounds, it is plausible that few firmly believe that neutrality is a completely useless concept, despite the disregard for neutrality evident in the European and North American political and diplomatic discourses.

The question is to what extent do these two sets of retain and salience attitudes overlap? Do 4 in 10 people in Ireland feel strongly that Irish neutrality should be retained and that it is very important? The distribution of those people who strongly advocate that Irish neutrality should be retained (scoring 0-2 on the attitude scale) in Table 8.1 shows that the majority (74%) believe it is highly salient, scoring between 8
and 10 on the attitude scale. Therefore, 3 in 10 people in Ireland are very strong advocates of Irish neutrality, believing it should be retained and that it is highly salient. A majority (nearly 6 in 10) of those who offered the mid-point score (5) of the eleven-point scale of attitude to neutrality also chose the mid-point score (5) of the salience scale. This indicates that an individual who is ambivalent about whether neutrality should be retained or rejected or who offers no opinion on that question, would be likely to have no opinion as regards the salience of neutrality.

From the point of view of the ‘rational’ public hypothesis, it is important to separate out those who are ambivalent about whether Ireland should retain her neutrality – pulled in two directions - from those who are indifferent and have no opinion. From the previous table it is clear that 14% of the population fall into the latter category. One way of looking for people who are genuinely ambivalent is to examine those who think neutrality is of utmost importance (score of ten on q7a) but who chose the mid-point score of five on the retain-reject question. Less than 1% of people in Ireland believe that neutrality is very important (10) but who occupy the middle ground as to whether neutrality should be given up or retained.

**Investigating the gender gap hypothesis**

The “gender gap” refers to the types of issues which give rise to consistent and substantial differences between men and women (Holsti, 1996: 167) and it is held that foreign policy is salient in producing gender differences (Wittkopf, 1990: 42). In a US study of the structure of public opinion Wittkopf found that there were significant differences between men and women on the Militant internationalism dimension (identified as an IR theoretical realist dimension by Bjereld and Ekenengren (1999)), with men more supportive of it and women more opposed to it (Wittkopf, 1990: 42). Women tend to dislike militarist action and men tend to approve of a more hawkish stand (Bjereld and Ekenengren, 1999: 511) and it is possible that retaining neutrality is viewed as a less militaristic foreign policy option than rejecting neutrality. The effect of gender on attitude to neutrality will be evaluated in the following ordinary least-squares regression model that control for other potentially salient socio-demographic and behavioural variables such as age, party affiliation and levels of education.

**The Generation or Age Gap**

The “generation gap” hypothesis has joined the ranks of famous “gap” hypotheses in the FPA and POFP literatures (Holsti, 1996: 157). The generation gap hypothesis involves establishing cutting-off points for age groups based on crucial events experienced during people’s formative years (Holsti, 1996: 162), such as the Vietnam
War or the bombing of Pearl Harbour and subsequent entry of the US into World War II. Formulating cutting-off points for the age categories of the Irish population with respect to significant foreign policy events is difficult because there is no consensus with respect to identifying the latter (although there are some possibilities, such as the experience of neutrality during World War II and Ireland’s entry into the EEC in 1973). To date, the empirical evidence in POFP analyses has not matched the theoretical plausibility of different generational interpretations of foreign policy (Holsti, 1996: 159). A more straightforward approach involves testing whether there are any differences in attitudes to neutrality on the basis of age. Past survey and voting data suggest that cleavages don’t fall neatly along age lines. In US POFP studies, Wittkopf hypothesises that those aged over fifty were ‘hard-line’ whilst those aged between 18 and 25 were ‘accommodationists’ (Wittkopf, 1990: 43) whilst Holsti is less positive of the relationships, surmising that the relationship between age and the four foreign policy orientations of hard-liners, internationalists, isolationists and accommodationists has been consistently weak (Holsti, 1996: 164).

There are several ways to apply the ‘age gap’ hypothesis to the case of Irish public opinion on Irish neutrality. One way is to hypothesise that younger people who were born after Ireland joined the European Community/Union might have a tendency to reject Irish neutrality given the dominance of the elite discourses against Irish neutrality in order to further European defence integration and NATO expansion. On the other hand, neutrality is also characterised by the alternative discourses as a moral and idealistic foreign policy option, and this may appeal more to the younger generation. This latter hypothesis is not as clear-cut because the elites pushing for further European defence integration reject neutrality as an immoral foreign policy option, so the grounds for morality claims are spread between the two opposing discourses. With respect to cleavages on Irish neutrality, Marsh noted the inconsistent results regarding the link between age and attitude to neutrality. He noted that younger people and older people were more inclined to support neutrality (Marsh, 1992: 15), but the differences were quite small. The effect of age on attitudes to neutrality will be examined in the OLS regression models to follow.

**Party Affiliation hypothesis and the left-right spectrum**

Foreign policy has never been an electoral issue in Irish politics (Keatinge, 1973: 258) due to several reasons, including the bipartisanship on neutrality since the World War and the organisation of the parties and party headquarters’ inability to have an effect on essentially localised political campaigns (Keatinge, 1973: 260). While placing attitudes to neutrality in the context of the characteristics of the Irish political system,
Keatinge points out that “the insularity of the Irish political system is seen in the relative weakness of the left-right party cleavage which is regarded as the norm in other West European states” (Keatinge, 1984: 100). Although this norm is standard in POFP analysis, it may not be applicable in the case of Ireland.

In 1984, Patrick Keatinge characterised the Labour Party (the oldest surviving political party) as the only party that advocated the concept of ‘fundamental’ neutrality; in fact, the party wanted to make it constitutionally unlawful to join a military alliance (Keatinge, 1984: 107). In the 1990s, a section of the party started to moved away from this position, for example, the then leader of Democratic Left (a party that has since merged with the Labour Party), Mr. Proinsias de Rossa said to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, “I have been arguing for some time that we needed to look at the idea of traditional neutrality. This is not just in terms of the changes in eastern Europe, but even predating that there were clearly changes on a world level which made the idea of traditional neutrality redundant” (Fanning, 1995). It is important to note that if there are differences of opinion over foreign policy within any of the political parties, the public is not likely to know about it (Keatinge, 1973: 263). Fianna Fáil has traditionally turned with the wind with respect to neutrality, playing to the galleries of public opinion and EU and US political elites, with no fundamental or ideological policy position, whereas Fine Gael advocates deeper integration with the EU and rejects Irish neutrality. Opting out of NATO in 1949 showed the constraints on Fine Gael’s attitude to neutrality; as Keatinge put it, “Fine Gael could not afford to opt out of a competition for nationalist legitimacy” (Keatinge, 1984: 101).

It is the smaller, radical parties of Sinn Féin and the Green Party that have emerged with policies in support of neutrality in recent years, and in the case of Sinn Féin, to the extent of supporting a rejection of membership of the EU to safeguard neutrality. Sinn Féin tabled a Private Members Bill in 2003 in an attempt to enshrine neutrality in the constitution, with the proposed amendment to article 28 reading “War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war or other armed conflict, nor aid foreign powers in any way in preparation for war or other armed conflict, or conduct of war or other armed conflict, save with the assent of Dáil Éireann” (O'Regan, Parties 43 An Irish CND report states, “The recent [1994/1995] Labour Party conference, on the insistence of the leadership, passed a resolution that there would be no change in Ireland’s military neutrality unless a referendum decided otherwise, turning down the proposal specifically to support neutrality and oppose WEU membership” (Goodwillie, 2006). Prior to the launch of the 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy written by the then Rainbow Government consisting of Democratic Left (that in 1998 merged with the Labour Party), Labour Party and Fine Gael, the leaders of the former two parties, Prionsias de Rossa and Dick Spring, moved away from the ‘active’ neutrality position once advocated by each of their parties. In a party speech delivered in March 1999, the Labour Party leader Mr. Ruairí Quinn advocated an EU defence and peacekeeping force to replace NATO and said he believed the results of a new IGC on a ‘Northern Hemisphere Defence Union’ would almost certainly lead to a redefinition of our neutrality’ (Quinn, 1999). This stands in opposition to a concept of active neutrality that involves peacekeeping with the UN only and the primacy and reform of that body.
The pattern of support for Irish neutrality by party vote (mean scores are shown in parentheses) in the ISPAS data shows that Sinn Féin (2.9), the Labour Party (3.3) and the Green Party (3.4) voters are more supportive of neutrality compared with the government coalition parties of Fianna Fáil (3.5) and the Progressive Democrats (4.6), as well as Fine Gael (3.8), although the difference between Fianna Fáil and the Green Party is marginal.

The numerous POFP studies suggesting a political party affiliation hypothesis have done so in the context of a left-right dimension (Bardes and Oldendick, 1978: 505; Holsti, 1996: 131), which as Keatinge makes clear, is not present in Ireland. Figure 8.2 below shows there is a poor relationship between self-placement on a left-right scale and attitudes to neutrality - the pattern is nearly flat and the correlation statistic of the two variables is -0.05.

FIGURE 8.2 Attitude to neutrality by left-right self-placement

Many of the US studies have found that party affiliation or partisanship has little importance in discriminating among respondents’ attitudes (Wittkopf, 1981: 120). Nonetheless, the question remains, can cleavages in public attitudes to Irish neutrality be explained in relation to party affiliations? For example, if a person expresses an intention to vote for Fine Gael, does it mean the voter may hold relatively dismissive or negative concepts of neutrality and negative attitudes towards the concept due to this political party affiliation? Marsh (1992: 16) found that attitudes to neutrality were
not strongly linked to party political affiliations. Given the changing positions of the major parties on the issue over the past twenty years, and the fact that neutrality is not a major electoral issue means that the public have not had to map parties with positions on neutrality, it is hypothesised that party affiliation is unlikely to be a significant variable in predicting attitudes to neutrality.

**Education**

It was noted in Chapter Six, that, “Rosenau found that individuals without the requisite information and interest in international affairs possessed opinions that were lacking in structure” (Sulfaro, 1996: 312) (notably Rosenau drew his conclusions in relation to a structure based on attitudes towards foreign policy and international events). In the POFP literature, a veritable industry has grown up around the hypothesis (commonly employed by realists using a security policy framework to interpret attitudes) that levels of political information and knowledge about international relations are a means to examine the structure of foreign policy opinions and to separate ‘real’ from ‘random’ foreign policy opinions (Sinnott, 2000: 1). The counter-argument is articulated by Wittkopf, who claimed that interest and knowledge are largely irrelevant to whether the American people are able, in the aggregate, to hold politically relevant foreign policy beliefs: “foreign policy beliefs may be both coherent and politically relevant even if they are not grounded in political sophistication” (Wittkopf, 1990: 15).

One of the best-supported generalisations in the US literature about foreign policy attitudes is that increasing levels of education are associated with stronger support for the co-operative (as opposed to the militant) side of the internationalism dimension (Holsti, 1996: 178). In the earliest studies, Almond found that “substantially more of the grade school groups showed isolationist and nationalist tendencies” (Almond, 1960: 128). In recent studies, Wittkopf found the more educated people were, the more likely they were to be ‘isolationists’ (Wittkopf, 1990: 37). Chapter Six discussed the difficulties in understanding what is meant by ‘isolationist’ and ‘internationalist’, and these difficulties are even more pronounced in attempts to apply these hypotheses to attitudes to neutrality because of the competing discourses over whether neutrality is a negative ‘isolationist’ policy or a positive, ‘active’, ‘internationalist’ policy. Is a state judged to be internationalist if it engages in military intervention, including starting a war (which (1) brings attention to the issue over whether military intervention that is to most people ‘war’ is acknowledged officially and internationally as a ‘war’, and (2) requires a judgement as to whether it is a just war or not) or is the meaning of the term with respect to the military activity of
peacekeeping? Can a state like Ireland be considered ‘internationalist’ rather than ‘isolationist’ if neutrality is adhered to, war is eschewed and peacekeeping is carried out? In terms of understanding the relationship between attitudes and levels of education, Holsti found levels of support for military action to drive Iraq out of Kuwait were consistently highest amongst those with college experience, although these differences narrowed during and after the war (Holsti, 1996: 179).

Almond found that “characteristically there were between two and three times as many “don't knows” or “no opinions” among those limited to grade school education as there were among the college educated” (Almond, 1960: 127). Education is related to the ability or willingness of an individual to provide a concept of neutrality in the ISPAS survey and the ability or willingness of an individual to provide a concept of neutrality does indicate levels of political interest and knowledge. Nonetheless, Holsti hypothesised that more detailed education variable analyses were more likely to aid understanding of the impact of occupation on foreign policy attitudes, rather than the effects of education (Holsti, 1996: 179) (emphasis added). Given that Marsh found that the working class C2DE social grouping (with lower than average education levels) is more likely to support neutrality, it is hypothesised that those with higher levels of education are more likely to reject neutrality.

Urban-Rural
A regional hypothesis is frequently considered in analyses of US public opinion; scholars such as Almond have suggested a geographical thesis that emphasized urban/rural differences in place of a regional explanation (Almond, 1960: 132). Holsti found that “evidence to substantiate the regional thesis is at best mixed” (Holsti, 1996: 180). Marsh found that rural dwellers were more in favour of neutrality (Marsh, 1992: 14) and that a higher percentage of rural dwellers were opposed to sending troops to the Gulf to assist the allied forces compared with urban dwellers (Marsh, 1992: 16).

Unconsidered Variables: security considerations and threat perception.
Everts argues, “there may be obvious reasons (including the wish to be as “objective” as possible) why public opinion is for all intents and purposes equated with “unstructured” and “nonorganized” opinion that is measured by mass surveys” (Everts, 2000: 179). Several problems with the assumptions embedded in this statement were articulated in Chapter Seven, including (1) that studies are concerned with understanding opinion vis-à-vis elite security policy that appears to be held to be rational by the academic and (2) that the security policy is assumed to be the type of policy that should be supported by the public. Public opinion is considered
‘unstructured’ and ‘non-organised’ because it does not appear to fit into the yardstick of security policy used by some realist academics to understand it. Other academics have established that “some opinions are largely unrelated to security considerations”; one “example concerns the confidence of Europeans in their security, which changed surprisingly little as a result of changing perceptions of the military balance” (Eichenberg, 1989: 5; 2000). Other realist yardsticks of foreign policy attitude rationality such as threat perception, have also turned out to be irrelevant variables in the search for structure; for example, Sinnott found “support for particular security arrangements or institutions [e.g. NATO] is only weakly related or may even be decoupled from threat perceptions” (Sinnott, 1997: 20). These yardsticks and variables that are commonly prescribed in the mainstream FPA and POFP literatures are not considered in this model due to the lack of data. The analysis above suggests that they are probably not drivers of neutrality.

The data and hypotheses
Table 8.1 describes the variables used in the model:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Label</th>
<th>Variable Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>q7a</td>
<td>Ireland, neutrality-remain/give up</td>
<td>Neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f1</td>
<td>sex of respondent</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f2yr</td>
<td>year of birth</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f4b</td>
<td>highest level of education completed</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e21</td>
<td>size of location</td>
<td>Urban-rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a9_4</td>
<td>Irl govt can’t influence what happens-Irl</td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q6_1</td>
<td>1/term,N.Irl-reunify with rest of Irl</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a5_4</td>
<td>Irl &amp; EU-unite fully/protect independence</td>
<td>Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d2</td>
<td>proud to be Irish</td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d8_1</td>
<td>how close you would allow-English</td>
<td>Anti-English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a15</td>
<td>if gen election tomorrow-give 1st pref?</td>
<td>Party Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a16</td>
<td>voting next ref (Nice)-favour/against?</td>
<td>Nice(II)Treaty Vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependent variable** (q7a): 0 means strongly retain neutrality and a score of 10 means strongly reject neutrality.

**Independent variables and hypotheses:**

**Socio-demographics**

**Gender** (f1): 1 = male and 2 = female. As Wittkopf found that men were more supportive of the Militant internationalism/realist dimension and women more opposed to it, (Wittkopf, 1990: 42), which was linked to the finding that women tend to dislike militarist action and men tend to approve of a more hawkish stand, (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 511). It is hypothesised that men are more likely to reject neutrality (conceived as a non-militarist stance) than women.
Age (f2yr): year=birth of respondent. As discussed earlier, the generation gap hypothesis of the international literature is not supported by empirical evidence and it is quite difficult to translate to this model because there are no Irish foreign policy events that stand out as having a profound effect on people’s lives. Previous Irish empirical evidence (Marsh, 1992) indicates younger people and older people do tend to support neutrality more than the rest, but the differences are quite small. Drawing on Wittkopf’s findings again, as the younger generation eschews the militant thrust of the Cold War foreign policy consensus (Wittkopf, 1990: 43) and neutrality is conceived as a policy opposed to the Cold War foreign policy consensus, it is hypothesised that younger people are more likely to wish to retain neutrality.

Education (f4b): 1= started primary level of education…11= finished third level postgraduate education. Education is a proxy for information and interest in Sinnott’s approach to modelling public opinion and foreign policy (2000) and is hypothesised to be a reasonable predictor of attitudes. Sinnott noted that the level of knowledge of the EU and its operations found in those opposed and those in favour of a common EU defence policy is slightly curvilinear. Higher levels of opposition are found among the least and the best informed on the European Union (25% and 29% respectively) (Sinnott, 1995: 17). Conceiving of neutrality as a policy that stands in opposition to a common EU defence policy would imply a relationship between education and attitude to neutrality, if, as Sinnott argues, education is linked to information. As most studies have not found a link between education and foreign policy opinion, it is hypothesised that education has no relationship with attitude to neutrality.

Urban-Rural (e21): 1= big city, 2= suburbs of a big city, 3= small town or city, 4= a country village, 5= a farm or home in the country. Marsh found that rural dwellers were marginally more inclined to support neutrality (Marsh, 1992). Given the differences between urban and rural dwellers were quite small and the theoretical issues discussed earlier, it is hypothesised that urban-rural is not a predictor of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

Values and Core Beliefs
The values and core beliefs are those considered in the SEM model (using the reference indicators), with the exception of ‘anti-English sentiment’, which is tested instead of ethnocentrism. The hypotheses remain the same as those posited in the SEM model.
Efficacy (a9_4): 1= strongly disagree…7= strongly agree. The feeling that people and the government have the power to exercise and fulfil a policy agenda or the power to determine one’s own path or the path of the state may be related to attitudes in favour of rejecting or retaining neutrality. State-level analyses suggest that efficacy is related to attitudes to neutrality, but it is hypothesised that efficacy is not a factor driving public attitudes to neutrality.

Northern Ireland (q6_1): 1= strongly disagree…7= strongly agree. It is hypothesised that Northern Ireland is an organising heuristic of neutrality attitudes in the realist literature employing a state-level analysis, specifically that attitudes in favour of re-unification are linked to attitudes rejecting Irish neutrality. As it is a relationship that applies to the level of government, with little evidence that it applies at the level of public opinion, it is hypothesised that Northern Ireland is not a predictor of public attitudes to Irish neutrality.

Independence (a5_4): 0= Ireland should unite fully with EU…10= Ireland should protect independence. It is hypothesised that because neutrality embodies the value of independence, a strong wish for independence should predict strong support for neutrality.

Patriotism (d2): 1= very proud to be Irish…4= not at all proud. As neutrality is a central part of the identity of the Irish people and the state, it is hypothesised that the more proud an individual is to be Irish, the more the individual will express support for Irish neutrality.

Anti-English sentiment (d8_1): 1= marry and have part of family…7= deport or debar from Ireland. The literature posits that neutrality is a result of anti-British feeling and on that basis, gives rise to the hypothesis that strong anti-English sentiment predicts strong support for neutrality.

Behaviour
Political Party vote in future election (a15): parties were run as dummy variables with Fianna Fáil, the largest political party in the State, as the reference. Marsh found that although the supporters of some parties seem to value neutrality more than others, the differences were quite small (Marsh, 1992: 16). As neutrality is not an election issue and there appears to be a lack of association between parties and positions on
neutral in public opinion, it is hypothesised that party voting behaviour is not a significant predictor of attitudes to neutrality.

**Nice Treaty** vote in future referendum (Nice II) (a16): 1= definitely vote in favour, 7= definitely vote against the Nice Treaty. Although the pro-Nice lobby and government put great effort into communicating the message that “neutrality” is safeguarded through the Seville Declaration, the Green Party and pro-neutrality lobby groups highlighted that the Seville Declaration does not safeguard (active) Irish neutrality. There may be a split vote as a result, with those in favour of retaining neutrality believing the Government and some believing the Opposition. It is hypothesised that those strongly in favour of retaining an ‘active’ concept of neutrality will vote against the Nice Treaty and those against neutrality will vote in favour of the Treaty. If there is a relationship, it indicates that adherence to ‘active’ neutrality provides a motivation to turn out to vote against EU referendums, corroborating the findings of the post-referendum survey reports by Sinnott.

**The models**

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model starts with the socio-demographic variables (gender, age, education, urban-rural) that constitute the social structure, followed by the addition of the values and attitudes variables (efficacy, attitudes to Northern Ireland, independence, patriotism and anti-English sentiment). These values are theoretical determinates of the behavioural variables (party vote, Nice Treaty vote).

**The findings**

The F-test of the ordinary least-squares regression model is statistically significant. The final model’s r-squared statistic of .0912 means that no more than 9% of the variance of attitude to neutrality (q7a) is accounted for by this model, however, this is a reasonable figure given that most public opinion models achieve an r-squared measure of between .08 and .10.
The directions of the coefficients correspond to the *a priori* assumptions made about the relationship between attitude to neutrality and the predictor variables, with one exception. As hypothesised, the regression coefficients for the social factors of gender and age, the values of independence and patriotism and voting behaviour in the Nice Treaty referendum are statistically significant. One exception is the relationship between anti-English sentiment and attitude to neutrality: in support of the literature on Irish neutrality but contrary to the hypothesis of this thesis, this relationship turns out to be positive and statistically significant.

**Socio-demographics: Gender, Age, Education and Urban–Rural**

The models consistently show evidence in favour of the hypothesis that men are more likely to reject neutrality compared to women. Are younger people are more likely to wish to retain neutrality? Looking at the unstandardised age coefficient, a one-unit increase in the year of birth variable (equivalent to a one year decrease in age) predicts a .015 decrease in q7a (equivalent to a marginal increase in the desire to retain Irish neutrality). Therefore, younger people are slightly more inclined to support the retention of Irish neutrality, confirming part of Marsh’s 1992 findings. The null hypothesis for the relationship between education and neutrality cannot be rejected. The null hypothesis regarding the relationship between urban–rural home location and public attitudes to Irish neutrality cannot be rejected. The failure of the urban–rural location to be a factor in the Irish case of public foreign policy attitudes corroborates the findings from analyses of US public opinion on foreign policy.
Values: Independence, Patriotism, Efficacy, Northern Ireland and anti-English

It is expected that the values found to be predictors of attitudes to neutrality in the structural equation model should also feature as statistically significant predictors controlling for socio-demographic and behavioural variables in the final OLS regression model. The null hypotheses in relation to Efficacy and Northern Ireland cannot be rejected in these models, whilst independence and patriotism are found to be significant positive predictors of support for Irish neutrality. The evidence in favour of anti-English sentiment as a predictor of support for neutrality confirms the hypotheses drawn from both the historical and political-realist literature on Irish neutrality.

Voting behaviours: Party and Nice Treaty

The results show that party voting behaviour does not predict attitudes to neutrality, corroborating Marsh’s 1992 findings that attitudes to neutrality were not strongly linked to party political affiliations and showing that the Irish case is not dissimilar to other cases of public opinion on foreign policy. The hypothesis that voting in favour of the Nice Treaty is linked to a rejection of Irish neutrality is supported by these findings, although the variable (along with anti-English sentiment) is statistically significant only at the .05 level compared to the other predictors that achieve significance at the .005 level.

Overall, the sizes of the significant coefficients in the model are quite small. The t-values show that of the statistically significant predictors: independence (-3.98) and gender (-3.81) have the largest magnitude, followed by age (-2.66), patriotism (2.63), the Nice Treaty vote behaviour (-2.50) and finally, anti-English sentiment (-2.39).

Conclusions

30% of the population exhibit highly intense salience and support attitudes, with 3% holding highly intense opposing attitudes (reject, not important). There is evidence of a gender gap in terms of attitude and concept of neutrality. An individual possessing any of the characteristics of favouring Ireland’s independence, being female, younger, proud of being Irish, less accepting of English people, and likely to have voted against the Nice Treaty, is more likely to be in favour of retaining Irish neutrality. Education, urban-rural home location, efficacy, attitudes to the Northern Ireland issue and partisanship do not have any relation with or effect on attitudes to Irish neutrality. The evidence that the values of independence and patriotism are positive predictors of support for Irish neutrality corroborates the results of the Structural Equation Model tested earlier.
The dynamics of Irish public opinion on foreign policy are not very different from those found in previous POFP studies in the USA in terms of the significance of gender and age and the lack of a relationship with location, education and partisanship. The importance of values in shaping foreign policy attitudes, and the theoretical rationality of the drivers of independence and patriotism coincide with the new themes and findings emerging from the new debate in POFP. Arguably, then, the Irish public shares as many ‘rational’ characteristics with other populations and should not be characterised as ‘singular’, ‘emotional’ or ‘non-rational’. The next chapter draws the overall conclusions of the thesis and considers future research.
Hollis and Smith acknowledge “the difference between understanding from the inside and explaining from the outside will seem to be pretty thin if beliefs and desires can appear in scientific explanations” (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 4), and this is particularly relevant and apparent in this thesis that examines quantified and empirical representations of beliefs in an effort to understand the structure of public opinion on Irish neutrality. The philosophical approach of this thesis rejects both forms of realism discussed by Hollis and Smith: the IR theory of Realism (with a big ‘R’) that calls for “the explanation of international behaviour in terms of national interests and without regard for the moral sentiments and hopes which nations profess or which observers may have in their hearts” and philosophical realism (with a small ‘r’) that is of the view that “whether a thing exists is a question about the world independent of questions about how we could know it or what statements concerning the thing mean” (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 10).

The thesis argues that Realism’s dominance in IR generally and in analyses of neutrality specifically, has erected epistemological barriers to understanding public opinion on neutrality because of the assumptions that neutrality is a product of the international structure and it cannot exist or be effected as a subject of values or desires of people within a state. Social constructivism is an IR theory or approach that opens up consideration of and legitimates a research programme permitting an opposing view. As Hollis and Smith point out “there is an affinity between Idealists, idealists and an interpretative approach, just as there is between Realists, realists and a scientific one. The other term is ‘positivism’….In International Relations…a further step is usually taken, in that ‘Positivism’ tends to be associated with quantitative analysis’ (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 11-12). Methodologically speaking, IR Realism is associated with positivism and behaviouralism, and in Chapter Six, the epistemology underpinning these approaches is shown to inhibit consideration of public opinion on neutrality and the meaning of Irish neutrality (i.e. a broader conception of neutrality beyond the balance-of-power, structural concept of military alliance non-membership). This acknowledged association of IR realism with positivism, behaviourism and quantitative analysis supports Jupille’s point that, while they are not usually recognised as such, disciplines and subfields, arguably, are metatheoretical” (Jupille, 2005: 211).

The philosophical premise of this thesis is that the metatheoretical association between quantitative analysis in the discipline of IR and Political Science with positivism and
behaviourism must be broken, and a pluralist paradigmatic approach to variable selection, hypothesis construction and model interpretation much be adopted to achieve a better understanding of public opinion on neutrality. The type of argument Carlsnaes makes, that “instead of this [Comparative Foreign Policy] epistemology we need an approach that posits agency as an analytical category in its own right, linking and mediating concrete actions and the structural properties – the institutional rules rather than behavioural regularities – of the larger sociopolitical domain” (Carlsnaes, 1992: 263), helps to demonstrate the newly-emerging acknowledgment of the epistemological inadequacy of the Realist behaviouralist approach to understanding a research subject such as public opinion on Irish neutrality. Deconstruction is the method employed to demonstrate the need to consider and empirically represent agency, and that freed Irish neutrality from the dominant ontological and epistemological (and institutional, elite-driven) constraints of Realism.

Jupille argues that although an ontologically and epistemologically post-positivist approach has rarely if ever been used with statistical methods, there is no logical incompatibility in their combined use, rather it is that “resource constraints, such as our willingness to invest time in learning new methods, come into play” (Jupille, 2005: 215). Jupille argues that the exceptions are unsurprising because “it is hard to conceive of work done within a post-positivist epistemology using statistical methods, since the latter rest squarely on the contested notion that observation and testing produce knowledge” (Jupille, 2005: 215-216). This is the crux of the problem that needs to be clarified.

To achieve this clarification, firstly, there is a need to continually emphasise the fact that using statistical methods to evaluate data on concepts does not render the concepts epistemologically incontestable (Jupille, 2005: 216); the second point that must be emphasised is that deconstructionists also produce ‘knowledge’ from their analyses and are not anti-empirical, as demonstrated by the conclusions of Chapter Three, “Poststructuralism is not, as critics have claimed, antiempirical” (Der Derian, 1997: 57). Deconstructionists occupying an ‘anti-essentialist’ position also acknowledge

44 Hollis and Smith also take issue with Carlsnaes and argue there are still two stories to tell because Carlsnaes’s “institutional perspective is really two perspectives. From one we see a world furnished with systems and individuals, each causally conditioning the other’s behaviour. From the other we seem to see a world of social agents whose interplay in normatively conditioned by established mutual expectations” (Hollis and Smith, 1994: 247) and disagree with his treatment of agents and structures as ontologically comparable. They contend this is due to his epistemology, in which they argue is interpretative. Ibid. Jabri and Chan’s riposte to Hollis and Smith’s contention that epistemology crucially affects ontology is “whose epistemology?” and comment on the unidimensional space of the heretofore dominant Realist paradigm in IR (Jabri and Chan, 1996: 109) and if ontology can indeed crucially affect epistemology, then “whose ontology?” (Ibid. They point out the epistemological difficulty of the relationship between the moral person and the moral state, if the state is often contested by national claims and national claims are based on contested views of culture. Hollis and Smith reply that every social theory needs an epistemology, that there is more than one epistemology, but do not offer what counts as reasons for believing one claim over another, they do not say which epistemology is ‘right’, instead they describe it as “a further and deeper question” (Hollis and Smith, 1996: 114). Finally, they reject the characterisation of disputes concerning ‘Explanation’ as epistemological and those that concern ‘Understanding’ as not.
that it is impossible to avoid essentialism completely, but that it must be used strategically, to avoid excluding important and valid aspects of a concept and thereby limiting policy and research. The important point here is that essentialism and difference are normally articulated together, and in this binary “can be restrictive, even obfuscating, in that it allows us to ignore or deny the differences within essentialism” (Fuss, 1989, xii) - i.e. as the government defines Irish neutrality “we are not members of NATO...if you are looking for an essential characteristic, that is it” (Cowen, 2003: 3 minutes) and realist academics posit, “the end of [neutrals’] status would be membership of a military alliance and the research proceeds from this assumption” (Doherty, 2002: 3). This essentialism excludes other relevant and important elements of the concept of Irish neutrality (in the context of understanding public opinion on neutrality) such as the characteristics of peace-promotion, non-aggression, the primacy of the UN and the confinement of state military activity to UN peacekeeping, not supporting ‘big powers’, not being involved in wars, maintaining a nuclear-free zone, and maintaining Ireland’s independence, identity and independent foreign policy decision-making (in the context of ‘big power’ pressure).

The issue post-positivists have with the analyses based on ‘positivist methods’, such as quantitative data analysis, is the exclusion of the truths of groups of people, different perspectives and important variables arising from the research of meta-theoretically unaware academics that use positivist methods. What this thesis argues is that it is not the methods in the case of public opinion on Irish neutrality that is the problem, but the unacknowledged IR theoretical assumptions of the academics that are brought to bear on the analysis and interpretation of data, and that exclude post-realist conceptions of neutrality, and the role of values in the conception of neutrality. This thesis cannot hope to include the perspective of every paradigm, but pushes the boundaries of the literature on neutrality and analyses of public opinion on neutrality by adopting a postrealist, pluralist perspective. The thesis has shown through deconstruction that IR theoretical assumptions are driving allegedly ‘objective’ analyses of Irish neutrality, and that the foundational truth claims of the researchers are held or supported due to the quantitative data forming empirical evidence in the analysis no more ‘objective’ and less ‘subjective’ because of the methods used.

Thirdly, it is the claims of positivist researchers that their findings are the sole, valid truthful answer to the research question that is of issue, and that they are not in any way theoretically mediated. The goal of many post-positivist researchers is to expose the gaps in the research, the limiting assumptions of researchers and the problems with the use of methods that obscures other no less important truths. Poststructuralists, for
example, investigate ‘the interrelationship of power and representational practices that elevate one truth over another, that legitimate and subject one identity against another, that make, in short, one discourse matter more than the next’ (Der Derian, 1997: 59). As a result of this emancipatory impulse, these researchers may be less likely to make extremely foundational, hegemonic truth claims that are implied to be free from theoretical biases.

Post-positivists are open to acknowledging their theoretical biases or paradigm dependency from the outset. Those using ‘positivist’ methods of quantitative analysis can also state their paradigm (for example, the research question of this thesis is approached from a post-realist perspective). Finally, many positivist academics differ from post-positivist ones in that they do not take into consideration the idea that knowledge equals power in their research or analyses. Many realist analyses of neutrality end with the conclusion that public support of neutrality is not ‘rational’ or ‘real’, it is emotional; the use of this language to explain public opinion on neutrality effectively undermines the credibility of neutrality and discredits public support of it. This is normatively questionable given the limited and biased nature of the research on Irish neutrality. The post-positivist emancipatory impulse seeks to dilute this power and to understand better why publics favour neutrality in ‘rational’ terms.

**Explaining or Understanding?**

For Hollis and Smith, “Understanding” means the use of interpretative methodological techniques and Explaining entails the use of statistical methodological techniques. The same methodological links are made with respect to ‘agency’ and ‘structure’:

“Broadly, accounts which treat agents as primitive will favour interpretative methods, while those that favour structural accounts will rely on overtly causal explanations” (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 396). However, this link between methodology and ‘explaining’ or ‘understanding’ and ‘structure’ or ‘agency’ is contested. As Wendt argues:

thinking about world politics from the perspective of actors – from the ‘inside’ – need not imply the abandonment of scientific or ‘explanatory’ inquiry and its methodological entailments….after all, the social psychologists who study social cognition have not eschewed science or causal explanation, despite their very deep concern with the production and effects of an ‘insiders’ view of the world…the characterization of one as Understanding and of the other as Explaining seems to be the legacy of positivist conceptions of explanation that forced students of social life into a choice between rigidly defined alternatives
– a choice that on a scientific realist view need not be made (Wendt, 1991: 391).

Wendt also recommends not making too much of the distinction between explanations from the inside and the outside because they address different sorts of questions: “to the extent that different questions call for different methods of enquiry, in other words, it is not the case, contrary to Hollis and Smith, that there are always two stories to tell (one inside, one outside). Sometimes one type of account makes more sense; sometimes another” (Wendt, 1991: 391).

The ontological status of the data analysis in chapters in the second half of the thesis reflects the middle ground identified by Georg Sørensen; as he puts it: “the most extreme metatheoretical positions in both positivist and postpositivist directions are less useful for our analytical purposes than those which try to find a middle ground…the middle ground can be found with respect to both epistemology and to ontology” (Sørensen, 1998: 87). Importantly though, in a related point, Hollis and Smith acknowledge “the difference between understanding from the inside and explaining from the outside will seem to be pretty thin if beliefs and desires can appear in scientific explanations” (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 4), and therefore it is not a question of ‘either/or’.

Sørensen argues that “it is relevant to note the constructive side of deconstructivism. The ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ seems to me to be a relevant element in dealing critically with any theory. In other words, deconstructing any theory can produce helpful insights” (Sørensen, 1998: 87). Wendt sees the contribution in terms of theory-building: “the connection between the two is not 1:1, and, as such we should not expect second order theory to entail first order conclusions. By constituting certain types of questions and answers as important or legitimate (or not), however, second order theory may open up (or close down) avenues for substantive theory and thereby exercise an important regulatory influence on the latter” (Wendt, 1991: 383). The result of the deconstruction has provided a theoretical basis from which to ontologically justify the modelling of values and beliefs of the Irish people in order to understand their attitudes to neutrality, which “is essentially the thrust of the agent-structure issue discussed” by Carlsnaes (Carlsnaes, 1992: 265).

The use of statistical methods to establish whether these values are drivers of public attitudes does not mean that the results are not mediated by a theoretical paradigm; in fact it is taken from the start that a nonrealist theory such as social constructivism is a
more satisfactory theoretical framework for understanding public opinion, including the dimension of patriotism underlying attitudes. The ontological status of the data analysis in these chapters is that the findings are theoretically-mediated; that although the factors are operationalised, they are still essentially-contested, and that other approaches such as feminist or cosmopolitan may find sufficient justification to include or exclude other factors, should the question of public opinion on Irish neutrality arise on those research agendas. The chapters in this thesis are evidence that “it seems quite plausible to suggest that many metatheoretical combinations are logically permissible, with some quite misunderstood and a good number grossly underexploited” (Jupille, 2005: 213). They support Sørensen’s argument that goes against Smith’s claim that there is an insurmountable gulf between positivist and post-positivist methodologies, that the “two cannot be combined together because they have mutually exclusive assumptions” (Sørensen, 1998: 86). They are the product of the view articulated by Carlsnaes, who does not “buy the concluding step of the central argument so eloquently defended by Hollis and Smith’s book (1990), to wit, that there are always two stories to tell, one from the inside (“understanding”) and one from the outside (“explanation”) and that the twain can never meet” (Carlsnaes, 1992: 267).

Identity in agent-structure debate and Wæver et al.’s societal security concept

In terms of theorising identity and considering whether domestic or international society dominates the determination of state identity and interest, which Wendt argues is an important one, “if we confine systemic theory to micro-economic analogies [e.g. game theory] in which identities and interests are necessarily exogenous to the system, we will never be able to theorize about such possibilities” (Wendt, 1992: 184). He argues “we need a kind of systemic theory informed by the holistic metaphors of sociology and social psychology, not one based on the in principle agnostic but de facto individualism of rational choice theory” (Wendt, 1992: 184); this “points towards a processual and cognitive systemic theory emphasizing the production of intersubjective understandings and expectations in terms of which conceptions of self and other are constituted” (Wendt, 1992: 184-185). He concludes with the need to separate structure/agency and levels of analysis talk: “we reserve levels of analysis talk for questions about what drives the behaviour of exogenously given actors, and agent-structure talk for questions about what constitutes the properties of those actors in the first place” (Wendt, 1992: 185). This is problematic because ‘questions about what drives behaviour of exogenously given actors’ may involve identity and therefore agency, a point which is said by Hollis and Smith to “connect directly to the long-running philosophical dispute about whether intentions, motives and reasons for
action are causes of action” (Hollis and Smith, 1994: 245), although they do not propose an answer to the question. Hollis and Smith reply by categorising Wendt as “taking the ‘Understanding’ side of the dispute between ‘Explaining’ and ‘Understanding’ (Hollis and Smith, 1992: 187) (Giddens is also defined as such) (Hollis and Smith, 1996: 113) and reject Wendt’s separation because “both levels involve questions about the nature of agency. The levels of analysis problem is not simply about how to explain behaviour, it is also unavoidably about what it means to be an actor” (Hollis and Smith, 1992: 188).

Ontological and epistemological problems are also present in Wæver et al.’s concept of societal security, which bears some relation to the notion of patriotism or national identity as societal identity in the model of drivers of support for neutrality. McSweeney criticizes the notion of societal identity as omitting how collective identity was constructed and articulated (McSweeney, 1996: 86). Because moral choices are involved in that process (McSweeney, 1996: 89) this is an important point given that Wæver et al. contend that “different societies have different vulnerabilities depending upon how their identity is constructed” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 124). “The referent objects in the society sector are whatever larger groups carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create a socially power argument that this “we” is threatened. Since we are talking about the societal sector, this “we” has to be threatened as to its identity” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 123). In this light, McSweeney raises legitimate ontological and epistemological questions of “who will judge what counts as the parameters of collective identity, and by what criteria must judgment be made?” (McSweeney, 1996: 88). McSweeney laments the fact that Wæver et al do not offer a way to arbitrate between competing identities (McSweeney, 1996: 88). In the event that sub-societal groups see things differently from the majority (McSweeney, 1996: 89), he concludes that society is a technical term, defined not as a human process but as a reality transcending the individuals who belong to it (McSweeney, 1996: 92). Buzan and Wæver reject McSweeney’s call for the process of identity formation as the reality that needs explication as an ineffective approach for security studies (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 224). Instead they “are interested in all action that fulfils the criteria of being a security speech act (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 245). Although they state that “one can chose to place the analytical emphasis on either end of the [constructed and deconstructionist] spectrum” (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 243), this ontological basis of their concept (the speech act) has been demonstrated as epistemologically questionable by Lene Hansen with respect to the security of sub-groups (raped women) in Pakistan (Hansen, 2000).
In their securitization perspective, identity is not a ‘value’ (i.e. the individual’s), it is an intersubjectively constituted social factor” (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 245).

However, in this case of public opinion on Irish neutrality, arguably, “the identity represents a value which can be threatened and secured” (McSweeney, 1998: 138).

Another issue arising from this debate pertinent to this case is that “identity cannot be read just from polls” (McSweeney, 1996: 89), to which Wæver et al agree (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 247), but that is the representation of national identity or patriotism operationalised in the models in the second half of the thesis. McSweeney appears to argue that this empirical basis takes away agency, and the ability of identity to change, but this is another example of the association of ontological realism with the methodology of quantitative analysis; the concept as it is used and analysed in the models is not rendered epistemologically incontestable. Arguably then, this approach satisfies McSweeney’s urging to “not to take it for granted as an unproblematic, objective fact and to examine its implications for conflict or security on that assumption” (McSweeney, 1998: 138).

It is difficult to find links between patriotism as a driver of Irish neutrality and the Wæver concept of societal security as they relate it to forms of threats because it offers cases such as minorities of ‘foreigners’ mixing into Finland (having an identity based on separateness) as problematic; national identity tied to cultural habits is threatened by a global brand such as McDonalds, language as a variable means that France is threatened by the spread of English; and finally existing national identity vulnerable to a ‘reassertion of racial and cultural distinctiveness’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 124-125). These notions are predicated on a unitary national identity being under threat from ‘within’ the state on various grounds from cultural and linguistic to foreign-ness. The most relevant case or scenario that Wæver et al might propose from this thesis is the ‘imposition’ of a European Union foreign policy or a military alliance that might negate the values and foreign policy properties of Irish neutrality, as held by the public. The analysis of such scenario is different depending on the IR paradigm used to look at it e.g. critical social constructivism, neorealism, conventional social constructivism or neoliberalism.

**Politics of the discipline and the research question**

Thus, the central argument of this thesis is that one cannot answer the questions of “what are public attitudes to Irish neutrality”, and “are they rationally structured”, without addressing the question “what is neutrality” and without taking the postmodernist, poststructuralist critique into account. There is a lot of “politics” involved in answering these questions that come from the disciplines and sub-
disciplines this question is a part of, specifically, Political Science, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Analysis, International Relations, International Relations Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis.

This is a postmodern thesis within the parameters of the subdiscipline of political psychology listed by Parker, in which ‘postmodernists’ are defined “as combining constructivism and deconstruction” (Parker, 1992: 88). Although this type of approach is classified as ‘marginal’, this thesis is incontrovertible evidence of Parker’s observation that “Social scientists could benefit from the attention of ‘postmodernists’ to the value base of data (Parker, 1992: 88). Parker argues that when postmodern ideas are employed in social and political psychology, they should be used critically. The aim should not be to improve the discipline, but to continue to fan the flames of a crisis in social and political psychology so that there will always be room for manoeuvre (Parker, 1992: 94). This thesis has sought to capitalise on and to expand that room for manoeuvre, in order to provide a critical, metatheoretical, IR theoretical and empirical study of public opinion and Irish neutrality.

This is also a Political Science and International Relations thesis, but one that challenges the mainstream foundations of those disciplines using postmodernism and poststructuralism. This study challenges the IR theory realist mainstream view that International Relations and domestic politics are fundamentally different, and the notion that “domestic politics is relegated to study in other disciplines, for example, domestic politics to political science” (Kubálková, 2001: 73). It challenges the associated realist assumption that ‘the domestic’ is less of a determinant of international relations and foreign policy than ‘the state’, as it has emphasised the role of public opinion in the maintenance of neutrality (recently backed up by Jesse) (2006: 23), that is in turn driven by national identity and the desire for independence (also iterated by Jesse) (2006: 23, 25). In the circumstances of significant realist opposition at the level of the Irish and EU elite that favour a military alliance alternative to neutrality, this study argues that the mainstream behaviouralist, policy-oriented understanding of public opinion on foreign policy that is based on the positivist/realist ontology should not dominate the discipline at the expense of political cognition, defined by McGraw as “a metatheoretical approach guiding research on basic substantive problems that are among the enduring concerns of political science” (McGraw, 2000: 807).

Furthermore, this thesis argues that the distinction between the “instrumental functions of attitudes (based on the direct costs and benefits of the attitude object to the
individual) from the symbolic (or “value-expressive”) function (when the attitude becomes a means for expressing values and social identity; see Herek, 1986; Prentice, 1987)” (Sears, 1993: 119) should not constitute a violent hierarchy undermining the latter. It objects to this behaviouralist, realist policy-oriented characterisation of attitudes to Irish neutrality as ‘symbolic’ that is associated with aspiration, a lack of policy prescription (Sinnott, 1996), rhetoric (Marsh, 1992: 12), allegations of the ambiguous nature of Irish neutrality (Marsh, 1992: 10), and subjugated to the “empirical” (Marsh, 1992: 13); it reverses the hierarchy of these binaries through the employment of the alternative theoretical tradition of social constructivism and the consideration of alternative ‘active’ concepts of neutrality.

The thesis argues for an awareness of the range of concepts of the phenomenon that is the subject of public attitude research, and argues this variability needs to be more keenly integrated into approach to the study of POFP. It also argues for the acknowledgement of the impact of the narrow realist interpretation of neutrality and public foreign policy attitudes that effectively denies the ontological possibility of significant empirical evidence of public ownership and support of neutrality. It exposes the need to re-conceive of language to capture the importance and power of cognition and values in the POFP literature and the discipline of Political Science generally to reflect a level of status currently accorded to realism and the rational choice costs and benefits approach.

The thesis can be read as an introduction to the application of poststructuralism in the analysis of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy and demonstrates the value of engaging in poststructuralism as a complementary research strategy. Carlsnaes has pointed out that “In the past two to three decades, there has been a strong structuralist-systemic stamp on IR, and hence also an effective damper on approaches such as foreign policy analysis concerned with the importance of unit-level factors and actors for understanding and explaining state behaviour” (Carlsnaes, 2006: 332). Neutrality has mainly been analysed within the classic school of international relations; a discipline that explicitly ignores mass public opinion and behaviour because it realized it did not have the theoretical tools to handle the mass of a state’s people in any analysis of inter-state behaviour (Bloom, 1990: 3). The problem, then, is that this paradigm has shaped a concept of neutrality and presented it as the true concept, but it is a concept that is incompatible and inconsistent with a study of public attitudes toward neutrality. It is only a ‘truth’ within the realist paradigm; the classical IR concept of neutrality cannot be easily slotted into a study of mass attitudes on the concept.
The poststructuralist approach in this thesis has exposed the dominance of neorealist discourse on neutrality in Ireland, with comparatively little attention accorded to social constructivist theses that provide a better framework for understanding and explaining public attitudes to Irish neutrality. It has demonstrated that the POFP literature needs to be less realist in the selection of variables to specify and model public attitudes to foreign policy, to employ social constructivist variables such as identity as much as it considers security policy, threat perception and efficacy. The use of poststructuralist deconstruction has drawn attention to the importance of levels of analysis in the FPA and POFP literature and shown how (neo)realist assumptions have underpinned the dominant elite discourses on Irish neutrality, that in turn have had serious implications for arguments over the “rationality” of public opinion on Irish neutrality.

The poststructuralist approach has ensured that the variables put forward in the literature have been considered with a critical perspective. It has helped to expose and emphasise the fact that many of the variables said to be related to neutrality and the characterizations of neutrality that are offered in the literature are derived from the paradigm the author of the text inhabits. Thus, the internal logic and theory of these literatures are not sole, objective ‘truths’ but functions of (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism, (critical) social constructivism and other types of IR approaches and paradigms. The poststructuralist approach has been used to demonstrate, with several detailed examples provided, how the concept of neutrality is essentially contested. Showing that neutrality is an essentially contested concept has also helped to demonstrate that the concept of neutrality held by an individual can be a key variable in explanations of an attitude to it.

**Are public attitudes to Irish neutrality ‘rationally’ structured?**

The sum total of the work in the first half of the thesis contributes to the argument that the interpretation of what constitutes a “rational public” cannot be separated from the IR theoretical and meta-theoretical worldview of the academic. Chapter Six showed how the hypothesis that public support for Irish neutrality is non-rational is based on an understanding and interpretation of neutrality in terms of the realist paradigm and the associated post-Cold War security policy dictates, specifically, the desire to have an EU military alliance to complement or substitute the NATO alliance. The employment of a nonrealist paradigm such as critical social constructivism conceives of support for neutrality as rational, based on an understanding of neutrality as an identity provider and embodiment of independence for the state’s people. Chapter Seven also argued that public opinion is more easily understood as rational when it is
examined at the level of cognitive orientations and values, as this is a better theoretical source of links to foreign policy postures such as neutrality.

The evaluation of the rational public hypothesis expects consistency in the meaning of neutrality as a signifier of stability in attitude (Gilland, 2001: 151); presence of a structure of beliefs underlying opinion (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 36); more than one dimension as a signifier of stability in attitude (Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, 2001: 54); that the dimensions tying foreign policy attitudes together into structures are specific to the foreign policy domain (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1101 1114) (Sulfaro, 1996: 306); that they should cohere to IR theory (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 515; Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron, 2004: 291) and finally, that controlling for socio-demographic and behavioural variables should compare favourably to the expectations from other cases of analysis. The failure on these criteria of the rational public concept means that the hypothesis is falsified. The summary table below shows the findings of the second half of the thesis that answered this question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 9.1 Summary Table of Rational Public hypothesis tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency in concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or more dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR theory coherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative coherence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As this thesis is the first thesis-length study of public attitudes to Irish neutrality, the structural equation model in Chapter Seven is evaluating the various IR, FPA, POFP, and Irish history/politics literatures’ hypotheses as much as it is part of a substantive report on the phenomenon of public opinion on Irish neutrality. The model of public attitudes to Irish neutrality in Chapter Seven focused on the cognitive level using structural equation models, and models in Chapter Eight went on to incorporate the standard behavioural and socio-demographic independent variables found in the public opinion and foreign policy literature in an Ordinary Least Squares regression. The results of the latter showed that the dynamics of Irish public attitudes to neutrality matched those of other cases of public opinion and foreign policy and Marsh’s
previous study of public opinion and Irish neutrality, as there was evidence of a small
gender gap and a small age effect, with no evidence supporting a relationship with
education, urban-rural home location or party affiliation. The two values that best
predicted public attitudes to Irish neutrality were patriotism and independence. In
favour of the Irish history and politics literature hypotheses, anti-English sentiment
was a small but statistically significant factor in support for neutrality. Thus, it is
argued that Irish public support for Irish neutrality is ‘rational’ in view of the presence
of two structural dimensions relating to the foreign policy domain and the social
constructivist IR theory paradigm underpinning attitudes, the results broadly
corroborate the historical hypotheses of the dynamics of Irish neutrality and the
characteristics of public opinion on neutrality compare well in terms of socio-
demographic and behavioural factors in respect of the international/US public opinion
and foreign policy dynamics.

Most public opinion and foreign policy analyses end with a comment on the role of
public opinion in foreign policy formulation: to echo Holsti’s assessment of US data,
this analysis cannot give rise to timeless prescriptions about such complex and
enduring issues such as the proper role of public opinion in the formulation and
implementation of Irish foreign policy (Holsti, 1996: 215). What can be said is that
there is some evidence that the public has an orienting set of values that it can use to
arrive at reasonable policy preferences without an extensive informational base (Page
and Shapiro, 1992: 385). Given that the values of identity and independence are
reasonably stable, policy preferences may change in understandable, predictable ways.

New Perspectives and Further Research
These concluding paragraphs will argue how the chosen approach to the research
question has opened for a new perspective on IR and FPA scholarly questions, and
also has enabled novel answers to these scholarly concerns. It will demonstrate the
added value of the approach in terms of the implications for other research and the
future research agenda it generates.

This thesis fits into what Carlsnaes regards as the “attempt to reconstruct the
parameters of action in favour of the notion of contingency i.e. granting decision-
makers more autonomy than the above – essentially deterministic – conception of
socialised agents allows for …a metatheoretical choice that retains the notion of
‘interpretative individuals but takes the ontological step from collectivism to
individualism. This is conceivably the current mainstream approach within foreign
policy analysis…the biggest impact within this approach has probably been the
adoption of various cognitive and psychological theories for explaining foreign policy
behaviour” (1992: 253). “The cognitivists, especially in Foreign Policy Analysis
(FPA), are told that their studies…are a coherent constructivist approach (ISA Panel
empirically to these developments in FPA and IR. For other approaches, it may also
constitute an empirical ingredient in the construction of the theory of “value-rational”
action discussed by Hollis and Smith, “where the goal is so dominant for the actor that
it drives out all calculation or concern for consequences” (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 77).

Dessler asks the following regarding the contribution of constructivism to FPA and
IR: “would constructivists introduce new methods and new epistemological standards
to empirical enquiry? Would they ask new questions? Was their purpose primarily to
turn our attention to long-ignored causal factors and effects in world politics? Or was
it to show that the study of these phenomena required new forms of theoretical and
historical analysis?” (Dessler, 1999: 123). He considers that “only in the last few
years have constructivists carried out the substantive work necessary to answer these
fundamental questions” (Dessler, 1999: 123). This thesis contributes to the
substantive work as follows: this thesis has demonstrated that the alleged
incompatibility of using positivist and postpositivist methods combined on the basis of
epiphenomenological and ontological difficulties is false. The fact that neither Hollis and
Smith, or Buzan and Wæver, or indeed, any of their critics have adjudicated as to
‘whose epistemology’ or ‘whose ontology’ is the most useful basis for considering
research questions and employing methodologies means that occupying the middle
ground is not less a legitimate space to occupy. Furthermore, occupying this ground
allows the deconstruction of ‘standard’ and commonly accepted research questions
and their approaches in order to consider a wider set of theoretical variables in
understanding the cognitive dynamics of publics and to theorise their role in foreign
policy. A refusal to be pigeon-holed into ‘Understanding’ or ‘Explaining’ and the
ontological, methodological and methodological associations that can be interpreted as
strictures is a demonstrably healthy one considering the new approach to
understanding public opinion on Irish neutrality evident in this thesis.

To occupy this position with respect to understanding the dynamics of other people’s
attitudes to foreign policy at the cognitive level invites a research agenda that has the
deconstruction of past questionnaires as a priority. A Vasquez-type analysis to
establish the extent of power politics assumptions underpinning US and European
analyses of public opinion on foreign policy is welcomed.
The softening of the link between statistical methods and law-generation maintained by Hollis and Smith has been achieved; a less essentialised, more contested interpretation of the models is achieved by mediating interpretation through IR theoretical paradigms. This means that formerly ‘positivist’ associated methods can legitimately be used in the fields of FPA and IR with a post-positivist ontology and qualified foundational epistemology. This can also have the effect of bringing values and beliefs closer to the centre-stage of IR and FPA theorising to satisfaction of both positivists and poststructuralists, as they can, on the one hand, be considered empirically and contribute to theory-building and on the other hand, also take into account of marginalised groups, societies and individuals – the latter points is demonstrated by the success of this approach in undermining of the marginalisation and discreditation of public opinion on neutrality through the application of labels such as ‘non-rational’, ‘emotional’ and confused, and the prioritisation of realist elites at the level of discourse as the body politic that is ‘rational’ on the question of Irish neutrality.

In terms of generalising to other cases, it is possible to understand the positions and discourses on neutrality through an IR theory-pluralist deconstructionist approach; and to use a theoretically-mediated conceptual framework to understand public and elite concepts of neutrality in Europe. The deconstruction might suggest identity as a key variable for other national populations in their support of neutrality, or indeed point to fragmented identities driven by different values underpinning a spectrum of attitudes to neutrality. Such fragmentation can be captured and represented through structural equation models, with the multiple indicator foundations of latent variables.

The reply to Dessler speaks in the affirmative to the spectrum of IR approaches alluded to in his questions: yes, new questions have been asked, operationalised and tested (identity); yes, attention has been turned to long-ignored causal factors and effects in foreign policy and world politics; and yes, it has also been show that the study of these phenomena required new combinations of metatheoretical methodological analyses.

In terms of contributions to the literature on the rational public, a new case-study of Ireland has been added and the study of the variable of IR theory has been pushed forward through the employment of deconstruction prior to model formulation. In terms of the policy understanding public opinion on Irish neutrality, there is evidence that demonstrates the divergence of government and public concepts of neutrality, and
this is no less a finding to take away from this thesis as the scholarly concerns articulated above.

The strength of the independence and identity factors in the structural equation model in Chapter Seven relative to the factors of efficacy, ethnocentrism and Northern Ireland, suggests the need to consider post-colonial theory and identity theory in attempts to understand the core values driving foreign policy attitudes. The basic theoretical premise that “an understanding of ‘who we are’ plays into the understanding of ‘what it is we do’” in the realm of foreign policy (Hudson, 2005: 19), together with the empirical evidence in support of the notion that “neutralité has a role as an identity provider for the population” (Goetschel, 1999: 121) are catalysts for further theoretical investigations into the role of national identity (Bloom, 1990: 79) and patriotism (Bloom, 1990: 121) in foreign policy analysis and international relations. This work would be complemented by an empirical investigation into the strength of these factors in models of public opinion in other European neutral states.

Finally, with respect to public attitudes to neutrality, there is a need to capture and test other foreign policy value dimensions that may have a bearing, such as cosmopolitanism and liberalism, questions relating to the futility of force, attitudes to alliances, etc, which serve as norms of justifying neutrality, constituting a type of militarism – non-militarism dimension.
APPENDIX A: OVERALL OPINION OF UK (THROUGH IRISH EYES)

Figure 2: ‘Now using the categories on the card, please tell me how favourable or unfavourable your overall opinion or impression of each country is. Take into account any of the things that you think are important. Remember it is your overall opinion or impression that we are interested in.’

APPENDIX A: CLOSE TO ENGLISH PEOPLE (ISPAS 2001/2002, Q. d8_1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How close you would allow-English</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cum.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>marry or welcome as members of family</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>64.52</td>
<td>64.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have as close friends</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>15.13</td>
<td>79.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have as next-door neighbour</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>86.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work in the same work-place</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>91.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>welcome as Irish citizens</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>94.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have as visitors only</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>99.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debar or deport from Ireland</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: SCHOLAR GOOGLE COUNT - “MCSWEENEY 1985 CASE FOR ACTIVE IRISH NEUTRALITY”

APPENDIX B: GOOGLE SCHOLAR COUNT – “MCSWEENEY 1985 IRISH NEUTRALITY”
APPENDIX C: GOOGLE SCHOLAR ADVANCED SEARCH – ARTICLES
“IRISH NEUTRALITY/BILL McSWEENY”

The European Neutrals and the European Community

Since the first application to join the EC in 1961, Irish neutrality has been made contingent upon its preventing no obstacle to the main-racing of economic...

Neutrality, European Community and World Peace: The Case of Austria


On the Obsolescence of Just War and Military Neutrality

JM Shelly - Peace Review, 2001 - Taylor & Francis

Cited by: 1 - Related Articles - Web Search
### APPENDIX D: ISPAS QUESTION A6 WHAT IS NEUTRALITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>no definition/no opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>means nothing/not much/nonsense/irrelevant/can't be neutral/doesn't exist/we are not neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>being neutral (in war)/staying neutral/remain neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>fence-sitting/immoral/avoiding responsibility/cowardice/doing nothing/spectate/stand back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>good thing/positive thing/like it/agree/Ireland should stay neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>no war/not involved in wars/not involved in conflict with countries/not drawn into wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>not supporting British action/not fighting alongside British troops/Britain mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>independence/make our own decisions/sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>not involved in other countries' wars/foreign or international conflicts/not going to war with other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>not supporting/not involved with/staying apart from Big Powers/Super powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Irish identity/proud of Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>no involvement in NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>non-aggression/not attacking someone else/don't declare war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>promote peace/being peaceful/having peace/stay peaceful/peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>UN mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>limits Ireland/army to peacekeeping/peacekeeping only/maintain peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>mediator in conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>EU membership mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>no involvement in a defence alliance/not being committed in advance/no prior commitment to war/not being allied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>important/means a lot to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>small/size mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>having no enemies/not coming under attack/free from war exempt (absolved) from war/no war/gives us protection/staying safe/feeling secure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>defending Ireland/(only)/protecting Ireland/not enter war unless attacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>children not sent to fight war/no conscription/don't want conscription or children to fight in wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>not supporting the US/US mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Northern Ireland mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>voice/have a say/Ireland's view point/stance/vocal about conflicts/Ireland should ask questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Ireland on its own/standing on own feet/taking care of Ireland/looking after our own interests/keeping to ourselves/minding our own business/not getting involved in other countries' affairs/isolation/n-alignment/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>specific war/incident mentioned/no planes refuelling here (at Shannon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>disagree with it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>confused/don't understand/can't explain/don't know enough/not really sure/hard to know what it means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>don't know/who</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>don't care/not interested/not important/doesn't affect me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>never/rarely think about it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>some exceptions mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>no nuclear weapons arms/bases in Ireland/keep our ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>unifying the country/presenting a united front/keeping peace in Ireland/staying peaceful/something to keep the country quiet/keep Ireland as one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>equality with other nations/everyone is the same/all people treated equally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>military neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>no side taken (in war)/non-partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>neutrality is difficult now/not possible now/invalid concept in modern age/gone now/historic neutrality only/doesn't mean as much as it used to mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>should join NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>not being part of an EU army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>a balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>involved in war/taking sides/with allies/we are a warring nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>should be involved in war/should get involved when needed/must do our bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>need to look up code/got cut off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>the right to decide whether to go to war/ability to make our own decisions as regards war/not forced (obliged) to go to war/not dragged into war/having control over army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>can't code, doesn't make sense, ambiguous</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Appendix E: rank order of codes by attitude to neutrality (q7a) where 0=retain, 10=reject

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code no.</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Population %</th>
<th>Mean q7a</th>
<th>Std dev q7a</th>
<th>Mean q7b</th>
<th>Std dev q7b</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Peaceful/promoting peace</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>2.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mediator in conflicts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Important/means a lot</td>
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<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>2.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Free from war/no enemies</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>No conscription/children not sent to war</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>8.14</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Not sup Big Power</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Not in EU army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Never/rarely think about it</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
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<td>Defending Ireland/no war unless attacked</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Unifying Ireland/presenting a united front</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>2.30</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Good thing</td>
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<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>2.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>UN involvement (only)</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Non-aggression</td>
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<td>2.33</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>2.49</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ireland's voice/stance on conflicts</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.95</td>
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<td>2.43</td>
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<td>3.01</td>
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<td>7.15</td>
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<td>Being neutral</td>
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<td>2.57</td>
<td>7.00</td>
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<td>Not involved in other countries war</td>
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<td>2.64</td>
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<td>(UN) peacekeeping only</td>
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<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>2.83</td>
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<td>2.84</td>
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<td>2.79</td>
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<td>Independence/make own decision</td>
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<td>3.11</td>
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<td>2.86</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>2.61</td>
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<td>Ireland standing on its own/minding own business</td>
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<td>2.62</td>
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<td>The right to decide to go to war or not</td>
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<td>3.73</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>2.36</td>
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<td>3.95</td>
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<td>2.94</td>
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<td>2.89</td>
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<td>6.64</td>
<td>2.51</td>
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<td>Some exceptions mentioned</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2.97</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>3.85</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Specific incident/war mentioned/US planes refuelling</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>6.92</td>
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<td>4.55</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>4.91</td>
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<td>3.61</td>
<td>7.56</td>
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<td>5.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Don’t care/not interested</td>
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<td>5.15</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.17</td>
<td>2.52</td>
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<td>Equality among nations/people</td>
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<td>6.75</td>
<td>2.36</td>
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<td>Disagree with it</td>
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<td>6.60</td>
<td>2.20</td>
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<td>Fence-sitting</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<td>3.07</td>
<td>6.53</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
## Appendix F: rank order of codes by salience of neutrality (q7b) where 0=not at all salient, 10=very salient

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Code no.</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>n =</th>
<th>Population %</th>
<th>Mean q7a</th>
<th>Std dev q7a</th>
<th>Mean q7b</th>
<th>Std dev q7b</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>no conscription/children not sent to war</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>8.14</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Important/means a lot</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>2.34</td>
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<td>Mediator in conflicts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>2.45</td>
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<td>Not in EU army</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Free from war/no enemies</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Defending Ireland/no war unless attacked</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Peaceful/promoting peace</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>2.72</td>
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<td>No NATO involvement</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>independence/make own decision</td>
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<td>3.11</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>2.27</td>
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<td>not sup Big Power</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>2.07</td>
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<td>Good thing</td>
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<td>2.80</td>
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<tr>
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<td>not involved in other countries war</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>2.64</td>
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<td>not supporting the US/US mentioned</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>no war/not involved in war</td>
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<td>14.7</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Unifying Ireland/presenting a united front</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>7.09</td>
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<td>3.21</td>
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<td>being neutral</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>7.00</td>
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<td>the right to decide to go to war or not</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.73</td>
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<td>6.98</td>
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<td>Non-aggression</td>
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<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>(UN) peacekeeping only</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Need to look up/sentence cut off</td>
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<td>9.0</td>
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<td>2.86</td>
<td>6.95</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Not involved in a defence alliance</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>2.47</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>3.14</td>
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<td>No side taken in war/non-partisan</td>
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<td>3.64</td>
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<td>2.78</td>
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<td>5.40</td>
<td>3.14</td>
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<td>2.44</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>2.61</td>
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<td>5.07</td>
<td>2.79</td>
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### APPENDIX G: DISTRIBUTION: NEUTRALITY ATTITUDE BY SALIENCE

#### DISTRIBUTION Table: Attitude to neutrality by salience of neutrality

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<th>Retain</th>
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<th>Very Important</th>
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<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
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<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
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<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.6%</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
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<td>0.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
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APPENDIX H: POST-ESTIMATION TESTS OF OLS REGRESSION

Test for multicollinearity

This test requires a check for correlation between the independent variables of the model. Other than age and education which are weakly correlated with a score of .36, (the younger the individual, the higher the level of education) none of the independent variables are strongly correlated with each other, meaning they are not measuring the same thing, satisfying one of the assumptions of OLS. Education does have associations with independence and anti-English sentiment, but they are not strong enough to be of concern.

It is also possible to check the independent variables using the test for variance inflation. A variable with ‘vif’ value of more than 10 would be suspect: all were around 1.0. None the variables could be considered a linear combination of other independent variables.
Variable | VIF | 1/VIF
----------|-----|------
_Ia15_9  | 1.32| 0.758830
_f4b_    | 1.30| 0.769235
_Ia15_2  | 1.26| 0.793384
_f2yr_   | 1.24| 0.804128
_Ia15_10 | 1.14| 0.874184
_Ia15_6  | 1.13| 0.883878
_Ia15_4  | 1.13| 0.886981
_Ia15_3  | 1.13| 0.888412
_a5_4_   | 1.12| 0.894794
_a16_    | 1.12| 0.896454
_q6_1_   | 1.11| 0.898326
_a9_4_   | 1.11| 0.902489
_e21_    | 1.10| 0.909752
_Ia15_8  | 1.09| 0.917927
_d2_     | 1.07| 0.935193
_d8_1_   | 1.07| 0.935194
_Ia15_5  | 1.06| 0.940924
_f1_     | 1.06| 0.946120
_Ia15_7  | 1.03| 0.971029

Mean VIF | 1.14

**Examination of fitted values**

The examination of the fitted values shows that they follow a normal distribution, (despite the skew in the dependent variable) which means that an important assumption of the OLS model is satisfied and the t-test results of the model are valid.

**Examination of residuals – test for normality**

Shown here on a normal probability plot, the residuals look normal, following the straight line, fulfilling another assumption.
Looking at the normal probability plot for individual predictor variables, the noise looks independent as the data is close to the line and spread out along the line. The plots for the other variables clustered close to the line and were spread out along the line too.

**Outliers**

There were two outliers in the data, i.e. two cases of age signalled a respondent was aged 12 and another was 100. Outliers were replaced as missing values. Overall the pattern seemed uniform and relatively linear. The same could be said for the other variables.
Test for heteroskedasticity
This tests the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous. The p-value indicates that it is not necessary to reject the hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that the variance is not homogenous. If the p-value were small, the hypothesis would have to be rejected, but it is not significant.

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of q7a

chi2(1) = 1.66
Prob > chi2 = 0.1983

Model Specification
It is possible that the model is missing some important variables. The linktest and ovtest are tools available in Stata to look for model specification errors. Both tests indicate that the model is not missing variables looking at the significance of _hatsq measure and the significance of the p-value respectively.

| q7a | Coef. | Std. Err. | t    | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----|-------|-----------|------|------|----------------------|
| _hat | .5318274 | .7143664 | 0.74 | 0.457 | -.8703474 to 1.934002 |
| _hatsq | .0638989 | .0963496 | 0.66 | 0.507 | -.1252182 to .253016 |
| _cons | .8154854 | 1.294439 | 0.63 | 0.529 | -1.725269 to 3.35624 |

Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of q7a
Ho: model has no omitted variables
F(3, 811) = 0.38
Prob > F = 0.7686
APPENDIX I: SINGLE INDICATOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL

Unstandardized estimates
chi-square=453.140 df=107 p-value=.000
rmsea=.042 pclose=1.000
### APPENDIX J: SINGLE INDICATOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE
### STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL REGRESSION WEIGHTS

#### Table J.1 Single Indicator Model Latent Variable Regression Weights

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<th>Ethnocentrism</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Patriotism</th>
<th>Efficacy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.259</td>
<td>.226</td>
<td>-1.143</td>
<td>.253</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>6.848***</td>
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#### Table J.2 Single Indicator Latent Variable Standardised Regression

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301
### APPENDIX K: SAMPLE CORRELATIONS USED IN THE STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL

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<th>a9_2</th>
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